1 CGHC010228572026 2026:CGHC:35889-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 703 of 2026 1 - South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Through Its Chairman-Cum-Managing Director, Headquarter, Seepat Road, Bilaspur, (Chhattisgarh) 2 - General Manager Vishrampur Area, S E C L, Vishrampur, District - Surajpur, (Chhattisgarh) 3 - Assistant Manager (Personnel), Rehar Land Mines, Vishrampur Area, District- Surajpur, (Chhattisgarh) 4 - Mining Manager Rehar Land Mines, Vishrampur Area, District- Surajpur, (Chhattisgarh) ... Appellants versus Smt. Amaresh Rajwade D/o Late Ramprasad, W/o Shri Vijay Kumar Sahu Aged About 33 Years (As Per Cause Title), R/o Karanjwar, Police Station And Tahsil Pratappur, District- Surajpur (Chhattisgarh) ... Respondent (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Appellants : Mr. Pankaj Singh, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Shubhank Tiwari, Advocate VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.08.19 10:54:48 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 13/08/2026 1. Heard Mr. Pankaj Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellants as well as Mr. Shubhank Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent on I.A. No. 1 of 2026, which is an application for condonation of delay. 2. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and considering the reasons mentioned in the application, we are of the considered opinion that sufficient cause has been shown in the application and accordingly, I.A. No. 1 of 2026 is allowed and delay of 44 days in filing the appeal is condoned. 3. This intra-court appeal has been preferred by the appellants, being aggrieved by the order dated 18.03.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 3668 of 2019, whereby the writ petition filed by the respondent was allowed, the order dated 23.10.2018 passed by the appellants was set aside, and the appellants were directed to pay monthly monetary compensation of Rs.6,000/- to the respondent with effect from 07.08.2018. 4. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent’s father, late Ramprasad, was an employee at Rehar Land Mines under the appellants and died in harness on 24.09.2012, leaving behind his widow, Smt. Sona Bai, and five daughters. The widow, being the 3 legitimate female dependant of the deceased, survived him by about one year and four months and expired on 07.01.2014. During her lifetime, she neither sought dependent employment nor monetary compensation. The terminal benefits, including gratuity of Rs.8,59,855/-, Life Cover Scheme amount of Rs.1,12,800/- and Coal Mines Provident Fund dues, were paid to her. Thereafter, the respondent, a married daughter residing in her matrimonial home, for the first time claimed dependent employment on 01.04.2017, which was rejected by the appellants. Her challenge in WPS No.4294 of 2018 was decided on 03.07.2018, whereby this Court held that she had neither pleaded nor established dependency upon the deceased and was not entitled to dependent employment, while liberty was reserved to make a representation regarding monetary compensation, confined to the question of her entitlement thereto. 5. Pursuant thereto, the respondent submitted a representation dated 07.08.2018 seeking monetary compensation, which was rejected by the appellants by order dated 23.10.2018 on the ground that the widow had never claimed such compensation during her lifetime and that the respondent, being a married daughter, was not a dependant under the National Coal Wage Agreement (hereinafter called as ‘NCWA’). The respondent thereafter filed WPS No.3668 of 2019. By the impugned order dated 18.03.2026, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition, held the respondent entitled to the benefit under sub-clause (iv) of Clause 9.5.0 of the NCWA-IX, set aside the order dated 23.10.2018 and directed the appellants to pay monthly 4 monetary compensation of Rs.6,000/- with effect from 07.08.2018. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants have preferred the present appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned Single Judge has erred in treating the respondent, who is admittedly a married daughter residing in her matrimonial home, as a “female dependant” entitled to monetary compensation under Clause 9.5.0(iv) of the NCWA-IX. It is submitted that the expression “female dependant” cannot be read in isolation and has to be understood in the light of the definition of “dependant” contained in Clause 9.3.3 and Clause 9.4.0(iii) of the Agreement. Under the said definition, the primary dependants are the wife/husband, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son, while a widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law can fall within the extended category only subject to the stipulated conditions of residence and dependency. A married daughter residing in her matrimonial home, therefore, does not fall within the recognised class of dependants. It is further submitted that in the earlier round of litigation, in WPS No.4294 of 2018 decided on 03.07.2018, this Court had already recorded a finding that the respondent had neither pleaded nor established her dependency upon the deceased and was not entitled to dependent employment. The said finding having attained finality, the respondent could not have claimed monetary compensation by seeking to overcome the very foundation on which her earlier claim had failed. 5 7. He would further submits that the widow of the deceased employee, Smt. Sona Bai, was the legitimate female dependant and survived for more than a year after the death of her husband, but never claimed either dependent employment or monetary compensation during her lifetime. She expired on 07.01.2014 and the benefits payable consequent upon the death of the employee had already been paid to her. It is argued that the benefit of compassionate appointment or monetary compensation is intended to provide immediate financial assistance to the dependants to tide over the sudden crisis caused by the death of the breadwinner and is neither a vested nor heritable right. The respondent, admittedly a married daughter, raised the claim for the first time after about four and a half years from the death of the employee and after the death of the widow. Thus, the very object of the scheme stood defeated by such a belated claim. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge, in directing payment of compensation with effect from 07.08.2018, travelled beyond the earlier order dated 03.07.2018, which had confined any possible monetary compensation to the period from the date of death of the deceased till the date of death of the mother. Accordingly, it is prayed that the impugned order be set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent be dismissed. 8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that the learned Single Judge has rightly appreciated the provisions of Clause 9.5.0(iv) of the NCWA-IX and correctly held the respondent to be entitled to monetary compensation as a female dependant of the deceased employee. It is submitted that the 6 expression “female dependant” occurring in the said clause is intended to extend the benefit to a female member of the deceased employee’s family and cannot be narrowly construed so as to exclude the respondent merely because she was married. He submits that the respondent had approached the appellants claiming the benefit and, pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court in the earlier writ petition, had specifically sought monetary compensation. The earlier order did not finally adjudicate her entitlement to monetary compensation, but expressly permitted her to raise such claim, which was thereafter considered and rejected by the appellants. Therefore, the appellants cannot contend that the issue of her entitlement stood concluded by the earlier order. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent further submits that the object of the NCWA is to extend financial assistance to the family of a deceased employee and the provision relating to monetary compensation is a beneficial provision which deserves a liberal and purposive interpretation. The respondent’s claim ought not to be defeated on the technical ground of her marital status, particularly when the learned Single Judge, upon consideration of the relevant provisions, has found her entitled to the benefit under Clause 9.5.0(iv). It is further submitted that the mere fact that the widow did not claim monetary compensation during her lifetime cannot extinguish the entitlement available to the respondent under the NCWA, nor can the payment of terminal benefits be treated as a substitute for the monetary compensation contemplated under Clause 9.5.0 of NCWA. The respondent, having approached the 7 appellants pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court and having thereafter diligently pursued her claim before this Court, cannot be denied the benefit on the ground of delay. Accordingly, learned counsel submits that the impugned order calls for no interference and the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein above and also gone through the pleadings of the parties and documents annexed with the writ appeal as well as writ petition. 11. The question which principally falls for consideration is whether the respondent, being a married daughter of the deceased employee, is entitled to claim monetary compensation under Clause 9.5.0(iv) of the NCWA-IX. It is true that Clause 9.5.0 specifically makes provision for employment/monetary compensation to a “female dependant”. However, the expression “female dependant” cannot be construed as creating an independent class of beneficiaries divorced from the requirement of dependency under the NCWA. The entitlement must necessarily flow from and be regulated by the scheme itself. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the very scheme of the NCWA in Subhadra v. Ministry of Coal, (2018) 11 SCC 201, has held that the claim is governed by the Scheme incorporated in the Bipartite Agreement and that, where the terms of the Agreement are specific, they leave no scope for conferring an entitlement dehors the Scheme. In the present case, the respondent admittedly was a married daughter residing in her matrimonial home and, significantly, 8 there is no pleading or material establishing that she was wholly or substantially dependent upon the earnings of the deceased employee at the time of his death. Mere relationship as a daughter, or the description “female” in Clause 9.5.0, cannot by itself confer entitlement to monetary compensation. The earlier order passed by this Court in WPS No.4294 of 2018 dated 03.07.2018 assumes considerable significance, wherein this Court had already found that the respondent had neither pleaded nor established her dependency upon the deceased and was not entitled to dependent employment. The liberty granted to her to submit a representation for monetary compensation was only a liberty to have the claim examined in accordance with the governing provisions; it did not amount to an adjudication that she was a dependant or confer upon her an absolute right to monetary compensation. 12. We are also of the considered view that the claim for monetary compensation requires to be examined independently in the factual setting in which it has been raised. The deceased employee died on 24.09.2012. His widow, Smt. Sona Bai, who was the surviving female dependant, remained alive for more than one year thereafter and expired on 07.01.2014. During her lifetime, she neither claimed employment nor monetary compensation under Clause 9.5.0. 13. It is relevant to notice here the provisions of 9.3.0, 9.4.0 and 9.5.0 of the Chapter-9 of NCWA-IX, which reads as under::- “9.3.0 Provision of Employment to Dependants 9 9.3.1 Employment would be provided to one dependant of workers who are disabled permanently and also those who die while in service. The provision will be implemented as follows. 9.3.2 Employment to one dependant of the worker who dies while in service In so far as female dependants are concerned, their employment/payment of monetary compensation would be governed by para 9.5.0. 9.3.3 the dependant for this purpose means the wife/husband as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependant is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in- law or son-in-law residing with the deceased and almost wholly dependant on the earnings of the deceased may be considered to be the dependant of the deceased. 9.3.4 the dependants to be considered for employment should be physically fit and suitable for employment and aged not more than 35 years provided that the age limit in case of employment of female spouse would be 45 years as given in Clause 9.5.0. In so far as male spouse is concerned, there would be no age limit regarding provision of employment. 9.4.0 Employment to one dependant of a worker who is permanently disabled in his place (i) The disablement of the worker concerned should arise from injury or disease, be of a 10 permanent nature resulting into loss of employment and it should be so certified by the Coal Company concerned. (ii) In case of disablement arising out of general physical debility so certified by the Coal Company, the employee concerned will be eligible for the benefit under this clause if he/she is upto the age of 58 years. The term 'general physical debility' would mean deficiency of a workman due to any disease or other health reason leading to his/her disablement to perform his/her duties regularly and/or efficiently. (iii) The dependant for this purpose means the wife/husband as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependant is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter/ widowed daughter-in- law or son-in-law residing with the employee and almost wholly dependant on the earning of the employee may be considered. In so far as female dependants are concerned, their employment would be governed by the provisions of clause 9.5.0. (iv) The dependants to be considered for employment should be physically fit and suitable for employment and aged not more than 35 years provided that the age limit in case of employment of female spouse would be 45 years as given in Clause 9.5.0. In so far as male spouse is 11 concerned, there would be no age limit regarding provision of employment. 9.5.0 Employment/Monetary compensation to female dependant Provision of employment/monetary compensation to female dependants of workmen who die while in service and who are declared medically unfit as per Clause 9.4.0 above would be regulated as under: (i) In case of death due to mine accident, the female dependant would have the option to either accept the monetary compensation of Rs. 4,000/- per month or employment irrespective of her age. (ii) In case of death/total permanent disablement due to cause other than mine accident and medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0., if the female dependant is below the age of 45 years she will have the option there to accept the monetary compensation of Rs. 3,000/- per month or employment. In case the female dependant is above 45 years of age she will be entitled only to monetary compensation and not to employment. (iii) In case of death either in mine accident or for other reasons or medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0, if no employment has been offered and the male dependant of the concerned worker is 12 years and above in age, he will be kept on a live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skill and qualifications when he attains the age of 18 years. During the 12 period the male dependant is on live roster, the female dependant will be paid monetary compensation as per rates at paras (i) & (ii) above. This will be effective from 1.1.2000. (iv) Monetary compensation wherever applicable, would be paid till the female dependant attains the age of 60 years. (v) the existing rate of monetary compensation will continue. The matter will be further discussed in the Standardisation Committee and finalised. Note : In the case of TISCO, the matter would be settled at bipartite level.” 14. The respondent, after the death of the widow, raised her claim for the first time on 01.04.2017, i.e. nearly four and a half years after the death of the employee. The scheme of monetary compensation under Clause 9.5.0 is a welfare measure intended to provide financial support to an eligible female dependant in the eventuality contemplated by the NCWA; it cannot be treated as a heritable or transferable monetary benefit which, upon non-claim by the eligible dependant during her lifetime, automatically devolves upon another member of the family. The distinction between consideration of a married daughter and establishment of her entitlement as a dependant is therefore material. Even assuming that the respondent's marital status, by itself, could not be treated as an absolute bar to consideration, she was still required to establish the foundational requirement of dependency under the Scheme, which she failed to do. 13 15. In the present case, the respondent's belated claim, raised years after the death of the employee and after the death of the widow who herself had never claimed the benefit, cannot be sustained merely by describing the respondent as a female dependant. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are unable to sustain the finding of the learned Single Judge that the respondent was entitled to monetary compensation under Clause 9.5.0(iv) of NCWA-IX. The learned Single Judge has, in our considered opinion, proceeded on an erroneous premise by treating the expression “female dependant” as sufficient by itself to confer entitlement, without first determining whether the respondent satisfied the essential requirement of dependency under the Scheme and without properly appreciating the effect of the earlier order dated 03.07.2018. The direction to pay monetary compensation with effect from 07.08.2018 is consequently unsustainable. 17. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 18.03.2026 passed in WPS No.3668 of 2019 is set aside. The writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed. The present writ appeal is, accordingly, allowed. 18. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice ved