CGHC010287772026 2026:CGHC:36489-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPCR No. 451 of 2026 Lakhan Ram S/o. Late Shivbhajan Ram Chaudhary, Aged About 41 Years R/o. Village Sohagpur, Chauki Karanj, P. S. Jainagar, District Surajpur (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - Secretary, Department Of Home Affairs, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Superintendent Of Jail, Central Jail Ambikapur, District - Sarguja (C.G.) 3 - Collector And District Magistrate, Surajpur (C.G. 4 - Superintendent Of Police, District Surajpur (C.G.) 5 - Station House Officer, P. S. - Jainagar, District - Surajpur, (C.G.) ...Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ For Petitioner : Shri Bharat Loniya, Advocate For Respondents/State : Shri Soumya Rai, Dy GA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Order on Board Per R amesh Sinha, Chief Justice 17.08.2026 Heard Shri Bharat Loniya, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Shri Soumya Rai, learned Dy GA for the State. 1. Present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following reliefs:- Wpcr 451 of 2026 2 “10.1 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the order dated 10.04.2026 (Annexure P/1) passed by the respondent authorities and direct the Respondent State to prematurely release the petitioner, in accordance with law, in the interest of justice. 10.2 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief as it may deem fit in the interest of justice.” 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order dated 10.04.2026 is wholly unsustainable as the competent authority has failed to apply the mind to the factors which are required to be considered while deciding a prayer for premature release. It is submitted that the petitioner has already undergone approximately 16 years of imprisonment and has earned regular remission on account of his good conduct in jail. It is further submitted that the Presiding Judge has expressed no objection to grant of remission, yet the said relevant consideration has not been dealt with in the impugned order. Learned counsel further submits that the State authorities have mechanically relied upon the gravity of the offence and the adverse opinion of the police and District Magistrate. Such considerations, by themselves, cannot constitute a valid basis for rejecting a claim for premature release after the convict has undergone a substantial period of incarceration. 3. It is argued that the authorities were required to examine the factors enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Laxman Naskar v. State of West Bengal, (2000) 7 SCC 626, wherein it has been Wpcr 451 of 2026 3 held that opinion of local residents and witnesses cannot by themselves determine whether a convict would be a danger to society upon release and that relevant considerations such as reformation of the prisoner and reports of jail authorities must be duly examined. Furthermore, the reasons relied upon by the authorities in the present case are substantially similar to the reasons which were found inadequate by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned order be quashed and the petitioner be directed to be released prematurely in accordance with the applicable rules/policy. 4. Per contra, learned State counsel opposes the petition and supports the impugned order. It is submitted that the petitioner was convicted for a heinous and serious offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201/34 of the IPC and, therefore, the competent authorities were justified in taking into consideration the nature and gravity of the offence while considering his prayer for premature release. Learned State counsel further submits that the competent authority had obtained reports from the local police, Superintendent of Police and Collector/District Magistrate, and the said authorities had expressed an adverse opinion regarding the petitioner's release. It is also contended that premature release is not an absolute right of a convict and that the competent authority is required to take into consideration the larger interest of society and public safety. On these grounds, dismissal of the writ petition is prayed for. Wpcr 451 of 2026 4 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. At the outset, it is necessary to bear in mind that the power of remission/premature release is discretionary, but such discretion is not unstructured or immune from judicial review. 7. In Epuru Sudhakar v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (2006) 8 SCC 161, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that orders relating to remission are subject to judicial review and may be interfered with where the decision-making process is arbitrary, mala fide or based upon irrelevant considerations. Similarly, in State of Haryana v. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216, it was emphasized that remission policies must be implemented in a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory manner. 8. The principles governing consideration of premature release were authoritatively considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Laxman Naskar (supra) . The relevant factors include: “(i) Whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large. (ii) Whether there is any chance of future recurrence of committing crime; (iii) Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing crime; (iv) Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining this convict any more; (v) Socio-economic condition of the convict's family.” Wpcr 451 of 2026 5 9. Significantly, in Laxman Naskar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined a case where the claim for premature release had been rejected on the basis of apprehension expressed by witnesses and persons of the locality, the age of the convict and the nature of the crime. The Court found such reasons to be inadequate and observed: “If we look at the reasons given by the Government, we are afraid that the same are palpably irrelevant or devoid of substance.” 10. The Court further observed that the views of witnesses or persons of the locality cannot, by themselves, determine whether a convict would constitute a danger upon premature release, particularly when such apprehensions are not examined in the light of the present conduct and reformation of the prisoner. 11. The aforesaid principle assumes greater significance in the present case because the impugned order does not disclose that the competent authority undertook any meaningful assessment of the petitioner's present conduct, his possibility of reformation, likelihood of recurrence of crime, or the necessity of his continued incarceration. The order proceeds substantially on the fact that the petitioner had committed a heinous offence and that adverse opinions had been expressed by the police and District Magistrate. The gravity of the offence is undoubtedly a relevant consideration; however, it cannot be treated as the sole and perpetual consideration while examining a claim for premature release after the convict has undergone a substantial period of imprisonment. Wpcr 451 of 2026 6 12. The importance of a reasoned consideration is also evident from the subsequent exposition of the law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Court has held that mechanical or stereotyped reasons, or a mere repetition of statutory language, would not constitute adequate consideration of a remission claim and that the relevant factors governing remission must be taken into account. 13. Tested on the aforesaid principles, the impugned order cannot be sustained. The petitioner is in custody since 22.07.2010 and has, according to the material placed before us, undergone approximately 16 years of incarceration. The record also indicates that he has earned regular remission on account of his conduct in prison and, significantly, the Presiding Judge has expressed no objection to grant of the benefit of remission. These are plainly relevant circumstances which required consideration by the competent authority. 14. However, the impugned order does not demonstrate that these circumstances were considered in their proper perspective. There is no discussion as to the petitioner's conduct during his long incarceration, whether he has reformed himself, whether there exists any real likelihood of his reverting to criminal activity, whether his continued incarceration serves any fruitful purpose, or whether any specific material demonstrates that his release would pose a present threat to public safety. Instead, the decision rests substantially upon the original nature of the offence and the adverse opinion of the police authorities. Wpcr 451 of 2026 7 15. It is true that the opinion of the police authorities or the District Magistrate may constitute a relevant consideration while examining a claim for premature release. However, such opinion cannot be treated as conclusive or determinative by itself. The same has to be considered along with the other relevant circumstances, particularly the petitioner's conduct during incarceration, the period of sentence already undergone and the possibility of his reformation and recurrence of crime. In the present case, the impugned order does not disclose such an assessment and rests substantially upon the gravity of the offence and the adverse opinions expressed by the authorities. 16. We are conscious of the fact that a convict has no indefeasible right to premature release merely because he has undergone a particular period of imprisonment. The power remains one to be exercised by the competent authority in accordance with the applicable law and policy. At the same time, the existence of discretion does not authorise its arbitrary exercise. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the decision on remission must be informed, reasonable and fair. 17. In the present case, the authority was required to balance the nature and gravity of the original offence with the petitioner's conduct during incarceration, the length of imprisonment already undergone, possibility of reformation, likelihood of recurrence and the question whether any fruitful purpose would be served by his continued incarceration. Such an exercise is conspicuously absent. Wpcr 451 of 2026 8 18. We may also note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has recognised that the State authority is required to exercise its discretion in relation to premature release in accordance with the applicable remission policy and to consider the benefit available to a convict under the governing policy in a fair and lawful manner. 19. In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned order dated 10.04.2026 cannot be sustained, as the petitioner's claim for premature release has not been considered on the relevant parameters and the authority has primarily relied upon the gravity of the offence and adverse police opinion, without considering the petitioner's long incarceration, conduct in prison and other relevant circumstances. 20. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 10.04.2026 is quashed and set aside. The competent authority shall reconsider the petitioner's case for premature release/remission in accordance with the applicable rules and the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Laxman Naskar (supra) and Epuru Sudhakar (supra). 21. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. The respondents are directed to grant the benefit of remission to the petitioner and release him forthwith, if not required in any other case, subject to compliance with usual terms and conditions as may be imposed under the Chhattisgarh Jail Rules, 1968. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice padma Digitally signed by V PADMAVATHI Date: 2026.08.19 17:59:15 +0530