1 CGHC010004572020 2026:CGHC:38194 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 80 of 2020 Shri Anand Ram Sahu, S/o. Late Shri Manrakhan Sahu, Aged About 59 Years, Occupation Class 4 Government Employee, R/o. Village Tuta, Tahsil Abhanpur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Collector, Office Of Collector, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Principal Secretary, School Education Department, Government Of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, New Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - The Director, Directorate Of Public Education, Indravati Bhawan, New Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Officer Incharge, Directorate, National Cadet Core (NCC), (Rajya Koshth) Dunganji Colony, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 5 - Officiating Officer Commanding 3 CG Air SQN, NCC, Raipur, House No.94-B, Sunder Nagar, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents ASHOK SAHU Digitally signed by ASHOK SAHU Date: 2026.08.25 16:20:51 +0530 2 For Petitioner : Mr. Arvind Shrivastava, Senior Advocate with Mr. Indrajit Thakur, Advocate For Respondents : Mr. Pranjal Shukla, Panel Lawyer (Single Bench) Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Order on Board 25.08.2026 1. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 09.09.2016, by which he has been denied the consequential benefits from the date of acquittal till date of his reinstatement. 2. Mr. Arvind Shrivastava, Learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Indrajit Thakur, learned counsel would submit that the said denial is contrary to the order passed by this Court in Jatashankar v. State of Chhattisgarh 1 . 3. Mr. Pranjal Shukla, learned State counsel, would support the impugned order and submit that the petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein above and gone through the records minutely. 1 2025 SCC OnLine Chh 7466 3 5. Admittedly, the petitioner was acquitted from the offence under Section 302 & 120-B of I.P.C. on 10.05.2013 and he has been reinstated on 09.09.2016, but he was denied for consequential benefits. 6. The issue involved herein is no longer res integra and it stands conclusively determined by their Lordships of the Supreme Court by their judgment first of all in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar 2 in which their Lordships have considered a case where an employee was dismissed from service on account of his conviction by a criminal court for his involvement in an offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC and subsequently, he was acquitted and as a consequence, reinstated. Their Lordships while considering the issue whether back-wages should be paid to the employee for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of reinstatement held as under: - "The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action 2 (1996) 11 SCC 603 4 by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages." 7. Similarly, in the matter of Union of India v. Jaipal Singh3, the principle of law laid down in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) has been followed with approval. 8. In the matter of Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal4, the Supreme Court has considered a provision in the service regulation which provided that an employee, who is absent from duty without any authority, shall not be entitled to any pay and allowance during the period of such absence (similar to F.R. 17) and held as under: - “15. … It is only if such employee is acquitted of all blame and is treated by the competent authority as being on duty during the period of suspension that such employee is entitled to full pay and allowances for the said period. In other words, the Regulations vest the power exclusively in the Bank to treat the period of such suspension on duty or on leave or otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be validly challenged. During this period, the employee renders no work. He is absent 3 (2004) 1 SCC 121 4 AIR 1994 SC 552 5 for reasons of his own involvement in the misconduct and the Bank is in no way responsible for keeping him away from his duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be saddled with the liability to pay him his salary and allowances for the period. That will be against the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ and positively inequitable to those who have to work and earn their pay. …” 9. In the matter of State Bank of India and another v. Mohammed Abdul Rahim5, the Supreme Court considering the earlier decisions in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh’s case (supra) and Baldev Singh v. Union of India6, held that subsequent acquittal of Government servant though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act, and observed as under: - “11. … During the aforesaid period there was, therefore, a prohibition in law on the appellant Bank from employing him. If the respondent could not have remained employed with the appellant Bank during the said period on account of the provisions of the Act, it is difficult to visualise as to how he would be entitled to payment of salary during that period. His subsequent acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act. The entitlement of the respondent to back wages has to be judged on the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement, undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and the same has been granted by the appellant Bank.” 10. Finally, in the matter of Raj Narain v. Union of India and others7, their Lordships have relied upon the decision rendered in 5 (2013) 11 SCC 67 6 (2005) 8 SCC 747 7 (2019) 5 SCC 809 6 Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) and have held that the appellant therein shall be entitled for back wages only from the date of acquittal till the date of his reinstatement. 11. In view of the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, the petitioner would be entitled for the consequential benefits from the date of acquittal i.e. 10.05.2013 till the date of reinstatement i.e. 09.09.2016. 12. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed to the above-extent. No cost(s). Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) Ashok Judge