1 CGHC010098332022 2026:CGHC:36500-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 518 of 2022 Manohar Mandavi S/o Late Heeralal Aged About 31 Years R/o Village- Tundekundel Police Station- Mangchuwa, District- Baloda (C.G.) ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through- Station House Officer, Police Station Mangchuwa, District- Balod (C.G.) ... Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. H.S. Patel, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Soumya Rai, Deputy Government Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 17.08.2026 1. Heard Mr. H.S. Patel, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Soumya Rai, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent. 2. The present criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.08.18 10:17:58 +0530 2 short, “CrPC”), calling in question the legality and validity of the impugned judgment dated 02.02.2022 passed by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Balod, District Balod, Chhattisgarh, in Sessions Trial No.04/2020. By the said judgment, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life along with a fine of Rs.500/-, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 30 days as well as rigorous imprisonment for 07 years along with a fine of Rs.500/-, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 30 days with a direction to run both the sentences concurrently. 3. The prosecution case, as projected before the learned Trial Court, was that the appellant-Manohar Mandavi had married deceased Kirti Bhuarya by way of a love marriage. After their marriage, both were living away from their respective villages for the purpose of earning their livelihood and used to visit their villages occasionally. The prosecution alleged that, on account of a dispute between the appellant and his wife, the appellant took her to the forest situated in the vicinity of village Tundekundel, strangulated her by pressing her neck and thereafter burnt her dead body between two rocks by placing wood and grass over it. The alleged occurrence was stated to have taken place approximately four to five months prior to 27.09.2019. 3 4. The deceased Kirti Bhuarya was the daughter of PW-1 Dirbal Bhuarya. It is also not in dispute that the appellant and deceased had contracted a love marriage. The appellant belonged to village Tundekundel whereas the deceased belonged to village Chamratola. After their marriage, the couple had gone outside their respective villages for earning their livelihood and were not ordinarily residing in either village. The evidence further indicates that, because the marriage was between persons belonging to different social communities, both the appellant and the deceased had been socially excluded by their respective communities. 5. On 26.09.2019, the appellant was brought by certain persons from village Tundekundel to the house of PW-1 Dirbal Bhuarya at village Chamratola. The villagers were enquiring about the whereabouts of the deceased. During such interrogation, the appellant initially stated that he had left his wife at her parental home. Subsequently, according to the prosecution witnesses, the appellant made statements to the effect that he had killed his wife in the forest and had thereafter burnt her body. 6. On the following day, i.e. 27.09.2019, the appellant was taken to Police Station Mangchua and thereafter to the forest area. According to the prosecution witnesses, the appellant pointed out a place situated between two large rocks where a burnt human skeleton was found. The police thereafter prepared the relevant documents, including the spot map, seizure/recovery 4 memorandum and other papers. The FIR was subsequently registered on the basis of the report of PW-1. 7. From the spot, burnt human bones/skeleton and pieces of bangles were recovered. The seizure proceedings were reduced into writing through Ex.P-5 and the articles were also shown in the property seizure memorandum Ex.P-6. The material seized included burnt soil, ash, pieces of burnt stones, ordinary stones and broken bangles, including red-coloured glass bangles. 8. The prosecution also relied upon the alleged memorandum/disclosure statement of the appellant, marked Ex.P-4, and the subsequent pointing out of the place where the skeleton was allegedly lying. The investigating officer PW-11 stated that Ex.P-4 was recorded in the presence of witnesses PW-4 Rajuram Kothari and PW-10 Ubalal Rawte. 9. The prosecution examined eleven witnesses, namely PW-1 Dirbal Bhuarya, PW-2 Khemalal Alendra, PW-3 Kanhaiya Badhai, PW-4 Rajuram Kothari, PW-5 Prakash Rawte, PW-6 Patwari Ajit Kumar Chourey, PW-7 Khamghan Sai, PW-8 Vishnu Sai, PW-9 Dr. Shivnarayan Manjhi, PW-10 Ubalal Rawte and PW-11 Sub- Inspector Abhishek Mahobiya. The appellant did not examine any defence witness and, in his examination under Section 313 CrPC, denied the allegations and pleaded false implication. 10. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned trial Court held that the prosecution had 5 succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and imposed the sentence as recorded in the impugned judgment dated 02.02.2022. 11. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellant has preferred the present criminal appeal before this Court, challenging the findings recorded by the learned trial Court and seeking reversal of his conviction and sentence. 12. Mr. H.S. Patel, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the judgment of conviction is unsustainable in law and on facts. According to learned counsel, the prosecution has failed to establish the most fundamental link in the chain of circumstances, namely, that the skeleton recovered from the forest was in fact that of deceased Kirti Bhuarya. It is submitted that there is admittedly no direct eyewitness to the alleged murder. The prosecution case is entirely circumstantial. In such a case, every circumstance relied upon by the prosecution must be firmly established and all the circumstances, taken cumulatively, must form a complete chain leading only to the guilt of the accused and must be inconsistent with his innocence. 13. Mr. Patel would further submit that the evidence regarding identification of the skeleton is wholly inadequate. PW-1, the father of the deceased, claimed to have identified the skeleton on 6 the basis of the red bangles found on its wrists. However, the other prosecution witnesses candidly admitted that, on seeing the burnt bones and skeleton, they could not identify whether the remains belonged to a male or a female, much less to the deceased Kirti Bhuarya. Several witnesses admitted that the skeleton could not be identified by merely looking at it. It is further submitted that PW-1 had not seen his daughter after she left with the appellant pursuant to the marriage. The appellant and deceased were living outside the village for earning their livelihood and used to visit the village only occasionally. Thus, the alleged identification of the skeleton merely from the presence of red bangles is inherently unsafe, particularly when the prosecution witnesses themselves admitted that similar bangles were easily available in the market. 14. Mr. Patel would next submit that the medical evidence does not establish that the deceased had suffered a homicidal death. PW-9 Dr. Shivnarayan Manjhi, after examining the burnt bones, opined that the remains were human and belonged to a female aged approximately 25 years ± 5 years. However, significantly, the doctor categorically stated that the cause of death could not be ascertained and even the period since death could not be determined. More importantly, the doctor stated that it was not possible to say whether the person had been killed and thereafter burnt or had been burnt alive. It is therefore urged that the medical evidence does not corroborate the prosecution case of 7 strangulation. No ligature material was recovered. No injury attributable to strangulation could be established because only a substantially burnt skeleton was available for examination. Even the doctor was unable to state whether the death was homicidal, suicidal or otherwise. 15. Mr. Patel would also challenge the alleged extra-judicial confession. It is submitted that the appellant was brought before a large gathering of villagers and was subjected to repeated interrogation. The witnesses themselves admitted that several persons were present and that the appellant was not left alone during the interrogation. According to learned counsel, the alleged confession is therefore not a voluntary extra-judicial confession made in circumstances inspiring confidence. It is further submitted that the alleged confession was recorded after the appellant had already been taken to the police and after the recovery proceedings had commenced. The investigating officer himself admitted circumstances relating to the timing of the memorandum which create doubt regarding the prosecution version. The alleged confession, therefore, cannot be treated as an independent and voluntary incriminating circumstance. 16. It is contended by Mr. Patel that the investigating officer admitted that the statement of one Sharma Maharaj, who was allegedly the person before whom the appellant disclosed the material fact, was never recorded. The omission assumes significance because the 8 prosecution witnesses repeatedly referred to the role of the said person in eliciting the alleged confession. It is further argued that there are material contradictions concerning the date on which the appellant was taken to the police station. Some witnesses stated that he was taken to the police station on 26.09.2019 itself, whereas the investigating officer attempted to suggest that the appellant was brought to the police station only on 27.09.2019. Such inconsistency, according to learned counsel, materially affects the prosecution chronology. Lastly, Mr. Patel would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove motive, failed to establish the identity of the deceased, failed to establish homicidal death, failed to establish the precise manner of death and has relied principally upon statements allegedly made by the appellant in circumstances which do not inspire confidence. It is therefore submitted that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt and the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside. 17. Per contra, Mr. Soumya Rai, learned State counsel would support the judgment of the learned Trial Court and submit that the prosecution has proved the case through a complete chain of circumstances. It is submitted that the appellant was the husband of the deceased and was the last person known to be associated with her. When the villagers questioned him regarding the whereabouts of his wife, he initially gave an explanation that she had been left at her parental home. Upon verification, however, that explanation was found to be false, as PW-1 stated that the 9 deceased had never returned to her parental home after marriage. 18. Mr. Rai would submit that the prosecution witnesses have consistently deposed that the appellant ultimately disclosed that he had killed his wife in the forest and burnt her body. Thereafter, the appellant himself led the police and the villagers to the precise spot between two rocks where the burnt human skeleton was found. Such conduct, according to learned State counsel, constitutes a strong incriminating circumstance. It is further submitted that the recovery of a human female skeleton from the very place pointed out by the appellant, coupled with the presence of bangles on the wrists and broken bangles around the remains, corroborates the prosecution case that the remains were those of a woman. The medical evidence also establishes that the skeleton was of a female of approximately the age of the deceased. He would submit that the alleged confession is not the sole circumstance relied upon by the prosecution. It is supported by the subsequent conduct of the appellant, his pointing out of the place of occurrence, the recovery of the skeleton, the recovery of bangles and the fact that he had falsely stated that he had left his wife at her parental home. It is therefore submitted that the learned Trial Court has considered the entire evidence in its proper perspective and has rightly found the appellant guilty. The appeal, according to learned State counsel, deserves to be dismissed. 10 19. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused the impugned judgment and carefully examined the entire material available on record, including the oral testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the documentary evidence, the medical evidence and the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution. 20. At the outset, it requires emphasis that the present case is admittedly one of circumstantial evidence. There is no eyewitness who claims to have seen the appellant assaulting, strangulating or killing the deceased. There is equally no eyewitness to the alleged burning of the body. 21. In a case based upon circumstantial evidence, the prosecution is required to establish each circumstance firmly and conclusively. The circumstances so proved must form a complete and unbroken chain which leads to the only reasonable conclusion that the accused and none else committed the crime. Suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute proof. 22. The principles governing a case based upon circumstantial evidence are by now well settled. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, the Supreme Court laid down the five golden principles governing such cases, namely, that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn must be fully established; they must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused; they must be of a conclusive nature and tendency; they must exclude every 11 possible hypothesis except the one sought to be proved; and there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. The said principles continue to govern appreciation of circumstantial evidence. 23. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that where the prosecution case rests upon circumstances, each circumstance must be proved independently and the cumulative effect of the circumstances must form an unbroken chain pointing towards the guilt of the accused and to no other reasonable conclusion. In State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, (2006) 12 SCC 254, the Supreme Court reiterated that the burden of proving all the circumstances which constitute the chain lies upon the prosecution and that suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute proof. The same principle has been reiterated in subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. 24. Tested on the aforesaid parameters, the evidence led by the prosecution in the present case requires particularly careful scrutiny, since there is no direct eyewitness account and the prosecution seeks to connect the appellant with the alleged death principally through the alleged extra-judicial confession, the pointing out of the place of recovery, the recovery of skeletal remains and bangles, and the surrounding circumstances. 25. Keeping the aforesaid principle in mind, the first and most 12 fundamental question is whether the prosecution has established that the human skeleton recovered from the forest was that of Kirti Bhuarya. IDENTITY OF THE SKELETON 26. The prosecution attempted to establish identity principally through PW-1 Dirbal Bhuarya, father of the deceased. PW-1 stated that he recognised the skeleton as that of his daughter. However, when his testimony is considered along with the evidence of the other witnesses and the circumstances in which the identification was allegedly made, serious doubt arises regarding the reliability of such identification. 27. PW-2 Khemalal Alendra categorically stated that, when he saw the remains at the spot, he could only see a burnt skeleton and that the identity of the person could not be ascertained merely by looking at it. He further stated that it was only after the appellant disclosed that the skeleton was that of his wife Kirti that the identity came to be associated with her. 28. Similarly, PW-3 Kanhaiya Badhai admitted in cross-examination that, when he reached the spot, only a burnt skeleton was visible and there was nothing else from which its identity could be established. PW-4 Rajuram Kothari also admitted that only pieces of bones were lying at the spot and that from those remains it was not possible to determine whether the skeleton belonged to a male or a female. PW-5 Prakash Rawte and PW-7 Khamghan Sai 13 also accepted that the identity of the skeleton could not be ascertained merely by looking at it. PW-8 Vishnu Sai similarly stated that nothing could be inferred from the skeleton as to whose remains they were. 29. The aforesaid admissions are not minor discrepancies. They go to the root of the prosecution case. The prosecution was required to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the skeleton was that of Kirti Bhuarya. Instead, the evidence shows that the witnesses could not identify the remains independently. 30. The reliance placed upon the red bangles is also insufficient. PW- 1 stated that when his daughter had left with the appellant, she was wearing red bangles and that red bangles were found around the wrists of the skeleton. On that basis, he claimed to have identified the remains. However, the investigating officer himself acknowledged the circumstances surrounding the bangles, and the evidence further shows that such red bangles are ordinarily available in the market. The presence of commonly available bangles cannot, by itself, constitute a conclusive means of identifying a completely burnt skeleton. 