1 CGHC010301662026 2026:CGHC:34444-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2070 of 2026 Amit Mittal S/o Late Rajendra Mittal Aged About 58 Years R/o Flat No. T G -2 B / 4, Garden Estate, Gurgaon, Nera Guru Dronacharya Metro Station, Gurgaon, Haryana -122002. ... Petitioner(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through -Police Station ACB / EOW, Raipur. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sunil Otwani, Sr. Adv. Along with Mr. Himanshu Pandey, Mr. Kumar Vinayakam Gupta, Mr. Dushyant Pal and Mr. Rajvansh Singh, Advocates For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vivek Sharma, Advocate General along with Mr. Praveen Das, Add. A.G. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 06.08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Sunil Otwani, learned Senior Advocate along with Mr. Himanshu Pandey, Mr. Kumar Vinayakam Gupta, Mr. Dushyant MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2026.08.07 10:40:35 +0530 2 Pal and Mr. Rajvansh Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Vivek Sharma, learned Advocate General along with Mr. Praveen Das, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent/ State. 2. The petitioner has filed this petition with following prayer: “(a) quash FIR No. 4/2024 dated 17.01.2024, registered at Police Station ACB/EOW, Raipur, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC and Sections 7 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Annexure P/1), insofar as the same relates to and concerns to the Petitioner; (b) quash the Notice dated 27.07.2026 (Annexure P/2), and all further investigation and proceedings consequent thereto, insofar as the same relate to and concern the Petitioner; (c) award the costs of this petition to the Petitioner; and (d) pass such other or further order(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice.” 3. The present petition has been preferred challenging the legality and continuance of FIR No. 04/2024 dated 17.01.2024 registered at ACB/EOW, Raipur, for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the IPC and Sections 7 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, insofar as the petitioner has been shown as an accused therein at Serial No. 51, along with 3 the consequential notice dated 27.07.2026 directing his personal appearance before the Investigating Agency. The petitioner is a Non-Executive Director of A2Z Infra Services Ltd., a public limited company engaged by the Chhattisgarh State Marketing Corporation Limited (CSMCL) for supply of manpower under government tenders. According to the petitioner, he never exercised any day-to-day control over the execution of the CSMCL contract, which was exclusively managed by the authorised representative, Mr. N. Uday Kumar Rao, pursuant to a Board Resolution dated 15.09.2020, and all operational activities, banking transactions and correspondence concerning the contract were handled by the said authorized representative. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that although he was named in FIR No. 4/2024, the investigating agency, despite filing the original charge-sheet and four supplementary charge-sheets therein, did not array him as an accused. Thereafter, another FIR, being FIR No. 44/2024, came to be registered concerning substantially the same CSMCL manpower contract, period of operation and alleged modus operandi. In the said second FIR, the petitioner was initially not named as an accused, however, after repeated appearance before the investigating authorities in compliance with summons, he was arrested on 04.05.2026, charge-sheeted on 18.05.2026 and subsequently enlarged on regular bail by this Court on 03.07.2026. The petitioner contends that the allegations in both FIRs arise out of the same transaction, involve the same 4 contractual arrangement and documentary evidence, and that the investigation in the second FIR itself relied upon the material collected during investigation of FIR No. 4/2024. According to the petitioner, no specific overt act, forged document or material establishing his personal involvement has been attributed to him, and the prosecution case itself attributes the operational control of the contract to the authorised representative. 5. The grievance of the petitioner is that notwithstanding the completion of investigation and filing of multiple charge-sheets in FIR No. 4/2024 without prosecuting him therein, and despite his arrest and prosecution in the connected FIR No. 44/2024, the respondent authorities issued the impugned notice dated 27.07.2026 requiring his personal appearance in connection with FIR No. 4/2024, more than two years after registration of the FIR and well beyond the period within which the Supreme Court of India had directed completion of investigation in the said crime. The petitioner submits that the continued investigation and repeated summons in FIR No. 4/2024 amount to an arbitrary, mala fide and duplicative exercise of investigative power concerning the same transaction, despite his consistent cooperation with the investigating agencies, and therefore constitute an abuse of the process of law warranting interference by this Court. 6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted 5 that the continuation of investigation in FIR No. 4/2024 and issuance of the impugned notice dated 27.07.2026 are wholly without jurisdiction, arbitrary and constitute an abuse of the process of law. It is argued that the Supreme Court of India, by order dated 16.09.2025 passed in SLP (Crl.) No. 11790/2024, had specifically directed that the investigation in the said FIR be concluded within a period of three months, which admittedly expired in December, 2025, and no extension of time was ever granted thereafter. Despite expiry of the period fixed by the Supreme Court, the respondent authorities issued the impugned notice more than seven months later, thereby acting in complete disregard of the binding directions issued under Articles 141 and 144 of the Constitution of India. It is further contended that the petitioner has already been subjected to investigation, arrest, filing of charge-sheet and cognizance in the connected FIR No. 44/2024 arising out of the very same CSMCL manpower contract, the same period, the same alleged modus operandi and substantially the same documentary evidence. Therefore, the continued investigation in FIR No. 4/2024 amounts to an impermissible successive prosecution founded on the same transaction, offending Articles 14, 20 and 21 of the Constitution. Reliance has been placed upon the decisions in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181, Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI (2013) 6 SCC 348, Babubhai v. State of Gujarat (2010) 12 SCC 254 and Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India 6 (2020) 14 SCC 12 to contend that multiple investigations based on the same cause of action are legally impermissible. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the timing of the impugned notice, issued immediately after the petitioner was released on bail in FIR No. 44/2024 and after expiry of the period fixed by the Supreme Court, clearly demonstrates mala fides and falls within the parameters laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 warranting exercise of inherent jurisdiction. 7. It is further argued that the petitioner has been implicated solely because he was a Non-Executive Director of A2Z Infra Services Ltd. and no specific overt act has been attributed to him in the FIR or in the material collected during investigation. According to learned Senior Counsel, the prosecution does not allege that the petitioner prepared, signed or used any forged document, handled any financial transaction, received any illegal gratification or participated in any conspiracy. On the contrary, the material collected during investigation itself establishes that the entire operational control of the CSMCL contract vested with Mr. N. Uday Kumar Rao pursuant to the Board Resolution dated 15.09.2020, who exclusively managed the bank account, correspondence and billing of the Company. It is submitted that, in the absence of any statutory provision creating vicarious liability under the IPC or the Prevention of Corruption Act, a Non- Executive Director cannot be prosecuted merely by virtue of his 7 designation, reliance being placed on S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89, National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal, (2010) 3 SCC 330, Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609 and the judgment of this Court in Shri Venkata Sarveasam Sastry Tejomurty v. State of Chhattisgarh, WPCR No. 1181 of 2011, order dated 01.05.2015. It is further contended that the essential ingredients of offences under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC, as well as Sections 7 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, are completely absent insofar as the petitioner is concerned, and the dispute, at best, relates to computation of contractual payments under the CSMCL tender, which is already the subject matter of arbitration proceedings. Learned Senior Counsel lastly submitted that the petitioner has cooperated with every summons issued by the investigating agency over the last several years and, in the absence of any material against him even after filing of multiple charge-sheets, the continued investigation and repeated summons constitute nothing but harassment and abuse of the process of law, thereby justifying exercise of this Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to quash the impugned proceedings. Reliance is also placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Sunil Bharti Muttal Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 609, relevant paras of which are quoted hereinbelow:- 8 “42. No doubt, a corporate entity is an artificial person which acts through Vits officers, Directors, Managing Director, Chairman, etc. If such a company commits an offence involving mens rea, it would normally be the intent and action of that individual who would act on behalf of the company. It would be more so, when the criminal act is that of conspiracy. However, at the same time, it is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so. 43. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be made an accused, along with the company, if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent. Second situation in which he can be implicated is in those cases where the statutory regime itself attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability, by specifically incorporating such a provision. 44. When the company is the offender, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect. One such example is Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In Aneeta Hadall, the Court noted that if a group of persons that guide the business of the company have the criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body corporate and it is in this backdrop, Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be understood. Such a position is, therefore, because of statutory intendment making it a deeming fiction. Here also, the principle of "alter ego", was applied only in one direction, namely, where a group of persons that guide the business had criminal intent, that is to be imputed to 9 the body corporate and not the vice versa. Otherwise, there has to be a specific act attributed to the Director or any other person allegedly in control and management of the company, to the effect that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or on behalf of the company.” 8. Learned Advocate General along with learned Additional Advocate General, opposing the petition, vehemently submitted that the present writ petition is premature and wholly misconceived, as the investigation in FIR No. 04/2024 is still in progress and the investigating agency is well within its statutory powers to summon any person whose presence is considered necessary for an effective and complete investigation. It is contended that the mere issuance of a notice requiring the petitioner to appear before the Investigating Officer does not confer any enforceable cause of action for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. According to the State, the petitioner has been named as an accused in FIR No. 4/2024 from the very inception of the investigation and the investigating agency has been collecting evidence regarding the larger conspiracy involving the CSMCL manpower contracts. It is submitted that the filing of charge- sheets against certain accused persons or the omission to array the petitioner as an accused in earlier charge-sheets does not curtail the statutory power of the investigating agency to conduct further investigation in accordance with law. The State further submits that investigation is a dynamic process and fresh 10 evidence collected during the course of investigation may legitimately require examination of persons who had earlier not been charge-sheeted. It is argued that the notice dated 27.07.2026 was issued only to facilitate such investigation and cannot, by itself, be characterised as arbitrary, mala fide or without jurisdiction. Learned State Counsel further submits that the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court directing completion of investigation within a stipulated period cannot be construed to mean that the investigation automatically becomes non est or void upon expiry of the said period, particularly when no order has been passed quashing the FIR or prohibiting continuation of investigation. According to the State, the petitioner cannot derive any vested right merely because the investigation could not be concluded within the period indicated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 9. Learned State Counsel further contended that FIR No. 4/2024 and FIR No. 44/2024 relate to separate offences, distinct conspiracies and different facets of the larger liquor procurement and manpower scam, though certain documents or transactions may overlap. It is submitted that the existence of common facts or documentary evidence does not render the second investigation illegal nor does it attract the principle against multiple FIRs, as the scope, participants and nature of allegations under the two FIRs are distinct and are required to be examined independently on the basis of evidence collected during investigation. It is argued that 11 the petitioner’s contention that he was merely a Non-Executive Director raises disputed questions of fact which cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution or while exercising inherent jurisdiction. Whether the petitioner had knowledge of, consented to, participated in, or benefited from the alleged conspiracy are all matters requiring appreciation of evidence during investigation and, if necessary, during trial. The State further submits that the material collected during investigation prima facie discloses the petitioner’s connection with the affairs of the Company during the relevant period and the extent of his involvement can be determined only after completion of investigation. It is therefore contended that this Court ought not to undertake a meticulous examination of the evidence or record findings on disputed factual issues at the threshold. Placing reliance upon the principles governing interference at the stage of investigation, particularly the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure (supra), learned State Counsel submitted that the inherent and extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court is to be exercised sparingly and only in the rarest of cases where the allegations ex facie fail to disclose any cognizable offence or where continuation of proceedings would amount to a clear abuse of the process of law. Since the allegations in the present case disclose commission of cognizable offences requiring thorough investigation, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 12 10. Learned State Counsel further placed strong reliance upon the order dated 03.02.2026 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in SLP (Crl.) No. 16980/2025 (Kawasi Lakhma v. State of Chhattisgarh) and connected matters, particularly paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof. Referring to the said order, it is submitted that the Supreme Court has itself taken note of the fact that investigation into the liquor scam, including FIR No. 4/2024, is still continuing against certain accused persons and that further supplementary charge-sheets are likely to be filed depending upon the outcome of the ongoing investigation. It is argued that the Supreme Court recorded the specific averment of the State that statements of several witnesses under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. had already been recorded and that further evidence was still being collected. The Supreme Court further observed that the investigation was likely to take a reasonably long time to reach its logical conclusion, having regard to the complexity of the allegations, the involvement of numerous accused persons, and the fact that different specialised agencies were investigating different facets of the larger scam. 11. Placing particular emphasis on paragraph 8 of the said order, learned State Counsel submitted that the Supreme Court has categorically held that any direction requiring conclusion of investigation in matters involving such complex and complicated questions, with several accused and multiple specialised investigating agencies, may have a cascading and adverse 13 impact on the prosecution case. It was further observed that the prosecution ought to be given a free hand along with reasonable time to complete the ongoing investigation falling within the domain of the respective investigating agencies. On the strength of the aforesaid observations, learned State Counsel contended that the challenge to the impugned notice is misconceived, as the investigation in FIR No. 4/2024 is continuing under the supervision of the competent investigating agency, and the petitioner cannot seek to interdict the statutory process merely on the ground that he has been called upon to cooperate with the investigation. It is therefore submitted that the observations of the Supreme Court clearly recognise the necessity of permitting the investigating agencies sufficient latitude and reasonable time to complete investigation in a scam of such magnitude and complexity, and consequently no interference is warranted by this Court at this stage. 12. Learned State Counsel further submitted that the reliance placed by the petitioner upon the orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Crl.) No. 11790 of 2024 is wholly misconceived. It is contended that the directions contained in the order dated 16.09.2025 directing completion of investigation within a stipulated period were issued in proceedings arising out of the case of co-accused Anil Tuteja and the said directions were confined to the facts of that case. It is further submitted that the subsequent extension granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court was 14 in favour of the Enforcement Directorate for completion of its investigation and filing of further prosecution complaint and not in favour of, nor binding upon, the Anti-Corruption Bureau/Economic Offences Wing conducting investigation in the present crime. Learned State Counsel also submitted that the validity of FIR No. 4/2024 had earlier been challenged by certain co-accused before the Division Bench of this Court in Cr.M.P. No. 721 of 2024, which came to be dismissed by a detailed judgment, and the said judgment has subsequently been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is therefore contended that the petitioner cannot indirectly challenge the continuance of investigation in the same FIR by raising contentions which have already been considered in earlier proceedings. 13. Learned State Counsel further submitted that the petitioner was issued notice dated 27.07.2026 requiring his appearance before the Investigating Officer on 31.07.2026 for the purpose of enquiry in connection with FIR No. 4/2024, however, instead of joining and cooperating with the investigation, the petitioner chose to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. It is argued that investigation in a cognizable offence is the exclusive domain of the investigating agency and the petitioner cannot be permitted to thwart the same merely because he disputes the allegations levelled against him. According to the State, all the pleas sought to be raised by the petitioner regarding absence of personal role, non-arraignment of the Company as an accused, alleged lack of 15 incriminating material and other factual aspects constitute matters of defence, which can appropriately be examined by the competent Court at the relevant stage after completion of investigation. It is, therefore, prayed that the petition, being devoid of merit and not disclosing any exceptional circumstance warranting interference under Section 528 of the BNSS, deserves to be dismissed. 14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with petition. 15. The legal position on the issue of quashing of criminal proceedings is well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, FIR or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases and Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the investigations of cognizable offences. However, where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the FIR or the charge-sheet may be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of the B.N.S.S.). 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill reported in (1995) SCC (Cri) 1059, Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi reported in (1999) 3 SCC 259 and Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E Ltd. & Ors 16 reported in 2000 SCC (Cri) 615, the Supreme Court clearly held that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence, Court should not quash the complaint. However, it was held that if the allegations do not constitute any offence as alleged and appear to be patently absurd and improbable, Court should not hesitate to quash the complaint. The note of caution was reiterated that while considering such petitions the Courts should be very circumspect, conscious and careful. Thus, there is no controversy about the legal proposition that in case a prima facie case is made out, the FIR or the proceedings in consequence thereof cannot be quashed. 17. In Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has authoritatively settled the scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). The Apex Court has held that the power to quash criminal proceedings is required to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and only in the rarest of rare cases. It has been categorically observed that while considering a prayer for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings, the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry into the reliability, genuineness or otherwise of the allegations contained in the FIR, nor can it appreciate the evidence or conduct a mini trial. The Court is only required to examine whether the allegations, if taken at their face 17 value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The Supreme Court further emphasized that criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the threshold, that investigation into cognizable offences should ordinarily be permitted to proceed unhindered, and that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be exercised with great caution and self- restraint, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in manifest miscarriage of justice. 18. Very recently, in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 02.09.2025), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the aforesaid principles and further held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS), the High Court cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact or evaluate the evidentiary worth of the material collected during investigation. Unless all these parameters are cumulatively satisfied, the High Court ought not to interfere in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, leaving the parties to establish their respective cases before the trial Court in accordance with law. 19. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out for interference at this stage. The allegations levelled in the impugned FIR disclose commission of 18 cognizable offences and form part of a larger investigation relating to the alleged liquor procurement and manpower scam. The contentions raised by the petitioner that he was merely a Non- Executive Director of the Company, that the operational affairs were managed by another person, that no specific overt act has been attributed to him, that the Company itself has not been arrayed as an accused, that the allegations pertain to a civil or contractual dispute and that FIR No. 44/2024 substantially overlaps with FIR No. 4/2024, are all matters involving disputed questions of fact, requiring appreciation of documentary as well as oral evidence. The correctness or otherwise of such contentions cannot be examined in proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS by undertaking a meticulous examination of the material collected during investigation or by recording findings on the petitioner’s defence. At this stage, this Court is only required to examine whether the allegations contained in the FIR, if accepted at their face value, disclose the commission of cognizable offences. This Court is satisfied that the allegations cannot be said to be so inherently improbable or absurd as to warrant quashing of the FIR at the threshold. 20. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the investigation pertains to an alleged scam involving numerous accused persons, voluminous documentary evidence and investigation by specialised agencies. As noticed hereinabove, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with proceedings arising out of the 19 same FIR in Kawasi Lakhma v. State of Chhattisgarh, has itself observed that the investigation is likely to take a reasonably long time to reach its logical conclusion and that any direction requiring premature conclusion of investigation in such complex matters may adversely affect the prosecution case. The Apex Court has further emphasised that the investigating agencies ought to be afforded a free hand together with reasonable time for completion of the ongoing investigation. Also the fact that the validity of the registration of FIR No. 04/2024 had already been challenged before this Court in the batch of petitions led by Cr.M.P. No. 721 of 2024, wherein, after elaborate consideration, the Division Bench declined to interfere with the FIR. It has further been brought to the notice of this Court that the said judgment has also been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Though the present petitioner seeks to raise certain individual grounds, the legality of the very FIR and the continuance of investigation therein already stands upheld. In such circumstances, this Court finds no justification to interdict the ongoing investigation at the instance of the present petitioner, particularly when the investigation has not yet culminated qua him. In view of the aforesaid observations, this Court is unable to accept the contention that the impugned notice issued to the petitioner is without jurisdiction merely because the investigation has continued beyond the period relied upon by the petitioner. 21. Equally, the submission that the petitioner has already been 20 proceeded against in FIR No. 44/2024 and, therefore, the continuation of investigation in FIR No. 4/2024 is impermissible, cannot be accepted at this stage. Whether both the FIRs arise out of the same transaction, whether they relate to distinct conspiracies, and whether the principle governing successive FIRs is attracted are issues which are intrinsically connected with the factual matrix and the material collected during investigation. At this stage, when the investigation is admittedly still in progress, this Court would refrain from expressing any opinion on such disputed issues, lest it prejudices either side in the course of investigation or subsequent proceedings. 22. The reliance placed by the petitioner on the orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in proceedings relating to co-accused persons also does not persuade this Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction. Likewise, the other contentions advanced by the petitioner relating to absence of sanction, want of vicarious liability, absence of ingredients of the offences alleged and lack of personal involvement are all matters which remain open to be urged before the appropriate forum at the appropriate stage in accordance with law. Suffice it to observe that at the present stage this Court is not expected to appreciate the evidentiary value of the material collected by the investigating agency or adjudicate upon the petitioner’s defence while exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS. 21 23. In view of the foregoing discussion and applying the settled principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present case does not fall within any of the exceptional categories warranting interference with the impugned FIR or the consequential notice issued during the course of investigation. The petition, being devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet