1 CGHC010413662022 2026:CGHC:37804-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 2000 of 2022 Loknath Bandhe S/o Dayaram Bandhe Aged About 21 Years R/o Village - Dotopar, Police Station - City Kotwali, Balodabazar, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh --- Appellant Versus State of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate, Balodabazar- Bhatapara, District - Balodabazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent CRA No. 1825 of 2022 Jai Kishan Bandhe S/o Dayaram Bandhe Aged About 25 Years R/o Dotopara, Police Station City Kotwali, Balodabazar, District : Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh --- Appellant Versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station City Kotwali, Balodabazar, District Balodabazar, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant in CRA No.2000/2022 : Mr. Adil Minhaj, Advocate For Appellant in CRA No.1825/2022 : Mr. Pragalbha Sharma, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Sumit Singh, Deputy Advocate General ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.08.25 10:29:09 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 24.08.2026 1. Since both these criminal appeals arise out of the same judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 03.11.2022 passed by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Balodabazar, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara, in Sessions Trial No.10/2021, they have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 2. Criminal Appeal No.2000 of 2022 has been preferred by appellant-Loknath Bandhe, whereas Criminal Appeal No.1825 of 2022 has been preferred by appellant-Jai Kishan Bandhe. By the impugned judgment, the learned trial Court convicted both the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced each of them to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, with default stipulation. The appellants were also convicted under the other offences charged against them. 3. According to the prosecution, on 16.07.2020 at about 8:00 p.m., a quarrel took place at Azad Chowk, Dotopara, between the deceased and the accused persons, during which abusive and threatening language was exchanged. It was alleged that thereafter Loknath brought a wooden plank (chaukki) and 3 assaulted Jayasurya, while Jai Kishan and other persons also participated in the assault. On intervention by persons from the locality, the assailants fled. Jayasurya was initially taken to Balodabazar Hospital and was thereafter referred to Raipur, but he succumbed to his injuries while being taken for further treatment. 4. On the basis of the information lodged by Kunti Bai, Crime No.454/2020 was registered for offences under Sections 294, 324, 506 and 34 IPC, and Section 302 IPC was subsequently added after the death of Jayasurya. During investigation, inquest and post-mortem proceedings were conducted, the spot map was prepared, the accused were arrested and their memorandum statements were recorded, blood-stained soil and plain soil were seized, and the clothes of the deceased and accused, along with the wooden plank, were seized and sent for examination. The FIR was proved by PW-15 Head Constable Bhim Kumar as Ex.P-3, while the investigating officer PW-14 Vijay Choudhary proved the spot map, memorandum, seizure and arrest proceedings, including Ex.P-4 and Ex.P-6 to Ex.P-14, as well as the subsequent medical and forensic correspondence. 5. The prosecution principally relied upon the ocular evidence of PW-3 Parasram, who stated that Loknath assaulted Jayasurya several times with a wooden plank, causing him to fall and sustain injuries. The prosecution also relied upon PW-4 Kunti Bai, PW-5 Tokeshwar and PW-9 Lakshmi Bai, who deposed regarding 4 the disclosure made by Jayasurya concerning the assault, as well as PW-1 Ghodghoti Jangde and PW-2 Vijay Kumar Tandon, who supported the prosecution regarding the quarrel preceding the assault. PW-6 Tularam Jangde deposed regarding the condition of the deceased and his subsequent referral to Raipur. The medical evidence consisted principally of the testimony of PW-12 Dr. M. Nirala, who conducted the post-mortem and proved Ex.P- 15, and PW-13 Dr. Shashi Kumar Jaiswal, who medically examined Jayasurya and proved Ex.P-16. 6. The post-mortem examination disclosed multiple ante-mortem injuries, including lacerated and punctured wounds and fractures of the sixth and seventh ribs. PW-12 opined that the injuries were caused by hard, sharp and blunt objects and that death had occurred due to excessive blood loss and shock resulting from the injuries, thereby establishing the homicidal nature of death. The prosecution further relied upon the seizure and examination of the wooden plank and clothes, including the report marked Ex.P-17 and the forensic report marked Ex.P-21. The accused, in their statements under Section 313 CrPC, denied the allegations and pleaded false implication, while the defence examined DW-1 Kartikram, whose evidence did not materially discredit the prosecution case. 7. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned trial Court held that the prosecution had succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt 5 and therefore, convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and imposed the sentence as recorded in the impugned judgment dated 03.11.2022. 8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellants have preferred the present criminal appeals before this Court, challenging the findings recorded by the learned trial Court and seeking reversal of his conviction and sentence. 9. Mr. Adil Minhaj, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.2000 of 2022, submits that the learned trial Court has erred in appreciating the evidence available on record in its proper perspective and has recorded the finding of conviction without there being cogent, reliable and unimpeachable evidence establishing the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It is contended that the prosecution witnesses do not present a consistent and trustworthy account of the occurrence and that there are material contradictions, omissions and discrepancies in their respective statements. Learned counsel further submits that the evidence of PW-3 Parasram, which has been treated as the principal ocular evidence, does not inspire confidence to sustain the conviction, particularly in view of the inconsistencies emerging from his deposition and the statements of other witnesses. It is therefore submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish the 6 necessary ingredients of the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. It is further submitted that the medical and seizure evidence, by itself, does not establish the involvement of the appellant in the commission of the offence. The recovery of the wooden plank and other articles has also not been proved in a manner sufficient to connect the appellant with the fatal assault. Learned counsel submits that the benefit of every reasonable doubt must necessarily go to the appellant and, therefore, the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial Court deserve to be set aside. In the alternative, it is submitted that, even if the entire prosecution case is accepted, the ingredients necessary for sustaining a conviction for murder are not established and the case deserves appropriate alteration of conviction. Accordingly, it is prayed that the appeal be allowed in full and the appellant be acquitted, or, in the alternative, such relief as may be permissible in law be granted. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ganesh Bhavan Patel and another v. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 4 SCC 371, Anbazhagan v. State Represented by the Inspector of Police, (2024) 20 SCC 500 and Tarun Sharma v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2094 to buttress his submissions. 10. Mr. Pragalbha Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1825 of 2022, submits that the learned trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the material 7 contradictions and inconsistencies appearing in the prosecution evidence and has proceeded to convict the appellant primarily on the basis of interested and related witnesses, whose testimony does not receive sufficient corroboration from the other evidence available on record. It is contended that the evidence concerning the actual assault is not free from doubt and that the prosecution has not been able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, the specific role attributed to the appellant in causing the fatal injuries to deceased Jayasurya. Learned counsel further submits that the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, including the seizure and medical evidence, do not conclusively connect the appellant with the commission of the alleged offence. He further submits that the appellant has been enlarged on bail by this Court vide order dated 26.04.2023 and has remained on bail pursuant thereto. It is contended that, considering the doubtful nature of the prosecution evidence, the material discrepancies in the testimonies of the witnesses and the absence of reliable evidence establishing the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Learned counsel therefore prays that the present appeal be allowed, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence be set aside and the appellant be acquitted of the charges levelled against him by extending to him the benefit of doubt. 11. Per contra, Mr. Sumit Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State, opposes the submissions advanced by 8 learned counsel for the appellants and submits that the learned trial Court, after considering the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record, has recorded a well-reasoned finding of conviction which does not warrant any interference by this Court. It is contended that the evidence of PW-3 Parasram is a direct account of the assault and is duly supported by the evidence of other prosecution witnesses, the medical evidence and the surrounding circumstances. Learned State counsel submits that the minor discrepancies or variations pointed out by the defence do not go to the root of the prosecution case and are insufficient to discard otherwise reliable testimony. It is further submitted that the homicidal death of Jayasurya stands conclusively established by the evidence of PW-12 Dr. M. Nirala and PW-13 Dr. Shashi Kumar Jaiswal, while the seizure of the weapon and other articles, coupled with the investigation conducted by PW-14 Vijay Choudhary and the FIR proved by PW-15 Bhim Kumar, lends further corroboration to the prosecution case. Learned State counsel submits that the appellants acted in furtherance of their common intention and that the prosecution has successfully established their participation in the fatal assault beyond reasonable doubt. It is therefore prayed that both the criminal appeals be dismissed and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 03.11.2022 passed by the learned trial Court be affirmed. 12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused 9 the impugned judgment and carefully examined the entire material available on record, including the oral testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the documentary evidence, the medical evidence and the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution. 