Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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HC-KAR
CNR: KAHC010493382026 NC: 2026:KHC:41487 CRL.P No. 10754 of 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 10754 OF 2026 BETWEEN:
1.
SRI RAJESH S., AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS, S/O. SIDDARAJU.
2.
SRI SIDDARAJU AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, S/O. NINGAPPA.
3.
SMT. CHIKKATAYAMMA AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS, W/O SIDDARAJU.
4.
SMT. ANUPAMA S.
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS, W/O. SANTHOSH M.,
PETITIONER NOS.1 TO 4 AT:
NO.166, 11TH MAIN, CHANDRANAGARA, KUMARASWAMY LAYOUT, 2ND STAGE, BENGALURU – 560 078.
5.
SMT. SHRUTHI S., AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
Digitally signed by PADMAVATHI B K Location: High Court of Karnataka
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HC-KAR
CNR: KAHC010493382026 NC: 2026:KHC:41487 CRL.P No. 10754 of 2026
W/O. SURESHA NO. 19/154, 6TH CROSS, SHAKAMBARI NAGARA, J.P.NAGAR 1ST STAGE, BENGALURU – 560 078.
6.
SRI SANTHOSHA AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS, S/O MAHADEVAPPA NO.30, CHANDRANAGARA, 3RD CROSS, KUMARASWAMY LAYOUT, 2ND STAGE, BENGALURU – 560 078.
7.
SRI SURESHA AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS S/O HANUMANTHU NO.19/154, 6TH CROSS SHAKAMBARINAGARA J.P.NAGAR 1ST STAGE BENGALURU – 560 078. …PETITIONERS (BY SRI. SIDDHARTHA D. K., ADVOCATE) AND:
1.
STATE OF KARNATAKA BY THALAGHATTAPURA POLICE STATION, KANAKAPURA MAIN ROAD, TALAGHATTAPURA, BENGALURU – 560 109
REPRESENTED BY THE SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR.
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HC-KAR
CNR: KAHC010493382026 NC: 2026:KHC:41487 CRL.P No. 10754 of 2026
2. XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.WAHEEDA M.M., HCGP FOR R-1;
SRI RAKSHITH R., ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 OF THE CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 OF THE BNNS) PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN S.C.NO.121/2021 PENDING BEFORE THE VI ADDL.DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU RURAL FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 323, 342, 376, 420, 504, 506, 34 OF IPC 1860 AS AGAINST THE PETITIONERS AT ANNEXURE-C.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
ORAL ORDER
Petitioners - accused Nos.1 to 7 are before this Court calling in question proceedings in S.C.No.121/2021, pending before the VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru Rural, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 342, 376, 420, 504, 506 and 34 of the IPC.
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CNR: KAHC010493382026 NC: 2026:KHC:41487 CRL.P No. 10754 of 2026
2. Heard Sri Siddartha D.K., learned counsel for petitioners, Smt.Waheeda M.M., learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent No.1 and Sri Rakshith R.,
learned counsel for respondent No.2. 3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: Petitioners are accused Nos.1 to 7, respondent No.2 is the complainant. Petitioner No.1 - accused No.1 and respondent No.2 - complainant meet in the year 2017; fall in love and said to be in a relationship and relationship moved on for three years. Accused No.1 and the complainant are said to have travelled all over. The mother of respondent No.2 – Mangalamma files a missing complaint that her daughter - respondent No.2 has gone missing on 29.08.2020, while the petitioner and accused No.2 had travelled to Mahadeshwara Hill to visit the temple. The missing complaint then becomes a crime in Crime No.167/2020. Thereafter, it transpires that petitioner No.1 and respondent No.2 appear before the Kumaraswamy Police Station and give their respective statements on 01.09.2020. While recording the statement of respondent No.2 before the jurisdictional police, she admits
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HC-KAR
CNR: KAHC010493382026 NC: 2026:KHC:41487 CRL.P No. 10754 of 2026
that she is already married to one Siddaraju in the year 2018 itself. Petitioner No.1 and complainant had gone to visit the temple and she does not wish to stay with her husband Siddaraju and wants to be with accused No.1. Accused No.1 also had tendered his statement indicating that he will marry respondent No.2, if the marriage between respondent No.2 and her husband - Siddaraju gets dissolved. The dissolution of marriage is not yet taken place even today. A complainant on 07.11.2020 comes to be registered by the complaint, which becomes a crime in Crime No.204/2020 for the afore-quoted offences, alleging that petitioner No.1 on the pretext of promise of marriage has indulged in physical relationship with the complainant. The police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet on 29.01.2021 and the matter now stands committed to the Court of Sessions and is pending in S.C.No.121/2021 for the afore-quoted offences. The discharge application filed by petitioner Nos.2 to 7 is also turned down by the concerned Court. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners would vehemently contend that not only accused No.1 alone is dragged into the
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HC-KAR
CNR: KAHC010493382026 NC: 2026:KHC:41487 CRL.P No. 10754 of 2026
proceedings, but every members of the family and friends have been dragged into the web of proceedings by respondent No.2 - complainant, whether they have role to play or otherwise.
He would submit that the complainant who is already married could not have registered the crime on the score that the petitioner No.1 has breached the promise of marriage. The statement recorded before the police was clear that accused No.1 would marry the complainant only after the dissolution of the marriage between Siddaraju and respondent No.2. Even before anything could happen, the complaint is registered.
Learned counsel submits that the acts between the complainant and petitioner No.1 were purely consensual.
5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 - complainant would however leave the decision to the Court as they are not interested to pursuing the matter any further.
6. Learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 - State would refute the submissions to contend that the matter is pending trial. Therefore, the petitioners should come out clean in a full blown trial.
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HC-KAR
CNR: KAHC010493382026 NC: 2026:KHC:41487 CRL.P No. 10754 of 2026
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the
submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and have perused the material on record. 8. The afore-narrated facts, the dates and the link in the chain of events are not in dispute. They are all a matter of record. The statement recorded by the complainant on 01.09.2020 reads as follows:
“ಕುಾರ ಕುಾರ ಕುಾರ ಕುಾರ ಾ ಾ ಾ ಾ ೇಔ
ೇಔ
ೇಔ
ೇಔ ೕ ೕ ೕ ೕ ಾೆ ಾೆ ಾೆ ಾೆ
.ನಂ ನಂ ನಂ ನಂ .167/2020 ೆಂಗಸು ೆಂಗಸು ೆಂಗಸು ೆಂಗಸು ಾೆಾದ ಾೆಾದ ಾೆಾದ ಾೆಾದ ೇನ ೇನ ೇನ ೇನ ಾೆಾದ ಾೆಾದ ಾೆಾದ ಾೆಾದ ೆಂಗನ ೆಂಗನ ೆಂಗನ ೆಂಗನ ೇೆ ೇೆ ೇೆ ೇೆ. ೇೆ ೇೆ ೇೆ ೇೆ:- xxxxx, xxxxx , xxxxx -ೕ - xxxxx
ಸಂತ ಊರು- xxxxx. #$ಾಂಕ.01.09.2020
$ಾನು ಈ &ೕಲ(ಂಡ *+ಾಸದ ನಮ- .ಾ/ 0ೋ.ೆ 2ಾಸ2ಾ3ರು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ ನಮ- .ಾ/ 56ೕಮ7 xxxxx ಈೆಯು ಹಷ; ೊ(ೕ< ನ ಆಾ ೆಲಸ ವನು? ಾ@ ೊಂ@ರು.ಾ4Aೆ ನಮ- ತಂBೆ ನಮ- ಸಂತ ಊAಾದ xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx ಇ ನಮ- ಅEFಯ 0ೋ.ೆ 2ಾಸ2ಾ3ರು.ಾ4Aೆ. ನಮ- ತಂBೆ .ಾ/Gೆ ಓಟುJ, 03 ಜನ ಮಕ(ದುL ದಲ$ೆಯ ಅಕ( xxxxx ಮದು2ೆ ಾ3ದುL ಇವರು xxxxx .ಾ ಇ 2ಾಸ2ಾ3ರು.ಾ4Aೆ. ಮತು4 ಮೂರ$ೆಯ ಮಗಳN xxxxx 06 $ೇ ತರಗ7ಯ 2ಾOಾಂಗವನು? ಾ@ ೊಂ@ರು.ಾ4Aೆ. ಈGೆP ಈGೆP ಈGೆP ಈGೆP ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ಸುಾರು ಸುಾರು ಸುಾರು ಸುಾರು 02 ವಷ;ದ ವಷ;ದ ವಷ;ದ ವಷ;ದ QಂBೆ QಂBೆ QಂBೆ QಂBೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ RಾಮAಾಜ RಾಮAಾಜ RಾಮAಾಜ RಾಮAಾಜ ನಗರದ ನಗರದ ನಗರದ ನಗರದ S2ಾಾದ S2ಾಾದ S2ಾಾದ S2ಾಾದ ದLAಾಜು ದLAಾಜು ದLAಾಜು ದLAಾಜು ಎಂಬುವವVGೆ ಎಂಬುವವVGೆ ಎಂಬುವವVGೆ ಎಂಬುವವVGೆ ಮದು2ೆಯನು? ಮದು2ೆಯನು? ಮದು2ೆಯನು? ಮದು2ೆಯನು? ಾ@ ೊXJರು.ಾ4Aೆ ಾ@ ೊXJರು.ಾ4Aೆ ಾ@ ೊXJರು.ಾ4Aೆ ಾ@ ೊXJರು.ಾ4Aೆ. $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು ಮದು2ೆಗೂ ಮದು2ೆಗೂ ಮದು2ೆಗೂ ಮದು2ೆಗೂ ದ ೇ ದ ೇ ದ ೇ ದ ೇ ನಮ- ನಮ- ನಮ- ನಮ- ಏVಾದ ಏVಾದ ಏVಾದ ಏVಾದ S2ಾಾದ S2ಾಾದ S2ಾಾದ S2ಾಾದ Aಾ0ೇZ Aಾ0ೇZ Aಾ0ೇZ Aಾ0ೇZ ಎಂಬುವವರನು? ಎಂಬುವವರನು? ಎಂಬುವವರನು? ಎಂಬುವವರನು? $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು ಇಬ[ರು ಇಬ[ರು ಇಬ[ರು ಇಬ[ರು ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಪರಸ]ರ ಪರಸ]ರ ಪರಸ]ರ ಪರಸ]ರ ^6ೕ ^6ೕ ^6ೕ ^6ೕ7ಸು74ದುL 7ಸು74ದುL 7ಸು74ದುL 7ಸು74ದುL ಇಬ[ರು ಇಬ[ರು ಇಬ[ರು ಇಬ[ರು ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಮದು2ೆಾಗ_ೇೆಂದು ಮದು2ೆಾಗ_ೇೆಂದು ಮದು2ೆಾಗ_ೇೆಂದು ಮದು2ೆಾಗ_ೇೆಂದು 7ೕಾ;S 7ೕಾ;S 7ೕಾ;S 7ೕಾ;S ೊಂ@BೆLೕವ` ೊಂ@BೆLೕವ` ೊಂ@BೆLೕವ` ೊಂ@BೆLೕವ` ಆದAೆ ಆದAೆ ಆದAೆ ಆದAೆ ನಮ- ನಮ- ನಮ- ನಮ- .ಾ/ .ಾ/ .ಾ/ .ಾ/ ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ದLAಾಜು ದLAಾಜು ದLAಾಜು ದLAಾಜು ಎಂಬುವವVGೆ ಎಂಬುವವVGೆ ಎಂಬುವವVGೆ ಎಂಬುವವVGೆ ಮದು2ೆ ಮದು2ೆ ಮದು2ೆ ಮದು2ೆ ಾ@ ಾ@ ಾ@ ಾ@ ೊXJರು.ಾ4Aೆ ೊXJರು.ಾ4Aೆ ೊXJರು.ಾ4Aೆ ೊXJರು.ಾ4Aೆ.
ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ದSಂದಲೂ ದSಂದಲೂ ದSಂದಲೂ ದSಂದಲೂ ನಮ- ನಮ- ನಮ- ನಮ- ಗಂಡನ ಗಂಡನ ಗಂಡನ ಗಂಡನ 0ೋ.ೆ 0ೋ.ೆ 0ೋ.ೆ 0ೋ.ೆ ಸಂಾರ ಸಂಾರ ಸಂಾರ ಸಂಾರ ನaೆಸಲು ನaೆಸಲು ನaೆಸಲು ನaೆಸಲು ಇಷJ ಇಷJ ಇಷJ ಇಷJ ಇರುವ`#ಲ ಇರುವ`#ಲ ಇರುವ`#ಲ ಇರುವ`#ಲ ಆದAೆ ಆದAೆ ಆದAೆ ಆದAೆ GೌV GೌV GೌV GೌV ಹಬ[ ಹಬ[ ಹಬ[ ಹಬ[ ಇರುವ ಇರುವ ಇರುವ ಇರುವ ಾರಣ ಾರಣ ಾರಣ ಾರಣ ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ನಮ- ನಮ- ನಮ- ನಮ- .ಾ/ .ಾ/ .ಾ/ .ಾ/ ನಮ- ನಮ- ನಮ- ನಮ- ಗಂಡನ ಗಂಡನ ಗಂಡನ ಗಂಡನ ಮ$ೆ/ಂ ಮ$ೆ/ಂ ಮ$ೆ/ಂ ಮ$ೆ/ಂದದದದ _ೆಂಗಳNVGೆ _ೆಂಗಳNVGೆ _ೆಂಗಳNVGೆ _ೆಂಗಳNVGೆ
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HC-KAR
CNR: KAHC010493382026 NC: 2026:KHC:41487 CRL.P No. 10754 of 2026
ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ಬಂ#ರು.ಾ4Aೆ ಬಂ#ರು.ಾ4Aೆ ಬಂ#ರು.ಾ4Aೆ ಬಂ#ರು.ಾ4Aೆ. ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ಪ`ನಃ ಪ`ನಃ ಪ`ನಃ ಪ`ನಃ ನನ? ನನ? ನನ? ನನ? ಗಂಡನ ಗಂಡನ ಗಂಡನ ಗಂಡನ ಮ$ೆGೆ ಮ$ೆGೆ ಮ$ೆGೆ ಮ$ೆGೆ ೋಗಲು ೋಗಲು ೋಗಲು ೋಗಲು ಇಷJ*ಲದ ಇಷJ*ಲದ ಇಷJ*ಲದ ಇಷJ*ಲದ ಾರಣ ಾರಣ ಾರಣ ಾರಣ $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು ನನ? ನನ? ನನ? ನನ? ಗಂಡ$ಾದ ಗಂಡ$ಾದ ಗಂಡ$ಾದ ಗಂಡ$ಾದ ಾರಣ ಾರಣ ಾರಣ ಾರಣ @eೕ ; @eೕ ; @eೕ ; @eೕ ; ಅನು? ಅನು? ಅನು? ಅನು? Sೕ@ Sೕ@ Sೕ@ Sೕ@ $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು Aಾ0ೇZ Aಾ0ೇZ Aಾ0ೇZ Aಾ0ೇZ ರವರನು? ರವರನು? ರವರನು? ರವರನು? ಮುಂBೆ ಮುಂBೆ ಮುಂBೆ ಮುಂBೆ ಮದು2ೆ ಮದು2ೆ ಮದು2ೆ ಮದು2ೆ ಯಗ_ೇೆಂದು ಯಗ_ೇೆಂದು ಯಗ_ೇೆಂದು ಯಗ_ೇೆಂದು 7ೕಾ;S 7ೕಾ;S 7ೕಾ;S 7ೕಾ;S ೊಂಡು ೊಂಡು ೊಂಡು ೊಂಡು $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು ಾಗೂ ಾಗೂ ಾಗೂ ಾಗೂ Aಾ0ೇZ Aಾ0ೇZ Aಾ0ೇZ Aಾ0ೇZ ಇಬ[ರು ಇಬ[ರು ಇಬ[ರು ಇಬ[ರು ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಮತ$ಾ@ ಮತ$ಾ@ ಮತ$ಾ@ ಮತ$ಾ@ ೊಂಡು ೊಂಡು ೊಂಡು ೊಂಡು $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ. 29/08/2020 ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ಾಾಂಾಲ ಾಾಂಾಲ ಾಾಂಾಲ ಾಾಂಾಲ 06-00 ಗಂfೆ ಗಂfೆ ಗಂfೆ ಗಂfೆ ಸಮಯದ ಸಮಯದ ಸಮಯದ ಸಮಯದ $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು ಾVಗೂ ಾVಗೂ ಾVಗೂ ಾVಗೂ ೇಳBೆ ೇಳBೆ ೇಳBೆ ೇಳBೆ ಮ$ೆಯನು? ಮ$ೆಯನು? ಮ$ೆಯನು? ಮ$ೆಯನು?
gಟುJ gಟುJ gಟುJ gಟುJ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು ಾಗೂ ಾಗೂ ಾಗೂ ಾಗೂ Aಾ0ೇZ Aಾ0ೇZ Aಾ0ೇZ Aಾ0ೇZ ಇಬ[ರು ಇಬ[ರು ಇಬ[ರು ಇಬ[ರು ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಮಹBೇಶರ ಮಹBೇಶರ ಮಹBೇಶರ ಮಹBೇಶರ _ೆಟJೆ( _ೆಟJೆ( _ೆಟJೆ( _ೆಟJೆ( ೋ3ದುL ೋ3ದುL ೋ3ದುL ೋ3ದುL $ಾವ` $ಾವ` $ಾವ` $ಾವ` ಅiೕ ಅiೕ ಅiೕ ಅiೕ ಇದುL ಇದುL ಇದುL ಇದುL ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ #ನ #ನ #ನ #ನ ಾಾಂಾಲ ಾಾಂಾಲ ಾಾಂಾಲ ಾಾಂಾಲ 05- 00 ಗಂfೆ ಗಂfೆ ಗಂfೆ ಗಂfೆ ಸಮಯದ ಸಮಯದ ಸಮಯದ ಸಮಯದ ಇಬ[ರು ಇಬ[ರು ಇಬ[ರು ಇಬ[ರು ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ _ೆಂಗಳNVGೆ _ೆಂಗಳNVGೆ _ೆಂಗಳNVGೆ _ೆಂಗಳNVGೆ 2ಾಪಸುj 2ಾಪಸುj 2ಾಪಸುj 2ಾಪಸುj ಬಂ#ರು.ೆ4ೕ2ೆ ಬಂ#ರು.ೆ4ೕ2ೆ ಬಂ#ರು.ೆ4ೕ2ೆ ಬಂ#ರು.ೆ4ೕ2ೆ. ನಂತರ $ಾನು ಾೇಾ3ರುವ ಬGೆP ನಮ- .ಾ/ ಕುಾರಾ ೇಔ ೕ ಾೇಯ ದೂರು Bಾಖರುವ ಬGೆP *Rಾರ 7ದು $ಾನು ಮತು4 Aಾ0ೇZ ಇಬ[ರು ಸಹ ೕ ಾೆGೆ ಬಂ#ರು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ. ನನGೆ ದLAಾಜು ರವರ 0ೋ.ೆ ಸಂಾರ ಾಡಲು ಮತು4 ಅವರ 0ೋ.ೆ Eೕವನ ನaೆಸಲು ಇಷJ ಇಲದ ಾರಣ $ಾನು $ಾ$ೇ ಸ ಇRೆl/ಂದ ಮ$ೆಯನು? gಟುJ ೋ3ರು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ ಮುಂBೆ ನನGೆ ಎ$ೇ .ೊಂದAೆಾದರೂ ಸಹ ಅದೆ( $ಾ$ೇ ಜವ_ಾLAಾ$ಾ3ರು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ ಇದೆ( ನಮ- ತಂBೆ .ಾ/ ಾಗೂ ನಮ- ಗಂಡ$ಾದ ದLAಾಜು ರವರು ಾರಣAಾ3ರುವ`#ಲ ಆದLVಂದ ನಮ- .ಾ/ ೊXJರುವ ದೂರನು? ಮುಾ4ಯ ಾಡ_ೇೆಂದು ೇೊಳmn.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ $ಾನು ಈಗ ಸ ಇRೆl/ಂದ Aಾ0ೇZ, ರವರ 0ೊ.ೆ ೋಗು74BೆLೕ$ೆ. ನನ? ಮುಂBೆ ಸQ/- ಓ# ೇಳ ಾ3 ಸV/Bೆ ಸQ/-“
(Emphasis added)
8.1. Petitioner No.1 statement is recorded on 01.09.2020, which reads as follows:
““““ಕುಾರಾ ಕುಾರಾ ಕುಾರಾ ಕುಾರಾ ೇಔ
ೇಔ
ೇಔ
ೇಔ ೕ ೕ ೕ ೕ ಾೆ ಾೆ ಾೆ ಾೆ,
.ಸಂ ಸಂ ಸಂ ಸಂ.167/2020 ಕಲಂ ಕಲಂ ಕಲಂ ಕಲಂ.ೆಂಗಸು ೆಂಗಸು ೆಂಗಸು ೆಂಗಸು ಾೆಾದ ಾೆಾದ ಾೆಾದ ಾೆಾದ ಬGೆP ಬGೆP ಬGೆP ಬGೆP. ಾqBಾರರ ಾqBಾರರ ಾqBಾರರ ಾqBಾರರ ೇೆ ೇೆ ೇೆ ೇೆ,
Aಾ0ೇZ ಎ g ದLAಾಜು, 23 ವಷ;, 2ಾಸ ನಂ.166, 11$ೇ &ೖ , ಚಂದ6ನಗರ, ೆ.ಎ. ೇಔ, _ೆಂಗಳNರು ನಗರ. tೕ ನಂ. 8310969560. ********
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HC-KAR
CNR: KAHC010493382026 NC: 2026:KHC:41487 CRL.P No. 10754 of 2026
$ಾನು ಈ &ೕಲ(ಂಡ *+ಾಸದ ತಂBೆ .ಾ/uಂ#Gೆ 2ಾಸಾ@ೊಂ@ದುL ಆfೋ aೆvವw ಆ3 ೆಲಸ ಾ@ೊಂ@ರು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ. ನನ? ತಂBೆ ದLAಾಜು ರವರು ಾರx( ಾೇ; ನ ತರಾV 2ಾOyಾರ ಾ@ೊಂ@ದುL .ಾ/ zಕ(.ಾಯಮ- ಮ$ೆ ೆಲಸ ಾ@ೊಂ@ರು.ಾ4Aೆ. $ಾನು ಕ+ೆದ 03 ವಷ;ಗಂದ ಾ5ನಗರ S2ಾಾದ xxxxx ಎಂಬುವವರ ಮಗ+ಾದ xxxxx ಎಂಬುವವರನು? ^6ೕ7ಸು74ದುL ಈ *ಷಯ ನಮ- ಮ$ೆಯವVGೆ ಾಗೂ xxxxx ರವರ ಮ$ೆಯವVGೆ 7#ರುವ`#ಲ.
ಈ3 ಈ3 ಈ3 ಈ3ರು2ಾGೆP ರು2ಾGೆP ರು2ಾGೆP ರು2ಾGೆP xxxxx ರವVGೆ ರವVGೆ ರವVGೆ ರವVGೆ 2018$ೇ $ೇ $ೇ $ೇ ಇಸ*ಯ ಇಸ*ಯ ಇಸ*ಯ ಇಸ*ಯ RಾಮAಾಜನಗರ RಾಮAಾಜನಗರ RಾಮAಾಜನಗರ RಾಮAಾಜನಗರ E ೆಯ E ೆಯ E ೆಯ E ೆಯ $ಾಗವn $ಾಗವn $ಾಗವn $ಾಗವn S2ಾಾದ S2ಾಾದ S2ಾಾದ S2ಾಾದ ದLAಾಜು ದLAಾಜು ದLAಾಜು ದLAಾಜು ಎಂಬುವವರ ಎಂಬುವವರ ಎಂಬುವವರ ಎಂಬುವವರ 0ೊ.ೆ 0ೊ.ೆ 0ೊ.ೆ 0ೊ.ೆ ಮದು2ೆಾ3ದುL ಮದು2ೆಾ3ದುL ಮದು2ೆಾ3ದುL ಮದು2ೆಾ3ದುL ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ *ಷಯ *ಷಯ *ಷಯ *ಷಯ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ 7#ರುತ4Bೆ 7#ರುತ4Bೆ 7#ರುತ4Bೆ 7#ರುತ4Bೆ. xxxxx ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು ಮದು2ೆಾದ ಮದು2ೆಾದ ಮದು2ೆಾದ ಮದು2ೆಾದ ನಂತರವ` ನಂತರವ` ನಂತರವ` ನಂತರವ` ನನ? ನನ? ನನ? ನನ? 0ೊ.ೆ 0ೊ.ೆ 0ೊ.ೆ 0ೊ.ೆ ಸಂಪಕ;ದರು.ಾ4Aೆ ಸಂಪಕ;ದರು.ಾ4Aೆ ಸಂಪಕ;ದರು.ಾ4Aೆ ಸಂಪಕ;ದರು.ಾ4Aೆ. ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಬGೆP ಬGೆP ಬGೆP ಬGೆP xxxxx ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಮದು2ೆ ಮದು2ೆ ಮದು2ೆ ಮದು2ೆ ಇಷJ*ರುವ`#ಲ ಇಷJ*ರುವ`#ಲ ಇಷJ*ರುವ`#ಲ ಇಷJ*ರುವ`#ಲ ಮ$ೆಯವರ ಮ$ೆಯವರ ಮ$ೆಯವರ ಮ$ೆಯವರ ಬಲವಂ ಬಲವಂ ಬಲವಂ ಬಲವಂತೆ( ತೆ( ತೆ( ತೆ( ಮದು2ೆಾ3ರುವ`Bಾ3 ಮದು2ೆಾ3ರುವ`Bಾ3 ಮದು2ೆಾ3ರುವ`Bಾ3 ಮದು2ೆಾ3ರುವ`Bಾ3 ೇಳm74ದLರು ೇಳm74ದLರು ೇಳm74ದLರು ೇಳm74ದLರು. ಈ3ರು2ಾGೆP ಈ3ರು2ಾGೆP ಈ3ರು2ಾGೆP ಈ3ರು2ಾGೆP #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ:27/08/2020 ಸಂ0ೆ ಸಂ0ೆ ಸಂ0ೆ ಸಂ0ೆ ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ಕAೆ ಕAೆ ಕAೆ ಕAೆ ಾ@ ಾ@ ಾ@ ಾ@ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ _ೇ0ಾAಾಗು74Bೆ _ೇ0ಾAಾಗು74Bೆ _ೇ0ಾAಾಗು74Bೆ _ೇ0ಾAಾಗು74Bೆ ೊರಗaೆ ೊರಗaೆ ೊರಗaೆ ೊರಗaೆ ೋGೋಣ ೋGೋಣ ೋGೋಣ ೋGೋಣ ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಕAೆ#ದುL ಕAೆ#ದುL ಕAೆ#ದುL ಕAೆ#ದುL $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ:29/08/2020 ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ಸಂ0ೆ ಸಂ0ೆ ಸಂ0ೆ ಸಂ0ೆ 06.00 ಗಂfೆ ಗಂfೆ ಗಂfೆ ಗಂfೆ ಸಮಯದ ಸಮಯದ ಸಮಯದ ಸಮಯದ ಅವರ ಅವರ ಅವರ ಅವರ ಮ$ೆಯ ಮ$ೆಯ ಮ$ೆಯ ಮ$ೆಯ ಬ ಬ ಬ ಬ ೋ3 ೋ3 ೋ3 ೋ3 ಅವರನು? ಅವರನು? ಅವರನು? ಅವರನು? ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ಮ ೆ ಮ ೆ ಮ ೆ ಮ ೆ ಮಹBೇಶರ ಮಹBೇಶರ ಮಹBೇಶರ ಮಹBೇಶರ _ೆಟJೆ( _ೆಟJೆ( _ೆಟJೆ( _ೆಟJೆ( ೋ3ರು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ ೋ3ರು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ ೋ3ರು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ ೋ3ರು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ. ನಂತರ ಈ #ನ xxxxx ರವರು ಾೆಾದ ಬGೆP ಅವರ .ಾ/ಾದ xxxxx ರವರು ಕುಾರಾ ೇಔ ೕ ಾೆಯ ದೂರು Sೕ@ರುವ *ಷಯ 7ದು $ಾನು ಾಗೂ xxxxx ಾೆGೆ ಾಜAಾ3 ಸದV ೇೆಯನು? Sೕ@ರು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ.
$ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು ಾಗೂ ಾಗೂ ಾಗೂ ಾಗೂ xxxxx ಕ+ೆದ ಕ+ೆದ ಕ+ೆದ ಕ+ೆದ 03 ವಷ;ಗಂದ ವಷ;ಗಂದ ವಷ;ಗಂದ ವಷ;ಗಂದ ^6ೕ7ಸು74ದುL ^6ೕ7ಸು74ದುL ^6ೕ7ಸು74ದುL ^6ೕ7ಸು74ದುL ಅವಳm ಅವಳm ಅವಳm ಅವಳm *2ಾಹ *2ಾಹ *2ಾಹ *2ಾಹ *Rೆ{ೕದನ *Rೆ{ೕದನ *Rೆ{ೕದನ *Rೆ{ೕದನ Sೕ@ದ Sೕ@ದ Sೕ@ದ Sೕ@ದ ಬಕ ಬಕ ಬಕ ಬಕ ಅವರನು? ಅವರನು? ಅವರನು? ಅವರನು? ಮದು2ೆಾಗು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ ಮದು2ೆಾಗು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ ಮದು2ೆಾಗು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ ಮದು2ೆಾಗು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ. ಈಗ ಈಗ ಈಗ ಈಗ xxxxx ರವರನು? ರವರನು? ರವರನು? ರವರನು? ನನ? ನನ? ನನ? ನನ? 0ೊ.ೆಯiೕ 0ೊ.ೆಯiೕ 0ೊ.ೆಯiೕ 0ೊ.ೆಯiೕ ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ೋಗು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ ೋಗು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ ೋಗು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ ೋಗು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ. ಇದL ಇದL ಇದL ಇದL *ಷಯವನು? *ಷಯವನು? *ಷಯವನು? *ಷಯವನು? ತಮGೆ ತಮGೆ ತಮGೆ ತಮGೆ 7ರು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ 7ರು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ 7ರು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ 7ರು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ. ನನ? ಸಮ|ಮ
ಓ# ೇBೆ ಸV/Bೆ. ಸQ/- ( ೆ}.ಎಂ.$ಾGೇZ ^.ಎ.ಐ)
ಸQ/-“
(Emphasis added)
8.2. The statement of the complainant is clear that she is already married to one Siddaraju and she is not insisting to stay with him and she is wanting to marry petitioner No.1. A
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HC-KAR
CNR: KAHC010493382026 NC: 2026:KHC:41487 CRL.P No. 10754 of 2026
perusal at the afore-quoted statement would clearly indicate that, if the marriage of respondent No.2 and Siddaraju would get dissolved, he would consider for marriage with respondent No.2. Two months after recording of the said statement, the complaint comes to be registered against the petitioner and other by the complainant alleging rape on the pretext of promise of marriage. The complaint reads as follows:
“Gೆ
#$ಾಂಕ: 7/11/2020
ಸ€ ಇನjyೆಕJw ಆ• ೕ ತಲಘಟJಪ`ರ ೕ ಾೆ _ೆಂಗಳNರು. ಇಂದ
Xxxxx Xxxxx Xxxxx Xxxxx
*ಷಯ: Aಾ0ೇಶರವರು ನನ?ನು? ಮದು2ೆಾಗು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆಂದು ನಂg ಅಕ6ಮ2ಾ3 ಗೃಹ ಬಂಧನದಟುJೊಂಡು Sರಂತರ2ಾ3 ನನGೆ BೈQಕ Bೌಜ;ನO ಮತು4 ಅ.ಾORಾರ ಾ@ದುL ಅವರ ಕುಟುಂಬದ ಸದಸOರುಗಳm ನನ?ನು? ಅಕ6ಮ2ಾ3 ಗೃಹ ಬಂಧನದಟುJೊಂಡು ಹ ೆ ಮತು4 Eೕವ _ೆದVೆ ಾxರುವ ಬGೆP ದೂರು. ಾ , ಅE;Bಾರ+ಾದ $ಾನು xxxxx ನನ? .ಾ/ಾದ xxxxx ರವರ 0ೊ.ೆ 2ಾಸ2ಾ3ರು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ. Aಾ0ೇZ ಎಂಬುವವರು ನನGೆ 3 ವಷ;ಗಂದ ಪVಚ*ಡುದುL ಪVಚಯ ^6ೕ7ಾ3 7ರು3 3 ವಷ;ಗಂದ ಇಬ[ರು ^6ೕ7ಸು74BೆLೕವ` #$ಾಂಕ 27/08/2020 ರಂದು Aಾ0ೇಶರವರು ನನ? .ಾ/ _ೈ< ನಂಬVGೆ (xxxxx) ೕ ಾ@ $ಾ*ಬ[ರು ಮದು2ೆಾGೋಣ _ಾ ಎಂದು #$ಾಂಕ 27/08/2020 ರಂದು ಸಂ0ೆ 6 ಗಂfೆGೆ ನನ?ನು? - 11 -
HC-KAR
CNR: KAHC010493382026 NC: 2026:KHC:41487 CRL.P No. 10754 of 2026
ಮ$ೆ/ಂದ ೊರಗaೆ ಬರುವಂ.ೆ 7ದರು Sೕನು ಒಂದು 2ೇ+ೆ _ಾರ#ದLAೇ $ಾನು ಾಯು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆಂದು ನನ?ನು?
ಎದVದರು ಅದರಂ.ೆ $ಾನು 27/08/2020 ರಂದು ಾಯಂಾಲ 6.15 S ಷೆ( $ಾನು ನಮ- ಮ$ೆ ಹ74ರ ಇರುವ _ೇಕVಯ ಬ ಬಂBೆನು ನಂತರ Aಾ0ೇಶರವರು ತನ? ಸಂತ ಆfೋದ ನನ?ನು? ೊVೊಂಡು ಾರx(Gೆ ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ಬಂದನು ಪ`ನ: ಅಂದ $ೇರ2ಾ3 ಮಹBೇಶರ _ೆಟJೆ( ೋBೆವ` ನಂತರ ಪ†0ೆ ಮು3 Aಾ0ೇಶರವರು ತ|ಣ ಊVGೆ ೋಗುವ`ದು _ೇಡ ನನGೆ _ೇ0ಾAಾ3Bೆ ಇiೕ ಎರಡು #ನ ಇದುL ನಂತರ _ೆಂಗಳNVGೆ 2ಾಪಸುj ೋGೋಣ2ೆಂದು ೇ ಮಹBೇಶರ _ೆಟJದiೕ ಇರುವ ‡ಾಸ3 ಾˆF ನ Aಾ0ೇಶರವರು ರೂ‰ ಾ@ದರು Aಾ0ೇಶರವರು ನನ?ನು? 29/08/2020 ರಂದು Aಾ76 ಸುಾರು 10 ಗಂfೆ ಸಮಯದ ನನ?ನು? ೈಂ3ಕ2ಾ3 ಬಳೊಳnಲು ಪ6ಯತ?ಪಟJರು ಇBೆ ಾ ಮದು2ೆಯ ನಂತರ ಇಟುJೊ+ೆNnೕಣ ಈಗ _ೇಡ ಎಂದು ೇBೇನು $ಾನು ಆಗ ಅದೆ( ಒಪ]#BಾLಗ ಎರಡು #ನಗಳ ನಂತರ #$ಾಂಕ 30/08/2020 ರಂದು _ೆಂಗಳNVGೆ 2ಾಪಸುj ಬಂBೇವ` $ೇರ2ಾ3 Aಾ0ೇಶರವರು ತಲಘಟJಪ`ರ ೕ ಾೆ ಸರಹ#Lನ GಾŠGಾರyಾಳOದ ಾBೇಶರ Bೇವಾ‹ನ ಹ74ರ ಬಂದು ಮನGೆ ನನ?ನು? ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ೋದನು ಊಟ ಮು3ದ ನಂತರ ನನ?ನು? ಬಲವಂತ2ಾ3 ೆದV $ಾನು ೇದ ಆGೆ ೇಳ#ದLAೇ $ಾನು ಾಯು.ೆ4$ೆಂದು ೆದV ನನ?ನು? BೈQಕ2ಾ3 ಬಲವಂತ#ಂದ ನನ? &ೕ ೆ ಸತತ2ಾ3 ಅ.ಾORಾರ ಾ@ರು.ಾ4$ೆ ನಂತರ ನನ? .ಾ/ಯವAಾದ xxxxxxx ರವರು #$ಾಂಕ 29/08/2020 ರಂದು ಾಯಂಾಲ Sೕ@ರುವ ದೂVನಯ ಕುಾರಾ ೇಔ ೕ ಾೆಯ ಬ[ಂ#ವರು Aಾ0ೇಶರವರ _ೈ< ನಂಬVGೆ (8310969560) ೕ ಾ@ ಾೆGೆ ಬರುವಂ.ೆ ೇದರು #$ಾಂಕ 1/09/2020 ರಂದು $ಾನು ಮತು4 Aಾ0ೇಶ ಾೆGೆ .ೆರ $ಾವ` ^6ೕ7ರುವ *Rಾರದ ಬGೆP ೇೆ Sೕ@ರು.ೆ4ೕ2ೆ, ಆಆಆಆ #ನ #ನ #ನ #ನ Aಾ0ೇಶರವರು Aಾ0ೇಶರವರು Aಾ0ೇಶರವರು Aಾ0ೇಶರವರು ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ೈಂ3ಕ2ಾ3
ೈಂ3ಕ2ಾ3
ೈಂ3ಕ2ಾ3
ೈಂ3ಕ2ಾ3 ಬಳರುವ ಬಳರುವ ಬಳರುವ ಬಳರುವ ಬGೆP ಬGೆP ಬGೆP ಬGೆP ಾೆಯ ಾೆಯ ಾೆಯ ಾೆಯ ಾವ`Bೇ ಾವ`Bೇ ಾವ`Bೇ ಾವ`Bೇ ಾQ7 ಾQ7 ಾQ7 ಾQ7 Sೕಡ_ೇದ2ೆಂದು Sೕಡ_ೇದ2ೆಂದು Sೕಡ_ೇದ2ೆಂದು Sೕಡ_ೇದ2ೆಂದು ೆದVರುವ ೆದVರುವ ೆದVರುವ ೆದVರುವ ಾರಣ ಾರಣ ಾರಣ ಾರಣ $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು ಆಆಆಆ ಾQ7ಯನು? ಾQ7ಯನು? ಾQ7ಯನು? ಾQ7ಯನು?
ಮುzlXJBೆ ಮುzlXJBೆ ಮುzlXJBೆ ಮುzlXJBೆ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ರ0ೇಶರವರು ರ0ೇಶರವರು ರ0ೇಶರವರು ರ0ೇಶರವರು 2ಾಸ*ದL 2ಾಸ*ದL 2ಾಸ*ದL 2ಾಸ*ದL GಾŠGಾರ GಾŠGಾರ GಾŠGಾರ GಾŠGಾರ yಾಳOದ yಾಳOದ yಾಳOದ yಾಳOದ ಮ$ೆGೆ ಮ$ೆGೆ ಮ$ೆGೆ ಮ$ೆGೆ ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ಕAೆದುೊಂಡು ೋದನು ೋದನು ೋದನು ೋದನು ಇBಾದ ಇBಾದ ಇBಾದ ಇBಾದ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ Aಾ0ೇಶನ Aಾ0ೇಶನ Aಾ0ೇಶನ Aಾ0ೇಶನ ತಂBೆ ತಂBೆ ತಂBೆ ತಂBೆ ದLAಾಜು ದLAಾಜು ದLAಾಜು ದLAಾಜು Aಾ0ೇಶನ Aಾ0ೇಶನ Aಾ0ೇಶನ Aಾ0ೇಶನ .ಾ/ .ಾ/ .ಾ/ .ಾ/ zಕ(.ಾಯಮ- zಕ(.ಾಯಮ- zಕ(.ಾಯಮ- zಕ(.ಾಯಮ- ಆತನ ಆತನ ಆತನ ಆತನ ಅಕ(ಂ#Aಾದ ಅಕ(ಂ#Aಾದ ಅಕ(ಂ#Aಾದ ಅಕ(ಂ#Aಾದ ಅನುಮಪ ಅನುಮಪ ಅನುಮಪ ಅನುಮಪ Aಾ0ೇಶನ Aಾ0ೇಶನ Aಾ0ೇಶನ Aಾ0ೇಶನ .ಾ/ .ಾ/ .ಾ/ .ಾ/ zಕ(.ಾಯಮ- zಕ(.ಾಯಮ- zಕ(.ಾಯಮ- zಕ(.ಾಯಮ- ಆತನ ಆತನ ಆತನ ಆತನ ಅಕ(ಂ#Aಾದ ಅಕ(ಂ#Aಾದ ಅಕ(ಂ#Aಾದ ಅಕ(ಂ#Aಾದ ಅನುಪಮ ಅನುಪಮ ಅನುಪಮ ಅನುಪಮ, ಶೃ7 ಶೃ7 ಶೃ7 ಶೃ7 ಾಗೂ ಾಗೂ ಾಗೂ ಾಗೂ ಅನುಪಾ+ಾದ ಅನುಪಾ+ಾದ ಅನುಪಾ+ಾದ ಅನುಪಾ+ಾದ ಗಂಡ$ಾದ ಗಂಡ$ಾದ ಗಂಡ$ಾದ ಗಂಡ$ಾದ ಸಂ.ೋಷ ಸಂ.ೋಷ ಸಂ.ೋಷ ಸಂ.ೋಷ (ಸಂತು ಸಂತು ಸಂತು ಸಂತು) ಾGೊ ಾGೊ ಾGೊ ಾGೊ ಶೃ7ಯ ಶೃ7ಯ ಶೃ7ಯ ಶೃ7ಯ ಗಂಡ$ಾದ ಗಂಡ$ಾದ ಗಂಡ$ಾದ ಗಂಡ$ಾದ ಸುAೇಶರವರುಗಳm ಸುAೇಶರವರುಗಳm ಸುAೇಶರವರುಗಳm ಸುAೇಶರವರುಗಳm ನನ? ನನ? ನನ? ನನ? &ೕ ೆ &ೕ ೆ &ೕ ೆ &ೕ ೆ ಆ2ಾ} ಆ2ಾ} ಆ2ಾ} ಆ2ಾ}ಯ ಯ ಯ ಯ ಶಬLಗಂದ ಶಬLಗಂದ ಶಬLಗಂದ ಶಬLಗಂದ _ೈದು _ೈದು _ೈದು _ೈದು ಹ ೆಯನು? ಹ ೆಯನು? ಹ ೆಯನು? ಹ ೆಯನು? ಾ@ ಾ@ ಾ@ ಾ@ Aಾ0ೇಶ Aಾ0ೇಶ Aಾ0ೇಶ Aಾ0ೇಶ ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ೊ ೆ ೊ ೆ ೊ ೆ ೊ ೆ ಾಡುವ`Bಾ3 ಾಡುವ`Bಾ3 ಾಡುವ`Bಾ3 ಾಡುವ`Bಾ3 ೆದVರು.ಾ4Aೆ ೆದVರು.ಾ4Aೆ ೆದVರು.ಾ4Aೆ ೆದVರು.ಾ4Aೆ. ತದ ತದ ತದ ತದ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ Aಾ0ೇಶ Aಾ0ೇಶ Aಾ0ೇಶ Aಾ0ೇಶ ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ಬಲವಂತ2ಾ3 ಬಲವಂತ2ಾ3 ಬಲವಂತ2ಾ3 ಬಲವಂತ2ಾ3 ಗೃಹಬಂಧನನ?ಟುJ ಗೃಹಬಂಧನನ?ಟುJ ಗೃಹಬಂಧನನ?ಟುJ ಗೃಹಬಂಧನನ?ಟುJ ಎಯೂ ಎಯೂ ಎಯೂ ಎಯೂ ೊರಗaೆ ೊರಗaೆ ೊರಗaೆ ೊರಗaೆ ೋಗಲು ೋಗಲು ೋಗಲು ೋಗಲು gಡBೇ gಡBೇ gಡBೇ gಡBೇ ಸತತ2ಾ3 ಸತತ2ಾ3 ಸತತ2ಾ3 ಸತತ2ಾ3 ನನ? ನನ? ನನ? ನನ? &ೕ ೆ &ೕ ೆ &ೕ ೆ &ೕ ೆ ಅ.ಾORಾರ ಅ.ಾORಾರ ಅ.ಾORಾರ ಅ.ಾORಾರ ಾ@ರು.ಾ4$ೆ ಾ@ರು.ಾ4$ೆ ಾ@ರು.ಾ4$ೆ ಾ@ರು.ಾ4$ೆ. ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ #ನ #ನ #ನ #ನ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ 25/092020 ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ನನGೆ ಮ$ೆಯiೕ ಮ$ೆಯiೕ ಮ$ೆಯiೕ ಮ$ೆಯiೕ ಮದು2ೆಾ3ರು ಮದು2ೆಾ3ರು ಮದು2ೆಾ3ರು ಮದು2ೆಾ3ರು.ಾ4$ೆ .ಾ4$ೆ .ಾ4$ೆ .ಾ4$ೆ, ಅಂ#Sಂದ ಅಂ#Sಂದ ಅಂ#Sಂದ ಅಂ#Sಂದ ಒಂದು ಒಂದು ಒಂದು ಒಂದು 2ಾರಗಳ 2ಾರಗಳ 2ಾರಗಳ 2ಾರಗಳ ಾಲ ಾಲ ಾಲ ಾಲ 0ೊ.ೆ3ದುL 0ೊ.ೆ3ದುL 0ೊ.ೆ3ದುL 0ೊ.ೆ3ದುL #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ 3/10/2020 ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು _ೆಳGೆP _ೆಳGೆP _ೆಳGೆP _ೆಳGೆP ನನ? ನನ? ನನ? ನನ?
