1 CGHC010313782026 2026:CGHC:36742-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 4279 of 2026 1 - Ashok Kumar Mittal S/o P.L. Mittal Aged About 59 Years Occupation- A Class Contractor R/o- Main Road Korba P.S. And Tehsil Korba District- Korba (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Water Resources Department Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, Raipur District Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Chief Engineer (Tender Cell) Water Resources Department O/o Engineer- In-Chief, Shivnath Bhavan, North Block Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Chief Engineer Water Resources Department Godavari Basin Jagdalpur District- South Bastar (C.G.) 4 - Executive Engineer Water Resources Division Kanker District Kanker (C.G.) 5 - B.P. Mishra And Co Through Proprietor B.P. Mishra Rani Road, Korba District- Korba (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) (cause title taken from CIS) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Krishna Tandon, Advocate SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2026.08.21 11:09:40 +0530 2 For Respondent(s) : Mr. Praveen Das, Addl. A.G. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 18/08/2026 1. Heard Mr. Krishna Tandon, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Praveen Das, Addl. Advocate General, appearing for the Respondent/State. 2. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners seek for the following relief(s): “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set-aside the order of disqualification by way of E-mail dated 18/06/2026. (Annexure P-1) issued by the Respondent No. 2related to NIT No. 03/SAC/26-27 was issued bearing Tender No. 190407 (First Call) 10.2 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set-aside the rejection of representation by the tendering committee (Annexure P-2). 10.3 That any other relief which this Hon'ble court may deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3. Subject matter in brief is that the petitioner is an ‘A’ Class contractor bearing Unique Identification No. CGeR01707. The respondents issued NIT No. 03/SAC/26-27, Tender No. 190407 (First Call), dated 08.05.2026 for re- construction of Bagod Anicut-cum-Lift Irrigation Scheme at Block Kanker, District Kanker. The petitioner participated in the tender and submitted all requisite qualification documents along with an EMD of Rs.5,00,000/-. The 3 petitioner also submitted a Pre-Qualification Certificate, valid up to 30.09.2026, along with the relevant Class ‘A’ contractor certificates, which were duly verified by the tendering authority. 4. However, on 18.06.2026, the petitioner was informed by e-mail that his Pre-Qualification Certificate had been rejected and he had been disqualified under Clause 2.1.6(i) and (ii) of the NIT on the ground that his contractor licence had allegedly been downgraded from Class ‘A’ to Class ‘B’ on 14.07.2025 and, therefore, he had furnished incorrect information. The petitioner submitted a reply dated 19.06.2026 and thereafter a detailed representation dated 24.06.2026, pointing out that the alleged order of demotion had already been set aside by this Court vide order dated 22.01.2026. Thus, according to the petitioner, at the relevant time of submission of the bid, there was no subsisting order of demotion against his contractor licence and he was duly entitled to participate as an ‘A’ Class contractor. 5. In the meantime, the financial bids were opened on 30.06.2026, wherein the private respondent, B.P. Mishra & Co., was declared L-1. The petitioner contends that his quoted price was substantially lower than that of the private respondent and that, as on the date of filing of the petition, no work order had been issued in favour of any bidder. The petitioner further contends that his representation against the disqualification was rejected by the Tender Committee without assigning any reasons, by passing a non- speaking order. It is also the petitioner’s case that Clause 2.1.6(ii) of the NIT has been wrongly invoked against him, despite the earlier order of this Court setting aside the demotion of his contractor licence. Aggrieved by his disqualification and rejection of his representation, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition seeking appropriate relief. 4 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been illegally and arbitrarily disqualified from the tender process on the ground that his contractor’s licence had allegedly been downgraded from Class ‘A’ to Class ‘B’ on 14.07.2025, whereas the said order of demotion had already been set aside by this Court vide order dated 22.01.2026, much prior to issuance of the NIT dated 08.05.2026 and submission of the petitioner’s bid. It is, therefore, contended that on the relevant date the petitioner was admittedly holding a valid Class ‘A’ contractor licence and had submitted all requisite documents on that basis. Learned counsel further submits that Clause 2.1.6 of the NIT, relating to disqualification on account of misleading, incorrect, incomplete or false information, has no application to the petitioner, as there was neither any suppression nor any incorrect declaration on his part, the petitioner having possessed a valid Class ‘A’ licence at the time of submission of the bid. It is further submitted that the impugned disqualification is contrary to the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court and has been passed without affording the petitioner an effective opportunity of hearing, in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is also contended that the detailed representation submitted by the petitioner was rejected by the Tender Committee without assigning any reasons, by passing a wholly non-speaking order. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the action of the tendering authority in disqualifying the petitioner is arbitrary, illegal and unsustainable in law and prays that the impugned disqualification and consequential action be set aside and the petitioner be permitted to participate in the tender process in accordance with law. 7. Learned State counsel, opposing the petition, submits that the petitioner was rightly disqualified from the tender process in accordance with the terms and conditions of the NIT, particularly Clause 2.1.6(i) and (ii), as the 5 petitioner’s contractor licence had admittedly been downgraded from Class ‘A’ to Class ‘B’ on 14.07.2025 and thereafter it was restored on 10.02.2026 after passing of the order dated 22.01.2026 passed by this Court in WPC No. 6221/2025. While submitting a bid, the petitioner was required to disclose the relevant status and furnish correct information regarding his eligibility and qualification, however, he has submitted the registration certificate which was issued on 16.08.2024 but has not submitted the document with respect to the subsequent even i.e. down-gradation of his contractor licence and upgradation after passing of the order or has not submitted the latest certificate of his registration. It is contended that the tendering authority, being the competent authority to scrutinize the qualification documents, found that the petitioner had furnished information which did not satisfy the prescribed qualification requirements and, accordingly, rejected his Pre-Qualification Certificate. Learned State counsel further submits that the subsequent order dated 22.01.2026 relied upon by the petitioner setting aside the order of demotion does not, by itself, confer any vested right upon the petitioner to seek participation in the tender, particularly when the tendering authority, upon scrutiny of the documents and the conditions contained in the NIT, found the petitioner ineligible. It is further submitted that the petitioner cannot claim a right to award of the contract merely on the ground that his financial bid was allegedly lower than that of the L-1 bidder, as price comparison arises only amongst technically qualified bidders. The decision to disqualify the petitioner was taken in accordance with the tender conditions and there is no material to establish any mala fide, favouritism or arbitrariness on the part of the respondents. Learned State counsel, therefore, submits that the writ petition is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed. 8. We have learned counsel for the parties, perused the material annexed 6 with the petition. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Tata Cellular vs. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651, had laid down certain principles for the judicial review of administrative action. “94. The principles deducible from the above are: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi- administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. Based on these principles we will examine the facts of this case since they commend to us as the correct principles.” 10. In the case of “Jagdish Mandal Vs. State of Orissa and others” 7 reported in (2007) 14 SCC 517, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that :- 22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made “lawfully” and not to check whether choice or decision is “sound”. When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions: (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; or Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance 8 with relevant law could have reached;” (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action.” 11. Upon consideration of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tata Cellular (Supra) and Jagdish Mandal (Supra), it is well settled that in matters relating to tender and award of contracts, the scope of judicial review is limited and this Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the decision of the tendering authority. The Court is primarily concerned with the decision-making process and interference is warranted only where the action of the authority is shown to be arbitrary, irrational, mala fide, biased or contrary to law. In the present case, the petitioner was disqualified by the competent tendering authority upon scrutiny of his qualification documents with reference to Clause 2.1.6(i) and (ii) of the NIT. The petitioner has failed to establish that the decision to disqualify him was actuated by mala fide, bias or an intention to favour the private respondent. Mere allegation of favouritism, without any cogent material, cannot constitute a ground for exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12. It is further evident that the petitioner participated in the tender process with full knowledge of the terms and conditions of the NIT and was required to satisfy the prescribed eligibility and qualification requirements. The petitioner’s contractor licence had admittedly been downgraded from Class ‘A’ to Class ‘B’ on 14.07.2025 and was thereafter restored on 10.02.2026 pursuant to the order dated 22.01.2026 passed by this Court in WPC No. 9 6221/2025. While submitting his bid, the petitioner was required to disclose the relevant and subsisting status of his contractor licence and furnish complete and correct information relating to his eligibility and qualification. However, the petitioner submitted the registration certificate issued on 16.08.2024 and did not place on record the subsequent material documents reflecting the intervening event of down-gradation of his contractor licence from Class ‘A’ to Class ‘B’ and its subsequent restoration/upgradation pursuant to the order dated 22.01.2026 passed by this Court, nor did he furnish the latest registration certificate reflecting his then existing status. Thus, the tendering authority was justified in examining the petitioner’s eligibility on the basis of the documents actually furnished by him and the status disclosed at the relevant point of time. Upon examination of the documents submitted by the petitioner, the tendering authority formed an opinion that the petitioner did not satisfy the relevant qualification requirement and accordingly rejected his Pre-Qualification Certificate. Such assessment of technical eligibility and compliance with the tender conditions falls primarily within the domain of the tendering authority, and this Court, while exercising the limited jurisdiction of judicial review, cannot substitute its own assessment for that of the competent authority merely because another view may also be possible. The petitioner has relied upon the order dated 22.01.2026 whereby the earlier order of demotion of his contractor licence was set aside; however, the subsequent restoration of the licence on 10.02.2026, by itself, does not obliterate the fact that the licence had remained downgraded from Class ‘A’ to Class ‘B’ from 14.07.2025 until its restoration, nor does it cure the petitioner’s failure to disclose the relevant intervening facts and furnish the latest and complete documents along with his bid. In the facts of the present case, the said circumstance by itself does not establish that the decision of the 10 tendering authority was arbitrary, unreasonable or irrational, or that no reasonable authority could have taken such a decision. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate any patent illegality, perversity, mala fide or procedural impropriety in the decision-making process warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its limited power of judicial review. 13. The contention of the petitioner that his financial bid was lower than that of the private respondent is also of no assistance to him. Once the petitioner was found ineligible at the stage of technical/pre-qualification scrutiny in accordance with the tender conditions, his financial bid could not confer upon him any vested right to claim consideration for award of the contract. The lowest financial quotation, by itself, does not create an enforceable right in favour of a bidder who has failed to satisfy the prescribed eligibility conditions. The decision to accept or reject a tender is required to be considered in the context of the tender conditions as a whole and the commercial and technical requirements of the project. 14. As regards the contention that the petitioner’s representation was rejected by a non-speaking order and that adequate opportunity of hearing was not granted, it is required to be kept in mind that the tender process is essentially a commercial transaction and, as held in Jagdish Mandal (supra), principles of equity and natural justice do not operate in the same manner as in ordinary adjudicatory proceedings. In the present case, the petitioner was informed of the reason for his disqualification and he thereafter submitted his reply/representation before the competent authority. Therefore, the petitioner cannot contend that he was wholly unaware of the basis of his disqualification or that the decision was taken behind his back without any opportunity whatsoever. The mere fact that the representation was not accepted or that 11 elaborate reasons were not recorded therein, in the absence of proof of arbitrariness, mala fide or perversity in the original decision, would not by itself warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 15. Applying the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tata Cellular (supra) and Jagdish Mandal (supra), this Court has to examine whether the decision-making process adopted by the respondents was mala fide or intended to favour any particular bidder, or whether the decision was so arbitrary and irrational that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with the relevant law could have reached such a conclusion. In the present case, the petitioner has not placed any cogent material on record to establish either of the aforesaid circumstances. The allegation that the petitioner was disqualified with an intention to favour the private respondent is unsupported by any substantive material. The tendering authority has acted on the basis of the prescribed tender conditions and its assessment of the petitioner’s qualification. Consequently, no ground is made out for exercise of judicial review merely on the basis of the petitioner’s disagreement with the decision of the tendering authority. 16. It is also pertinent that the work order has admittedly not been issued in favour of any bidder as yet. However, the pendency of issuance of the work order, by itself, cannot enlarge the scope of judicial review or confer any right upon the petitioner to seek interference with the tender process. In the absence of any finding that the tender process is vitiated by mala fide, arbitrariness, irrationality or violation of a statutory provision, this Court would be slow to interfere with the commercial decision of the competent authority, particularly when such interference may result in further delay in execution of a public project. 12 17. In view of the foregoing discussion and having regard to the settled principles governing judicial review in tender matters, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner has failed to make out any case of mala fide, arbitrariness, irrationality, bias or illegality in the decision of the respondents disqualifying him from the tender process. The petitioner has also failed to establish any legally enforceable right to participate in the financial evaluation merely on the ground that his quoted price was lower than that of the L-1 bidder. Consequently, no ground is made out for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition, being devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed. 18. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice sagrika