Research › Search › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

2026 DAILYLAW 333 (KER)

Mani v. G. , S/o. Gopalan VS Food Corporation of India, Represented By Its Chairman & Managing Director

2026-03-16

Harisankar V Menon

body2026
JUDGMENT : HARISANKAR V.MENON, J. W.P.(C) Nos.38243, 38251 of 2023, 19381, and 25999 of 2024 These writ petitions pertain to the alleged recasting of the seniority list of the headload workers with the respondent Corporation. 2. For ease of reference, the facts pleaded in W.P.(C) No.19381 of 2024 is noticed. The petitioners state that they were originally employed under a contractor as headload workers for handling food grains in the Food Corporation of India (FCI) godown at Mulankunnathukavu depot, Thrissur District. The petitioners state that, upon enactment of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), which resulted in the abolition of the contract labour system, the headload workers, like the petitioners herein, became direct employees of the respondent Corporation under a Direct Payment System. The petitioners state that the workers were headed by a ‘Sardar’. It is also stated that the headload worker is initially promoted as a ‘Mandal’ and thereafter as a ‘Sardar’. The petitioners contend that on the basis of Exts.P1 and P2 circulars, settlement at Ext.P3 and seniority lists at Exts.P6 and P7 were cast with reference to various headload workers working with the respondent Corporation. The petitioners state that their promotions to the post of ‘Mandal/Sardar’ were being initially granted with reference to the original seniority at Exts.P6 and P7. The petitioners in W.P.(C) No.19381 of 2024 would contend that, with reference to the seniority list at Ext.P7, he was promoted as a Mandal on 02.01.2018, pursuant to Ext.P8 order. The grievance of the writ petitioners in these writ petitions is on the basis of the steps taken by the respondent Corporation for recasting the seniority pursuant to a notice at Ext.P10 dated 19.08.2023. On receipt of the proposals contained in Ext.P10 notice, the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.19381 of 2024 submitted Ext.P11 objection, pointing out that there cannot be any such recasting of seniority. However, the petitioners state that the seniority was recast at Ext.P12, and a draft seniority list was also prepared pursuant to Ext.P13. On receipt of the proposals contained in Ext.P10 notice, the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.19381 of 2024 submitted Ext.P11 objection, pointing out that there cannot be any such recasting of seniority. However, the petitioners state that the seniority was recast at Ext.P12, and a draft seniority list was also prepared pursuant to Ext.P13. The petitioners contend that the recasting of the seniority, as above, was challenged before this Court by filing the captioned writ petitions, and pursuant to the interim order of this Court dated 24.11.2023, the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.38243 of 2023 was permitted to continue in the post of ‘Sardar’ and the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.38251 of 2025 was permitted to continue in the post of ‘Mandal’, to which they were originally promoted. However, the petitioners contend that the steps taken as above, for recasting the seniority, require to be set aside and the petitioner’s seniority require to be reckoned with effect from the original seniority at Ext.P7. The petitioners also contend that in 2014, also Ext.P26 seniority list was issued in tune with the earlier seniority at Ext.P6. 3. I have heard Sri.C.S.Ajith Prakash, learned counsel for the respective petitioners in these writ petitions, and Sri.Ann Thankam Mathew, and Sri.Jose Kuriakose, learned Standing Counsel for the Food Corporation of India, Sri.N.Satheesh, learned counsel for the party respondents in W.P.(C) No.38243 of 2023, and Sri.S.Nirmal, learned counsel for respondents 10 to 12 in W.P.(C) No.38243 of 2023. 4. The challenge raised in these writ petitions, as noticed earlier, is with reference to the recasting of the seniority originally done pursuant to Ext.P7 seniority list. It is not in dispute that the petitioners, as noticed earlier, were working on behalf of third party suppliers of labourers. It is only pursuant to the Act, the petitioners came to be absorbed in the FCI. The petitioners, as noticed earlier, seek to rely on the circulars at Exts.P1 and P2 to contend that the seniority list at Ext.P7 was validly prepared. The circular dated 23.02.2006 at Ext.P2, issued by the respondent Corporation, with reference to the recasting of the Labour System which was being carried on in the Corporation on account of the Direct Payment System, has specifically issued various directions. One of the directions issued was to prepare a depot wise seniority list, on the basis of "date of induction/joining” with reference to the age of the labourers. One of the directions issued was to prepare a depot wise seniority list, on the basis of "date of induction/joining” with reference to the age of the labourers. It should be noticed here that prior to the Direct Payment System, the petitioners were working on behalf of the 3 rd party employers, is not in dispute. That is why, when the circular at Ext.P2 was issued, it has been categorically laid down that the depot wise seniority requires to be framed with effect from the date of joining in the service of the respondent Corporation. The seniority at Ext.P7 also specifically records the date of joining as the date on which the Direct Payment System was introduced in the respondent Corporation in the year 1996. The contention of the respondent Corporation is to the effect that, though the seniority at Ext.P7 was prepared as above, there were mistakes in Ext.P7 and therefore, those mistakes require to be rectified. It is on that basis that the subsequent seniority list has also been issued, as evidenced by Ext.P13. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that the seniority at Ext.P7 has been prepared with specific reference to the modality that was prescribed by the respondent Corporation pursuant to the communication at Ext.P24 dated 14.06.1996. Here, the afore communication specifically notes that the Direct Payment System of labour is to be introduced from 01.05.1996. The requirement under paragraph No.4 of the afore communication as regards the bio-data, etc., to be obtained from the labour, also cannot be taken as a pointer to the effect that the earlier service with the respondent Corporation through the third party employer should also be reckoned for the purpose of seniority. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the petitioners may not be entitled to seek refuge under the communication of the year 1996, as evidenced by Ext.P24. 6. This Court also notices that the same issue, though with reference to the entitlement of the employees for their gratuity, has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.1953 of 2005 , by a judgment dated 01.08.2006. In the afore case, this Court has categorically found as under:- “8. 6. This Court also notices that the same issue, though with reference to the entitlement of the employees for their gratuity, has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.1953 of 2005 , by a judgment dated 01.08.2006. In the afore case, this Court has categorically found as under:- “8. The above dictum laid down by the apex court though with reference to the provisions contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, will squarely apply in considering as to whether there is any employee-employer relationship between the appellant and the workmen prior to the introduction of the Direct Payment System. In the light of the dictum laid down by the apex court, it has to be held that there was no employer-employee relationship between the appellant and the workmen prior to the introduction of the Direct Payment System. If so, in the absence of any express provision contained in the Payment of Gratuity Act to rope in such period as service rendered while the workmen were under the employment of third person, the appellants cannot be mulcted with the liability to pay gratuity reckoning such past service as well. The claim if any by the workmen can only be laid against the employer under whom they were employed during that period.” Thus, it has been categorically found by this Court that the workmen, like the petitioners, would not be entitled for reckoning their service prior to the introduction of the Direct Payment System for the entitlement of gratuity, since there was no employer-employee relationship between the workmen and the respondent Corporation. In my opinion, the afore principles would also have a bearing with reference to the claims made by the petitioners in these cases. As already found, the petitioners are similarly situated like the respondents in W.A. No.1953 of 2005 , considered by the afore judgment. Therefore, the petitioners herein also are not entitled to contend that their earlier service prior to the introduction of the Direct Payment System should also be reckoned for the purpose of the seniority. 7. Sri.Ajith Prakash, the learned counsel for the petitioners, also sought to rely on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Kerala State Electricity Board v. Sasidharan [ 2020 (3) KLT 514 ] to contend that the “doctrine of sit back” would apply to the case at hand. 7. Sri.Ajith Prakash, the learned counsel for the petitioners, also sought to rely on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Kerala State Electricity Board v. Sasidharan [ 2020 (3) KLT 514 ] to contend that the “doctrine of sit back” would apply to the case at hand. But, in my opinion, the principles in the afore judgment may not have any application to the case at hand, since, even as regards the petitioners herein, it is only with reference to their date of induction/joining the service of the Corporation that they get absorbed in the FCI. Similarly, the petitioners are seeking to reckon their service with third-party service providers for reckoning their seniority. In such circumstances, the “doctrine of sit back” would not have any application to the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the petitioners are not entitled to succeed, and these writ petitions would stand dismissed.