1 CGHC010312722026 2026:CGHC:36136-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2133 of 2026 Naval Kishor Aditya S/o. Shri Maheshwar Prasad Aditya Aged About 33 Years R/o. Gondpara, Village - Bargawan, P.S. Akaltara, District - Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station - Mahila Thana, District - Janjgir-Champa, (C.G.) 2 - X Y Z (Details Of The Cause Title Filed In Closed Envelope) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Kamlesh Patel, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Jitendra Shrivastava, G.A. and Mr. Sajal Gupta, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 14.08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Kamlesh Patel, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Jitendra Shrivastava, learned Government Advocate for MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2026.08.14 16:59:40 +0530 2 respondent No.1/ State as well as Mr. Sajal Gupta, learned counsel for respondent No.2. 2. The petitioner has filed this petition with following prayer: “a) Quash the FIR dated 22-04-2026, bearing Crime No. 02/2026 (Annexure P/1), registered at Police Station Mahila Thana, District Janjgir- Champa (C.G.), against the Petitioner; b) Quash the Chargesheet dated 16-06-2026, bearing No. 02/2026 (Annexure P/2), filed before the learned court below against the Petitioner; c) Quash the Cognizance Order dated 19-06-2026 (Annexure P/3) passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.S.C.) [POCSO], Janjgir, in Special Criminal Case (POCSO) No. 40/2026; d) Quash all subsequent/consequential proceedings in Special Criminal Case (POCSO) No. 40/2026 pending before the Ld. Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.S.C.) [POCSO], Janjgir (C.G.) against the Petitioner in connection with the aforesaid FIR and chargesheet; and e) Pass such other and further orders as may be deemed just, fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice.” 3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that respondent No. 2 alleged that she had been in contact with the petitioner since 2011 and that the petitioner had established physical relations with her on the promise of marriage, while delaying the marriage on account 3 of family reasons. Pursuant to her complaint dated 17.04.2026, FIR No. 02/2026 was registered on 22.04.2026 at Police Station Mahila Thana, District Janjgir-Champa, for offences under Sections 87 and 64(2)(m) of the BNS, 2023 and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. During investigation, however, the parties solemnized their marriage on 20.04.2026 and started residing together as husband and wife. The statement of respondent No. 2 was thereafter recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Champa, on 24.04.2026, wherein she stated that the relationship was longstanding, the delay in marriage was due to family circumstances, the complaint had arisen out of a misunderstanding, and that she was married to the petitioner and did not want any legal action against him. Despite the aforesaid subsequent developments, the investigating agency filed charge- sheet No. 02/2026 on 16.06.2026, whereupon the learned Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.S.C.) [POCSO], Janjgir, took cognizance on 19.06.2026. The petitioner has, therefore, approached this Court seeking quashing of the FIR, charge-sheet, cognizance order and all consequential proceedings. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned FIR, charge-sheet and cognizance order are an abuse of the process of law, particularly when the petitioner and respondent No. 2 have amicably resolved their differences and have solemnized their marriage on 20.04.2026 and are presently residing together as 4 husband and wife. It is contended that the essential ingredient of a false promise to marry is absent, as the parties were in a relationship for several years and ultimately married each other, demonstrating that there was no fraudulent intention at the inception. It is further submitted that the statement of respondent No. 2 recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS before the learned Magistrate categorically states that the complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and that she does not desire any legal action against the petitioner. Learned counsel further points out the prolonged relationship and delay in lodging the complaint as circumstances indicating that the relationship was consensual and not founded upon any misconception of fact. Reliance is placed upon Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 and Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385 to contend that a subsequent failure or delay in marriage cannot, by itself, be treated as a false promise to marry made from the inception. It is also submitted that the parties have applied for registration of their marriage and executed notarized affidavits affirming their marital status and are peacefully residing together, and continuation of the criminal proceedings would cause serious prejudice to their matrimonial life. Learned counsel further relies upon Madhukar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1415, and submits that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, continuation of the proceedings would serve no useful purpose 5 and would amount to an abuse of the process of law. 5. Learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 2/complainant submits that the petitioner has solemnized marriage with Respondent No. 2 and both are presently living together as husband and wife. It is further submitted that the dispute between the parties has been amicably resolved and respondent No. 2 has no objection to the quashing of the FIR, charge-sheet, cognizance order and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the State opposes the petition and submits that the prosecution case cannot be terminated merely on the basis of the subsequent marriage between the petitioner and Respondent No. 2. It is contended that the relationship between the parties commenced when Respondent No. 2 was a minor and the allegations relate to the period during which she was below the age of majority. Therefore, the subsequent marriage, compromise or the present cohabitation of the parties cannot efface the alleged offences under the POCSO Act. Learned State counsel submits that the allegations in the FIR, the material collected during investigation and the charge-sheet disclose prima facie commission of the alleged offences and, therefore, the petition for quashing deserves to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with petition. 8. The legal position on the issue of quashing of criminal 6 proceedings is well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, FIR or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases and Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the investigations of cognizable offences. However, where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the FIR or the charge-sheet may be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of the B.N.S.S.). 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill reported in (1995) SCC (Cri) 1059, Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi reported in (1999) 3 SCC 259 and Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E Ltd. & Ors reported in 2000 SCC (Cri) 615, the Supreme Court clearly held that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence, Court should not quash the complaint. However, it was held that if the allegations do not constitute any offence as alleged and appear to be patently absurd and improbable, Court should not hesitate to quash the complaint. The note of caution was reiterated that while considering such petitions the Courts should be very circumspect, conscious and careful. Thus, there is no controversy about the legal proposition that in case a prima facie case is made out, the FIR or the proceedings in consequence thereof cannot be quashed. 7 10. In Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has authoritatively settled the scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). The Apex Court has held that the power to quash criminal proceedings is required to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and only in the rarest of rare cases. It has been categorically observed that while considering a prayer for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings, the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry into the reliability, genuineness or otherwise of the allegations contained in the FIR, nor can it appreciate the evidence or conduct a mini trial. The Court is only required to examine whether the allegations, if taken at their face value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The Supreme Court further emphasized that criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the threshold, that investigation into cognizable offences should ordinarily be permitted to proceed unhindered, and that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be exercised with great caution and self- restraint, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in manifest miscarriage of justice. 11. Very recently, in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 02.09.2025), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated 8 the aforesaid principles and further held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS), the High Court cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact or evaluate the evidentiary worth of the material collected during investigation. Unless all these parameters are cumulatively satisfied, the High Court ought not to interfere in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, leaving the parties to establish their respective cases before the trial Court in accordance with law. 12. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles, this Court is of the considered view that the present case does not fall within the exceptional category warranting exercise of inherent jurisdiction for quashing of the FIR, charge-sheet and consequential proceedings. The allegations contained in the FIR, when taken at their face value, disclose the commission of cognizable offences and the charge-sheet has also been filed after completion of investigation. The contention of the petitioner that the relationship between the parties was consensual, that the complaint was lodged due to misunderstanding, and that the subsequent marriage and statement of respondent No. 2 absolve the petitioner, involve disputed questions of fact and appreciation of evidence, which cannot be adjudicated upon in proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS. More particularly, the prosecution case pertains to a period when respondent No. 2 was allegedly a minor and the applicability of the provisions of the POCSO Act is required to be examined on the basis of the evidence available on 9 record. The subsequent marriage between the parties and their present cohabitation, though relevant circumstances, cannot by themselves obliterate the alleged offences or furnish a ground for quashing the prosecution at the threshold. Accordingly, no exceptional circumstance or manifest abuse of the process of law is made out warranting interference by this Court. The petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet