[2026:RJ-JP:17331] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3243/2026 Pratap Singh S/o Shri Tej Singh, Aged About 55 Years, R/o Dhani Rathoran, Madanganj- Kishangarh, Tehsil Kishangarh District Ajmer ----Petitioner/Plaintiff Versus 1. Ramratan S/o Noratmal, R/o Agra Gate, Tehsil And District Ajmer 2. Swaroopchand S/o Rameshwar Lal, R/o Agra Gate, Tehsil And District Ajmer 3. Padamchand S/o Kalusingh Kothari, R/o Oawali Mohalla, Madanganj, Kishangarh, Tehsil Kishangarh, District Ajmer 4. Smt. Premlata W/o Padanchand Kothari, R/o Oawali Mohalla, Madanganj, Kishangarh, Tehsil Kishangarh, District Ajmer 5. State Of Rajasthan, Through Tehsildar Kishangarh, District Ajmer …...Respondents /Defendants 6. Commissioner, Nagar Parishad Kishangarh, District Ajmer …….Respondents/Non-Appelant 7. Hanuman Singh S/o Amar Singh, R/o Dhani Rathoran, Madanganj Kishangarh, Tehsil Kishangarh, District Ajmer. 8. Ganpat Singh S/o Amar Singh, R/o Dhani Rathoran, Madanganj Kishangarh, Tehsil Kishangarh, District Ajmer. 9. Mu. Antar Kanwar Widow Of Raghuveer Singh, R/o Dhani Rathoran, Madanganj Kishangarh, Tehsil Kishangarh, District Ajmer. 10. Narendra Singh S/o Raghuveer Singh, R/o Dhani Rathoran, Madanganj Kishangarh, Tehsil Kishangarh, District Ajmer. 11. Mahendra Singh S/o Raghuveer Singh, R/o Dhani Rathoran, Madanganj Kishangarh, Tehsil Kishangarh, District Ajmer. 12. Poonam Kanwar D/o Raghuveer Singh, R/o Dhani Rathoran, Madanganj Kishangarh, Tehsil Kishangarh, District Ajmer. 13. Lalita Kanwar D/o Tejsingh, R/o Dhani Rathoran, Madanganj Kishangarh, Tehsil Kishangarh, District Ajmer. [2026:RJ-JP:17331] (2 of 15) [CW-3243/2026] 14. Sharwan Singh S/o Tejsingh, R/o Dhani Rathoran, Madanganj Kishangarh, Tehsil Kishangarh, District Ajmer. 15. Prem Kanwar D/o Tejsingh, R/o Dhani Rathoran, Madanganj Kishangarh, Tehsil Kishangarh, District Ajmer. 16. Uchchhab Kanwar W/o Rup Singh, R/o Dhani Rathoran, Madanganj Kishangarh, Tehsil Kishangarh, District Ajmer. 17. Manju Kanwar D/o Rup Singh, R/o Dhani Rathoran, Madanganj Kishangarh, Tehsil Kishangarh, District Ajmer. 18. Sanju Kanwar D/o Rup Singh, R/o Dhani Rathoran, Madanganj Kishangarh, Tehsil Kishangarh, District Ajmer. 19. Gajendra Singh S/o Rup Singh, R/o Dhani Rathoran, Madanganj Kishangarh, Tehsil Kishangarh, District Ajmer. 20. Rajendra Singh S/o Rup Singh, R/o Dhani Rathoran, Madanganj Kishangarh, Tehsil Kishangarh, District Ajmer. ----Proforma Respondents/plaintiffs For Petitioner(s) : Mr. J.K. Moolchandani Assisted by Mr. Devanshu Sharma & Ms. Vishalakshi Pareek For Respondent(s) : Ms. Anita Aggarwal assisted by Mr. Laxmikant, Mr. Vibhanshu Sharma & Ms. Kalpana for respondents No.3 & 4 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GANESH RAM MEENA Order Arguments concluded on ::: March 18, 2026 Order reserved on ::: March 18, 2026 Order pronounced on ::: May,02 , 2026 1. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner/plaintiff (for short, 'the petitioner') under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 19.01.2026 passed by the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer, whereby the second appeal filed by the petitioner [2026:RJ-JP:17331] (3 of 15) [CW-3243/2026] against the order dated 17.01.2020 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Ajmer, was dismissed and the order dated 21.05.2018 passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer, Kishangarh District, Ajmer (for short, 'the learned SDO'), was upheld. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner filed a suit before the learned SDO under Sections 88 and 188 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 read with Section 136 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 stating therein that the land bearing Khasra Nos. 713, 714, 715, 718, 719 and 728, total measuring 20 Bigha 9 Biswa situated at Village Kishangarh, was in the khatedari of Late Govind Singh, who sold the said land except the land bearing Khasra No. 728 total measuring 16 Bigha 19 Biswa through registered sale deed to Shri Gani Khan. However, the Revenue Officer recorded the land bearing Khasra No. 728 measuring 3 Bigha 10 Biswa in the name of Shri Gani Khan, based on which, the said land was sold by him to respondent/defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and they further sold it to respondent Nos. 3 and 4, who got converted the entire land for industrial purpose. It was prayed that decree be passed to declare null and void the mutations No. 309, 639 dated 25.01.1999, mutation No. 664 dated 04.09.1999 as regard land Khasra No. 728. Thereafter, respondent Nos. 3 and 4 filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'CPC') with the averments that the Revenue Court has no jurisdiction to hear the suit qua the land already converted to non-agricultural purpose. The said [2026:RJ-JP:17331] (4 of 15) [CW-3243/2026] application was dismissed by the learned SDO vide order dated 03.01.2012 for want of specific particulars. Subsequently, another application was filed by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 under Order 7 Rule 11 and Section 11 of CPC with the detail particulars regarding the conversion of land in question, which was allowed and the plaint filed by the petitioner was rejected by the learned SDO vide its impugned order dated 21.05.2018. The petitioner then filed an appeal against the said order before the Revenue Appellate Authority, which also came to be dismissed on 17.01.2020. Thereafter, an appeal was filed by the petitioner against the orders dated 21.05.2018 and 17.01.2020 before the Board of Revenue, however, the same was also dismissed on 19.01.2026. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned SDO, while dismissing the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC vide its order dated 03.01.2012, considered the fact that after consolidation, when Khasra Nos. 263 and 264 were created, entire land including Khasra No. 728 was registered in the name of Ghani Khan and only 4 bighas land, out of 20 bighas of Khasra No. 263, was converted for industrial use and thus, once the said application is dismissed, another application on same grounds could not have been entertained as the earlier decision of 03.01.2012 was not challenged by the respondents and also, the requirements, under Order 7 Rule 9 CPC, were not complied with. [2026:RJ-JP:17331] (5 of 15) [CW-3243/2026] The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the Courts below misused their jurisdiction by giving findings that the disputed land was an industrial category rather than agricultural category even before the original suit was filed. The learned counsel further submitted that on the date of filing of the suit, since a part of the land was recorded under the agricultural land, the order of the learned SDO, Kishangarh, Ajmer, allowing the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC and thereafter, the orders passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority and the Board of Revenue upholding the order of the learned SDO, are illegal and arbitrary. He further submitted that the earlier application filed by the respondent Nos.3 and 4 under Order 7 Rule 11 was dismissed vide order dated 03.01.2012, and therefore, the second application was not even maintainable. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred the judgment dated 04.08.2023 passed by this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.19271/2017 (Smt. Durgawati Vs. Ramsahai Meena and Ors.) and also referred the order dated 10.05.2017 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6916/2017 (Saina Vs. Returning Officer and Ors.). 4. Ms. Anita Aggarwal, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 submitted that as per the averments made in the plaint itself, in para 9 of the plaint, the petitioner himself has admitted this fact that the land has already been converted from the agricultural purposes to non-agricultural purpose, i.e., industrial. She further [2026:RJ-JP:17331] (6 of 15) [CW-3243/2026] submitted that the conversion took place long back in the year 1972 vide a lease deed annexure-R3/6. She further submitted that remaining part of the land had also been converted from the agricultural purposes to residential purposes. She further submitted that in view of the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short ‘the Act of 1955’) and the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (for short ‘ the Act of 1956’), since the land in question was converted from agricultural purposes to the industrial and residential purposes, the Revenue Court is not having the jurisdiction to entertain the suit pertaining to the land in question and, therefore, the Courts below have not committed any error in rejecting the plaint and upholding the said order. 5. Considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the material made available on record. 6. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Anr. Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in (2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 329 has laid down principles to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in para 49, as under:- “49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. [2026:RJ-JP:17331] (7 of 15) [CW-3243/2026] (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, “within the bounds of their authority”. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. [2026:RJ-JP:17331] (8 of 15) [CW-3243/2026] (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the [2026:RJ-JP:17331] (9 of 15) [CW-3243/2026] tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter- productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 7. The Court of learned SDO, then the Revenue Appellate Authority and thereafter, the Board of Revenue gave concurrent findings as regards the sale of land in question and so also the conversion of land from agricultural purposes to other purposes (industrial and residential). 8. The petitioner himself in para 9 of the plaint has admitted the fact that a part of the land has been converted from agricultural purposes to industrial purposes and mutation of the same was also opened on 18.04.2001, i.e. 10 years prior to filing of the suit. Para 9 of the plaint is quotted as under: “ यह कक पकतववदद ससखयव 1 व 2 कक दवरव पकतववदद ससखयव 3 व 4 कक नवम कवकय कक गई आरवजद कक खसरव नस. 446, 447 गग. मम. चवह व बवरवनद रकबव 9 कबसवव गग. मम. चवह तथव खसरव नस. 447 कव 16 बदघव आरवजद कव नवमवनतकरण ससखयव 664 कदनवसक 4.9.1999 तथव पकतववदद ससखयव 3 व 4 कक दवरव इसद आरवजद कव शकष कहससव 4 [2026:RJ-JP:17331] (10 of 15) [CW-3243/2026] बदघव कजसकक वतरमवन हससरव नस. 447/2 औधककगक पयकजनवथर भभ पररवतरन करवव कलयव गयव हग कजसकक नवमवनतकरण सखयव 759 कदनवसक 18-4-2001 हग। जक कवकय कक आधवर पर खकलव गयव हग ककनतम एकककरण पभवर खसरव नमबर 728 रकबव 3 बदघव 10 कबसवव कक आरवजद कमलवन ककतफल अनमसवर खसरव नस. एकककरण 263,264 तथव वतरमवन खसरव नमबर 446,447 व 447/2 कक आरवजद मम सकममकलत कर लद गई हग। उक 3 बदघव 10 कबसवव आरवजद पर ववददगण आज कदन तक ममकक पर कवकबज कवशत हग । उक आरवजद आज भद ववददगण कक जवनवर चरवनक कवम मम आ रहद हग। पकतववददगण कव आज कदन तक कभद कबजव कवशत नहह रहव हग न आज ममकक पर कवकबज हग” 9. It is a settled law that the concurrent findings given by the Courts below, after scrutiny of the material available on record, the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot interfere with the same because the High Court is not a court of appeal while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This view of the Court finds support from the recent judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh Vs. Natwarlal Shamji Gada and Anr. (SLP (C) No.8991/2025, decided on 24.04.2026. Para 16 of the judgment of Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh (supra) is quoted as under:- “16. Yet another aspect that goes to the root of the matter is that the tenants challenged the order passed by the Appellate Bench permitting the amendment by filing a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is well settled that in exercise of such jurisdiction, it would not be open for the High Court to review or reassess the material that was taken into consideration by the Court while passing the [2026:RJ-JP:17331] (11 of 15) [CW-3243/2026] impugned order. In this regard we may usefully refer to the decision in Raj Kumar Bhatia v. Subhash Chander Bhatia, wherein a three Judge Bench of this Court held as under: “11 ……The High Court has in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution entered upon the merits of the case which was sought to be set up by the appellant in the amendment. This is impermissible. Whether an amendment should be allowed is not dependent on whether the case which is proposed to be set up will eventually succeed at the trial. In enquiring into merits, the High Court transgressed the limitations on its jurisdiction under Article 227. In Sadhna Lodh v. National Insurance Company, this Court has held that the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 227 is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within the parameters of its jurisdiction. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal and it is not open to it to review or reassess the evidence upon which the inferior court or tribunal has passed an order. The Trial Court had in the considered exercise of its jurisdiction allowed the amendment of the written statement under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC. There was no reason for the High Court to interfere under Article 227.” Thus, the discretion exercised by the Appellate Bench while allowing the amendment was not liable to be interfered with in exercise of the Article 227 of the Constitution of India, especially when there was no error of jurisdiction nor a statutory bar for permitting the plaint to be amended based on subsequent events.” [2026:RJ-JP:17331] (12 of 15) [CW-3243/2026] 10. This Court in case of Smt. Durgawati (supra) has observed that in respect of the agricultural land, the suit can be entertained by the Revenue Court if on the date of filing of the suit, the land in question was recorded as agricultural land. 11. In the present case, as per the facts on record and the findings given by the Courts below, a part of the land was converted from agricultural purposes to non-agricultural purposes prior to filing of the suit and there is no demarcation of the land, which has been converted to non- agricultural purposes prior to filing of the suit and, therefore, the Revenue Court is not having the jurisdiction to entertain the suit, wherein the land which is not an agricultural land, is also involved. As a propriety of law, the Revenue Court can not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. If a part of the suit land is an agricultural land, other part is industrial land, however, the Civil Court can entertain the suit pertaining to the land, which is not an agricultural land and a part of that land might be recorded as an agricultural land. 12. When there is undemarcated land, which is not an agricultural land, then the jurisdiction vests in the Civil Court and not in the Revenue Court even if a part of land is recorded as an agricultural land. The Revenue Court could have entertained the suit if the whole land, on the date of filing of the suit, was recorded as an agricultural land and after filing of the suit, same has been converted to the non- agricultural purposes, but in the present case, admittedly a part of the land was already converted long back from [2026:RJ-JP:17331] (13 of 15) [CW-3243/2026] agricultural purposes to industrial purposes and for which lease deed has already been issued in favour of the respondents and the respondents have already raised construction over that land. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the principles of res judicata would operate in the present case as earlier an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was dismissed vide order dated 03.01.2012 and subsequent application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was allowed vide order dated 21.05.2018. 14. It is basic principle of law that if a decree is passed by a Court having no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, then it would be vitiated and null and void. Allowing the proceedings of a suit before the Revenue Court, having no jurisdiction, would be of no meaning. 15. The earlier application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was dismissed for want of specific details and when the Court below, on a subsequent application with complete details, as regards the status of the land in question and averred in the plaint, has passed an order of rejection of the plaint, does not suffer any illegality because allowing any proceeding, which is vitiated by law, would be of no fruitful purpose and it would be just wastage of time of the Court. 16. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in case of Dilip Buildcon Ltd. (M/S) Vs. Ghyanshyam Das Dwivedi reported in ILR (2018) M.P. 2502 in Civil Revision No.190/2018, decided on 28.09.2018 has observed in paras 13, 14 and 15, as under:- [2026:RJ-JP:17331] (14 of 15) [CW-3243/2026] “13. This court in the case of Rehana Parveen (supra) in para 6 and 7 has held as under:- 6. The technical principle of res judicata would not be operative more so, if substantial change in circumstances is averred and found prima facie justified. If such is the case, the subsequent application for custody of the minor cannot be thrown out at the threshold holding it to be not maintainable. The circumstances in the instant case as averred by the petitioner in her petition and as contended by her learned counsel prima facie justify reconsideration of her petition on merits. 7. Therefore, there cannot be any possible objection regarding the maintainability of the application as above. The learned trial Court therefore grossly erred and failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, by dismissing the application holding the same to be not maintainable. Therefore, the impugned order is set aside and the case is remanded for consideration and hearing of the application for the custody of the child. 14. As per the said judgment the technical principle of res judicata would not be operative while deciding the subsequent application. As the circumstances, which is made in the subsequent application was not available at the time when the previous application was decided. 15. The Apex Court in the case of Dhanwanti Joshi (supra) has held that in absence of proof of such change in circumstances, the order would not bar any subsequent proceedings on the same subject matter between the parties by operation of res judicata.” 17. The observations made by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in case of Dilip Buildcon Ltd(supra), [2026:RJ-JP:17331] (15 of 15) [CW-3243/2026] squarely cover the present case and plea of resjudicata is not applicable in this case. 18. Taking into consideration the discussions made above, the facts on record, the facts in the plaint and the concurrent findings of three Courts, as regards the sale and status of the land in question and so also the scope of this Court to be exercised under Articles 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court finds no illegality and perversity in the impugned orders passed by the learned Courts below. 19. Hence, the instant writ petition filed by the petitioner is dismissed being devoid of merit. 20. The stay application and pending application, if any, also stand disposed of. (GANESH RAM MEENA),J ARTI SHARMA