31. More importantly, PW-1 had not seen his daughter after she had left with the appellant. The evidence indicates that the appellant and the deceased had gone away for employment and were visiting the village only occasionally. Thus, the possibility that PW- 1's identification was influenced by the information supplied by the 14 appellant cannot be completely excluded. 32. It is also significant that the prosecution did not produce any scientifically conclusive identification of the skeleton. The medical evidence does not establish identity. No DNA comparison establishing that the remains belonged to Kirti Bhuarya has been brought on record. 33. In a prosecution for murder, the identity of the victim is not a peripheral matter. It is an essential foundational fact. Unless the prosecution establishes that the person alleged to have been murdered is in fact dead and that the remains recovered are those of that person, the subsequent circumstances cannot safely be used to sustain a conviction for murder. 34. The importance of establishing the identity of the deceased assumes even greater significance in a case where the prosecution relies upon recovery of skeletal remains. The prosecution cannot proceed on an assumption that the remains recovered from the spot necessarily belonged to the person alleged to have been murdered. The identity of the deceased is itself a fact which must be established through reliable and legally admissible evidence. Where the prosecution evidence leaves a reasonable doubt as to whether the recovered remains were those of the deceased named in the charge, such doubt necessarily affects the entire prosecution case. In the present case, there is no scientific evidence, such as DNA examination, 15 establishing that the recovered skeleton was that of deceased Kirti Bhuarya. The identification sought to be made through the red bangles is, in the circumstances of the case, inherently unsafe, particularly when the prosecution witnesses themselves admitted that the skeletal remains could not independently be identified and that the bangles were commonly available. The possibility that the identification was influenced by the information allegedly furnished by the appellant cannot, therefore, be ruled out. 35. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the prosecution has not established the identity of the skeleton with the degree of certainty required in a criminal trial. MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND CAUSE OF DEATH 36. It is a settled principle that where medical evidence is incapable of establishing the cause or manner of death, the Court must exercise particular caution before drawing a conclusion of homicidal death merely from the surrounding circumstances. In the present case, PW-9 has not merely failed to support the prosecution version of strangulation; his evidence positively leaves the manner of death undetermined. The doctor could not state whether the deceased had been killed before the body was burnt or whether the person had been burnt alive. Thus, the medical evidence does not corroborate the specific prosecution allegation of strangulation. 16 37. This assumes significance because the prosecution has alleged a specific mode of commission of murder, namely, strangulation by pressing the neck with a gamcha. Yet, neither the alleged ligature nor any corresponding medical finding has been brought on record. The medical evidence, therefore, does not provide the necessary corroborative link between the appellant and the alleged homicidal death. 38. The evidence of PW-9 Dr. Shivnarayan Manjhi assumes considerable importance. The doctor examined the burnt bones and prepared his expert report, Ex.P-12. His examination established that the recovered bones were human bones and that they belonged to a female. On the basis of the skeletal examination, the age was estimated to be approximately 25 years plus or minus 5 years. 39. However, the doctor's evidence does not establish the cause of death. Rather, the expert opinion specifically states that neither the period since death nor the cause of death could be determined from the remains. Most importantly, the doctor categorically opined that it was not possible to say whether the person had first been killed and thereafter burnt or had been burnt alive. 40. This part of the medical evidence creates a serious difficulty for the prosecution. The charge under Section 302 IPC necessarily requires proof of death caused by the accused with the requisite 17 intention or knowledge. Here, the medical evidence does not establish the manner or cause of death. 41. The prosecution alleged strangulation by pressing the neck with a gamcha. Yet, no gamcha or ligature material was recovered. No medical finding establishes strangulation. The doctor could not opine that the deceased had been strangulated. 42. The distinction is material. The Court cannot infer homicidal death merely because burnt human remains were found. The remains establish, at best, that human bones of a female were recovered and had been subjected to extensive burning. They do not, by themselves, establish that the person died a homicidal death. 43. Indeed, the medical evidence leaves open the possibility that the person could have died in some other manner and that the body was thereafter burnt. The prosecution was required to exclude such reasonable possibilities. It has failed to do so. EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION 44. The next circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is the alleged confession of the appellant before the villagers. 45. We have carefully examined the testimony of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, PW-5, PW-7, PW-8 and PW-10. The witnesses broadly state that the appellant was brought to village Chamratola, questioned regarding the whereabouts of Kirti and thereafter, during the course of interrogation, made incriminating statements. 18 46. PW-2 stated that after the appellant initially claimed to have left Kirti at her parental home, the villagers became suspicious and thereafter questioned him again. He then allegedly disclosed that he had killed Kirti in the forest. PW-3 gave a similar account and stated that the appellant ultimately disclosed that he had killed Kirti near his village and was thereafter taken to the police station. PW-4 Rajuram Kothari also stated that, during the village meeting, the appellant initially stated that Kirti had been left at her parental home, but subsequently made a different statement regarding her death. 47. However, the mere consistency of several witnesses in narrating the same occurrence does not automatically transform the alleged statement into a legally sufficient confession. The Court is required to examine the circumstances in which the statement was made, the person before whom it was made, its voluntariness, its exact contents and the extent to which it receives independent corroboration. 48. The evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession has been considered by the Supreme Court in Sahadevan and Another v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 6 SCC 403. The Supreme Court held that an extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence and has to be examined with greater care and caution. It must be voluntary, truthful and inspire confidence, and ordinarily the Court would look for reliable corroboration before acting upon such 19 evidence. The Supreme Court has reiterated these principles in subsequent decisions, including State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 and Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan, decided on 13.12.2019. 49. The Supreme Court has further emphasised that the circumstances in which an alleged extra-judicial confession is made are of considerable importance. The Court is required to examine the person before whom the confession was allegedly made, the circumstances in which it was made, the possibility of coercion or intimidation, and whether the version is consistent with the other proved circumstances. 50. More importantly, the alleged extra-judicial confession does not receive such independent corroboration from the remaining evidence as would make it safe to rely upon it for recording a conviction for murder. The alleged recovery of the skeleton does not establish its identity as that of Kirti Bhuarya; the medical evidence does not establish homicidal death; and there is no scientific evidence connecting the appellant with the recovered remains. Thus, the very circumstances which were required to corroborate the confession themselves remain doubtful. 51. In Sahadevan (supra), the Supreme Court has made it clear that where an extra-judicial confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities and does not appear cogent and trustworthy, the Court would be justified in excluding it 20 from consideration. In the present case, the alleged confession was not made in circumstances which inspire the requisite degree of confidence. The appellant was surrounded by a large number of villagers and was repeatedly questioned regarding the whereabouts of his wife. PW-3 himself admitted the presence of approximately 60-70 persons and that the appellant was not permitted to leave alone. The alleged statement, therefore, requires considerably greater corroboration before it can be treated as a circumstance pointing towards guilt. 52. The prosecution evidence shows that the appellant was surrounded by a large number of villagers and was subjected to repeated questioning regarding the whereabouts of his wife. PW-3 specifically admitted that approximately 60-70 persons were present at the place where the appellant was questioned and that he was not permitted to go away alone. 53. This circumstance assumes importance. The alleged confession was not made spontaneously in an ordinary setting to a person in whom the appellant had reposed confidence. It was allegedly made after repeated interrogation by a group of villagers who were already suspicious of him. 54. The prosecution also failed to examine the person referred to by the witnesses as Sharma Maharaj, who allegedly elicited the crucial statement from the appellant. The investigating officer admitted that no statement of the said person was recorded. This 21 omission assumes significance because, according to the prosecution's own case, the said person was a material link in the alleged confession. 55. The alleged confession therefore requires independent and convincing corroboration. Unfortunately, the independent circumstances relied upon by the prosecution themselves suffer from serious deficiencies. DISCLOSURE STATEMENT AND SECTION 27 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT 56. The prosecution relied upon Ex.P-4, the memorandum allegedly recording the statement of the appellant, and Ex.P-5, the recovery memorandum. 57. It is well settled that only that portion of a statement made by an accused in police custody which distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered can be proved under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The discovery of a fact is not equivalent to proof of the entire confession contained in the memorandum. The evidentiary value of a discovery under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is also limited by the statutory requirement that only so much of the information as distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered is admissible. The discovery of an object or the identification of a place does not, by itself, establish that the accused committed the offence connected with that object or place. 22 58. The Supreme Court, while considering circumstantial evidence involving a recovery under Section 27, has repeatedly held that a discovery may constitute one link in the chain but cannot, by itself, complete the chain of circumstances. In enn number of cases, the Supreme Court observed that the discovery evidence, even when accepted, must be considered along with the remaining circumstances and that a discovery by itself is insufficient to fasten criminal liability where the chain remains incomplete. In the present case, even if the appellant's pointing out of the place is accepted in its entirety, the fact discovered is only the presence of burnt human remains at that particular location. It does not establish that the remains belonged to Kirti Bhuarya, nor does it establish that the appellant caused her death. The evidentiary value of the discovery, therefore, cannot be enlarged beyond what the law permits. In the present case, the alleged memorandum contains an extensive narrative concerning the killing of the deceased and burning of her body. Such narrative, insofar as it amounts to a confession of guilt, cannot be treated as substantive evidence merely because a recovery or pointing-out followed. What remains to be considered is the limited fact actually discovered pursuant to the information supplied by the appellant. The evidence does indicate that the appellant pointed out a particular place in the forest where a burnt skeleton was found. The witnesses consistently stated that he led them to a place between two rocks. However, the fact that the appellant pointed 23 out a place where human remains were found does not, by itself, establish that he had murdered the person whose remains were recovered. Nor does it establish that the remains belonged to Kirti Bhuarya. 59. The discovery, therefore, has limited evidentiary value. It may establish that the appellant had knowledge of the place, but knowledge of the place is not synonymous with proof of participation in the murder. THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF POINTING OUT THE PLACE 60. The prosecution has placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the place where the skeleton was found was not an ordinary or frequently visited location and that the appellant alone led the police and villagers to that place. 61. We have considered this circumstance carefully. It undoubtedly raises suspicion against the appellant. However, suspicion cannot replace proof. The prosecution has not established that the place was exclusively within the knowledge of the appellant. The investigating officer admitted that the area surrounding the spot was forest. The Patwari PW-6 prepared a spot map on 02.11.2019, and the place was shown to him by PW-4. 62. Even assuming that the appellant had knowledge of the location, that circumstance would require corroboration from other reliable evidence connecting him with the death of Kirti. Such 24 corroboration is conspicuously absent. CONTRADICTIONS REGARDING THE POLICE CUSTODY AND CHRONOLOGY 63. Another circumstance which cannot be ignored is the inconsistency concerning when the appellant was taken to the police station. 64. The prosecution witnesses stated that the appellant was taken to Police Station Mangchua on 26.09.2019 after the village interrogation. However, the investigating officer gave a different version concerning the time when the appellant was brought to the police station. The Trial Court itself noticed this discrepancy. This discrepancy becomes material when the prosecution relies upon the subsequent memorandum and recovery as a spontaneous discovery arising from the appellant's information. 65. In a case resting almost entirely on circumstantial evidence, the chronology of events must be established with reasonable clarity. The prosecution cannot simultaneously rely upon an alleged confession made before villagers and an alleged police interrogation while leaving material uncertainty regarding the point at which the appellant came into police custody. INVESTIGATION 66. We also find certain deficiencies in the investigation which assume significance when considered cumulatively. The 25 investigating officer admitted that the statement of Sharma Maharaj was not recorded, although the prosecution witnesses attributed a material role to him in the alleged disclosure made by the appellant. The investigating officer also admitted that the burnt skeleton was collected and sent for examination, but there is no scientific identification linking the remains to Kirti Bhuarya. 67. The prosecution also did not produce any material establishing the last known presence of the deceased with the appellant immediately prior to the alleged occurrence. The evidence merely shows that the couple used to live outside the village for work and occasionally visited their respective villages. There is also no evidence establishing when Kirti was last seen alive with the appellant. No witness has stated that he saw the deceased in the company of the appellant immediately before the alleged murder. Thus, the important link between the appellant and the death remains unproved. CUMULATIVE APPRECIATION OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE 68. We are conscious that individual circumstances, when viewed in isolation, may create a strong suspicion against the appellant. The appellant was the husband of the deceased. He gave inconsistent explanations regarding her whereabouts. He allegedly disclosed that he had killed her. He thereafter pointed out the place where a burnt skeleton was found. These circumstances undoubtedly call for careful consideration. 26 69. But a criminal conviction cannot rest upon suspicion merely because suspicion appears strong when individual circumstances are placed one after another. It is necessary to remind ourselves of the distinction between suspicion and proof. The conduct attributed to the appellant may undoubtedly give rise to suspicion. However, suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute legal proof. The principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra), wherein it was emphasised that the circumstances must form a complete chain and must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Where two reasonably possible views emerge from the evidence, the view favourable to the accused must necessarily prevail. 70. The prosecution was required to establish, at the very least, the following essential links: (i) that Kirti Bhuarya was in fact dead; (ii) that the skeleton recovered from the forest was that of Kirti Bhuarya; (iii) that the death was homicidal; (iv) that the appellant was the person who caused such death; and (v) that the appellant thereafter caused disappearance of evidence with the requisite intention so as to attract Section 201 IPC. 27 71. On the evidence available, the first link in the precise form required for a conviction for murder itself remains doubtful. The prosecution has established recovery of human remains of a female, but has not conclusively established that the remains belonged to Kirti Bhuarya. 72. The second and third links are equally problematic. The medical evidence establishes that the bones were human and belonged to a female of approximately 25 years ± 5 years, but it expressly states that the cause of death could not be determined and that it could not be said whether the person was killed before burning or burnt alive. 73. The fourth link—namely, the appellant's authorship of the death— is sought to be established substantially through the alleged extra- judicial confession and the pointing out of the place. For the reasons already discussed, neither circumstance, independently or cumulatively, reaches the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 74. The fifth link, relating to Section 201 IPC, also depends upon proof of the underlying offence and the identity of the deceased. If the prosecution cannot establish beyond reasonable doubt that the recovered remains belonged to Kirti and that the appellant caused her death, the conviction under Section 201 IPC cannot independently survive on the same uncertain foundation. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S APPROACH CAN BE SUSTAINED 28 75. The learned Trial Court placed substantial reliance upon the consistency of the villagers' evidence regarding the statements made by the appellant and the fact that he pointed out the place where the burnt skeleton was recovered. 76. The Trial Court also relied upon the presence of bangles and the medical opinion that the skeleton belonged to a female of approximately the age of the deceased. With respect, while those circumstances may generate suspicion, they do not constitute an unbroken chain of circumstances sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder. The Trial Court itself recorded that several witnesses could not identify the skeleton by merely seeing the remains and that PW-2 had stated that the identity became known only on the basis of the appellant's disclosure. The Trial Court nevertheless proceeded to bridge that evidentiary gap by relying upon the alleged confession. 77. In our considered view, such an approach reverses the burden of proof. The prosecution must first establish the identity of the deceased through reliable evidence. It cannot rely upon the accused's alleged statement to establish identity and then use the identity so derived as corroboration of the same statement. 78. Likewise, the fact that the skeleton was found at a place pointed out by the appellant cannot itself prove that the skeleton was that of his wife. Nor can the fact that he knew of the place establish that he had caused the death of the person whose remains were 29 found there. The law requires the Court to distinguish between a circumstance which creates suspicion and a circumstance which proves a fact forming part of the chain of guilt. The present case, in our considered opinion, does not cross that threshold. BENEFIT OF DOUBT 79. The rule relating to benefit of doubt is not a rule of technicality but a fundamental component of criminal jurisprudence. The prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and cannot derive assistance from any weakness in the defence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where, upon appreciation of the entire evidence, two views are reasonably possible, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted. 80. In the present case, the doubt is not fanciful, remote or imaginary. It arises from concrete deficiencies in the prosecution evidence: the identity of the skeleton is not scientifically established; the alleged identification through bangles is doubtful; the medical expert could not determine the cause or manner of death; there is no medical confirmation of strangulation; the alleged extra-judicial confession was made in circumstances requiring careful scrutiny and lacks satisfactory independent corroboration; and the pointing out of the place, even if accepted, does not establish the appellant's authorship of the death. 81. These are not isolated discrepancies which may be brushed aside as minor variations. They affect the very substratum of the 30 prosecution case. The prosecution has failed to establish the essential links connecting the appellant with the alleged homicidal death. As such, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt arising from the evidence. The principle is not that every fanciful or imaginary possibility must result in acquittal. But where the prosecution evidence leaves a reasonable and substantial doubt regarding the identity of the deceased, the cause of death and the appellant's authorship of the death, the Court cannot record a conviction merely because the surrounding circumstances appear suspicious. 82. In the present case, the following circumstances cumulatively create reasonable doubt: (a) there is no eyewitness to the alleged murder; (b) there is no scientific identification establishing that the recovered skeleton was that of Kirti Bhuarya; (c) the identification by PW-1 is based essentially upon red bangles; (d) other prosecution witnesses admitted that the skeleton could not be identified merely by seeing it; (e) the medical expert could not determine the cause or manner of death; (f) the medical expert could not state whether the person was killed and thereafter burnt or burnt alive; 31 (g) no weapon or ligature material connected with the alleged strangulation was recovered; (h) there is no reliable evidence regarding the deceased's last-seen presence with the appellant; (i) the statement of the material person, Sharma Maharaj, was not recorded; (j) there is inconsistency regarding the time/date when the appellant was taken into police custody; and (k) the pointing out of the place, even if accepted, establishes at best knowledge of the location and not necessarily authorship of the crime. 83. These circumstances, taken together, make it unsafe to uphold the conviction. We may also notice that the prosecution evidence does establish that the appellant and deceased had been socially ostracised following their inter-community marriage and that the appellant had approached the villagers seeking acceptance into his community. That circumstance explains why he came before the villagers and why questions were raised regarding his wife. However, it cannot by itself furnish proof of murder. The evidence concerning the social circumstances of the marriage cannot be converted into proof of homicidal conduct. 84. Criminal jurisprudence does not permit conviction on the basis of moral suspicion or on the basis that the accused has failed to 32 furnish a satisfactory explanation. The burden remains throughout upon the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant's failure to examine any defence witness cannot cure deficiencies in the prosecution case. The accused is not required to prove his innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on the strength of its own evidence. 85. We are therefore unable to agree with the conclusion reached by the learned Trial Court that the prosecution has established the charges under Sections 302 and 201 IPC beyond reasonable doubt. CONCLUSION 86. On an overall appreciation of the evidence, we find that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that burnt human skeletal remains of a female were recovered from a forested location and that certain bangles were found along with the remains. The prosecution has also established that the appellant pointed out the location where such remains were found. However, those circumstances, even when taken together, do not conclusively establish that the remains were those of Kirti Bhuarya, nor do they establish that the appellant caused her death. 87. The medical evidence is particularly significant. The expert has categorically stated that the cause of death could not be determined and that it was not possible to say whether the person 33 had been killed and thereafter burnt or had been burnt alive. The prosecution has therefore failed to establish homicidal death as against the appellant. In the absence of proof of homicidal death and identity of the deceased, the alleged extra-judicial confession and pointing-out evidence cannot, by themselves, sustain a conviction for murder. 88. The question before us is not whether the circumstances raise suspicion against the appellant. They undoubtedly do. The question is whether those circumstances establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant murdered Kirti Bhuarya and thereafter caused disappearance of the evidence of such offence. On a careful and cumulative appreciation of the evidence, we are unable to answer that question in the affirmative. 89. The prosecution evidence falls short of the standard required for sustaining a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence. The chain is not complete and, more importantly, there remain reasonable and substantial gaps relating to the identity of the deceased, the cause and manner of death and the appellant's connection with the death. 90. The Supreme Court has consistently cautioned that a criminal Court must not allow suspicion to take the place of proof and that the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution must exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to cross 34 that threshold. The possibility that the recovered skeletal remains may not be conclusively attributable to the deceased, coupled with the uncertainty regarding the cause and manner of death and the absence of reliable corroboration of the alleged confession, creates a reasonable doubt which must necessarily enure to the benefit of the appellant. 91. We are conscious that the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the deceased and the conduct attributed to the appellant are suspicious. However, the distinction between "may be guilty" and "must be guilty" is fundamental to criminal adjudication. Suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof. The prosecution was required to establish a complete chain of circumstances excluding every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the appellant. In the present case, that chain remains incomplete. Consequently, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 92. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 02.02.2022 passed by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Balod, District Balod (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No.04 of 2020, convicting the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, is hereby set aside. 93. The appellant-Manohar Mandavi is acquitted of the charges under Sections 302 and 201 IPC by extending to him the benefit of 35 doubt. The appellant shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 94. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant is directed forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with two reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 95. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu