- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 14TH DAY OF JULY, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 11323 OF 2024 BETWEEN: B.M.JAYARAM, S/O LATE MASTI GOWDA, AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO.1081/31, 18TH A MAIN ROAD, 5TH BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE - 560 010. …PETITIONER (BY SRI.S.MAHESH, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. G A K. GOWDA, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, BY R.R.NAGAR POLICE STATION, REPRESENTED BY THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT BUILDING, BENGALURU - 560 001. 2. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.RASHMI PATEL, HCGP FOR R1; Digitally signed by PADMAVATHI B K Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 SRI.SOURAV M., ADVOCATE FOR R2) THIS CRL.P. IS FILED U/S 482 OF CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNSS) PRAYING TO QUASH THE F.I.R REGSTERED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT POLICE IN CRIME NO.220/2024 FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 64, 316(2), 318(4), 351(2), 352 OF THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHIUTA(BNS) 2023, PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HON'BLE XLVI ADDL. CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE, AT BENGALURU. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioner is before this Court calling in question the registration of a crime in Crime No.220/2024 for the offences punishable under Sections 64, 316(2), 318(4), 351(2) and 352 of the BNS, 2023 pending before the XLVI Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru. 2. Heard the learned counsel, Sri. S. Mahesh, appearing for the petitioner, Smt. Rashmi Patel, learned High - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri. Sourav M., learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2. 3. Shorn of unnecessary details, facts in brief, germane, are as follows: The petitioner is the sole accused and respondent No.2 is the complainant. The two meet in the year 2019, at which point in time, the petitioner and respondent No.2 - the complainant both were married to their respective spouses and were residing separately. The friendship between the two grows on account of certain events and the friendship blossoms into relationship, which was physical as well. It travels for 4 years. On 09.08.2024, when the relationship would turn sore, a complaint comes to be registered for the offences punishable under Sections 64, 316(2), 318(4), 351(2) and 352 of the BNS, 2023 as observed hereinabove. The registration of the crime is what had driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. This Court had granted an interim order of stay of further investigation. The said interim order is subsisting even today. The matter is heard with the consent of the parties and - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 an application being filed by the State seeking vacation of the interim order. 4. Learned counsel, Sri. S. Mahesh, appearing for the petitioner taking this Court through the documents appended to the petition would seek to demonstrate that the relationship between the two was consensual for over 4 years, as both the petitioner and the complainant were married and have had this relationship for over 4 years. Financial transactions may have happened between the two. The money may have been taken and returned and all those things are now projected after about 4 years to become a crime. Learned counsel would seek quashment of the proceedings by placing reliance upon a plethora of judgments rendered by the Apex Court on the issue. 5. Learned counsel representing respondent No.2 - the complainant would however vehemently refute the submissions in contending the allegations become the ingredients of Section 64 of the BNS, 2023 inter alia and therefore, the crime should not be obliterated at this stage. Therefore, he would seek that the investigation in the case at hand is a must. - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 6. Learned High Court Government Pleader also would toe the lines of the learned counsel appearing for the complainant in seeking dismissal of the petition. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The link in the chain of events are all a matter of record. The petitioner and respondent No.2 - the complainant being married to their respective spouses is again a matter of record. The two meet in the year, particularly on 29.12.2019. The meeting develops into friendship, friendship into relationship and relationship into physical relationship, and the relationship has continued not for a day or two, but for about 3 to 4 years. After the relationship turned sore on whatever consideration it could be, monetary or otherwise, the complaint emerges on 09.08.2024. Since the entire issue has now triggered from the registration of the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. The complaint reads as follows: - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 ¢£ÁAPÀ: 09.08.2024 EªÀjUÉ, ¥Éưøï E£Àì¥ÉPÀÖgï DgïDgï£ÀUÀgÀ ¥Éưøï oÁuÉ ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ-560098. EAzÀ XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ªÀiÁ£ÀågÉ, «µÀAiÀÄ:- £À£Àß ªÉÄÃ¯É CvÁåZÁgÀ ªÀiÁr £À£ÀߣÀÄß £ÀA©¹ £À¤ßAzÀ ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß ªÁ¥À¸ÀÄì ¤ÃrzÉ, CªÁZÀå ±À§ÝUÀ½AzÀ ¤A¢¹, ¥Áæt ¨ÉzÀjPÉ ºÁQ ªÉÆøÀ ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀ dAiÀÄgÁA JA¨ÁvÀ£À «gÀÄzÀÞ zÀÆgÀÄ. ************** F ªÉÄîÌAqÀ «¼Á¸ÀzÀ°è £Á£ÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £À£Àß ªÀÄUÀ ªÁ¸ÀªÁVzÀÄÝ £À£Àß ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £À£Àß ¥ÀwAiÀiÁzÀ £ÁgÁAiÀÄt ¸Áé«Ä gÀªÀgÀ ªÀÄzsÉå ªÀÄ£À¸ÁÜ¥ÀUÀ½zÀÄÝ ¥Éưøï oÁuÉAiÀÄ°è ºÀ®ªÀÅ zÀÆgÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ°è N.J¸ï. ªÀÄvÀÄÛ JA.¹ PÉøïUÀ¼ÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ J¸ï.¹ 310/2021 (307) gÀ°è PÉøïUÀ¼ÀÄ £ÀqɸÀĪÀ ¸ÀAzÀ¨sÀðzÀ°è PÉ®ªÀÅ jf¸ÀÖgï zÁR¯Áw vÉUɸÀ®Ä £À£ÀUÉ ¸ÀºÁAiÀÄ ªÀiÁqÀĪÀAvÉ CªÀgÀ vÀAVAiÀÄ UÀAqÀ dAiÀÄgÁA gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß §¸ÀªÉñÀégÀ £ÀUÀgÀzÀ°ègÀĪÀ CªÀgÀ D¦üøï£À°è ¨sÉÃn ªÀiÁr¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. EªÀgÀÄ ¤ªÀÄUÉ F PÉÃ¸ï £À «µÀAiÀÄzÀ°è ¤ªÀÄUÉ ªÀiÁUÀðzÀ±Àð£À ºÁUÀÆ zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß vÉUɸÀ®Ä ¤ªÀÄUÉ ¸ÀºÁAiÀÄ ªÀiÁqÀÄvÁÛgÉAzÀÄ ºÉý £À£Àß ªÉƨÉʯï£ÀA§gï£ÀÄß dAiÀÄgÁA gÀªÀjUÉ PÉÆr¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. 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DzÀÝjAzÀ dAiÀÄgÁA gÀªÀgÀÄ £À£Àß EZÉÒUÉ «gÀÄzÀÞªÁV £À£ÉÆßA¢UÉ zÉÊ»PÀ ¸ÀA¨sÉÆÃUÀ ªÀiÁr ºÁUÀÆ £À£ÀߣÀÄß £ÀA©¹ £À¤ßAzÀ ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉzÀÄ, ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß ªÁ¥À¸ÀÄì ¤ÃqÀzÉ ªÉÆøÀ ªÀiÁr, £À£ÀUÉ ¸ÀƼɪÀÄÄAqÉ JA§ÄzÁV CªÁZÀå ±À§ÝUÀ½AzÀ ¤A¢¹, £À£Àß ZÁjvÀæzÀ §UÉÎ CªÁZÀå ±À§ÝUÀ½AzÀ ¤A¢¹, ¥Áæt ¨ÉzÀjPÉ ºÁQgÀÄvÁÛIÄJ. DzÀÝjAzÀ dAiÀÄgÁA gÀªÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÞ ¸ÀÆPÀÛ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ PÀæªÀÄ PÉÊUÉƼÀî®Ä vÀªÀÄä°è PÉÆÃjPÉƼÀÄîvÉÛãÉ." (Emphasis added) A perusal at the complaint would indicate one unmistakable fact that the complainant and the petitioner have had a relationship for 4 years, which was undoubtedly consensual in the light of the circumstance that both the two were already married to their respective spouses. In the teeth of these consensual acts, whether it would amount to rape as obtaining under Section 64 of the BNS, 2023 need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter. 9. The Apex Court in the case of DR. DHRUVARAM MURLIDHAR SONAR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA1, has held as follows: 1 (2019) 18 SCC 191 - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 "…. …. …. 11. In State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 539] , it was held that while exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It was further held as under : (SCC p. 94, para 6) “6. … It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” 12. Recently, in Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P. [Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P., (2017) 13 SCC 369 : (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 633] , this Court has observed as under : (SCC p. 387, para 41) “41. Inherent power given to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose and object of advancement of justice. In case solemn process of Court is sought to be abused by a person with some oblique motive, the Court has to thwart the attempt at the very threshold. … Judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment. When there are materials to indicate that a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and proceeding is maliciously - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 instituted with an ulterior motive, the High Court will not hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceeding. … the present is a fit case where the High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and quashed the criminal proceedings.” 13. It is clear that for quashing the proceedings, meticulous analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers. 14. In the instant case, FIR was registered against the appellant and the co-accused under Sections 376(2)(b), 420 read with Section 34 IPC and under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. Section 376(2)(b) prescribes punishment for the offence of rape committed by a public servant taking advantage of his official position on a woman in his custody as such public servant or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to him. The said provision during the relevant point of time was as under: “376. Punishment for rape.— (1) * * * (2) Whoever,— (a)*** (b) being a public servant, takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on a woman in his custody as such public servant or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to him; or (c)-(g)*** shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may be for life and shall also be liable to fine.” 15. Section 375 defines the offence of rape and enumerates six descriptions of the offence. The first - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 clause operates where the woman is in possession of her senses and, therefore, capable of consenting but the act is done against her will and the second where it is done without her consent; the third, fourth and fifth when there is consent but it is not such a consent as excuses the offender, because it is obtained by putting her, or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. The expression “against her ‘will’ ” means that the act must have been done in spite of the opposition of the woman. An inference as to consent can be drawn if only based on evidence or probabilities of the case. “Consent” is also stated to be an act of reason coupled with deliberation. It denotes an active will in mind of a person to permit the doing of the act complained of. 16. Section 90 IPC defines “consent” known to be given under fear or misconception: “90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.—A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception;” 17. Thus, Section 90 though does not define “consent”, but describes what is not “consent”. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. If the consent is given by the complainant under misconception of fact, it is vitiated. Consent for the purpose of Section 375 requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and moral quality of the act, but also after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent. Whether there was any consent or not is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances. 18. In Uday v. State of Karnataka [Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775], - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 this Court was considering a case where the prosecutrix, aged about 19 years, had given consent to sexual intercourse with the accused with whom she was deeply in love, on a promise that he would marry her on a later date. The prosecutrix continued to meet the accused and often had sexual intercourse and became pregnant. A complaint was lodged on failure of the accused to marry her. It was held that consent cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. It was held thus : (SCC pp. 56-57, paras 21 & 23) “21. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no straitjacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by the courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them. *** 23. Keeping in view the approach that the court must adopt in such cases, we shall now proceed to consider the evidence on record. In the instant case, the prosecutrix was a grown-up girl studying in a college. She was deeply in love with the appellant. She was, - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 however, aware of the fact that since they belonged to different castes, marriage was not possible. In any event the proposal for their marriage was bound to be seriously opposed by their family members. She admits having told so to the appellant when he proposed to her the first time. She had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act she was consenting to. That is why she kept it a secret as long as she could. Despite this, she did not resist the overtures of the appellant, and in fact succumbed to them. She thus freely exercised a choice between resistance and assent. She must have known the consequences of the act, particularly when she was conscious of the fact that their marriage may not take place at all on account of caste considerations. All these circumstances lead us to the conclusion that she freely, voluntarily and consciously consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant, and her consent was not in consequence of any misconception of fact.” 19. In Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar [Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 253] , the Court framed the following two questions relating to consent : (SCC p. 104, para 30) (1) Is it a case of passive submission in the face of psychological pressure exerted or allurements made by the accused or was it a conscious decision on the part of the prosecutrix knowing fully the nature and consequences of the act she was asked to indulge in? (2) Whether the tacit consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of a misconception created in her mind as to the intention of the accused to marry her? In this case, the girl lodged a complaint with the police stating that she and the accused were neighbours and they fell in love with each other. One day in February 1988, the accused forcibly raped her and later consoled her by saying that he would marry her. She succumbed to the entreaties of the accused to have sexual - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 relations with him, on account of the promise made by him to marry her, and therefore continued to have sex on several occasions. After she became pregnant, she revealed the matter to her parents. Even thereafter, the intimacy continued to the knowledge of the parents and other relations who were under the impression that the accused would marry the girl, but the accused avoided marrying her and his father took him out of the village to thwart the bid to marry. The efforts made by the father of the girl to establish the marital tie failed. Therefore, she was constrained to file the complaint after waiting for some time. 20. With this factual background, the Court held that the girl had taken a conscious decision, after active application of mind to the events that had transpired. It was further held that at best, it is a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false promise to marry, for which the accused is prima facie accountable for damages under civil law. It was held thus : (Deelip Singh [Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 253] , SCC p. 106, para 35) “35. The remaining question is whether on the basis of the evidence on record, it is reasonably possible to hold that the accused with the fraudulent intention of inducing her to sexual intercourse, made a false promise to marry. We have no doubt that the accused did hold out the promise to marry her and that was the predominant reason for the victim girl to agree to the sexual intimacy with him. PW 12 was also too keen to marry him as she said so specifically. But we find no evidence which gives rise to an inference beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had no intention to marry her at all from the inception and that the promise he made was false to his knowledge. No circumstances emerging from the prosecution evidence establish this fact. On the other hand, the statement of PW 12 that “later on”, the accused became ready to marry her but his father and others took him away from the village would indicate that the accused might have been prompted by a genuine - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 intention to marry which did not materialise on account of the pressure exerted by his family elders. It seems to be a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false promise to marry. On this aspect also, the observations of this Court in Uday case [Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775] at para 24 come to the aid of the appellant.” 