13. This Court shall first deal with Criminal Appeal No.2000 of 2022 preferred by appellant-Loknath Bandhe and thereafter Criminal Appeal No.1825 of 2022 preferred by appellant-Jai Kishan Bandhe. Criminal Appeal No.2000 of 2022 14. The principal question which arises for consideration in Criminal Appeal No.2000 of 2022 is as to whether the prosecution has been able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that appellant- Loknath Bandhe was the person who inflicted the fatal injuries upon deceased Jayasurya and, if so, whether the offence proved against him would amount to murder punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code or would fall within any of the exceptions to Section 300 IPC so as to attract Section 304 Part-I IPC. 15. 15. Before examining the individual depositions, it is appropriate to notice that the homicidal nature of death of Jayasurya stands firmly established from the medical evidence. The post-mortem examination was conducted by PW-12 Dr. M. Nirala. The external examination disclosed several injuries on the body of the deceased. The post-mortem report, marked as Ex.P-15, records, 10 inter alia, lacerated wounds and punctured wounds over different parts of the body and fracture of the sixth and seventh ribs. The internal examination also revealed corresponding injuries to the chest and other internal organs. The doctor opined that injuries Nos.2 to 6 were caused by a hard, sharp and pointed object, whereas injury No.7 was caused by a hard and blunt object. The duration of the injuries was within 24 hours and, in the opinion of PW-12, death occurred on account of excessive blood loss and shock resulting from the injuries. He further opined that the death was homicidal in nature. The testimony of PW-12 remained substantially unshaken in cross-examination. 16. The medical evidence is further corroborated by PW-13 Dr. Shashi Kumar Jaiswal, who examined Jayasurya shortly after the occurrence. His examination disclosed multiple injuries, including injuries over the forehead, left side of the chest, left thigh, left hand and left elbow. He opined that the injuries could have been caused by hard, sharp and pointed objects and that the injuries were of recent duration. Ex.P-16 is the medical examination report proved by him. The witness also stated that, having regard to the condition of the injured, he was referred to a higher medical centre. Thus, there is no serious controversy regarding the fact that Jayasurya died an unnatural and homicidal death as a result of injuries sustained during the occurrence. The medical evidence establishes the nature and seriousness of the injuries, whereas the real question is whether those injuries can safely be attributed 11 to appellant-Loknath and, further, what was the requisite intention accompanying his act. 17. Coming to the ocular evidence, PW-3 Parasram is the most material witness so far as the actual assault is concerned. He stated that on 16.07.2020 at about 8:15 p.m., he had come to Azad Chowk, Dotopara, after taking food and went to the house of his paternal aunt Lakshmi Bai. At that time, he noticed an altercation between Jayasurya and appellant-Jai Kishan. He and Ghodghoti attempted to intervene and pacify them. According to him, when Jayasurya and the accused persons were proceeding towards their respective houses, a further altercation took place on the road. At that stage, Loknath, Dayaram, Chhotu, Shashi, Hemant and others assaulted Jayasurya. PW-3 specifically attributed the use of the wooden plank (chaukki) to appellant- Loknath and stated that Loknath assaulted Jayasurya with the said plank several times, as a result of which Jayasurya fell down at the place of occurrence. He further stated that after the assault, the deceased was lying there and subsequently died. 18. The importance of PW-3's testimony lies in the fact that he is not merely a witness to a circumstance occurring after the incident; he claims to have been present at the place of occurrence and to have actually seen the assault. His presence at the spot is also supported by his own version regarding the earlier quarrel and the intervention made by him and Ghodghoti. Significantly, even 12 in cross-examination, although certain omissions and variations were brought out, his presence at the occurrence could not be wholly dislodged. The trial Court also treated him as the principal direct witness of the assault. 19. At the same time, the evidence of PW-3 has to be scrutinised with some care. His deposition does not attribute every injury found on the deceased to Loknath. He has specifically attributed the assault with the chaukki to Loknath, whereas the remaining accused have been described collectively. The distinction assumes significance while determining the individual liability of each accused. The Court cannot mechanically convert a general allegation of participation by several persons into an individual finding of common intention unless the surrounding circumstances establish such common intention beyond reasonable doubt. 20. The evidence of PW-1 Ghodghoti Jangde and PW-2 Vijay Kumar Tandon provides corroboration regarding the quarrel which preceded the assault. PW-1 stated that there was an altercation between Jayasurya and the accused persons and that he attempted to pacify the parties. PW-2 also stated that he had witnessed the earlier altercation and that the parties were abusing each other. These witnesses therefore support the prosecution regarding the genesis of the occurrence, though neither of them furnishes the same degree of direct evidence concerning the fatal 13 assault as PW-3. 21. The testimony of PW-4 Kunti Bai is also relevant. She stated that she came to know that Jayasurya had been taken to hospital and, upon reaching the hospital, enquired from him as to what had happened. According to her, Jayasurya told her that he had gone to Azad Chowk where a dispute arose with Jai Kishan and that, thereafter, Dayaram and others assaulted him. She attributed the assault to several persons, including Loknath and Jai Kishan. Her evidence, therefore, is in the nature of a statement made by the injured shortly before his death and is relevant to the extent permissible in law. 22. PW-9 Lakshmi Bai similarly stated that after learning about the incident she went to the hospital along with her son and met Jayasurya. On being asked as to who had assaulted him, according to her, Jayasurya named Loknath, Dayaram, Dayaram's son, Jai Kishan, Hemant, Chhotu and others and stated that he had been assaulted with a chaukki. She also noticed injuries on his body. Her testimony regarding the statement made by the deceased substantially corroborates the occurrence and, in particular, lends support to the presence and involvement of Loknath. 23. PW-5 Tokeshwar also deposed regarding the statement made by Jayasurya after the occurrence. According to him, Jayasurya stated that Dayaram had initially assaulted him and thereafter 14 Loknath came there; when his hands were caught, other persons, including Loknath and Jai Kishan, assaulted him with the chaukki. The testimony of PW-5, therefore, broadly corroborates the prosecution case regarding the occurrence and the presence of Loknath, although the precise role attributed to the different persons is not identical in every account. 24. PW-6 Tularam Jangde is material for another reason. He stated that two or three days prior to the occurrence the health of Jayasurya had deteriorated, and on the date of occurrence he was at his house. He came to know that Jayasurya had been assaulted and taken to hospital. He thereafter made enquiries and learnt that Loknath and others had assaulted him with a chaukki. His evidence is essentially corroborative regarding the immediate aftermath and the information received concerning the assault. 25. PW-2 Vijay Kumar Tandon also stated that at the relevant time Jayasurya was abusing persons present there, whereupon Jai Kishan came out of his house and objected to the abuses. An altercation followed, but after the intervention of Ghodghoti and others, the parties initially separated. The witness further stated that he thereafter went towards the pond and, on the next morning, learnt that Jayasurya had been assaulted with a chaukki and had died. This evidence is important because it demonstrates that the occurrence had its genesis in a sudden verbal altercation 15 and that the assault was not preceded by any proved preparation or pre-arranged plan. 26. PW-1 also stated that after the parties were initially pacified, they proceeded towards their respective houses and the later assault occurred on the road. His cross-examination contains certain admissions regarding the fact that the initial quarrel had subsided and that the subsequent altercation took place when the parties were returning home. The evidence thus suggests that the fatal occurrence developed out of a quarrel at the spot rather than pursuant to any established prior design. 27. The prosecution evidence regarding the investigation is supplied principally by PW-14 Vijay Choudhary, the investigating officer. He proved the proceedings relating to the registration and investigation of the offence, the spot map, arrest of the accused persons, memoranda and seizures. The FIR was proved by PW- 15 Bhim Kumar as Ex.P-3. PW-14 stated that the memoranda of Jai Kishan and Loknath were recorded as Ex.P-7 and Ex.P-8 respectively. Pursuant to the memorandum of Loknath, his clothes and the chaukki were seized and seizure proceedings were recorded as Ex.P-10. The investigating agency also prepared the spot map Ex.P-4 and seized soil samples and other articles. 28. It is, however, necessary to appreciate the evidentiary value of the recovery with due caution. The mere recovery of an article 16 pursuant to a memorandum does not, by itself, establish the entire prosecution case. Its significance depends upon whether the article is satisfactorily connected with the occurrence and whether the other evidence establishes the role of the accused. In the present case, the recovery of the chaukki lends some corroborative value to the ocular version of PW-3 that a wooden plank was used in the assault. Nevertheless, the conviction cannot rest upon the recovery alone. 29. PW-10 Deepak, a police constable, proved the seizure of the clothes of the deceased and other articles under Ex.P-14. The seized chaukki and clothes were thereafter sent for examination. PW-14 proved the correspondence sent for chemical examination and the report received from the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur, marked as Ex.P-21. 30. The evidence of the forensic and seizure witnesses thus constitutes corroborative evidence. However, the decisive evidence against Loknath remains the direct ocular testimony of PW-3, supported by the surrounding evidence and the statements attributed to the deceased by PW-4, PW-5 and PW-9. The fact that the deceased had sustained multiple injuries and that he subsequently succumbed to those injuries is conclusively established by PW-12 and PW-13 and Ex.P-15 and Ex.P-16. 31. The defence has argued that the witnesses are related or interested witnesses and that their evidence ought not to be acted 17 upon. There is no quarrel with the proposition that the evidence of a related witness requires careful scrutiny. At the same time, relationship by itself is not a ground for discarding otherwise reliable evidence. The trial Court also considered this aspect and relied upon the settled principle that the testimony of a related witness cannot be rejected merely on the ground of relationship. 