1 CGHC010263992026 2026:CGHC:38029-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 795 of 2026 Food Corporation Of India Through Divisional Manager, Food Corporation Of India, Divisional Office Chhattisgarh Vidhan Sabha Road, Kapa Post - Pandri, District - Raipur (C.G.) ... Appellant versus Mrs. Kiran Goutam Sharma W/o Goutam Sharma, Aged About 44 Years Occupation Assistant Grade- I I (A/cs.) Food Corporation Of India, District Office, Raipur, District Raipur C.G. ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Sunil Pillai, Advocate For Respondent : Ms. Smita Jha, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 25.08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Sunil Pillai, learned counsel for the appellant on I.A. No.04/2026 i.e., application seeking condonation of delay in filing the writ appeal for a period of 10 days. Also heard Ms. Smita Jha, learned counsel for the respondent. ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.08.25 17:22:12 +0530 2 2. For the reasons mentioned in I.A. No.04/2026, the delay stands condoned. We proceed to hear the matter finally. 3. The appellant has filed this writ appeal against the order dated 13.05.2026, passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.6133/2023 (Mrs. Kiran Goutam Sharma vs. General Manager (Personnel) and Others), whereby the learned Single Judge has partly allowed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner / respondent herein. 4. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent/writ petitioner, a regular employee of the Food Corporation of India, posted as Assistant Grade-II at District Office, Raipur, became pregnant with twins and, owing to medical complications, one foetus was aborted on 25.04.2019, while the remaining pregnancy was declared high- risk requiring prolonged bed rest; thereafter, she delivered a premature female child on 03.09.2019 and sought leave on account of abortion/miscarriage as well as maternity leave, besides reimbursement of medical expenses incurred at a private hospital. Despite repeated representations and correspondence, she was granted 68 days of Extra Ordinary Leave without salary, resulting in deductions of Rs.46,332/- and Rs.33,932/- from her salary, while her claim for additional statutory leave was rejected on the ground that she was governed by the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972 and that the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 was not applicable, her claim for medical reimbursement was also only partially 3 allowed. She thereafter relied upon the Government of India Office Memorandum dated 02.09.2022 and sought 30 days’ leave for abortion/miscarriage and 60 days’ maternity leave, after adjustment of the leave already granted, along with reimbursement of the outstanding medical expenses of Rs.3,76,773/- and refund of Rs.80,254/- deducted from her salary, which led to the filing of WPS No.6133/2023. The learned Single Judge, vide order dated 13.05.2026, partly allowed the writ petition, against which the present writ appeal has been preferred. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge erred in granting the respondent 60 days’ special maternity leave and 30 days’ additional leave for abortion, as neither relief has any legal basis in the facts of the present case. It is submitted that the Office Memorandum dated 02.09.2022, relied upon for grant of 60 days’ special maternity leave, was issued subsequent to the relevant events of 2019 and is applicable only in cases of stillbirth or death of a child soon after birth, the latter expression being confined to death within 28 days of birth, and therefore has no application to the respondent’s case of miscarriage. It is further submitted that the respondent had already been granted 45 days’ leave on account of miscarriage from 25.04.2019 to 08.06.2019 and that her claim for an additional 30 days’ leave under Section 10 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 is also untenable, as, under Regulation 23 of the FCI (Staff) Regulations, 1971, the respondent 4 is governed by the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972, and the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act are not applicable to the Food Corporation of India. It is contended that the learned Single Judge failed to consider the specific objection regarding such inapplicability and, therefore, could not have founded the grant of leave on the said Act. 6. Learned counsel further submits that the direction to reconsider the respondent’s claim for reimbursement of medical expenses is also unsustainable, as the medical bills had already been duly considered and reimbursement was sanctioned in accordance with the applicable CGHS rates, as reflected from the voucher annexed as Annexure R/4 to the reply, no illegality or infirmity was found in the decision of the appellant-authorities, nor was the order sanctioning reimbursement quashed or set aside. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned order, insofar as it grants the aforesaid leave and directs reconsideration of the medical reimbursement claim without recording any finding of illegality, warrants interference and is liable to be set aside. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent/writ petitioner opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and submits that the learned Single Judge after considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly partly allowed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner / respondent herein, in which no interference is called for. 5 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order and other documents appended with the writ appeal. 9. The principal grievance of the appellant is that the learned Single Judge, while partly allowing the writ petition, erred in granting leave towards miscarriage and maternity and in directing reconsideration of the respondent’s claim for medical reimbursement, without properly appreciating the applicable FCI (Staff) Regulations, 1971 and the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972. It is contended that the Office Memorandum dated 02.09.2022, being subsequent to the relevant events of 2019, was inapplicable, particularly when the respondent had already been granted leave on account of miscarriage. The appellant has also challenged the quashing of recovery of Rs.80,254/- and the direction for reconsideration of medical reimbursement, contending that the medical bills had already been duly examined and reimbursement sanctioned in accordance with the applicable rules and rates. 10. The learned Single Judge, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and considering the pleadings, documents and the statutory and regulatory framework placed before the Court, examined the respondent’s entitlement to leave arising out of miscarriage and subsequent childbirth, the effect of the absence of sufficient leave balance, the recovery made from her salary and her claim for reimbursement of medical expenses. While dealing 6 with the aforesaid issues, the learned Single Judge relied upon the principles enunciated in Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal and others, (2023) 13 SCC 681, and proceeded to hold that the entitlement of a woman employee to maternity-related leave could not be defeated merely on the ground of insufficiency of leave balance. The learned Single Judge further held that the leave granted on account of miscarriage could not, in the facts of the case, operate to deny the respondent the benefit of maternity leave in respect of her subsequent pregnancy. The learned Single Judge also found the recovery of Rs.80,254/- to be unsustainable and directed its quashing, while, in respect of medical reimbursement, directed the competent authority to reconsider the claim after proper verification of the relevant records. Ultimately, the writ petition was partly allowed and the respondent was held entitled to leave for a period of 90 days covering maternity as well as miscarriage, by observing as under :- “7. Upon perusal of the record as well as the rules framed thereunder, it is evident beyond doubt that a woman who conceives and is expected to give birth to a child is entitled to maternity leave of six months; such entitlement cannot be curtailed on the basis of mere assumptions or presumptions regarding the possibility of miscarriage, as the statutory framework itself recognizes and safeguards the rights of a pregnant woman. The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 specifically provides that 7 even in cases of miscarriage, the concerned woman is entitled to leave, albeit for a limited and prescribed period as provided under the law. Furthermore, the second aspect that merits consideration is that if the petitioner subsequently conceives again, the grant of leave for an earlier miscarriage or abortion cannot operate as a disqualification to deny her full maternity leave for the subsequent pregnancy. Under the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, every woman, whether employed on a regular or contractual basis, is entitled to maternity leave of six months, and such statutory entitlement cannot be denied even to a temporary employee, as the object of the legislation is to ensure the health, dignity, and welfare of both the mother and the child. 8. The statutory entitlement to maternity leave cannot be curtailed on the ground that the petitioner does not have a sufficient leave balance in her account, as the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 expressly provides for a specific and independent period of leave to be granted to a woman employee, which operates irrespective of the ordinary leave account maintained by the employer; therefore, the respondent authorities cannot lawfully deny such benefit merely on the pretext of absence of leave balance, as such denial is contrary to the legislative mandate and runs afoul of the constitutional framework 8 of the Constitution of India, particularly the principles safeguarding the dignity, health, and welfare of working women. The denial of maternity leave, including leave on account of miscarriage, amounts to a violation of the petitioner’s statutory as well as constitutional rights, and reflects a grave illegality on the part of the respondent authorities in refusing to grant benefits that are clearly envisaged under law. Insofar as the reimbursement of medical expenses is concerned, the same requires due consideration and verification by the competent authorities, and in this regard, it is appropriate that the respondent authorities examine the medical bills submitted by the petitioner and take a reasoned decision as to their admissibility and reimbursement in accordance with the applicable rules and policies. 9. The recovery of an amount of Rs. 80,254/- from the petitioner on the purported ground of absence of leave balance is wholly untenable and legally unsustainable, particularly in light of the statutory protections afforded under the governing maternity laws; such action on the part of the respondent authorities is arbitrary and contrary to the settled principles of law, and therefore, the said recovery cannot be allowed to stand. Accordingly, the recovery of Rs. 80,254/- effected against the petitioner is hereby quashed and set aside. 10. Insofar as the reimbursement of medical 9 bills is concerned, the respondent authorities are hereby directed to reconsider the case of the petitioner afresh, after undertaking a thorough and proper verification of all relevant documents and records submitted by her, and thereafter to pass a reasoned and appropriate order in accordance with law within a reasonable period. 11. However, insofar as the grant of leave is concerned, the petitioner is duly entitled to the benefit of leave for a period of 90 days, covering both maternity as well as miscarriage, in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions and governing rules, and such entitlement cannot be denied or curtailed by the respondent authorities. 12. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed in part.” 11. The principal question which arises for consideration in the present intra-court appeal is whether the learned Single Judge, while partly allowing the writ petition, committed any patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court in appellate jurisdiction. On a careful consideration of the matter, we find no such infirmity in the impugned order. 12. The contention of the appellant that the respondent was not entitled to any benefit towards maternity/miscarriage leave merely because she had already been granted a particular period of leave 10 or because of insufficiency of leave balance, cannot, in the facts of the present case, persuade us to take a different view from the one taken by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge has considered the nature of the leave claimed by the respondent in the backdrop of the circumstances in which she had suffered miscarriage of one foetus and thereafter undergone a high-risk pregnancy resulting in premature delivery. The finding recorded by the learned Single Judge is founded upon the principle that maternity-related benefits are intended to protect the health, dignity and welfare of a woman employee and cannot be defeated by adopting a purely technical approach concerning the availability of leave in the employee's leave account. 13. We also find that the learned Single Judge has not proceeded merely on the basis of the respondent's personal circumstances but has examined the claim in the context of the legal principles governing maternity and miscarriage-related leave. The reliance placed upon Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal and others, reported in (2023) 13 SCC 681, has been duly considered while determining the nature and extent of the respondent's entitlement. The appellant has not been able to demonstrate before us that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are based upon a misreading of the record or that the same suffer from perversity or any patent error of law warranting interference in an intra-court appeal. 11 14. So far as the challenge to the quashing of recovery of Rs.80,254/- is concerned, the learned Single Judge has specifically examined the circumstances in which the said amount came to be recovered from the respondent's salary and, having regard to the finding regarding her entitlement to maternity/miscarriage-related leave, held such recovery to be unsustainable. Once the respondent's entitlement to the relevant period of leave has been recognized, the consequential recovery founded upon the alleged absence of sufficient leave balance could not independently be sustained. The appellant has not shown any error in the aforesaid reasoning which would justify appellate interference. 15. Insofar as the direction relating to reimbursement of medical expenses is concerned, we find that the learned Single Judge has not directed payment of the entire amount claimed by the respondent as a matter of course. The direction is only to reconsider the claim afresh after proper verification of the relevant bills, documents and records and thereafter to take a reasoned decision in accordance with the applicable rules and policies. Such a direction, in our considered view, does not cause any undue prejudice to the appellant-authorities. Rather, it ensures that the respondent's claim is examined by the competent authority in accordance with law. The appellant has also not demonstrated that the said direction amounts to a positive finding that the entire amount claimed by the respondent is mandatorily payable, 12 irrespective of the applicable rules or rates. 16. It is equally well settled that while exercising intra-court appellate jurisdiction, this Court does not ordinarily substitute its own view merely because another view may also be possible. Interference is warranted where the order under challenge suffers from patent illegality, perversity, jurisdictional error, failure to consider material evidence or other such manifest infirmity. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has considered the rival submissions, examined the relevant circumstances and recorded reasons for granting the reliefs in part. On a careful reading of the impugned order as a whole, we do not find any such patent infirmity or perversity which would warrant exercise of our appellate jurisdiction. 17. The grounds urged by the appellant essentially seek a re- appreciation of the same material which was already considered by the learned Single Judge. No material has been brought before us to demonstrate that the learned Single Judge ignored any material statutory provision, proceeded on an erroneous factual premise or exercised jurisdiction not vested in the Court. The mere fact that the appellant-authorities may have taken a different view regarding the respondent's entitlement to leave or reimbursement cannot, by itself, furnish a ground for interference with a reasoned order passed by the learned Single Judge. 13 18. Having regard to the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered view that the order dated 13.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No.6133/2023 does not suffer from any illegality, perversity or other infirmity warranting interference. The learned Single Judge has exercised the jurisdiction vested in the Court and has granted relief only to the extent considered legally justified, while leaving the issue of medical reimbursement to be examined by the competent authority in accordance with law. We, therefore, find no ground to interfere with the impugned order. 19. Consequently, the writ appeal, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. The order dated 13.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No.6133/2023 shall stand affirmed. The appellant-authorities shall comply with the directions contained in the impugned order in accordance with law and within the time stipulated therein, if any. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu