1 CGHC010186152022 2026:CGHC:36509-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 980 of 2022 Mohd. Sheikh Yusuf Musalman S/o Sheikh Najir Musalman, Aged About 30 Years R/o Gautam Nagar, Zone No. 1, Khursipar Power House, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh. Present Address House Of Samir Paan Shop, Mahant Talab, Kota, P.S. Saraswati Nagar, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, P.S. Sarawati Nagar, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Appellant : Ms. Reena Singh, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Jitendra Shrivastava, Govt Advocate ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hon'ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice and Hon'ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, CJ 17 . 08 .202 6 1. This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.03.2022 passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 281/2019, whereby learned trial Court has convicted the appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA 2 Rs.100/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for 3 months. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 29.09.2019 Smt. Shaikh Saira, resident of Mahant Talab, Kota, who was working as a domestic help, appeared at Police Station Saraswati Nagar and lodged a report stating that after having dinner, she was watching television with her family members. Upon hearing a commotion nearby, she came outside and saw a crowd gathered in front of the house of her niece, Shabana Begum. Several persons from the neighbourhood had gathered there. The husband of Shabana, namely Mohammad Yusuf, was sitting amongst the crowd and was shouting, “I have killed my wife.” When she went inside the house, she found Shabana lying on her right side. About one year prior to the incident, Sikandar, the younger brother of accused Yusuf, had allegedly committed rape upon Shabana's daughter, Minhaj, in respect of which a report had been lodged at Durg, Bhilai, and Sikandar had been arrested and sent to jail. The accused had been quarrelling with his wife, Shabana, and had allegedly strangulated her to death with a piece of cloth. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid information, FIR No. 30/2019 was registered. The witnesses were summoned and inquest proceedings were conducted. The dead body of the deceased was sent to Mekahra for post-mortem examination. On the basis of the statements of the witnesses, the accused was arrested 3 from the spot and criminal proceedings were initiated against him. Upon finding sufficient material, a case for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against the accused vide Crime No. 154/2019. 4. During the course of investigation, statements of the witnesses were recorded. A site map of the place of occurrence was prepared by the police as well as by the Patwari. The seized articles were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur, for examination. After recording the statements of the witnesses and completing all other necessary investigation, the charge-sheet was filed before the competent jurisdictional Court. Thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of Session, Raipur, under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Subsequently, the learned Sessions Judge, Raipur, transferred the case to the Court of 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur for trial in accordance with law. 5. The charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was framed against the accused. The charge was read over and explained to him, to which he denied the same and claimed to be tried. 6. In support of its case, the prosecution examined Sheikh Saira (PW-1), Mahmuda Begum (PW-2), Sheikh Kalam (PW-3), Minhaj Naaz (PW-4), Patwari Narendra Kumar Soni (PW-5), Shilpa Goswami (PW-6), Zakir (PW-7), Head Constable Chandra 4 Bahadur Singh (PW-8), Praneshwar Verma (PW-9), Prakash Kumar Dhuvanshi (PW-10), Gautam Chand Gawade (PW-11) and Dr. Shiv Narayan Manjhi (PW-12). On the basis of the testimony of the aforesaid witnesses, the prosecution exhibited the following documents: site map/panchnama as Ex.P-1; notice issued to the witnesses for the dead-body panchnama as Ex.P-2; inquest information register as Ex.P-3; site map of the place of occurrence as Ex.P-4; notice issued to Sheikh Kalam under Section 160 CrPC as Ex.P-6; seizure memo as Ex.P-7; police statement of witness Zakir as Ex.P-8; attested copies of the storehouse register as Ex.P-9 and Ex.P-10; First Information Report as Ex.P- 11; dead-body handing-over memo as Ex.P-12; duty certificate as Ex.P-13; notice as Ex.P-14; seizure memo as Ex.P-15; application for post-mortem examination as Ex.P-16; arrest panchnama of the accused as Ex.P-17; information regarding the seized articles as Ex.P-18; letters relating to sending the seized articles and the complaint to the Forensic Science Laboratory as Ex.P-19 and Ex.P-20; receipts as Ex.P-21 and Ex.P-22; FSL report as Ex.P-23; letter containing information regarding the criminal case registered against the brother of the accused as Ex.P-24; photocopy of the said FIR as Ex.P-25; FIR registered against the accused as Ex.P- 26; and post-mortem report as Ex.P-27. 7. During his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused, in response to Questions No. A-13 and A-25, admitted that he had once asked his wife to withdraw the 5 case registered against his brother. He further stated that his wife used to tell him that his brother had committed a wrong against her daughter. In response to Question No. A-26, the accused admitted that when his mother was crying, he had told his wife to forgive his brother, even if he had committed any wrong, and to let him go. In response to Question No. A-45, the accused stated that the persons present at the spot had restrained him until the police arrived and that thereafter the police took him away. In response to Question No. A-179, the accused admitted his presence at the place of occurrence and stated that he was residing in the said house with his wife and children. In response to Question No. A- 180, he admitted that he was present at his house at the time of the incident. 8. The accused was afforded an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defence; however, he did not examine himself or produce any defence witness and merely stated that he was innocent, had been falsely implicated and had not committed any offence. 9. The trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, by judgment dated 31.03.2022, convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment. The said judgment is under challenge in the present criminal appeal preferred under Section 374(2) of the CrPC by the appellant. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Trial 6 Court has committed a serious error of law and fact in convicting the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, as the prosecution has failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt. The learned Trial Court has not properly appreciated the material contradictions and inconsistencies appearing in the prosecution evidence, particularly with regard to the cause and manner of death of the deceased. It is submitted that the medical evidence assumes great significance in the present case. As per the post-mortem report (Ex.P-27), the cause of death has been opined to be strangulation, whereas PW-4 Minhaj Naaz, the daughter of the deceased and a material child eye-witness, has stated that her mother died due to suffocation. Thus, there is a material discrepancy between the medical opinion and the ocular account regarding the manner and cause of death. The learned Trial Court has failed to properly examine this contradiction and has proceeded to record conviction without reconciling the ocular testimony with the medical evidence. It is further submitted that where the prosecution case rests substantially upon the testimony of a child witness, such evidence requires careful scrutiny and corroboration, particularly when there are material inconsistencies between the ocular and medical evidence. The statement of PW- 4, therefore, could not have been accepted mechanically without examining whether it is consistent with the medical findings and other surrounding circumstances. Learned counsel further submits that the prosecution has failed to establish an unbroken 7 and reliable chain of circumstances connecting the appellant with the commission of the offence. The alleged statement of the appellant that he had asked his wife to forgive his brother or withdraw the case against his brother does not constitute an admission of the murder and cannot, by itself, establish the appellant's guilt. Likewise, the appellant's presence in his house at the relevant time is not sufficient to establish that he committed the offence. The learned Trial Court has placed undue reliance upon the answers given by the appellant under Section 313 CrPC, although such answers cannot take the place of substantive prosecution evidence. The prosecution was required to independently prove the commission of murder and the appellant's involvement therein beyond reasonable doubt. It is a settled principle that where there is a material discrepancy between the ocular evidence and medical evidence, the Court must carefully assess whether the two are reconcilable; if the medical evidence completely rules out the ocular version on a material aspect, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused. The learned Trial Court has failed to apply the said principle and has overlooked the material contradiction between the post-mortem report showing strangulation and the testimony of PW-4 attributing the death to suffocation. In view of the aforesaid material discrepancy, the doubtful nature of the ocular evidence, and the failure of the prosecution to establish the manner of death and the appellant's involvement beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant 8 deserves to be given the benefit of doubt and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.03.2022 deserve to be set aside and the appellant deserves to be acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC. 11. Learned State counsel, per contra, supports the judgment of conviction and submits that the learned Trial Court, after appreciating the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record, has rightly convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC. The prosecution case is duly supported by the testimony of PW-1 Sheikh Saira, who immediately reached the spot on hearing the commotion and found the deceased lying inside the house, while the appellant was present amongst the persons gathered outside and was proclaiming that he had killed his wife. The presence of the appellant at the place of occurrence has also been admitted by him in his examination under Section 313 CrPC. Further, the appellant admitted that he had earlier asked his wife to withdraw the criminal case against his brother and had asked her to forgive his brother for the wrong committed against her daughter. These circumstances provide a strong motive for the commission of the offence. The evidence of PW-4 Minhaj Naaz, daughter of the deceased, is also material and cannot be discarded merely because she was a child witness. Her testimony has to be assessed on the touchstone of reliability and the surrounding circumstances. The prosecution evidence, read as a whole, establishes the presence of the appellant with the 9 deceased and the circumstances immediately preceding and following the occurrence. The post-mortem report also establishes that the death was homicidal in nature, and the mere use of the expression “suffocation” by PW-4, instead of the medical term “strangulation”, cannot by itself demolish the prosecution case. It is further submitted that the alleged discrepancy between the medical evidence and the testimony of PW-4 is not of such a nature as to create a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution case. Strangulation itself results in asphyxia or suffocation, and therefore the statement of the child witness that the deceased died due to suffocation cannot be treated as inconsistent with the medical opinion that the cause of death was strangulation. The medical evidence is required to be considered along with the ocular and surrounding evidence and not in isolation. The Supreme Court has consistently held that where the ocular testimony is otherwise reliable, a minor discrepancy between medical evidence and ocular evidence is not sufficient to discard the prosecution case. Further, the answers given by the accused under Section 313 CrPC, particularly his admitted presence at the place of occurrence and his knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the incident, may be taken into consideration along with the other evidence on record, though the conviction is not founded solely upon such answers. The prosecution has established the circumstances forming a complete chain pointing towards the guilt of the appellant, while the appellant has failed to 10 offer any plausible explanation for the death of his wife occurring in the matrimonial home. The learned Trial Court has considered the evidence in its entirety and has recorded a well-reasoned finding of guilt. There is no perversity or illegality warranting interference in appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.03.2022 deserve to be affirmed. 12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 13. The first question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court was justified in holding that death of deceased Shabana Begum was homicidal in nature ? 14. In this regard, Dr. Shiv Narayan Manjhi (PW-12), the medical witness, stated in his deposition that during the post-mortem examination of the deceased Shabana Begum, he found the following injuries on the body of the deceased: Contusion: A contused wound measuring 3 cm in diameter was present over the right frontal prominence of the head. Extravasation of blood was present beneath the scalp at the site of injury. Abrasion: An abrasion measuring 3 cm in diameter was present over the right frontal region of the head. Abrasion: An oblique abrasion measuring 1.5 × 1 cm was present over the upper portion of the nose. Extravasation of blood was present beneath the skin due to the injury. 11 Abrasion: An abrasion measuring 2 cm in diameter was present extending from the left side of the chin towards the middle portion. Extravasation of blood was present beneath the skin due to the injury. Abrasion: Eighteen semi-circular abrasions extending from the right side of the neck towards the middle portion were present. Thirteen semi-circular abrasions were also present on the left side of the lower portion of the neck, extending towards the left side from the middle portion. All these injuries extended from the upper to the lower portion of the neck. On dissection of the skin of the neck, contusions were found in the muscles on both sides of the neck. On opening the internal structures of the neck, the posterior projections of the thyroid cartilage (laryngeal skeleton) were found fractured on both sides. Both horns of the hyoid bone were also fractured. Extravasation of blood was present around the fractured portions due to the injuries. A considerable amount of blood clots was present around the tracheal cartilage. Contusion: A contused wound measuring 6 × 5 cm was present over the occipital region of the posterior aspect of the head. On opening the scalp, all parts of the skull were found intact. Abrasion: A horizontal abrasion measuring 6 × 1 cm was present over the posterior aspect of the right shoulder. Abrasion: A vertical abrasion measuring 3 × 1 cm was present over the upper portion of the right scapular region. Abrasion: A vertical abrasion measuring 5 × 1 cm was present over the upper portion of the left scapular region. Abrasion: A vertical abrasion measuring 2.5 × 0.5 cm was present over the back of the deceased, on the right side parallel to the T-11 vertebra. 12 Contusions/Abrasions: A contusion measuring 3 × 2.5 cm was present over the middle portion of the right iliac crest. A vertical injury measuring 5 × 2 cm was present over the outer portion of the right knee. Similarly, a horizontal injury measuring 3 × 2 cm was present over the middle portion of the left knee. A vertical injury measuring 2 × 1.5 cm was present over the middle portion of the left leg below the knee. 15. Dr. Shiv Narayan Manjhi (PW-12) further stated that all the aforesaid injuries had been caused by hard and blunt objects. All the injuries showed reddish-coloured ecchymosis (extravasation of blood due to the injuries). All the injuries were ante-mortem in nature. The injuries present on the body of the deceased were, in the ordinary course of nature, sufficient to cause death. Thereafter, the witness stated that he conducted the internal examination of the dead body. The witness further stated that he preserved the blood of the deceased by placing a blood-stained piece of cloth in a sealed packet for the purpose of blood grouping. He also preserved all the clothes of the deceased and advised that they be subjected to chemical examination. The witness stated that, in his opinion, the cause of death of the deceased was asphyxia due to manual strangulation, i.e., compression of the neck by hand. The nature of death was homicidal. The injuries present on the body of the deceased were within 12 hours prior to death. In his opinion, the time since death was within 24 hours prior to the post-mortem examination. 13 The post-mortem report prepared by him is Ex.P-27, and he identified his signatures on the relevant portions thereof. 16. During cross-examination by the defence, Dr. Shiv Narayan Manjhi (PW-12) admitted that he had stated in his report, with complete certainty, that the deceased had died due to manual strangulation, i.e., compression of the neck by hand, and not due to any other cause. He further admitted that he did not find any symptoms suggestive of ligature strangulation. He also admitted that, apart from manual compression by hand, no other object could have caused fractures of both posterior horns of the thyroid cartilage in the manner found in the present case. When questioned by the Trial Court under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, the witness stated that the two bones/cartilaginous structures of the posterior portion of the neck could be fractured only when a person's neck is compressed by hand. He further stated that, in the present case also, the fractures of the posterior portions of the neck were caused due to compression of the neck by hand. Thus, the trial Court, relying upon the statement of Dr. Shiv Narayan Manjhi (PW-12), who has conducted postmortem over the body of deceased Shabana Begum, vide Ex.P/27, has recorded the finding that the deceased died due to manual strangulation, and that the nature of her death was homicidal. 17. On a careful appreciation of the evidence of Dr. Shiv Narayan Manjhi (PW-12), who conducted the post-mortem examination 14 and proved the post-mortem report (Ex.P-27), we find no reason to take a different view from that taken by the learned Trial Court. The medical witness has categorically stated that the deceased had sustained multiple ante-mortem injuries, particularly numerous semi-circular abrasions over the neck, contusions in the neck muscles, fracture of the thyroid cartilage and both horns of the hyoid bone, with extravasation of blood around the fractured portions. He has further given a definite opinion that the cause of death was asphyxia due to manual strangulation (throttling) and that the nature of death was homicidal. His opinion remained unshaken in cross-examination, and he specifically ruled out ligature strangulation and attributed the injuries to compression of the neck by hand. The medical evidence, therefore, provides clear and cogent support to the conclusion that the deceased died an unnatural and homicidal death. Accordingly, we affirm the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court that the death of deceased Shabana Begum was homicidal in nature. The answer to the question framed above is, therefore, in the affirmative and against the appellant. 18. The next question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court has rightly held that the accused/ appellant, being husband of the deceased, with the intention of causing the death of deceased Shabana Begum, deliberately strangulated her and thereby intentionally caused her death? 15 19. In the prosecution evidence, Sheikh Saira (PW-1) stated that, upon reaching the place of occurrence, she found the dead body of deceased Shabana lying on the floor. She further stated that a red cloth was wrapped around the deceased's neck and that the persons from the locality had apprehended Mohammad Yusuf and were restraining him. She also stated that accused Mohammad Yusuf removed the red cloth from the neck of Shabana and fled from the spot. She further stated that the police personnel from Police Station Saraswati Nagar were called to the spot. The witness also stated that the proceedings relating to the site map/panchnama (Ex.P-1), notice (Ex.P-2), death information register (Ex.P-3) and spot map (Ex.P-4) were conducted in her presence. The testimony of this witness with regard to the proceedings relating to the notice for the dead-body panchnama (Ex.P-2) was corroborated by Mahmuda Begum (PW-2). Sheikh Kalam (PW-3) also stated that, on the date of the incident, he had gone to the house of the deceased and found the dead body of Shabana lying there. 20. In this regard, Shilpa Goswami (PW-6), who stated that she was the younger sister of the deceased, deposed that on the date of the incident she went to the place of occurrence and found the deceased lying dead in her room. She further stated that the police conducted the proceedings relating to the dead-body panchnama (Ex.P-2) and site map/panchnama (Ex.P-1) in her presence. Praneshwar Verma (PW-9), Assistant Sub-Inspector, 16 stated that, on the basis of Merg No. 30/2019, the First Information Report under Section 302 of the IPC was registered against the accused vide Ex.P-11. Inspector Gautam Chand Gawade (PW-11) also stated that, on receiving the Merg information, Merg No. 30/2019 was registered under Section 174 of the CrPC; witnesses were summoned by issuing notice Ex.P-2 for conducting the dead-body panchnama; after preparation of the panchnama, the dead body of the deceased was sent to Mekahara Hospital vide Ex.P-13; an application for conducting the post-mortem examination was prepared vide Ex.P-16; the dead- body panchnama was prepared vide Ex.P-1; and the Merg information was recorded vide Ex.P-3. The said witness also stated that he had participated in the proceedings relating to the Merg information. 21. Keeping in view the allegations levelled against the accused, if the prosecution evidence is examined, it would appear that Sheikh Saira (PW-1), Mahmuda Begum (PW-2), Sheikh Kalam (PW-3) and Shilpa Goswami (PW-6), who reached the place of occurrence and saw the dead body, have consistently stated that when they went to the house of deceased Shabana, her dead body was lying inside the room. They further stated that, at that time, Mohammad Yusuf was shouting repeatedly that “I have killed my wife; let me go and run away,” and that the accused Mohammad Yusuf thereafter removed the red cloth lying around Shabana's neck and fled from the spot. 17 22. Thus, the aforesaid witnesses have stated that the accused himself admitted that he had killed his wife and thereafter removed the red cloth from her neck and fled from the spot. Such conduct and statement of the accused indicate an admission of his involvement in the killing of the deceased. 23. The ocular evidence of PW-4 assumes considerable importance. The witness is the daughter of the accused and the deceased. There is no rule of law that the testimony of a child witness is to be discarded merely because of her age. Section 118 of the Evidence Act makes every person competent to testify unless the Court finds that such person is incapable of understanding the questions or giving rational answers. In Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 5 SCC 341, the Supreme Court held that the testimony of a child witness, if found reliable and competent, can itself constitute the basis of conviction. The Court is required to scrutinise such evidence carefully, particularly to rule out tutoring, but corroboration is not an inflexible requirement of law. The same principle has been reiterated in subsequent decisions, including State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 INSC 178. 24. Applying the aforesaid principle to the testimony of PW-4, we find her evidence to be natural and trustworthy. She had no reason to falsely implicate her own father in the murder of her mother. Her presence in the house at the relevant time is admitted even by the 18 accused in his statement. Her evidence regarding the quarrel between her parents immediately preceding the occurrence is consistent with the injuries found on the person of the deceased. Her statement that the accused assaulted the deceased and pressed a pillow over her mouth is also consistent with the occurrence of a violent physical assault, although the precise medical cause of death is established independently by PW-12 as manual strangulation. 25. The fact that, during cross-examination, PW-4 stated that she was in another room and could not clearly see all the articles lying in the room where the occurrence took place does not demolish her testimony. Her evidence has to be appreciated as a whole. She heard the quarrel, woke up, saw the accused assaulting the deceased, thereafter saw the subsequent conduct of the accused, and consistently maintained that the accused was responsible for the death. Minor variations regarding the exact position from which she witnessed the assault or the articles lying in the room do not affect the substratum of her testimony. 26. It is equally significant that the evidence of PW-4 is not standing alone. Immediately after the occurrence, PW-1 Sheikh Saira, PW- 2 Mahmuda Begum, PW-3 Sheikh Kalam and PW-6 Shilpa Goswami reached the place of occurrence and found the dead body of Shabana inside the house. Their evidence further establishes the conduct of the accused immediately after the 19 occurrence. According to these witnesses, the accused was shouting that he had killed his wife and thereafter removed the red cloth from the neck of the deceased and fled from the spot 27. The conduct of the accused immediately after the occurrence is a relevant circumstance under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. His conduct becomes particularly significant when considered alongside the medical evidence and the testimony of PW-4. 28. The statement attributed to the accused that “I have killed my wife” also assumes evidentiary significance. Such statement, if found to have been voluntarily made to persons other than police officers, is in the nature of an extra-judicial confession. The Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180, has held that an extra-judicial confession is not to be rejected merely on the ground that it is extra-judicial. If voluntary, truthful and made in a fit state of mind, it may be relied upon, subject to careful scrutiny of the credibility of the witnesses 29. Likewise, in Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 6 SCC 403, the Supreme Court reiterated that an extra-judicial confession must be voluntary, truthful, inspire confidence and preferably receive support from other cogent circumstances 30. In the present case, the alleged statement of the accused cannot be viewed in isolation. It is corroborated by the presence of the accused at the place of occurrence, the homicidal injuries suffered by the deceased, the testimony of PW-4, the conduct of the 20 accused in removing the cloth from the neck of the deceased and fleeing from the spot, and the absence of any plausible explanation from him. Thus, even assuming that the statement is to be treated with the caution applicable to an extra-judicial confession, it passes the test of credibility when examined against the entire prosecution evidence. 31. Another important circumstance is the special knowledge of the accused regarding the occurrence. The prosecution is not seeking to discharge its initial burden merely by invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution has first established the homicidal death of Shabana Begum and has placed material evidence connecting the accused with the occurrence. Only thereafter does the question of the accused's special knowledge arise. 32. Section 106 of the Evidence Act embodies the principle that when a fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of explaining that fact lies upon that person. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681, the Supreme Court explained that where an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house, the prosecution ordinarily cannot be expected to produce direct evidence of every aspect of the occurrence, and facts within the special knowledge of the person present in the house may legitimately require explanation from him. Similarly, in State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, (2006) 12 21 SCC 254, the Supreme Court held that Section 106 does not shift the primary burden of proof from the prosecution; however, where the prosecution establishes the foundational circumstances and the accused fails to explain facts especially within his knowledge, such failure may constitute an additional link in the chain of circumstances. 33. In the present case, the accused himself admits that he, the deceased and the children were together in the house during the relevant night. The deceased was subsequently found dead inside the house with multiple ante-mortem injuries and, in particular, injuries clearly attributable to manual strangulation. The accused was admittedly present at the place of occurrence. The deceased could not possibly have inflicted upon herself the injuries found by PW-12, nor has the accused offered any plausible explanation as to how she sustained those injuries or how she came to suffer fatal manual strangulation. What is more significant is that the defence did not put to the medical witness any specific alternative theory explaining the injuries. Nor was any satisfactory explanation offered to PW-4 regarding the quarrel and assault which immediately preceded the death. The accused has consequently failed to explain a fact which was peculiarly within his knowledge. 34. The failure of the accused to furnish a satisfactory explanation, however, is not being treated as a substitute for proof by the 22 prosecution. Rather, it operates as an additional circumstance after the prosecution has established the foundational facts. This distinction is important. Section 106 cannot be used to relieve the prosecution of its obligation to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. But once the prosecution establishes that the deceased died a homicidal death inside the house where the accused was admittedly present and where the child witness saw the accused assaulting the deceased, the failure of the accused to explain the occurrence becomes a relevant and incriminating circumstance. 35. The injuries found on the deceased also lend assurance to the testimony of PW-4. The deceased had sustained injuries not merely on the neck but also on the head, shoulders, back, waist and knees. The nature and distribution of these injuries are indicative of a physical assault and resistance preceding the fatal strangulation. The evidence of PW-4 that there was a quarrel between the accused and the deceased immediately before the occurrence is, therefore, not an isolated assertion; it finds substantial corroboration from the medical evidence. 36. The motive alleged by the prosecution also stands established. PW-4 stated that her paternal uncle Sikandar had committed a wrongful act against her, pursuant to which a criminal case was registered and he was arrested. The evidence further shows that the accused was insisting that the deceased withdraw the case 23 against his brother, whereas the deceased refused to do so. Ex.P- 24 and Ex.P-25 produced by the Investigating Officer support the existence of the criminal proceedings against Sikandar 37. More importantly, the accused himself admitted during his examination that he had asked his wife to withdraw the case against his brother. He further admitted the circumstances concerning the misconduct of his brother towards his daughter and his own request to his wife to forgive his brother. These are admissions emanating from the accused himself and materially corroborate the prosecution evidence regarding the strained relationship between the accused and the deceased on account of the criminal case. 38. Motive, by itself, may not ordinarily be sufficient to establish guilt; however, where the prosecution has otherwise established a complete chain of circumstances, proof of motive provides an important link and lends assurance to the prosecution version. In the present case, motive is not being relied upon as the sole basis of conviction. It is an additional circumstance which fits naturally into the established chain of events: the accused wanted the criminal case against his brother to be withdrawn; the deceased refused; a quarrel took place; the deceased suffered multiple injuries and ultimately died of manual strangulation; the accused was present in the house; PW-4 witnessed the assault; immediately thereafter the accused declared that he had killed his 24 wife and fled from the spot; and thereafter he offered no satisfactory explanation for her death. 39. The cumulative effect of these circumstances is decisive. The prosecution has established: (i) that Shabana Begum died an unnatural and homicidal death; (ii) that the cause of death was asphyxia due to manual strangulation; (iii) that the deceased had sustained multiple ante-mortem injuries indicating a violent struggle; (iv) that the accused was present with the deceased in the house at the relevant time; (v) that PW-4, the daughter of the accused and deceased, witnessed the assault and attributed the occurrence to the accused; (vi) that the testimony of PW-4 is materially corroborated by the medical evidence and the circumstances proved by the other witnesses; (vii) that immediately after the occurrence the accused declared that he had killed his wife and thereafter attempted to flee; (viii) that the accused himself admitted the circumstances which established his presence and the relevant motive; (ix) that the accused had a motive arising from his insistence that the deceased withdraw the criminal case against his brother; and (x) that despite being the person in the best position to explain the occurrence, the accused has furnished no satisfactory explanation for the fatal injuries and homicidal death of his wife. 40. The aforesaid circumstances form a complete and coherent chain. The law relating to circumstantial evidence is well settled. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 25 SCC 116, the Supreme Court laid down the well-known five principles, namely, that the circumstances must be fully established; they must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt; they must be conclusive in nature; they must exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence; and the chain must be so complete as to leave no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused 41. Tested on the aforesaid parameters, the circumstances proved in the present case point unerringly towards the guilt of the accused. They are not capable of being reasonably explained on the hypothesis that some unknown person entered the house, assaulted the deceased, manually strangulated her and thereafter disappeared, particularly when the accused himself was present in the house, the child witness attributes the assault to him, and the accused immediately thereafter proclaimed that he had killed his wife. 42. We are conscious that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. The principle is fundamental and requires no reiteration. But the present case does not rest upon suspicion or conjecture. It rests upon direct testimony of PW-4, medical evidence, the accused's admitted presence, his conduct immediately after the occurrence, his incriminating statement, the established motive and his failure to explain facts peculiarly within his knowledge. Each circumstance reinforces the other. The 26 circumstances, taken cumulatively, exclude the reasonable hypothesis of innocence. 43. We also find no substance in any attempt to discard the testimony of PW-4 merely because she is the daughter of the accused. Relationship with the accused is not a ground for rejection of otherwise trustworthy testimony. Indeed, in the peculiar facts of the present case, the fact that the witness was the daughter of both the accused and the deceased lends significance to her testimony, since she had no apparent reason to falsely implicate her own father in the death of her mother. Her evidence has withstood detailed cross-examination on all material particulars. 44. It is also significant that the accused did not furnish any alternative explanation which could reasonably account for the homicidal death of the deceased. His mere denial of the prosecution case cannot displace the positive evidence led by the prosecution. Where an accused offers no explanation regarding circumstances which are exclusively or specially within his knowledge, such failure, in the backdrop of otherwise established incriminating circumstances, can legitimately be taken into consideration as an additional link in the chain. 45. Thus, upon a holistic appreciation of the evidence, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court committed no error in concluding that the accused/appellant intentionally caused the death of his wife Shabana Begum by strangulating her. The 27 evidence establishes not merely the fact that the accused was present at the place of occurrence, but his active participation in the assault and the subsequent conduct consistent only with his guilt. 46. Consequently, the finding of the learned Trial Court that the accused/appellant caused the homicidal death of Shabana Begum and thereby committed the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC is based on proper appreciation of the oral, medical and documentary evidence on record. The finding is neither perverse nor contrary to the evidence. No material contradiction, omission or infirmity has been demonstrated which would justify interference by this Court in appellate jurisdiction. 47. In view of the foregoing discussion, we answer the question framed in paragraph 18 in the affirmative. We hold that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused/appellant, being the husband of deceased Shabana Begum, deliberately assaulted and manually strangulated her, thereby intentionally causing her death. The chain of circumstances is complete and consistent only with the guilt of the accused. 48. Accordingly, the findings recorded by the trial Court are well- reasoned and do not warrant any interference. The appeal, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. 28 49. It is stated at the Bar that the accused / appellant is in jail, he shall serve out the sentence as ordered by the learned trial Court. 50. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record of the case to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance and also send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellants are undergoing their jail sentence to serve the same on the appellants informing them that they are at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Chandra