32. In the present case, PW-3 is not shown to have any compelling reason to falsely implicate Loknath in a grave offence. More importantly, his specific attribution of the chaukki assault to Loknath finds support from the statements attributed to Jayasurya by PW-4, PW-5 and PW-9. There are undoubtedly variations in the precise sequence of assault and in the names of the persons who participated. However, such variations are natural when a sudden street altercation involving several persons is described by different witnesses. What remains consistent is that Loknath was present at the occurrence and that he used a wooden plank in assaulting Jayasurya. 33. The defence has also placed emphasis upon the fact that the medical evidence refers to injuries caused by hard, sharp and pointed objects in addition to a blunt object. This circumstance does create some uncertainty as to the precise instrumentality of every injury found on the deceased. But it does not, in the facts of the present case, discredit the direct evidence that Loknath used a wooden chaukki during the assault. Medical evidence is 18 ordinarily corroborative and cannot be used to discard credible ocular testimony unless there is a fundamental and irreconcilable inconsistency between the two. Here, the evidence of PW-12 establishes that at least one injury was attributable to a hard and blunt object, which is consistent with the prosecution allegation of an assault by a wooden plank. 34. The next and more important question is the nature of the offence attributable to Loknath. The prosecution case itself discloses that the occurrence originated in a quarrel. There is no evidence of any prior conspiracy, preparation or premeditated plan on the part of Loknath to kill Jayasurya. The witnesses speak of abuses and a sudden altercation. Even PW-3's account indicates that the parties initially intervened and attempted to pacify the dispute and that the subsequent assault occurred in the course of the ensuing altercation. 35. The fact that Loknath brought a chaukki from his house and assaulted Jayasurya is certainly a serious circumstance. The use of a wooden plank, particularly against the body of another person, is an act which is likely to cause serious bodily injury. Thus, this Court is unable to accept the submission that Loknath had no knowledge whatsoever of the consequences of his act. At the same time, the material on record does not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the assault was actuated by a premeditated intention to cause the death of Jayasurya. 19 36. Section 300 IPC itself recognises circumstances in which culpable homicide would not amount to murder. Exception 4 applies where death is caused without premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that the question is not merely whether a quarrel took place, but whether the occurrence as a whole satisfies the requirements of the exception. 37. In K. Ravi Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 14 SCC 588, the Supreme Court explained that the essential requirements of Exception 4 are a sudden fight, absence of premeditation, the act having been committed in the heat of passion, and absence of undue advantage or cruel or unusual conduct. The Court also reiterated that the cause of the quarrel and who offered the first provocation are not decisive factors and that the number of injuries is not by itself determinative. 38. Likewise, in Muthu v. State, Criminal Appeal No.204 of 2024, decided on 10.07.2024, the Supreme Court examined the plea of conversion from Section 302 IPC in the context of a sudden fight and absence of established intention to kill. The Court reiterated that the question whether the case falls within an exception to Section 300 depends upon the facts and circumstances established on record. 20 39. In the present case, however, having regard to the weapon used, the manner of assault spoken to by PW-3, the multiple injuries found on the deceased, including injuries on the chest region, and the circumstances in which the assault was committed, this Court is of the considered view that Loknath can safely be attributed the intention of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. At the same time, the evidence does not establish the requisite intention to cause death so as to bring the case within the main clause of Section 300 IPC. 40. The distinction between Section 304 Part-I and Part-II is therefore material. Part-I applies where the act is done with the intention of causing death or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, whereas Part-II applies where there is knowledge that the act is likely to cause death but no such intention. On the facts established here, the deliberate use of the wooden plank against the deceased and the repeated blows attributed to Loknath demonstrate more than mere knowledge. His conduct reflects an intention to cause bodily injury of a nature likely to cause death. Consequently, the appropriate conviction is under Section 304 Part-I IPC. 41. This conclusion is also consistent with the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in cases where a sudden quarrel culminates in a fatal assault but the evidence does not establish premeditated intention to kill. An occurrence arising from a 21 sudden quarrel and heat of passion may attract Exception 4 and yet, depending upon the nature of the injury and the mental element proved, the appropriate offence may be Section 304 Part-I rather than Part-II. 42. It is also relevant that the Supreme Court has in appropriate cases modified a conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 and imposed a sentence of ten years' rigorous imprisonment where the factual circumstances demonstrated absence of premeditation but established culpability under the lesser provision. In the present case, the deceased had been subjected to a sudden assault arising from a quarrel. There is no evidence of prior preparation to kill him. The accused persons did not carry any deadly weapon with them as part of a pre-arranged plan. The wooden plank was brought during the quarrel. The incident occurred in the course of an altercation and the assailants thereafter fled when persons from the locality intervened. These circumstances materially distinguish the case from a calculated or premeditated murder. The conduct of Loknath, nevertheless, cannot be completely exonerated merely because the occurrence arose from a quarrel. He voluntarily participated in the assault and, according to the direct testimony of PW-3, repeatedly used the wooden plank against Jayasurya. The medical evidence demonstrates that the assault resulted in serious bodily injuries, including rib fractures and internal injuries, ultimately causing death. Therefore, the case squarely falls within culpable homicide 22 not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part-I IPC. 43. So far as the conviction under Section 201 IPC is concerned, the material available on record does not disclose a separate and satisfactory foundation for sustaining the conviction of Loknath under Section 201 IPC independent of the main occurrence. The prosecution has relied substantially upon the seizure and subsequent forensic examination of the articles. There is, however, no clear evidence establishing that Loknath caused disappearance of evidence or gave false information with the requisite knowledge or intention contemplated by Section 201 IPC. Accordingly, the conviction under Section 201 IPC also cannot be sustained merely as a consequence of the conviction for the substantive offence. 44. The conviction of appellant-Loknath Bandhe under Section 302 IPC is, therefore, liable to be altered to one under Section 304 Part-I IPC. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, the nature of weapon used, the manner of assault, the sudden genesis of the occurrence, absence of proved premeditation, the age of the appellant at the relevant time and the period already undergone, this Court considers that a sentence of ten years' rigorous imprisonment would meet the ends of justice. 45. It is stated before this Court that appellant-Loknath Bandhe has remained in custody since 17.07.2022. He is directed to serve out 23 the sentence as modified above. 46. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No.2000 of 2022 deserves to be partly allowed. The conviction of appellant-Loknath Bandhe under Section 302 IPC is altered to conviction under Section 304 Part-I IPC and he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years. The conviction and sentence under Section 201 IPC are set aside. The fine, if any, imposed under the altered conviction shall stand modified accordingly. Criminal Appeal No.1825 of 2022 47. We shall now consider Criminal Appeal No.1825 of 2022 preferred by appellant-Jai Kishan Bandhe. The evidence against Jai Kishan requires separate consideration because the prosecution evidence which directly attributes the use of the chaukki to Loknath does not attribute the same specific act to Jai Kishan. 48. The prosecution case regarding Jai Kishan primarily rests upon the allegation that he was present during the quarrel and participated in the subsequent assault along with several other persons. The trial Court inferred common intention from the collective conduct of the accused persons. However, in an appeal against conviction, the Court is required to examine whether such inference is firmly founded upon proved circumstances and whether the evidence establishes the participation of the particular accused beyond reasonable doubt. 24 49. PW-3 Parasram is the most important witness for the actual occurrence. His evidence specifically attributes the assault with the chaukki to Loknath. So far as Jai Kishan is concerned, PW-3 states that an initial quarrel had taken place between Jai Kishan and Jayasurya. He further stated that thereafter several persons joined the altercation. However, the specific fatal assault with the chaukki is attributed to Loknath. Thus, while PW-3 establishes Jai Kishan's presence during the earlier quarrel, his evidence does not furnish the same degree of certainty regarding Jai Kishan's participation in the fatal injuries. 50. This distinction becomes more significant when the evidence of PW-4 Kunti Bai is examined. According to PW-4, when she met Jayasurya at the hospital, he disclosed that the dispute had initially taken place with Jai Kishan but that thereafter Dayaram and several other persons had assaulted him. Although Jai Kishan is included in the list of persons named by the deceased, the statement does not consistently specify what particular act was committed by Jai Kishan or which injury was caused by him. 51. PW-5 Tokeshwar also gives a somewhat different account. According to him, Dayaram initially assaulted Jayasurya, thereafter Loknath came, and subsequently other persons participated in the assault. The precise role attributed to Jai Kishan is not consistent with the specific role attributed to Loknath by PW-3. PW-9 Lakshmi Bai states that Jayasurya 25 named Loknath, Dayaram, Dayaram's son, Jai Kishan and others as persons who had assaulted him. Again, there is no specific attribution of any particular weapon or injury to Jai Kishan. The statement is therefore omnibus in nature so far as Jai Kishan's individual role is concerned. 52. The medical evidence also does not assist the prosecution in establishing the specific role of Jai Kishan. PW-12 Dr. M. Nirala establishes the homicidal nature of death but does not identify the person who caused the individual injuries. PW-13 Dr. Shashi Kumar Jaiswal similarly proves the injuries suffered by Jayasurya but does not connect any particular injury to Jai Kishan. The recovery evidence is likewise insufficient to connect Jai Kishan with the fatal assault. PW-14, the investigating officer, states that memoranda of both accused were recorded as Ex.P-7 and Ex.P- 8, but the recovery of the chaukki relied upon by the prosecution is connected with the memorandum of Loknath and the seizure proceedings recorded as Ex.P-10. There is no corresponding recovery of the weapon of assault from Jai Kishan which could furnish independent corroboration of his participation in the fatal assault. PW-7 Santosh Dohariya and PW-8 Bhavesh Kumar Dhruv were examined regarding the memorandum and seizure proceedings. Their evidence does not provide any direct account of Jai Kishan causing injury to Jayasurya. Indeed, PW-7 stated that he had not heard any statement of the accused persons against them and did not support the prosecution regarding any 26 incriminating disclosure. PW-8 similarly did not provide substantive evidence connecting Jai Kishan with the fatal assault. 53. The trial Court placed considerable reliance upon Section 34 IPC and held that both accused shared a common intention. However, common intention cannot be presumed merely because two persons were present at the place of occurrence or because they had earlier quarrelled with the deceased. Common intention may certainly develop at the spot, and the prosecution is not required to prove a formal prior agreement; nevertheless, the circumstances must establish a meeting of minds and participation in furtherance of the common intention beyond reasonable doubt. 54. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Section 34 IPC embodies the principle of constructive liability and that the common intention may be inferred from the conduct and circumstances of the case. At the same time, the inference must arise from proved facts and cannot be based on conjecture. The Court has also recognised that the absence of an overt act is not by itself decisive where common intention is otherwise clearly established. The present case, however, stands on a different footing because the evidence itself is inconsistent regarding Jai Kishan's precise participation and does not satisfactorily establish that he shared the intention of Loknath to cause the fatal injuries. 55. The evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, in fact, shows that the first 27 phase of the occurrence was a quarrel between Jayasurya and Jai Kishan. PW-2 stated that Jai Kishan came out of his house after Jayasurya was abusing persons in the vicinity and objected to the abuses. PW-1 similarly speaks about an initial altercation. The parties were thereafter pacified. It was subsequently, on the road, that the more serious assault occurred. This sequence makes it unsafe to infer that Jai Kishan necessarily shared the intention that later developed in the mind of Loknath when he used the chaukki. 56. The distinction between presence and participation assumes importance in criminal jurisprudence. Mere presence at the scene, previous quarrel with the deceased, or even participation in an earlier verbal altercation cannot, without more, establish that the accused shared the common intention to cause the fatal injuries. The prosecution must prove the nexus between the accused and the act constituting the offence. 57. There are also material variations in the statements attributed to the deceased. One account refers to Dayaram as the initial assailant and thereafter to Loknath and others; another names several persons collectively; another attributes the specific use of the chaukki to the group. Such variations may not be fatal to the prosecution case as a whole, particularly against Loknath whose specific role is independently established by PW-3. But when the Court is required to determine the individual guilt of Jai Kishan, 28 these inconsistencies assume significance because there is no independent evidence identifying the precise act committed by him. 58. The principle that an accused is entitled to benefit of doubt does not mean that every minor discrepancy must result in acquittal. At the same time, where the evidence leaves a reasonable doubt regarding the participation of a particular accused in the fatal act, the doubt must operate in his favour. The prosecution is required to establish the guilt of each accused independently and not merely through the collective character of the occurrence. 59. In this regard, the Supreme Court has cautioned that while an appellate Court should not interfere with a finding of conviction merely because another view is possible, where the evidence suffers from material uncertainty regarding the individual role of an accused, the criminal standard of proof must be maintained. The prosecution cannot bridge such a gap by resorting to assumptions regarding common intention. 60. In the present case, the following circumstances create a reasonable doubt regarding the participation of Jai Kishan in the fatal assault: (i) PW-3, the principal eyewitness, specifically attributes the assault with the chaukki to Loknath and does not attribute any specific fatal blow to Jai Kishan; (ii) the statements attributed to Jayasurya by PW-4, PW-5 29 and PW-9 are not consistent regarding the sequence and individual roles of the assailants; (iii) there is no specific medical evidence connecting any particular injury to Jai Kishan; (iv) there is no weapon recovery from Jai Kishan connecting him with the fatal assault; (v) the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 establishes an earlier quarrel between Jai Kishan and Jayasurya, but does not establish that Jai Kishan thereafter shared the intention of Loknath when the fatal assault occurred; and (vi) the subsequent collective allegations against several persons are omnibus in character and do not satisfactorily establish the individual participation of Jai Kishan beyond reasonable doubt. 61. It is true that the deceased, as narrated by PW-4 and PW-9, named Jai Kishan among the persons who assaulted him. But such a statement, particularly when considered along with the inconsistent accounts regarding the individual roles and in the absence of independent corroboration, cannot safely be treated as sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder with the aid of Section 34 IPC. The Court is conscious that a dying declaration can form the sole basis of conviction if found wholly reliable; however, before acting upon an oral dying declaration, particularly one transmitted through witnesses, the Court must be satisfied 30 regarding its consistency, voluntariness and reliability. 62. Here, the oral statements attributed to Jayasurya are not uniform regarding the sequence of assault or the particular role played by each accused. They are broadly consistent about the fact of assault, but that is insufficient to establish the individual culpability of Jai Kishan for the fatal assault when the prosecution seeks to impose constructive liability under Section 34 IPC. The recovery evidence also does not cure this deficiency. As noted above, the chaukki recovery is associated with Loknath. The prosecution has not brought on record any equally strong circumstance connecting Jai Kishan with the weapon or the fatal injuries. The forensic material may corroborate the occurrence, but it does not establish the individual participation of Jai Kishan in the absence of a clear foundational fact. 63. It is also significant that the prosecution case does not disclose any prior preparation by Jai Kishan to cause the death of Jayasurya. His initial confrontation with Jayasurya was a verbal altercation arising at the spot. The parties were intervened upon and separated. Thereafter the fatal assault occurred. In such circumstances, the possibility that Jai Kishan was involved in the initial quarrel but did not share the subsequent intention to cause the fatal injuries cannot be ruled out. The benefit of doubt is therefore not being extended to Jai Kishan on the basis of a minor discrepancy or an isolated omission. Rather, the doubt 31 arises from the cumulative effect of the inconsistencies concerning his individual role, absence of a specific attribution by the principal eyewitness, absence of recovery connecting him with the weapon, and lack of reliable independent evidence demonstrating that he shared the common intention to cause the fatal injuries. 64. Consequently, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant-Jai Kishan Bandhe for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC or for the other offences in respect of which conviction has been recorded on the basis of the same evidence. The Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence also emphasises that constructive liability under Section 34 IPC cannot be applied in a mechanical manner and that the foundational facts from which common intention is inferred must themselves be proved. In cases where the evidence leaves a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused shared the common intention or participated in the act constituting the substantive offence, the accused is entitled to the benefit of that doubt. 65. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No.1825 of 2022 preferred by appellant-Jai Kishan Bandhe deserves to be allowed. The conviction and sentence imposed upon him by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Balodabazar, District 32 Balodabazar-Bhatapara, in Sessions Trial No.10/2021 vide judgment dated 03.11.2022 are hereby set aside. The appellant- Jai Kishan Bandhe is acquitted of the charges levelled against him by extending the benefit of doubt. The appellant-Jai Kishan Bandhe is stated to be on bail, his bail bonds and sureties stand discharged. 66. In the result :- (i) Criminal Appeal No.2000 of 2022 – Loknath Bandhe: The appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of appellant- Loknath Bandhe under Section 302 IPC is altered to one under Section 304 Part-I IPC. He is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years. The conviction under Section 201 IPC is set aside. The appellant is stated to be in custody since 17.07.2022, he is directed to serve out the sentence as modified above. 67. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record of the case to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance and also send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant-Loknath Bandhe is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant-Loknath Bandhe informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, if so advised, with assistance of High Court Legal 33 Services Committee or Supreme Court Legal Service Committee. (ii) Criminal Appeal No.1825 of 2022 – Jai Kishan Bandhe: The appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence recorded against appellant-Jai Kishan Bandhe by the learned trial Court vide judgment dated 03.11.2022 in Sessions Trial No.10/2021 are set aside. He is acquitted of the charges by extending to him the benefit of doubt. 68. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant-Jai Kishan Bandhe is directed forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with two reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant-Jai Kishan Bandhe on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 69. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. 70. After passing of the judgment, Mr. N.K. Malviya, learned counsel appearing for the Objector, appeared before the Court and submitted that his appearance may kindly be taken on record and 34 his presence may be marked in the proceedings. Accordingly, the appearance of Mr. N.K. Malviya, learned counsel for the Objector, is hereby recorded and his presence is marked. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu