1 CGHC010092332022 2026:CGHC:38090-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 477 of 2022 Dinesh Yadav S/o Tikeshwar Yadav Aged About 19 Years Caste Mahkul, R/o Butkachhar, Chowki- Kardega, Police Station- Tapkara, District- Jashpur Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus State of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Chowki- Kardega, Police Station- Tapkara, District- Jashpur Chhattisgarh ...Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Ms. Madhunisha Singh, Amicus Curiae. For Respondent/State : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice . 25.08.2026 1. The appeal was filed by Mr. J.K. Saxena, Advocate on behalf of the appellant, who continue to appear on 16.03.2022, 01.08.222, 16.11.2022, 20.12.2022, 17.01.2023, 03.02.2023, 27.02.2023 & 13.03.2023. Thereafter, the High Court Legal Services Committee appointed Ms. Sofia Khan, Advocate to appear on behalf of the BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2026.08.25 17:02:52 +0530 2 appellant, but there is no power filed by Ms. Sofia Khan as it is apparent from record. As neither Mr. Saxena nor Ms. Khan has appear on behalf of the appellant, the Court requested Ms. Madhunisha Singh, Advocate present in the Court to appear in this case as Amicus Curiae and she has consented for the same. 2. Heard Ms. Madhunisha Singh, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent. 3. The present criminal appeal, preferred under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’), is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 10.02.2022 passed by the learned First Additional Sessions and Special Judge, Kunkuri, District Jashpur (C.G.) (under Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012) (for short, ‘learned trial Court’), in Special Case No. 02 of 2020, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as follows: Conviction Sentence Section 363 of the the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) Rigorous imprisonment (for short, ‘R.I.’) for 02 years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine, 01 year R.I. more. Section 366 of the IPC R.I. for 05 years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine, 01 year R.I. more. Section 6 of the Protection of R.I. for 20 years and fine of 3 Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘POCSO Act’) Rs.5000/-, in default of payment of fine, 02 years R.I. more. All the sentences shall run concurrently. 4. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the mother of the victim (PW-3) appeared at Police Outpost Karedga, Police Station Tapkara, and submitted a written complaint stating that her daughter (the victim) had passed Class VIII and was then about 14 years of age. On 14.04.2019, she and her daughter had gone to Keradih to attend the marriage of a relative. At that time, Dinesh Yadav of Butkachhar was talking to her daughter and had also obtained her mobile number. On 17.07.2019, Dinesh Yadav took the victim from her village to his house at Butkachhar and kept her there for three days, whereafter the complainant went there and brought her daughter back. On 25.07.2019, at about 6:00 p.m., the victim went near the Community Building, from where Dinesh Yadav took her away. Thereafter, she could not be traced for about four months. On 20.12.2019, the victim called her mother from an unknown number and informed her that she was coming to Kunkuri and asked her to come and take her back. Accordingly, her mother went to Kunkuri and brought her daughter home. On being questioned as to where she had gone, the victim informed her mother that, on 17.07.2019, Dinesh Yadav had taken her to his house at Butkachhar for the first time on the pretext of keeping her as his wife and had kept her there for three days, during which he had sexual intercourse with her. Thereafter, on 25.07.2019, Dinesh Yadav again took her from near the 4 Community Building, stating that he would keep her as his wife. He took her through the garden and thereafter stayed in a rented room near the Power House at Bagicha, where he kept the victim and represented her as his wife and had sexual intercourse with her against her wishes. Dinesh used to talk to another girl, and when the victim objected to the same, he assaulted her. Being frightened, she returned home. It was only upon being informed by the victim that her mother came to know that the appellant, Dinesh Yadav, had subjected her daughter to sexual exploitation. 5. On the basis of the aforesaid report lodged by the mother of the victim, Police Outpost Karedga, Police Station Tapkara, registered the First Information Report, Ex.P-17, on 22.12.2019 as Crime No. 0/19 for offences punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of the IPC. Thereafter, on 23.12.2019, the said unnumbered First Information Report was forwarded to and registered at Police Station Tapkara as Crime No. 12/2019 for offences punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of the IPC and Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act, and investigation was taken up. A spot map of the place of occurrence, Ex.P-1, was prepared. On 23.12.2019, a requisition was submitted to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kunkuri, seeking permission for medical examination of the private parts of the victim by a woman medical officer. After obtaining the consent of the victim, her medical examination was conducted, and the medical report, Ex.P-8, as well as the report in the prescribed proforma, Ex.P-9, were obtained. 5 6. The appellant was arrested in the presence of witnesses vide arrest memo, Ex.P-23, and intimation of his arrest was given to his mother, Smt. Tulsa Bai, acknowledgment whereof is Ex.P-24. Thereafter, a requisition was sent to the Community Health Centre, Duldula, for conducting the medical examination of the appellant and furnishing the report, pursuant to which his medical examination report was obtained. A separate requisition, Ex.P-21, was also sent to the Medical Officer, Community Health Centre, Duldula, District Jashpur (Chhattisgarh), for examination of the private parts of the appellant. After examination, the report, Ex.P-10, and the report in the prescribed proforma, Ex.P-11, were obtained. 7. Pursuant to seizure memo, Ex.P-15, one underwear belonging to the appellant, Dinesh Yadav, was produced and seized in the presence of witnesses. The complainant also produced before the police the Class VIII mark-sheet of the victim, which was seized in the presence of witnesses vide seizure memo, Ex.P-16. The mark-sheet records the date of birth of the victim as 16.07.2005. On the same day, a vaginal slide of the victim, produced by a police constable at Police Outpost Karedga, was seized in the presence of witnesses vide seizure memo, Ex.P-18. 8. On 29.12.2019, an application, Ex.P-25, was submitted to the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bagicha, for recording the statement of the victim under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., and her statement, Ex.P-4, was thereafter recorded. On 06.01.2020, a spot map of the place of 6 occurrence, Ex.P-2, was prepared. On 08.01.2020, the seized articles, along with a requisition, were forwarded to the Joint Director, Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Ambikapur, Surguja (Chhattisgarh), for chemical examination and opinion. An acknowledgment of receipt of the exhibits was obtained and, after examination, the report, Ex.P-28, was received. 9. On 17.01.2020, a requisition was sent to the Headmaster of Government Primary School, Nonpani, seeking production of the Admission and Withdrawal Register relating to the said school. The said register was produced by the teacher, Kedarnath Singh, and a certified copy thereof was seized in the presence of witnesses vide seizure memo, Ex.P-13. On 11.01.2020, a requisition was sent to the Tehsildar, Duldula, for preparation and submission of a site inspection map of the place of occurrence by the concerned Patwari. The site inspection maps, Exs.P-6 and P-3, along with the panchnama, Ex.P-7, were thereafter received. 10. On 12.02.2020, Ram Ram produced a motorcycle, which was seized in the presence of witnesses vide seizure memo, Ex.P-27. After collecting the other evidence and recording the statements of the witnesses, the investigating agency submitted Final Report No. 08/2020 before the learned trial Court against the appellant, Dinesh Yadav, for offences punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of the IPC and Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act. The learned trial Court took cognizance of the case and commenced the proceedings on 7 17.02.2020. 11. On 18.02.2020, the learned trial Court framed charges against the appellant, Dinesh Yadav, for offences punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376(2) of the IPC and under Section 5 of the POCSO Act, punishable under Section 6 thereof. The appellant denied the charges and claimed to be tried. After completion of the trial, the appellant was examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. with respect to the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence. In his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the appellant pleaded innocence and false implication and stated that he did not wish to adduce any evidence in defence. No defence witness was examined on his behalf. 12. In order to bring home the charges, the prosecution examined 12 witnesses and exhibited 28 documents. 13. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him in the manner detailed in paragraph 2 of the impugned judgment. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submits that the appellant has been falsely implicated and that the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is contended that the prosecution case is fraught with material contradictions, omissions and inherent inconsistencies, which go to the root of the matter and render 8 the prosecution version wholly unreliable. He further submitted that the learned trial Court has committed a serious error in convicting the appellant under the provisions of the POCSO Act, as the prosecution has failed to conclusively establish that the victim was a minor on the date of the alleged incident. Learned counsel submits that the reliance placed upon the Admission and Discharge Register (Ex.P/14C), wherein the date of birth/age of the victim is recorded, is wholly misplaced. The Assistant Teacher (PW-9), in his cross-examination, has categorically admitted that he was neither the author of the relevant entry nor in a position to state the basis or source on the basis of which the date of birth of the victim had been recorded. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the father of the victim (PW-2) and her mother (PW-3), in their respective depositions before the learned trial Court, have categorically stated that they were not aware of the actual date of birth of the victim and that they were illiterate. It is, therefore, contended that, in the absence of cogent, reliable and admissible documentary evidence establishing the age of the victim, the prosecution has failed to discharge the burden of proving that she was below 18 years of age at the relevant time. Learned counsel submits that no radiological examination or other reliable medical age-determination test was conducted. According to him, the failure to establish the age of the victim creates a serious doubt regarding the applicability of the provisions of the POCSO Act. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant further contends that the 9 statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. clearly indicates that she had accompanied the appellant voluntarily and had thereafter stayed with him. It is submitted that this aspect of her statement materially affects the prosecution case regarding kidnapping and forcible sexual intercourse. He also contends that the medical evidence does not lend support to the prosecution version. Referring to the MLC report (Ex.P-8), it is submitted that no external or internal injuries were found on the private parts of the victim. It is further submitted that the FSL report (Ex.P/28) is negative and does not corroborate the prosecution allegations. According to learned counsel, the absence of medical or forensic corroboration, when considered along with the material inconsistencies appearing in the prosecution evidence, creates a serious doubt regarding the veracity of the allegations. In such circumstances, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Learned counsel accordingly prays that the appeal be allowed and the appellant be acquitted of all the charges. 17. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State has opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and has supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. It is submitted that the offences proved against the appellant are grave and heinous in nature and that the learned trial Court has rightly recorded the conviction after a proper and thorough appreciation of the evidence available on record. 18. Learned State counsel further submits that the testimony of the 10 victim is cogent, consistent and trustworthy and inspires confidence. It is contended that it is a settled principle of law that, where the testimony of the victim is found to be reliable and trustworthy, conviction can be based solely upon her testimony and corroboration is not required as a matter of rule. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court has duly considered the evidence on record and has recorded its findings on the basis of sound reasoning. According to learned State counsel, no illegality, perversity or material infirmity is discernible in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence warranting interference by this Court. The appeal, being devoid of merit, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 19. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have carefully perused the entire record of the learned trial Court. 20. The foremost question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the victim was a minor, i.e. below 18 years of age, on the date of the alleged incident. 21. For the purpose of determining the age of the victim, this Court has carefully scrutinized the evidence available on record. The prosecution has primarily relied upon the entry in the Admission and Withdrawal Register (Ex.P/14C) and the testimony of the victim (PW-1). As per the said register, the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 16.07.2005. 22. In her deposition before the Court, the victim (PW-1) stated that her date of birth was 16.07.2005. However, the father of the victim (PW- 11 2) and her mother (PW-3), in their respective testimonies, deposed that they did not know the actual date of birth of the victim, as they were illiterate. They, however, stated that the victim was about 14 years of age. 23. The Assistant Teacher (PW-9) of the victim's school deposed that the particulars of the victim were entered at pages 4 and 5 of the Admission and Discharge Register (Ex.P/14C) and that the victim had been admitted to Class I. As per the said register, the date of birth of the victim was recorded as 16.07.2005. However, in his cross-examination, PW-9 candidly admitted that the relevant entries had not been made by him and that he could not state the basis or the document on the basis of which the date of birth of the victim had been recorded. This admission calls for cautious scrutiny of the evidentiary value of the said entry. 24. Upon an overall and cumulative consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the evidence available on record, it becomes apparent that the prosecution has failed to produce cogent and reliable foundational evidence conclusively establishing the date of birth of the victim so as to prove that she was below 18 years of age at the time of the alleged incident. Mere reliance upon the school Admission and Discharge Register (Ex.P/14C), in the absence of evidence regarding the source or basis of the recorded date of birth, does not, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, provide a safe basis for conclusively determining the age of the victim. 12 25. Furthermore, the oral testimony of the parents of the victim regarding her age is not based upon their personal knowledge of her actual date of birth. They have themselves stated that they were unaware of her date of birth. Though the victim has stated her date of birth as 16.07.2005, the prosecution has not brought on record satisfactory foundational evidence establishing the basis on which the said date of birth came to be recorded in the school register. In such circumstances, this Court is not persuaded to hold, beyond reasonable doubt, that the victim was below 18 years of age at the relevant point of time. The resultant doubt on this crucial aspect of the prosecution case must necessarily enure to the benefit of the appellant. 26. In the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of UP, (2006) 5 SCC 584, relying upon its earlier judgment in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp. SCC 604, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “26. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded." 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40, 42, 43, 44 and 48 13 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, reported in (2011) 2 SCC 385, has observed as under: “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses 14 does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the 15 observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted.” 28. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:- “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 16 33.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the 17 standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7. This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board 18 provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 29. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paras 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back 19 upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age 20 on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 21 30. Upon an appreciation of the evidence available on record, it emerges that the victim (PW-1), in her deposition before the learned trial Court, stated her date of birth as 16.07.2005. PW-2, the father of the victim, and PW-3, the mother of the victim, however, deposed that they did not know the exact date of birth of the victim and stated that they were uneducated. They merely stated that the victim was about 14 years of age. Thus, neither PW-2 nor PW-3 was in a position to furnish any reliable or independent basis for the date of birth of the victim. 31. The prosecution has relied upon the Admission–Discharge Register (Ex.P-14C) and the Class VIII mark-sheet (Ex.P-16) to establish the age of the victim. In both the documents, the date of birth of the victim has been recorded as 16.07.2005. PW-9, the Assistant Teacher of the concerned school, deposed with reference to the Admission–Discharge Register that the victim had been admitted in Class I and that her date of birth was recorded as 16.07.2005. However, in his cross-examination, PW-9 admitted that the relevant entries in the register were not made by him and that he was unable to state the basis or the document on the basis of which the said date of birth had been entered in the school record. 32. In these circumstances, mere production and exhibition of the Admission–Discharge Register (Ex.P-14C) and the mark-sheet (Ex.P- 16) cannot, by themselves, conclusively establish the correctness of the date of birth recorded therein. The prosecution has not examined the person who originally furnished the date of birth or the person who 22 made the relevant entry in the school record. Nor has any foundational document, such as a birth certificate or any contemporaneous public record, been produced to establish that the date of birth recorded in the school documents was based upon authentic and reliable material. 33. It is also significant that the parents of the victim, namely PW-2 and PW-3, admittedly did not know her exact date of birth. The prosecution, despite the issue of age being material to the applicability of the provisions of the POCSO Act, did not produce any birth certificate or other primary document evidencing the date of birth of the victim, nor was any radiological or other medical age determination examination conducted. In view of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgments referred to hereinabove, the evidentiary value of the school entry is substantially weakened when the basis or source of such entry has not been proved. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish the age of the victim, and particularly that she was below 18 years of age on the date of the alleged incident, beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt on this issue. 34. The next question that arises for consideration is whether, notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to establish the minority of the victim beyond reasonable doubt, the evidence available on record is sufficient to establish the commission of the offence of rape by the appellant. 35. The victim (PW-1), in her deposition, stated that she had studied 23 up to Class VIII and that her date of birth was 16.07.2005. She stated that the appellant had obtained her mobile number at the time of a marriage ceremony and thereafter used to call her. She further stated that on 17.08.2019, the appellant came near the Community Building, called her, and took her on his motorcycle to Butkachhar, where she stayed for about three days, after which her mother brought her back. She further deposed that on 25.08.2019, the appellant again took her to Butkachhar, where she remained for about two to three months and thereafter stayed with him near the Power House at Bagicha for another two to three months. She stated that when she objected to the appellant talking to a girl named Santoshi, he assaulted her, whereafter she came to Kunkuri by bus and was taken back home by her mother. 36. During her cross-examination, the victim admitted that during her first stay at Butkachhar for three days, the appellant had forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her. She further stated that during her second stay at the appellant's house for about three months, he had sexual intercourse with her. However, she also admitted that on both occasions she had gone to the Community Building without informing her parents; that she travelled with the appellant on his motorcycle; that several persons from her village and other villages met them on the way; and that she neither raised any alarm nor sought assistance from any of them. She further admitted that, despite staying at Butkachhar for about two to three months and having opportunities to meet and converse with several persons, she did not disclose the alleged occurrence to anyone. 24 37. PW-2, the father of the victim, and PW-3, her mother, have deposed regarding the circumstances in which the victim returned home. However, neither of them is an eyewitness to the alleged acts of sexual intercourse, and their evidence, insofar as the alleged sexual assault is concerned, is based upon what was subsequently disclosed to them by the victim. 38. PW-5, Dr. Smt. K. Kujur, examined the victim on 23.12.2019. She found no external injury on the body of the victim and no injury, abrasion or scratch on the genital region. The secondary sexual characteristics were fully developed and the hymen was found to be old torn. In her opinion, the victim had previously experienced sexual intercourse. She also prepared vaginal swab slides and forwarded them for FSL examination. The medical examination report and prescribed proforma were marked as Exs.P-8 and P-9 respectively. 39. In her cross-examination, PW-5 admitted that no injury or abrasion was found on either the external or internal parts of the victim and that, looking to her physical development, she appeared to be a major. She further admitted that, at the time of examination, there was no physical sign indicating that the victim had been assaulted or subjected to forcible sexual intercourse. Thus, the medical evidence does not provide any corroboration regarding forcible sexual intercourse. 40. PW-8, Dr. Vipin Indwar, examined the appellant on 28.12.2019 and found him physically healthy, with normally developed genital 25 organs and fully developed secondary sexual characteristics. No injury or abrasion was found on his genital region or inner thighs. On the basis of the clinical examination, he opined that the appellant was capable of performing sexual intercourse. His reports were marked as Exs.P-10 and P-11. 41. In cross-examination, PW-8 admitted that Ex.P-10 did not contain any specific observation regarding the presence or absence of erection of the appellant's genital organ. Nevertheless, the medical evidence establishes only that the appellant was physically capable of performing sexual intercourse and does not, by itself, connect him with the alleged sexual act. 42. The FSL report (Ex.P/28) is also of considerable significance. The articles and vaginal slides sent for forensic examination were subjected to chemical analysis, but no semen stains or human spermatozoa were detected therein. Thus, the FSL report is negative and does not provide any forensic corroboration to the allegation of sexual intercourse. Though absence of semen or spermatozoa by itself may not conclusively disprove an allegation of sexual assault, in the facts of the present case, the negative FSL report assumes significance when considered cumulatively with the other deficiencies in the prosecution evidence. 43. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt by leading cogent, reliable, and unimpeachable evidence. Suspicion, however 26 strong, cannot take the place of proof. It is equally well settled that a conviction in cases of sexual assault can be based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is found to be wholly reliable and inspires confidence. 44. Further, in Alamelu (supra), where the facts and circumstances were similar to that of the present case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “51. This Court in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan {AIR 1952 SC 54} declared that corroboration is not the sine qua non for a conviction in a rape case. In the aforesaid case, Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:- "The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge, ... The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand." 52. The aforesaid proposition of law has been reiterated by this Court in numerous judgments subsequently. These observations leave no manner of doubt that a conviction can be recorded on the sole, uncorroborated testimony of a victim provided it does not suffer from any basic infirmities or improbabilities which render it unworthy of credence. 27 xxx xxx xxx 54. Even PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu stated that Sekar (A1) had brought the girl with him to his house and told him that he had married her. They had come to see Trichy and requested a house to stay. This witness categorically stated that he thought that they were newly married couple. He had made them stay in Door No. 86 of the Police Colony, which was under his responsibility. On 10th August, 1993, the police inspector, who arrived there at 10.00 p.m. told this witness that Sekar (A1) had married the girl by threatening her and "spoiled her". The girl, according to the prosecution, was recovered from the aforesaid premises. Therefore, for six days, this girl was staying with Sekar (A1). She did not raise any protest. She did not even complain to this witness or any other residents in the locality. Her behavior of not complaining to anybody at any of the stages after being allegedly abducted would be wholly unnatural. 55. Earlier also, she had many opportunities to complain or to run away, but she made no such effort. It is noteworthy that she made no protest on seeing some known persons near the car, after her alleged abduction. She did not make any complaint at the residence of Selvi, sister of Sekar (A1) at Pudupatti. Again, there was no complaint on seeing her relatives allegedly assembled at the temple. Her relatives apparently took no steps at the time when mangalsutra was forcibly tied around her neck by Sekar (A1). No one sent for police help even though a car was available. She made no complaint when she was taken to the house of PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu and stayed at his place. Again, there was no protest when Sekar (A1) took her to the police station on 5th day of the alleged abduction and told at the Tiruchi Police Station that they had already been married. The above behaviour would not be natural for a girl who had been compelled to marry and subjected to illicit sexual intercourse. 28 56. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt any of the offences with which the appellants had been charged. It appears that the entire prosecution story has been concocted for reasons best known to the prosecution.” 45. In the light of the aforesaid principles, the testimony of PW-1 requires careful scrutiny. Her evidence shows that on both occasions she went to the Community Building without informing her parents, travelled with the appellant on his motorcycle, and admittedly encountered several persons on the way, yet neither raised an alarm nor sought assistance. She further remained at the appellant's house for a considerable period and admitted that she did not disclose the alleged occurrence to any person despite having opportunities to do so. These circumstances, coupled with the inconsistencies and omissions in her testimony, create a serious doubt regarding the prosecution version. 46. The medical evidence also does not corroborate the allegation of forcible sexual intercourse. Although the hymen of the victim was found to be old torn and the doctor opined that she had previously experienced sexual intercourse, no external or internal injury or other physical sign suggestive of forcible intercourse was found. The medical evidence, therefore, does not establish that the alleged sexual intercourse was forcible. 47. The forensic evidence is equally inconclusive. The FSL report (Ex.P/28) is negative and does not disclose the presence of semen stains or human spermatozoa on the articles examined. While such 29 negative forensic evidence cannot, in isolation, be treated as conclusive proof of innocence, it does not lend any corroboration to the prosecution case and assumes significance in the overall assessment of the evidence. 48. Thus, the testimony of the victim, which forms the foundation of the prosecution case, does not inspire the requisite confidence so as to sustain the conviction in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Her conduct, the material omissions and inconsistencies in her evidence, the absence of any physical signs of forcible intercourse, and the negative FSL report, when considered cumulatively, give rise to a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution case. 49. It is well settled that where two views are reasonably possible on the evidence on record, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients of the offences charged against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt. 50. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 10.02.2022 are hereby set aside. The appellant, Dinesh Yadav, is acquitted of all the charges levelled against him. He is reported to be in custody and shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 51. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the CrPC (now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the 30 appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 52. The Registrar (Judicial) is directed to send a copy of this order, along with the learned Trial Court record forthwith to the concerned Trial Court for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Amit/Brijmohan