1 CGHC010297902026 2026:CGHC:37532-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPCR No. 467 of 2026 Sukhchand Chandravanshi S/o Rikhichandra Chandravanshi Aged About 47 Years R/o Village Majholi, Police Station Pandatarai, District Kabirdham C. G. --Present Address Central Jail Bastar, Place Jagdalpur C. G. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Home / Jail, Mahanadi Bhawan Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur District Raipur C. G. 2 - Secretary Department Of Law, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar Nawa, Raipur District Raipur C. G. 3 - Director General ( Jail ) And Correctional Services, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar Nawa, Raipur District Raipur C. G. 4 - Chhattisgrh, Rajya Dandadesh Punarvilokan Board, Through Its Secretary Office At Raipur District Raipur C. G. 5 - Superintendent Of Police Kawardha, District Kabirdham C. G. 6 - District Magistrate / Collector Kawardha, District Kabirdham C. G. 7 - Jail Superintendent, Central Jail Durg, District Durg C. G. ... Respondent(s) (cause title taken from CIS) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Vikas Kumar Pandey, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Priyank Rathi, Govt. Advocate SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2026.08.25 10:16:36 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 21.08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Vikas Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner through legal aid. Also heard Mr. Priyank Rathi, Govt. Advocate for the Respondent/ State. 2. The petitioner has filed the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking following relief(s):- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue writ of certiorari setting aside the impugned order dated 05-01-2026 (Annexure P-1) passed by the respondent No.1 and may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent state authority to reconsider the application of petitioner for remission of jail sentence/premature release. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief, as it may deems fit and appropriate.” 3. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the petitioner is a life convict, presently serving his sentence as Convict Prisoner at Central Jail, Durg. He was convicted under Section 302 of the IPC for committing murder arising out of a land dispute and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 50,000/- by the learned Trial Court in S.T. No.34/2009 vide judgment dated 19.04.2011. His criminal appeal, being CRA No.445/2021, was dismissed by this Court vide judgment dated 14.09.2015. The petitioner was arrested on 01.05.2009 and claims to have undergone approximately 20 years and 08 months of custody. Upon completion of more than 14 years of sentence, his case was considered for remission under Rule 358 of the Chhattisgarh 3 Prison Rules, 1968 and Section 432 of the Cr.P.C. The concerned authorities, including the Presiding Judge, initially furnished favourable recommendations/opinion in his case. 4. However, the Remission Board, relying upon the opinions of the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police regarding an apprehension of breach of peace upon his release, recommended rejection of remission. On the basis thereof, the respondent No.1 rejected the petitioner's claim for remission vide impugned order dated 05.01.2026. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has preferred the present petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order dated 05.01.2026 rejecting the petitioner's claim for remission has been passed mechanically and without proper consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances governing the exercise of power under Rule 358 of the Chhattisgarh Prison Rules, 1968 and Section 432 of the Cr.P.C. The petitioner has undergone about 20 years of incarceration, during which his conduct in jail has remained good, as reflected from the favourable recommendation of the Superintendent of Jail, and even the learned Presiding Judge had furnished a favourable opinion in respect of his remission. However, the respondent No.1, instead of duly considering these relevant factors, has rejected the petitioner's claim merely on the basis of an apprehension expressed by the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police that his release may result in breach of peace, without there being any cogent or objective material to substantiate such apprehension. It is further submitted that the petitioner was about 38 years of age at the time of his arrest and is presently about 53 years old and has already 4 undergone a substantial period of incarceration, which are relevant considerations while examining his claim for premature release. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the impugned order is against the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rajo Rajwa Rajendra Mandal v. State of Bihar, reported in (2023) SCC Online SC 1068 and the judgment passed in Joseph v. State of Kerla reported in (2023) SCC Online 1211. Therefore, the impugned order, having been passed without proper application of mind and on the basis of an unsubstantiated apprehension, deserves to be quashed and the respondents may kindly be directed to reconsider the petitioner's case for remission afresh in accordance with law. 6. On the other hand, learned State counsel would submit that the petitioner is not entitled to claim remission as a matter of right and that the impugned order dated 05.01.2026 has been passed by the competent authority after considering the relevant material placed before it. The State submits that the circumstances leading to the present conviction are of a serious nature. The petitioner had earlier faced trial in the main case before the learned Trial Court, wherein the learned Trial Court ultimately acquitted the accused; however, during the said proceedings, the concerned witness had deposed against the present petitioner. Being aggrieved by the deposition of the said witness and harbouring anger against him, the petitioner subsequently committed his murder, for which he was tried and convicted under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. Thus, the present case is not merely a case of an ordinary offence but involves the deliberate murder of a material witness arising out of the earlier 5 criminal proceedings. It is further submitted that the apprehension expressed by the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police regarding the possibility of breach of peace upon the petitioner's release cannot be brushed aside, particularly having regard to the antecedents and the circumstances in which the petitioner committed the offence. The favourable opinion of the Jail Superintendent or the Presiding Judge is only one of the factors to be considered and does not confer any vested right upon the petitioner to obtain remission. The competent authority is required to consider the overall impact of the release upon public order, the nature and gravity of the offence, the antecedents of the convict and the possibility of recurrence of similar incidents. Therefore, the decision of the respondent No.1, based upon the material and reports furnished by the competent authorities, does not suffer from any illegality or perversity warranting interference by this Hon'ble Court, and the present petition deserves to be dismissed. ******* It is further argued that grant of remission is not a matter of right, but lies within the discretionary domain of the appropriate Government, to be exercised on the basis of relevant considerations including public interest and societal impact. In this regard, reliance is placed on State of Haryana v. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216 and Union of India v. V. Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors., (2016) 7 SCC 1, to contend that the power of remission must be exercised cautiously, keeping in view the gravity of the offence and its impact on society. Learned State counsel would submit that merely because the petitioner has completed a certain period of incarceration or earned remission, he does not become entitle to premature release as a matter of right. It is thus submitted that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or 6 perversity and the present petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the pleadings, annexures and the material available on record. 8. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds that the impugned order dated 05.01.2026 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The petitioner has undergone a substantial period of incarceration and his case for remission was considered under Rule 358 of the Chhattisgarh Prison Rules, 1968 and Section 432 of the Cr.P.C. It is also evident from the record that the Superintendent of Jail had furnished a favourable recommendation regarding the petitioner and the learned Presiding Judge had also expressed his opinion in favour of remission. However, the competent authority, while rejecting the petitioner's case, has principally relied upon the adverse opinions of the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police regarding an apprehension of breach of peace upon his release, without demonstrating any independent and objective consideration of the relevant factors governing premature release. The mere expression of apprehension, unsupported by any specific material indicating the likelihood of recurrence of the offence or actual disturbance of public peace, cannot by itself constitute a sufficient ground for rejection of a remission claim, particularly when the petitioner's conduct during incarceration has been reported to be satisfactory and he has undergone a considerable period of sentence. The fact that the petitioner was convicted under Section 302 of the IPC for the murder of a witness in the earlier criminal case is undoubtedly a relevant circumstance, but the same has to be weighed along with his conduct in prison, the period already undergone, the present 7 circumstances, the possibility of his rehabilitation and the other relevant considerations prescribed under the applicable remission policy. The authority is required to undertake a meaningful and reasoned consideration of all such factors rather than mechanically relying upon adverse opinions. 9. It is well-settled that while exercising powers under Sections 432 and 433 CrPC, the appropriate Government is required to take a holistic and reasoned decision. The law on the subject has been succinctly laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laxman Naskar v. Union of India, (2000) 2 SCC 595, wherein the Court identified the guiding factors for grant of premature release. The relevant portion reads: “The following factors are required to be considered: (i) whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large; (ii) whether there is any chance of future recurrence of committing crime; (iii) whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing crime; (iv) whether any fruitful purpose is being served by keeping the convict in prison; and (v) socio-economic condition of the convict’s family.” 10. In the present case, there is no discussion whatsoever of the aforesaid parameters in the impugned order. The authority has failed to evaluate the petitioner’s conduct during incarceration, his reformation, or the likelihood of recidivism. 11. Further, in Ram Chander v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr., AIR 2022 SC 2017 : (2022) 4 SCR 1103, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphasized that the opinion sought under Section 432(2) CrPC. must be based on objective assessment and not merely on the nature of the 8 offence. The Court observed: “The opinion of the Presiding Judge must reflect due application of mind to the relevant factors and cannot be a mere reiteration of the nature of the offence or the findings recorded at the time of conviction.” 12. Similarly, in Rajo v. State of Bihar, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1068, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the opinion of the Presiding Judge or other authorities is only one of the inputs and cannot be treated as determinative. It was held: “The appropriate Government is required to take an independent decision based on all relevant considerations including post-conviction conduct; the opinion of the Presiding Judge cannot be given primacy if it merely reiterates the circumstances of conviction.” 13. In the present case, the impugned order reflects a mechanical reliance on adverse opinions without independent evaluation. Such an approach defeats the very purpose of remission, which is rooted in the reformative theory of punishment. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216 has held: “The policy of remission is a reformative measure and should be applied in a fair and reasonable manner. The decision must not be arbitrary but based on relevant considerations.” 15. Likewise, in Union of India v. V. Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors., (2016) 7 SCC 1, it has been observed: “Though the power of remission is discretionary, it 9 must be exercised in a just, fair and reasonable manner, and cannot be exercised arbitrarily or on extraneous considerations.” 16. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the respondent authorities have failed to discharge their statutory obligation. The impugned order is cryptic, non-speaking, and suffers from non-application of mind, as it does not reflect consideration of the petitioner’s long incarceration, jail conduct, reformation, or other relevant factors. 17. It is also pertinent to note that the petitioner has undergone more than the requisite period of incarceration and his case was duly recommended by the Jail Superintendent. There is nothing on record to indicate any adverse conduct during incarceration or any likelihood of threat to society upon release. 18. In view of the foregoing analysis and the settled legal position, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 05.01.2026 (Annexure P/1) is arbitrary, unsustainable and liable to be set aside. 19. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 05.01.2026 is hereby quashed. 20. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner has undergone a substantial period of incarceration, has earned remission and maintained satisfactory conduct during his custody, coupled with the fact that he has been acquitted in the main case in which the deceased had appeared as a witness and deposed against him, and there being no material on record indicating any likelihood of recidivism or disturbance of public peace upon his release, this Court deems it 10 appropriate to direct the respondent authorities to reconsider and grant the benefit of premature release to the petitioner in accordance with the applicable remission policy and law. 21. The respondents are, therefore, directed to release the petitioner forthwith, if not required in any other case, in accordance with law. 22. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice sagrika