21. In Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] , the Court has drawn a distinction between rape and consensual sex. This is a case of a prosecutrix aged 19 years at the time of the incident. She had an inclination towards the accused. The accused had been giving her assurances of the fact that he would get married to her. The prosecutrix, therefore, left her home voluntarily and of her own free will to go with the accused to get married to him. She called the accused on a phone number given to her by him, to ask him why he had not met her at the place that had been pre-decided by them. She also waited for him for a long time, and when he finally arrived, she went with him to a place called Karna Lake where they indulged in sexual intercourse. She did not raise any objection at that stage and made no complaints to anyone. Thereafter, she went to Kurukshetra with the accused, where she lived with his relatives. Here too, the prosecutrix voluntarily became intimate with the accused. She then, for some reason, went to live in the hostel at Kurukshetra University illegally, and once again came into contact with the accused at Birla Mandir there. Thereafter, she even proceeded with the accused to the old bus- stand in Kurukshetra, to leave for Ambala so that the two of them could get married at the court in Ambala. At the bus station, the accused was arrested by the police. The Court held that the physical relationship between the parties had clearly developed with the consent of the prosecutrix as there was neither a case of any resistance nor had she raised any complaint anywhere at any time, despite the fact that she - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 had been living with the accused for several days and had travelled with him from one place to another. The Court further held that it is not possible to apprehend the circumstances in which a charge of deceit/rape can be levelled against the accused. 22. Recently, this Court, in Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka [Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC 204] , disposed of on 6-4-2018, has observed that it is difficult to hold that sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship which has continued for eight years is “rape”, especially in the face of the complainant's own allegation that they lived together as man and wife. It was held as under : (Shivashankar case [Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC 204] , SCC p. 205, para 4) “4. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is difficult to sustain the charges levelled against the appellant who may have possibly, made a false promise of marriage to the complainant. It is, however, difficult to hold sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship which has continued for eight years, as “rape” especially in the face of the complainant's own allegation that they lived together as man and wife.” 23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by accused, or where an - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 accused, on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under Section 376 IPC. 24. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the Primary Health Centre and the complainant was working as an Assistant Nurse in the same health centre and that she is a widow. It was alleged by her that the appellant informed her that he is a married man and that he has differences with his wife. Admittedly, they belong to different communities. It is also alleged that the accused/appellant needed a month's time to get their marriage registered. The complainant further states that she had fallen in love with the appellant and that she needed a companion as she was a widow. She has specifically stated that “as I was also a widow and I was also in need of a companion, I agreed to his proposal and since then we were having love affair and accordingly we started residing together. We used to reside sometimes at my home whereas sometimes at his home”. Thus, they were living together, sometimes at her house and sometimes at the residence of the appellant. They were in a relationship with each other for quite some time and enjoyed each other's company. It is also clear that they had been living as such for quite some time together. When she came to know that the appellant had married some other woman, she lodged the complaint. It is not her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her. She had taken a conscious decision after active application of mind to the things that had happened. It is not a case of a passive submission in the face of any psychological pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent and the tacit consent given by her was not the result of a misconception created in her mind. We - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 are of the view that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not make out a case against the appellant. We are also of the view that since the complainant has failed to prima facie show the commission of rape, the complaint registered under Section 376(2)(b) cannot be sustained." The Apex Court observes the subtle difference between what would amount to a rape and what would amount to consensual acts between two consenting adults. 10. Again, in a similar circumstance, while considering whether a consensual relationship would become the offence of rape, the Apex Court in the case of ANKIT TOMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA2, has held as follows: "…. …. …. 5. We have gone through the FIR in the above case, wherein the complainant was working in a Massage Parlour and was also in-charge of the same; having been so entrusted by the owner. The appellant is alleged to have come to the Parlour as a customer and then had a physical relationship with her. It is stated that the relationship continued for some time and the complainant permitted the relationship only because the appellant had promised to marry her. It is also alleged that despite the promise made to the complainant, the appellant married another girl and hence the said complaint is filed. 2 2026 SCC OnLine SC 436 - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 6. The contention of the appellant is that the appellant had consensual relationship with the complainant and later married another on 12.03.2024 when the complaint was raised. It is the specific defence that the complainant was married and had two children and there was no reason for the appellant to extend a promise of marriage, which in any event would not have been possible. 7. We are unable to find any distinction insofar as the application of the principles declared in Amol Bhagwan Nehul. Looking at the facts of the said case, this Court was persuaded to quash the complaint on four grounds. Firstly, the Court noticed that even if the allegations in the FIR are true and correct, there appears to be consent on the part of the complainant. Especially when she admits that they fell in love and interacted frequently and engaged in a physical relationship. Then, it was noticed that the consent as coming out from the facts and circumstances cannot be said to be either on ‘inducement or misrepresentation’ or on the basis of a ‘coercion or threat of injury’. Lastly, it was found that the complainant being married and having a child of four years, there is no possibility of a deception having been employed in the form of a promise to marry, for engaging in physical relationship. 8. The reading of the FIR indicates that the dictum is squarely applicable. The complainant was employed in a massage parlour and was also entrusted with the running of the same. The appellant had visited the parlour as a customer and it was within the premises of the parlour, where the complainant was in charge, the couple had physical relationship, even as per the allegation in the FIS. The relationship is said to have commenced in August 2023 and is said to have continued till March 2024; obviously and admittedly consensual. It is also the case of the prosecutrix that on 15.03.2024, she informed the appellant about her pregnancy and then he quarrelled with her. Admittedly the marriage of the appellant took place on 12.03.2024 after which the FIR was registered - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 alleging a quarrel on 15.03.2024, three days after the marriage. The complainant is married and a mother of two children, as the FIS itself indicates. There is no allegation that she was divorced from her husband or even separated from him. We are convinced that as in the cited decision, there was a consensual relationship, neither inducement nor threat and no possibility of a deception luring the complainant into a physical relationship on the pretext of marriage. 9. We are of the opinion that there is no reason to wait for the FSL report since even if the child, who passed away, is found to be of the appellant, the consent demolishes the case of the complainant that there was rape on the promise of marriage. We hence find absolutely no reason to sustain the order of the High Court. We set aside the order of the High Court and quash the criminal proceedings in FIR No. 127 dated 28.03.2024 of the Police Station Kheripul, District - Faridabad and there shall be no further proceedings on the said FIR. The bail bonds executed by the appellant shall stand cancelled." In the light of the elucidation of law by the Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgments, permitting further investigation against this petitioner on such consensual acts, would become an abuse of the process of the law. It becomes apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF HARYANA v. BHAJAN LAL3, wherein it is held as follows: “…. …. …. 3 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” (Emphasis supplied at each instance) 11. In the light of the complaint not making out any offences since the acts were consensual between the two and the judgments rendered by the Apex Court, I deem it appropriate to exercise my jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C./Section 528 of the BNSS and obliterate the proceedings against the petitioner; however, with an observation that if - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35975 CRL.P No. 11323 of 2024 there are some monetary transactions between the two, it is open to the complainant to initiate any proceedings in accordance with law. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) Criminal petition is allowed. (ii) The impugned crime in Crime No.220/2024 pending before the XLVI Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru stands quashed qua the petitioner. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE SJK List No.: 1 Sl No.: 5