1 CGHC010320592026 2026:CGHC:37741-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 792 of 2026 State Of Chhattisgarh Council Science And Technology Vigyan Bhawan Vidhan Sabha Road Daldal Seoni Raipur District- Raipur Chhattiisgarh, Through- The Secretary, Department Of Science And Technolgy Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya Nava Raipur Atal Nagar, Raipur District- Raipur Chhattisgarh, ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - Satish Kumar Chandra S/o Shri Ram Lal Chandra Aged About 33 Years Working As Peon, Chhattisgarh Council Of Science And Technology Vigyan Bhawan Vidhan Sabha Road, Daldal Seoni Raipur R/o Village Malni Post- Salni, District Janjgir-Champa Chhattisgarh 2 - Director General Of Chhattisgarh Council Science And Technology Vigyan Bhawan Vidhan Sabha Road, Daldal Seoni, Raipur District- Raipur Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General. For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Sourabh Kumar Pande, Deputy Advocate General. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2026.08.25 11:31:35 +0530 2 Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 24.08.2026 1. The present writ appeal is preferred assailing the order dated 15.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 4690/2021 (Satish Kumar Chandra vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Another), whereby, the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner / respondent No.1 herein was allowed and the impugned orders of termination dated 21.09.2020 and the order of rejection of departmental appeal dated 17.03.2021 are quashed and set-aside. 2. It has been pointed out by learned counsel, appearing for the appellant as well as learned counsel appearing for the respondent that in an identical matter, this Bench had dismissed WA No. 775/2026 (State of Chhattisgarh Vs. Bhojeshwar Chandrakar and Another) vide order dated 18.08.2026, observing as follows : “6. The primary question that arises for consideration before this Court is whether the delay of about 70 days in preferring the present writ appeal deserves to be condoned or not. 7. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of "State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary" 2024 INSC 932, while considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:- "5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within 3 limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows: "13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows: "15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it 4 tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature." 14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant." Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. 5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below: "24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay. 25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long 5 after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced 6 that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. xxx xxx xxx 34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case. 36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs." Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court 7 correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold. 6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously. 7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private 8 litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733). 8. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of the aforementioned judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised with great caution and only upon a clear and satisfactory demonstration of "sufficient cause." The law is well-settled that poverty or ignorance of law, by themselves, do not constitute such sufficient cause, and that negligence, 9 inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be overlooked under the guise of advancing substantial justice. 9. In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principles and upon careful consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that the delay of 70 days in filing the present appeal is grossly inordinate. The explanation offered by the appellants i.e. the delay has been occurred on account of procedural sanction from the State authorities, cannot be treated as "sufficient cause" in the eye of law. It is now well-settled that poverty or ignorance of law by themselves do not constitute adequate justification for condoning delay, nor can the valuable right that accrues to the opposite party by virtue of the law of limitation be lightly taken away. 10. The doctrine of limitation is founded upon public policy that seeks to ensure certainty and finality in litigation. Once the statutory period has expired, a litigant seeking indulgence of the Court must show diligence and bona fides, and must explain satisfactorily the circumstances which prevented timely action. In the present case, the appellant has not been able to point out any circumstance arising within the period of limitation which disabled him/her from approaching this Court. On the contrary, the record reveals that the appellant/ State remained inactive for a long period and sought to revive its claim only after consulting legal aid services. Such explanation cannot be construed as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, particularly when the delay is prolonged and unexplained for a substantial period. 11. Even otherwise, so far as the merit of the present appeal is concerned, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has committed no error, either of fact or of law, in allowing the writ petitions and quashing the orders of termination dated 21.09.2020 and the appellate orders dated 10 17.03.2021. The findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are based upon the admitted facts emerging from the record and do not warrant any interference in intra-Court appellate jurisdiction. 12. It is not in dispute that the respondents/petitioners were initially engaged on Collector rate during the years 2011-2012 and thereafter, in the year 2014, their services were regularized on the post of Peon in the regular pay scale. It is further undisputed that after such regularization, they continuously discharged their duties for several years and remained in service till the passing of the impugned termination orders in September, 2020. Thus, the petitioners had not only continued in service for a considerable length of time but had also been treated by the department as regular employees pursuant to the order of regularization. 13. The learned Single Judge has rightly held that before terminating the services of the writ petitioners, no regular departmental enquiry was conducted, no definite charges were framed and no effective opportunity of hearing was afforded to them. The impugned termination orders, therefore, were rightly held to be violative of the principles of natural justice and the protection available to regular employees under law. 14. The contention of the appellants that the initial appointments or regularization of the writ petitioners were irregular cannot be accepted as a justification for the impugned action. The record does not disclose any allegation or finding that the writ petitioners had secured their appointments by fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of material facts. If there were any procedural lapses in the process of appointment or regularization, the same were attributable to the authorities themselves. After permitting the writ petitioners to continue in service for several years pursuant to 11 regularization, the appellants could not have terminated their services in a summary manner without following the due process of law. The learned Single Judge has, therefore, rightly relied upon the settled principles governing fair procedure and natural justice. 15. This Court further finds that the appellate orders dated 17.03.2021 are non-speaking and devoid of reasons, reflecting no proper application of mind to the issues raised by the writ petitioners. The relief granted by the learned Single Judge is also balanced, inasmuch as reinstatement has been directed with notional pay and seniority, while denying back wages. In the considered opinion of this Court, the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are based on the material available on record and settled principles of law and do not warrant any interference in the present writ appeal. 16. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellant has failed to make out any sufficient cause for condonation of the inordinate delay of 70 days in preferring the present writ appeal. Apart from the delay and laches, this Court has also considered the writ appeal on merits and finds no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge, who has rightly quashed the termination orders dated 21.09.2020 and the consequential appellate orders dated 17.03.2021, particularly in view of violation of the principles of natural justice and failure on the part of the authorities to conduct a proper departmental enquiry before terminating the services of the respondents/writ petitioners. Accordingly, I.A. No. 2, seeking condonation of delay, stands dismissed. 17. Consequently, the present writ appeal is also dismissed as being barred by delay and laches and also being devoid of merit. 12 18. No order as to costs.” They further submit that since the facts and issue involved in the present case is identical to that of WA No. 775/2026 as the present appeal is also barred by 72 days, hence this appeal may also be dismissed in the same terms. 3. Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed in terms of the order dated 18.08.2026 passed in WA No. 775/2026. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet