12.08.2026 Court No.13 Item No.40 AP MAT 556 of 2018 The Board of Governors, Ghani Khan Choudhury Institute of Engineering & Technology & Ors. Vs. Md. Noor Alam & Anr. Mr. Sarwar Jahan Ms. Mousumi Mitra Mr. Gourav Das Mr. Sayantan Hazra Ms. Shalini Sen Ms. Sahina Parvin Mr. Aritra Ranjan Dutta Roy … For the Appellants. Mr. Sabir Ahmed Mr. S. Sarkar Mr. Dhiman Banerjee Mr. Quazi Ezaz Ahmed Mr. Ayaan Bhattacharyya … For the Writ Petitioner/Respondent. 1. The subject appeal is directed against a judgement and/or order dated 7th June, 2018 passed by a Single Bench of this Court. By the said judgement the Single Bench set aside an order dated 10th November, 2017 passed by the appellants terminating the service of the writ petitioner/respondent with due notice. 2. Mr. Jahan, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the impugned order of termination was actuated on two grounds. Firstly, suppression of sections under which the writ petitioner/respondent was charged with in the FIR in two several criminal cases and secondly, non-disclosure of the fact that the charge sheets have been filed in both cases against him. The fact that factual charge sheets having been filed was discovered by the appellants in a Police Verification Report (PVR), which 2 mentioned the same. The report was therefore obviously adverse. Hence, the writ petitioner/ respondent, who was a probationer, was terminated simpliciter from service without any stigma. The Single Bench, therefore, fell in error in setting aside the order of termination and hence, the instant appeal. 3. Per contra, Mr. Ahmed, learned counsel for the writ petitioner/respondent has referred to the case of Deb Halder Vs. Union of India and Ors., whose writ petition being WPA 31413 (W) of 2017 was preceding that of respondent herein. The Single Bench in the order dated 3rd September, 2018 allowing the said writ petition in the case of Deb Halder found that the order of termination was not passed merely for the pendency of the criminal cases on any suppression in the Attestation Form but also mentioned that he had misconducted himself on account of unauthorized absence and unauthorized involvement of a tender process. In an appeal filed by the employer a Division Bench went on to record additional grounds, which must have found place in the order of termination, that during the period of probationary service as Superintendent, Deb Halder committed further acts and omissions in recruiting personnel without having qualifications. 4. The Single Bench in the said order dated 3rd September, 2018, therefore, rightly found that the termination of Deb Halder was stigmatic and set aside the same for being violative of Article 311 of the Constitution 3 of India. A stigmatic termination is ex facie illegal and must and ought to have been passed after due departmental enquiry into such stigmatic allegations. A Division Bench of this Court vide judgement dated 28th January, 2026 passed in FMA 2046 of 2018 (The Board of Governors and Ors. Vs. Deb Halder) confirmed the order of the Single Bench and a SLP carried by the appellant/institute to the Supreme Court was dismissed by a detailed judgement dated 27th July, 2026 passed in SLP (C) No.8806 of 2026. The Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to several earlier decisions on the subject namely Director (Production), Heavy Engineering Corporation and Ors. Vs. Jagannath Prasad reported in 1995 Supp (4) SCC 699; Samsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Anr. reported in (1974) 2 SCC 831; Dipti Prakash Banerjee Vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Ors. reported in (1999) 3 SCC 60 and Pavanendra Narayan Verma Vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences and Anr. reported in (2002) 1 SCC 520. Both the views of the Single Bench and Division Bench of this Court that a termination order containing stigmatic findings is ex facie illegal in the absence of a disciplinary enquiry against such employee has been affirmed by the Supreme Court. 5. In the instant case, however, the order of termination dated 10th November, 2017 is as follows:- “Office Order The Board of Governors (BoG) of GKCIET, Malda, West Bengal in its 11th meeting, held on various 4 agendas, held on 07.11.2017 in Ministry of Human Resource Development, Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi, while taking decision regarding confirmation of service of staff of the institution on completition of probation, inter-alia decided not to confirm service of Md. Noor Alam, Data Operator due to adverse police Verification Report. The Board of Governors further decided to terminate probationary service of Md. Noor Alam with immediate effect for the reasons recorded in the said resolution which are reproduced here in below:- “…It is noted that Md. Noor Alam, Data Operator, has been charge sheeted in police cases (Kaliachak P.S. Case No.195/08 dated 20.05.2008 and C.S. No.287/08 dated 20.05.2008 & Kaliachak P.S. Case No.196/08 dated 20.05.2008 and C.S. No.265(A)/08 dated 30.08.2008), which predates his joining at GKCIET. It is clear that he did not have a favourable PVR at the time of offer his employment. Since favourable PVR is a must for any Govt./quasi govt. employment and in light of the fact Md. Noor Alam suppressed this information at the time of seeking initial employment, there was a willful suppression of facts by him. Thus his probation cannot be confirmed. Hence his probationary service will be terminated with immediate effect which will be effective from the date of issue of the termination letter (with one month’s salary in lieu of one month notice). Accordingly probationary service of Md. Noor Alam, Data Operator is hereby terminated with immediate effect i.e. from this date and in lieu of one month notice he will get one month salary. Sd/- Prof. P.R. Alapati Director & i/c Chairman/BoG, GKCIET” 6. It appears from the above that the grounds of termination of the writ petitioner/respondent herein are willful suppression of information while seeking initial employment and the adverse Police Verification Report (PVR). There are no other allegations. 7. It appears to this Court that the writ petitioner/respondent while submitting his Attestation 5 Form, which provided the initial appointment, had indicated that he was involved in Kaliachak P.S. Case No.195 dated 20.05.2008 and Kaliachak P.S. Case No.196 dated 20.05.2008, which were pending against him. He also disclosed that he was arrested in both the cases and subsequently enlarged on bail. 8. The Attestation Form had indicated after paragraph 11 is as follows:- “If the answer to any of the above mentioned question is “Yes”, give full particular of the case Viz. Arrest / detention / fine / conviction / sentence / punishment, etc., and the nature of the case pending in the Court / University / Educational authority, etc. At time of filling up of this form.” 9. A plain reading of the aforesaid clause clearly indicates that the writ petitioner/respondent ought to have disclosed the full particulars of the cases with sections under which he was accused in the FIR and that charge sheets were filed against him. It is completely irrelevant as to whether the writ petitioner/respondent has been subsequently acquitted in the aforesaid two criminal cases. 10. The sections under which the writ petitioner/respondent was charged were under Sections 341/323/354/506/34 of the IPC in respect of Kaliachak P.S. Case No.195/2008 dated 20.05.2008 and under Sections 341/325/326/506/34 of the IPC r/w Section 9(B) of I.E. Act in respect of Kaliachak P.S. Case No.196/2008 dated 20.05.2008. Charge sheets have been filed against the writ petitioner/respondent in both the 6 cases under Sections 341/323/354/506/34 of the IPC in Kaliachak P.S. Case No.195/2008 dated 20.05.2008 and under Sections 341/325/506/34 of the IPC in Kaliachak P.S. Case No.196/2008 dated 20.05.2008. 11. What has, therefore, actuated the order of termination is the suppression of sections under which the writ petitioner/respondent was charged and the suppression of charge sheets themselves. The appellant institute came to know of the charge sheets from the Police Verification Report (PVR). 12. In the light of the above, this Court finds a serious factual distinction between the order of termination in Deb Halder (Supra) and that of the writ petitioner/respondent. On a plain reading of the order of termination, it clearly transpires that there was no stigma attached to the writ petitioner/respondent. The question of any enquiry or internal disciplinary proceedings against the writ petitioner/respondent by the appellants unlike in the case of Deb Halder, therefore, could not have arisen. 13. Had the writ petitioner/respondent not suppressed the sections under which FIRs were registered against him and had not suppressed the filling of charge sheets against him, it is quite improbable the appellants may have engaged writ petitioner/respondent, albeit in the post of “Computer Operator”. 14. In the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Deb Halder, the case Partha Biswas Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine 7 Cal 1457 and Sushil Kumar Singhal Vs. Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank reported in (2010) 8 SCC 573 are factually distinguishable. They would not be applicable to this case. 15. In the light of the above discussions, this Court is of the view that the order of the Single Bench setting aside the impugned order of termination dated 10th November, 2017 to be erroneous. The said order of termination dated 10th November, 2017 not being stigmatic in any form, did not call for any interference. It is order of termination simpliciter, based on suppression of facts in the Attestation Form submitted by the respondent and on the adverse PVR. 16. The impugned judgement and/or order dated 7th June, 2018 is hereby set aside. 17. Accordingly, MAT 556 of 2018 is allowed and disposed of. Consequently, all connected pending applications, if any, are also disposed of. 18. There shall be no order as to costs. 19. All parties shall act on the server copy of this order duly downloaded from the official website of this Court. (Rajasekhar Mantha, J.) (Anuj Singh, J.)