&ೕ ೆ &ೕ ೆ &ೕ ೆ &ೕ ೆ ಹ ೆ ಹ ೆ ಹ ೆ ಹ ೆ ಾ@ ಾ@ ಾ@ ಾ@ ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ನನ?ನು? ಮ$ೆ/ಂದ ಮ$ೆ/ಂದ ಮ$ೆ/ಂದ ಮ$ೆ/ಂದ ೊರಗaೆ ೊರಗaೆ ೊರಗaೆ ೊರಗaೆ ಾxರು.ಾ4$ೆ ಾxರು.ಾ4$ೆ ಾxರು.ಾ4$ೆ ಾxರು.ಾ4$ೆ. ಇBಾದ ನಂತರ Aಾ0ೇಶನ
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HC-KAR
CNR: KAHC010493382026 NC: 2026:KHC:41487 CRL.P No. 10754 of 2026
ಸಂಬಂŒಕAಾದ ಮೇಶ ಮತು4 •ಾಂತರವರ ಮ$ೆGೆ ಹುಡುxೊಂಡು ೋBೆನು ಅಯೂ ಸಹ Aಾ0ೇಶ ಇರಲ ಅವರ ಬ ನaೆದ *ಷಯವನು? ಅವರ ಸಂಬಂŒಕರ ಬ ೇBೆನು ಅವರುಗಳm ಈ *ಷಯದ ಬGೆP $ಾವ` ಏನೂ ಸಾಯ ಾಡ ಾಗುವ`#ಲ $ಾ2ೆಲರೂ ೇV Aಾ0ೇಶನನು? ಹುಡುೋಣ2ೆಂದು 7ದರು ಾಗೂ Aಾ0ೇಶ ಗುವವAೆGೆ ನಮ- ಮ$ೆಯiೕ ಇರು ಎಂದು ಇiೕ ಉೊಂಡರು ಅಂ#Sಂದಲೂ Aಾ0ೇಶSGೆ ಎ ಾ ಕaೆ ಹುಡುxದರೂ x(ರುವ`#ಲ ಮತು4 ತ ೆ ಮAೆೊಂಡು ಓaಾಡು74BಾL$ೆ, ಾGಾ3 Aಾ0ೇಶ ನನGೆ ಮದು2ೆಾಗು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆಂದು ನಂg ಅಕ6ಮ2ಾ3 ಗೃಹ ಬಂಧನದಟುJ ೈಂ3ಕ Bೌಜ;ನO ಾಡಲು ಾಗೂ $ಾನು xೕಳm 0ಾ7iಂದು ಆತನ ತಂBೆ ದLAಾಜು, ಆತನ .ಾ/ zಕ(.ಾಯಮ- ಅವನ ಅಕ(ಂ#Aಾದ ಅನುಪಮ, ಶೃ7 ಾಗೂ Aಾ0ೇಶನ •ಾವಂ#Aಾದ ಸಂ.ೋಷ (ಸಂತು) ಸುAೇಶರವರುಗ+ೇ $ೇರ ಾರಣ ಇವರುಗಳm ನನGೆ ನನ? 0ಾ7 ಮ@2ಾಳ ಬGೆP ೆಟJBಾ3 _ೈಯುL ನನ? &ೕ ೆ ಹ ೆ ನaೆ Eೕವ _ೆದVೆ ಾxದುL ಾಗೂ Aಾ0ೇಶGೆ ನನ? &ೕ ೆ ಅ.ಾORಾರ 2ೆಸಗಲು ಕುಮ-ಕು( Sೕ@ರುವ ಆತನ ಕುಟುಂಬ ಸದಸOರ *ರುದL ಾನೂನು Vೕ7ಯ ಕ6ಮ ಜರು3 ನನGೆ ಸೂಕ4 ರ|ೆ Sೕಡ_ೇೆಂದು ತಮ- ೇೊಳmn.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ.”
(Emphasis added)
8.3. The police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet against the petitioner and all others. The summary of the charge sheet reads as follows:
“17.
ೇನ ಸಂqಪ4 ಾAಾಂಶ
ಾq-1 ರವVGೆ ಎ1 ಆAೋ^ಯು 3 ವಷ;ಗಳ QಂBೆ ಪVಚಯ2ಾ3ದುL ನಂತರ ಪVಚಯ ^6ೕ7ಾ3 7ರು3 ಇಬ[ರೂ ಮೂರು ವಷ;ಗಂದ ಪರಸ]ರ ^6ೕ7ಸು74ದುL, #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ:27-08-2020 ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ಆAೋ^ಯು ಆAೋ^ಯು ಆAೋ^ಯು ಆAೋ^ಯು ಾq ಾq ಾq ಾq-1 ರವVGೆ ರವVGೆ ರವVGೆ ರವVGೆ ೕ ೕ ೕ ೕ ಾ@ ಾ@ ಾ@ ಾ@ $ಾ*ಬ[ರೂ $ಾ*ಬ[ರೂ $ಾ*ಬ[ರೂ $ಾ*ಬ[ರೂ ಮದು2ೆಾGೋಣ ಮದು2ೆಾGೋಣ ಮದು2ೆಾGೋಣ ಮದು2ೆಾGೋಣ _ಾ _ಾ _ಾ _ಾ ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ೇದುL ೇದುL ೇದುL ೇದುL ಆಗ ಆಗ ಆಗ ಆಗ ಾq ಾq ಾq ಾq-1 ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು _ಾರBೆ _ಾರBೆ _ಾರBೆ _ಾರBೆ ಇBಾLಗ ಇBಾLಗ ಇBಾLಗ ಇBಾLಗ Sೕನು Sೕನು Sೕನು Sೕನು ಬರ#ದLAೆ ಬರ#ದLAೆ ಬರ#ದLAೆ ಬರ#ದLAೆ $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು $ಾನು ಾಯು.ೆ4ೕ ಾಯು.ೆ4ೕ ಾಯು.ೆ4ೕ ಾಯು.ೆ4ೕ$ೆ$ೆ$ೆ$ೆ ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ೆದVBಾಗ ೆದVBಾಗ ೆದVBಾಗ ೆದVBಾಗ ಾq ಾq ಾq ಾq-1 ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು ಮ$ೆ/ಂದ ಮ$ೆ/ಂದ ಮ$ೆ/ಂದ ಮ$ೆ/ಂದ ೊರGೆ ೊರGೆ ೊರGೆ ೊರGೆ ಬಂ#ದುL ಬಂ#ದುL ಬಂ#ದುL ಬಂ#ದುL ಸಂ0ೆ ಸಂ0ೆ ಸಂ0ೆ ಸಂ0ೆ 06-15 ಗಂfೆGೆ ಗಂfೆGೆ ಗಂfೆGೆ ಗಂfೆGೆ ಆAೋ^ ಆAೋ^ ಆAೋ^ ಆAೋ^ ಾq ಾq ಾq ಾq-1 ರವರನು? ರವರನು? ರವರನು? ರವರನು? ತನ? ತನ? ತನ? ತನ? ಆfೋದ ಆfೋದ ಆfೋದ ಆfೋದ ಕೂVೊಂಡು ಕೂVೊಂಡು ಕೂVೊಂಡು ಕೂVೊಂಡು ಾರx(Gೆ ಾರx(Gೆ ಾರx(Gೆ ಾರx(Gೆ ೋ3 ೋ3 ೋ3 ೋ3 ಅ ಅ ಅ ಅ ಇದುL ಇದುL ಇದುL ಇದುL ಮರು#ನ ಮರು#ನ ಮರು#ನ ಮರು#ನ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ:28-08- 2020 ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ಅಂದ ಅಂದ ಅಂದ ಅಂದ ಬjನ ಬjನ ಬjನ ಬjನ ಮ ೆಮಾBೇಶರ ಮ ೆಮಾBೇಶರ ಮ ೆಮಾBೇಶರ ಮ ೆಮಾBೇಶರ _ೆಟJೆ( _ೆಟJೆ( _ೆಟJೆ( _ೆಟJೆ( ೋ3 ೋ3 ೋ3 ೋ3 ಅ ಅ ಅ ಅ-ಇ ಇ ಇ ಇ ಸು.ಾ4@ೊಂ@ದುL ಸು.ಾ4@ೊಂ@ದುL ಸು.ಾ4@ೊಂ@ದುL ಸು.ಾ4@ೊಂ@ದುL #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ #$ಾಂಕ:30-08-2020 ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ಮ ೆ ಮ ೆ ಮ ೆ ಮ ೆ ಮಾBೇಶರ ಮಾBೇಶರ ಮಾBೇಶರ ಮಾBೇಶರ _ೆಟJದ _ೆಟJದ _ೆಟJದ _ೆಟJದ ಇರುವ ಇರುವ ಇರುವ ಇರುವ ಾq ಾq ಾq ಾq-11 ರವVGೆ ರವVGೆ ರವVGೆ ರವVGೆ ೇVದ ೇVದ ೇVದ ೇVದ ಮಧು ಮಧು ಮಧು ಮಧು @ ೆ•j @ ೆ•j @ ೆ•j @ ೆ•j ಾˆF
ಾˆF
ಾˆF
ಾˆF ನ ನ ನ ನ, ರೂಂ ರೂಂ ರೂಂ ರೂಂ ನಂ ನಂ ನಂ ನಂ.112 ಅನು? ಅನು? ಅನು? ಅನು? ತನ? ತನ? ತನ? ತನ? ೆಸVನ ೆಸVನ ೆಸVನ ೆಸVನ ಬು• ಬು• ಬು• ಬು• ಾ@ ಾ@ ಾ@ ಾ@ ಅ ಅ ಅ ಅ, ಾq ಾq ಾq ಾq-1 ರವರನು? ರವರನು? ರವರನು? ರವರನು?
ಇVೊಂಡು ಇVೊಂಡು ಇVೊಂಡು ಇVೊಂಡು ಅವರ ಅವರ ಅವರ ಅವರ &ೕ ೆ &ೕ ೆ &ೕ ೆ &ೕ ೆ ಬಲವಂತ2ಾ3 ಬಲವಂತ2ಾ3 ಬಲವಂತ2ಾ3 ಬಲವಂತ2ಾ3 ಹಠ ಹಠ ಹಠ ಹಠ ಸಂ•ೋಗ ಸಂ•ೋಗ ಸಂ•ೋಗ ಸಂ•ೋಗ ನaೆರು.ಾ4$ೆ ನaೆರು.ಾ4$ೆ ನaೆರು.ಾ4$ೆ ನaೆರು.ಾ4$ೆ. ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ಅಂದ ಅಂದ ಅಂದ ಅಂದ ಾq ಾq ಾq ಾq-1
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CNR: KAHC010493382026 NC: 2026:KHC:41487 CRL.P No. 10754 of 2026
ರವರನು? ರವರನು? ರವರನು? ರವರನು? _ೆಂಗಳN _ೆಂಗಳN _ೆಂಗಳN _ೆಂಗಳNVGೆ VGೆ VGೆ VGೆ ಕAೆತಂದು ಕAೆತಂದು ಕAೆತಂದು ಕAೆತಂದು ತಲಘಟJಪ`ರ ತಲಘಟJಪ`ರ ತಲಘಟJಪ`ರ ತಲಘಟJಪ`ರ ೕ ೕ ೕ ೕ ಾೆಯ ಾೆಯ ಾೆಯ ಾೆಯ ಸರಹ#LGೆ ಸರಹ#LGೆ ಸರಹ#LGೆ ಸರಹ#LGೆ ೇVದ ೇVದ ೇVದ ೇVದ ನಂ ನಂ ನಂ ನಂ. 12/5gggg, 2$ೇ $ೇ $ೇ $ೇ ಾ6 ಾ6 ಾ6 ಾ6, AಾಮಯO AಾಮಯO AಾಮಯO AಾಮಯO ಬaಾವೆ ಬaಾವೆ ಬaಾವೆ ಬaಾವೆ, ೊಸಹn ೊಸಹn ೊಸಹn ೊಸಹn, GಾŠಗರyಾಳOದ GಾŠಗರyಾಳOದ GಾŠಗರyಾಳOದ GಾŠಗರyಾಳOದ ಾq ಾq ಾq ಾq-7 ರವVGೆ ರವVGೆ ರವVGೆ ರವVGೆ ೇVದ ೇVದ ೇVದ ೇVದ 5$ೇ $ೇ $ೇ $ೇ ಮಹ@ಯನ ಮಹ@ಯನ ಮಹ@ಯನ ಮಹ@ಯನ ಒಂದು ಒಂದು ಒಂದು ಒಂದು ರೂಂ ರೂಂ ರೂಂ ರೂಂ ಅನು? ಅನು? ಅನು? ಅನು? _ಾ@GೆGೆ _ಾ@GೆGೆ _ಾ@GೆGೆ _ಾ@GೆGೆ ಪaೆದು ಪaೆದು ಪaೆದು ಪaೆದು ಅ ಅ ಅ ಅ ಾq ಾq ಾq ಾq-1 ರವರನು? ರವರನು? ರವರನು? ರವರನು? ಕೂ@ಾೊಂಡು ಕೂ@ಾೊಂಡು ಕೂ@ಾೊಂಡು ಕೂ@ಾೊಂಡು ಬಲವಂತ2ಾ3 ಬಲವಂತ2ಾ3 ಬಲವಂತ2ಾ3 ಬಲವಂತ2ಾ3 ಆೆಯ ಆೆಯ ಆೆಯ ಆೆಯ &ೕ ೆ &ೕ ೆ &ೕ ೆ &ೕ ೆ ಹಠ ಹಠ ಹಠ ಹಠ ಸಂ•ೋಗ ಸಂ•ೋಗ ಸಂ•ೋಗ ಸಂ•ೋಗ ನaೆರು.ಾ4 ನaೆರು.ಾ4 ನaೆರು.ಾ4 ನaೆರು.ಾ4$ೆ$ೆ$ೆ$ೆ. ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ಎಎಎಎ2 /ಂದ /ಂದ /ಂದ /ಂದ ಎಎಎಎ7 ಆAೋ^ಗಳm ಆAೋ^ಗಳm ಆAೋ^ಗಳm ಆAೋ^ಗಳm ಾq ಾq ಾq ಾq-1 ರವVGೆ ರವVGೆ ರವVGೆ ರವVGೆ ಅ2ಾಚO ಅ2ಾಚO ಅ2ಾಚO ಅ2ಾಚO ಶಬLಗಂದ ಶಬLಗಂದ ಶಬLಗಂದ ಶಬLಗಂದ _ೈದು _ೈದು _ೈದು _ೈದು ೈಗಂದ ೈಗಂದ ೈಗಂದ ೈಗಂದ ಹ ೆ ಹ ೆ ಹ ೆ ಹ ೆ ಾ@ ಾ@ ಾ@ ಾ@ yಾ6ಣ yಾ6ಣ yಾ6ಣ yಾ6ಣ _ೆದVೆ _ೆದVೆ _ೆದVೆ _ೆದVೆ ಾx ಾx ಾx ಾx ಎಎಎಎ1 ಆAೋ^Gೆ ಆAೋ^Gೆ ಆAೋ^Gೆ ಆAೋ^Gೆ ಎಎಎಎ2 /ಂದ /ಂದ /ಂದ /ಂದ ಎಎಎಎ7 ಆAೋ^ಗಳm ಆAೋ^ಗಳm ಆAೋ^ಗಳm ಆAೋ^ಗಳm ಕುಮ-ಕು( ಕುಮ-ಕು( ಕುಮ-ಕು( ಕುಮ-ಕು( Sೕ@ರು.ಾ4Aೆ Sೕ@ರು.ಾ4Aೆ Sೕ@ರು.ಾ4Aೆ Sೕ@ರು.ಾ4Aೆ. ಆದLVಂದ ಆAೋ^ಗಳ *ರುದ’ &ೕಲ(ಂಡ ಕಲಂ Vೕ.ಾ Bೋ“ಾAೋಪಣ ಪXJ.”
(Emphasis added) A perusal of the complaint or the summary of the charge sheet what would unmistakably emerge is that, all the other members of the family and friends of petitioner No.1 are also dragged into the web of proceedings in an issue which is purely between accused No.1 and the complainant.
Therefore, the proceedings against the said accused Nos.2 to 7 cannot be permitted to be continued as it would on the face of it become an abuse of the process of law. 9. Insofar as petitioner No.1 - accused No.1 is concerned, a perusal at the afore-quoted statement of the complainant is that, it is an admitted fact that the complainant was already married to someone else; she having been married to someone else, could not have projected that the acts have taken place on the pretext of promise of marriage. They are all consensual
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acts. Even otherwise, consensual acts would not amount to rape is a well-settled principle of law as delineated by the Apex Court in its
judgment rendered in the case of DR. DHRUVARAM MURLIDHAR SONAR v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA1 has held as follows:
“…. …. …. 11. In State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 539] , it was held that while exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It was further held as under : (SCC p. 94, para 6)
“6. … It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.”
…
…
…
23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the
1 (2019) 18 SCC 191
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complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape.
There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by accused, or where an accused, on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under Section 376 IPC. 24. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the Primary Health Centre and the complainant was working as an Assistant Nurse in the same health centre and that she is a widow. It was alleged by her that the appellant informed her that he is a married man and that he has differences with his wife. Admittedly, they belong to different communities. It is also alleged that the accused/appellant needed a month's time to get their marriage registered. The complainant further states that she had fallen in love with the appellant and that she needed a companion as she was a widow. She has specifically stated that “as I was also a widow and I was also in need of a companion, I agreed to his proposal and since then we were having love affair and accordingly we started residing together. We used to reside sometimes at my home whereas sometimes at his home”. Thus, they were living together, sometimes at her house and sometimes at the residence of the appellant. They were in a relationship with each other for quite some time and enjoyed each other's company. It is also clear
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that they had been living as such for quite some time together.
When she came to know that the appellant had married some other woman, she lodged the complaint. It is not her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her. She had taken a conscious decision after active application of mind to the things that had happened. It is not a case of a passive submission in the face of any psychological pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent and the tacit consent given by her was not the result of a misconception created in her mind. We are of the view that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not make out a case against the appellant. We are also of the view that since the complainant has failed to prima facie show the commission of rape, the complaint registered under Section 376(2)(b) cannot be sustained.”
9.1. Later, the Apex Court in the case of SHAMBHU KHARWAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH2 has held as follows:
“…. …. …. 9. In Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of Maharashtra [Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] a two-Judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.), held in Sonu v. State of U.P. [Sonu v. State of U.P., (2021) 18 SCC 517] observed that: (Pramod SuryabhanPawar case [Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] , SCC pp. 616-18 & 620, paras 12, 14, 16 & 18)
“12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect to Section 375IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act.
An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after
2 (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1032
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evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action. …
***
14. … Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. … ***
16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a
“misconception of fact” that vitiates the woman's “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a
“misconception of fact” where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. … ***
18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given.
The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.”
(emphasis supplied)
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…
…
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11. In this backdrop and taking the allegations in the complaint as they stand, it is impossible to find in the FIR or in the charge-sheet, the essential ingredients of an offence under Section 376IPC. The crucial issue which is to be considered is whether the allegations indicate that the appellant had given a promise to the second respondent to marry which at the inception was false and on the basis of which the second respondent was induced into a sexual relationship. Taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 375IPC are absent. The relationship between the parties was purely of a consensual nature. The relationship, as noted above, was in existence prior to the marriage of the second respondent and continued to subsist during the term of the marriage and after the second respondent was granted a divorce by mutual consent. 12. The High Court, in the course of its judgment, has merely observed that the dispute raises a question of fact which cannot be considered in an application under Section 482CrPC. As demonstrated in the above analysis, the facts as they stand, which are not in dispute, would indicate that the ingredients of the offence under Section 376IPC were not established. The High Court has, therefore, proceeded to dismiss the application under Section 482CrPC on a completely misconceived basis.”
9.2. The Apex Court in the case of SAMADHAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA3, observes as follows:
“…. …. …. 3 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528
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25. The allegation of rape in the present case hinges entirely on respondent No. 2's claim that appellant established physical relations with her on false pretext of marriage.
It is alleged by the appellant that respondent No. 2 opposed the idea of marriage whenever the appellant broached the said idea; however, the appellant kept on insisting possibly this was because her first marriage was in subsistence. It is, however, not clear as to why, despite being opposed to the idea of marriage, respondent No. 2 continued to meet the appellant and indulged in physical relations with him even though she was already married. …. …. …. 27. In this regard, it becomes relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398, (“Mahesh Damu”) wherein the following observations were made:
“27. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or
consideration. A woman may have reasons to have physical relationship other than the promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal marital ties. 28. Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the physical relationship without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact.”
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(underlining by us)
28. We find that the present case is not a case where the appellant lured respondent No. 2 solely for physical pleasures and then vanished. The relationship continued for a period of three long years, which is a considerable period of time. They remained close and emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage. 29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken relationships are given the colour of criminality. The offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases where there exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter of profound concern and calls for condemnation. 30. In Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764, this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed that a mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings.
What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage. The relevant portion is extracted as under:
“20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section
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376(2)(n)IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's statement under Section 164CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship. Further, both parties are now married to someone else and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution.”
(underlining by us)
31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in which, in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage holds deep social and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not uncommon for a woman to repose complete faith in her partner and to consent to physical intimacy on the assurance that such a relationship would culminate in a lawful and socially recognised marriage.
In such circumstances, the promise of marriage becomes the very foundation of her consent, rendering it conditional rather than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such consent may stand vitiated where it is established that the promise of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The law must remain sensitive to such genuine cases where trust has been breached and dignity violated, lest the protective scope of Section 376 of the IPC be reduced to a mere formality for those truly aggrieved. At the same
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time, the invocation of this principle must rest upon credible evidence and concrete facts, and not on unsubstantiated allegations or moral conjecture. 32. Upon a careful consideration of the record in the present case, we are unable to discern any material that would warrant the invocation of Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. The facts of the present case unmistakably indicate that it is a classic instance of a consensual relationship having subsequently turned acrimonious. …. …. …. 34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled respondent No. 2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor does it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her presence there. Therefore, the only logical inference that emerges is that respondent No. 2, of her own volition, visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It is also borne out from the record that whenever the appellant brought up the subject of marriage, respondent No. 2 herself opposed the proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of respondent No. 2 that the physical relationship between the parties was premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of merit and stands unsustainable. …. …. …. 37.
The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in question itself reveals that the relationship between the parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent No. 2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire to meet her.Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the marriage of respondent No. 2 was subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the material on record, it is manifest that the relationship between the parties was
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consensual,and therefore, the absence of an express statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasised in the impugned order, cannot be held against the appellant when the same can be otherwise clearly discerned. 38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of this Court in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations were made:
“29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to amount to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such consent was given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660], in which it was held as follows : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24)
“21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit.
Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on
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account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. xxx
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances.
The ‘failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance’. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.”.”
9.3. The Apex Court in the case of PRAMOD KUMAR NAVRATNA v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH4, observes follows:
“…. …. …. 4 2026 SCC OnLine SC 154
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16. Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC provides for enhanced punishment in cases where rape is committed repeatedly on the same woman. It mandates rigorous imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years which may extend to life imprisonment for the remainder of the person's natural life. The object of this provision is to address aggravated instances of sexual assault where the offence is not a single incident but has occurred repeatedly on the same victim. The expression “repeatedly” employed in the provision is of significance. It contemplates more than one act of sexual assault, committed at different points in time on the same victim. Courts have consistently interpreted this phrase to mean a series of acts that are separate in nature and not a continuation of a single transaction. In genuine cases under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, the pattern is usually unmistakable; it is an initial act of sexual assault, followed by multiple acts under fear, pressure, captivity, or continued deceit, often when the woman is rendered vulnerable and unable to escape the situation. 17.
At the outset, we refer to the ratio in the case of Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385 whereby this Court had decided a similar matter, wherein allegedly, the prosecutrix had also given her consent for a sexual relationship with the accused-appellant therein, upon an assurance to marry. The prosecutrix, who was herself a married woman having three children, had continued to have such a relationship with the accused-appellant, at least for about five years till she gave the complaint. In the conspectus of such facts and circumstances, this Court had observed as under:
“21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section 375 IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to
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note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceived the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376.
As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court.”
18. It has been time and again settled by this Court, that the mere fact that the parties indulged in physical relations pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case. An offence under Section 375 of the IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations. The issue for consideration is whether, given the facts and circumstances of the case and after examining the FIR, the High Court was correct in refusing to quash the ongoing criminal proceedings against the accused-appellant arising out of FIR No. 213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 and the Chargesheet No. 269/2025. …. …. …. 22. The Courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in identifying the genuine cases filed under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC by identifying the essential ingredients to constitute the said offence i.e. there should be a promise of marriage made by the accused solely with a view to obtain
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consent for sexual relations and without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations.Such genuine cases that deserve prosecution of the accused must be clearly demarcated from the litigation that arises from the cases of consensual relationships between consenting adults going acrimonious on account of dispute and disagreement or a future change of mind.
In view of the aforesaid settled position of law, the respondent No. 1-State and the complainant- respondent No. 3 has failed to place any material on record to show how the accused-appellant on the subsequent meetings managed to repeatedly coax and dupe the complainant-respondent No. 3 into having physical relations with him on the false pretext of marriage considering the fact that within initial meetings, both parties were aware about the marital status of the victim and therefore it cannot be, by any stretch imagination said that the consent of the complainant- respondent No. 3 has been vitiated or obtained on fraud and misrepresentation made by the accused-appellant. 23. At this stage, it is material to refer to the decision of this Court in Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398, wherein the following observations were made:
“29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to amount to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90 IPC, it must have been made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such consent was given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. …”
24. On a perusal of the allegations made in the present case, it is an admitted fact that the complainant-respondent No. 3, within the first
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initial meetings told the accused-appellant that she was a married woman with divorce proceedings pending before the Family Court. Therefore, in the same breath, she cannot be allowed to claim and allege that she was also coaxed by the accused-appellant into having a physical relationship with him on the false pretext of marriage as the two facts cannot stand together on the same plane and simultaneously as both are antagonistic and antithetical to each other. In our opinion, the facts of the present case clearly indicate a consensual relationship gone sour whereas both the parties should have exercised restraint and should have refrained from involving the State into their personal relationship turning rancour. 25.
At this juncture, it is important to place reliance upon the observations in Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764, wherein this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed that a mere break- up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage. Furthermore, this Court in Samadhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528 through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed that this Court has, on numerous occasions, taken note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken relationships are given the colour of criminality. The offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases where there exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert every soured relationship into an offence of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter of
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profound concern for the judiciary already facing a heavy load and calls for condemnation. 26. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference to paragraph 102 therein, where this Court observed thus:
“102.
In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the Accused. xxx
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the Accused. xxx
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where
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there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
27. On a careful
consideration of the aforementioned judicial dictum, we find that the offence alleged against the accused-appellant herein is not made out at all. In fact, we find that the allegation of rape on false pretext of marriage even when taken on its face value, does not amount to an offence of rape and hence not liable for punishment under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC in the instant case and therefore, the
judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal squarely apply to the facts of these cases. Therefore, it is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution emanating from the FIR and consequent Sessions Case No. 89/2025 to continue.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
In the light of the afore-quoted judgments of the Apex Court, if the facts of the case at hand are taken at its face value, the allegations against the petitioners do not constitute the offences and the continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of the criminal law. Therefore, the
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proceedings before the concerned Court against the petitioners is required to be obliterated.
10. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
a. The criminal petition is allowed. b. The proceedings in S.C.No.121/2021, pending before the VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru Rural, stand quashed.
Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE
nvj List No.: 2 Sl No.: 43