1 CGHC010086922023 2026:CGHC:37541-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 609 of 2023 Shyam Tyagi S/o Ashok Tyagi Aged About 25 Years R/o Bhatthipara, Baikunthpur Police Station - Baikunthpur, District - Koriya, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh Through The S H O Baikunthpur, District - Koriya, Chhattisgarh. 2. Abhishek Sharma S/o Rajeshwar Sharma Aged About 21 Years Nagar Bazar Para, P.S. Charcha, District Koriya, Chhattisgarh. ...Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Anuroop Panda, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Government Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 21 .08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Anuroop Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent No. 1. BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2026.08.24 11:34:36 +0530 2 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following prayer: “It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow this petition, and quash the Final Report No. 103/2020 dated 30.06.2020 submitted by the Police Station Baikunthpur, Distt. Baikunthpur (C.G.) and the FIR No. 303 of 2019 dated 16.11.2019 against the petitioner for commission of offence punishable under Sections 384, 420 read with Section 34 of IPC in the interest of justice.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the prosecution initiated against the petitioner is an abuse of the process of law, as the allegations contained in the complaint/FIR, even if accepted in their entirety, do not disclose the essential ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 384 and 420 read with Section 34 of the IPC. He further submitted that on 16.11.2019 at about 11:40 a.m., certain students pursuing B.Sc. Nursing, namely Krishna, Rabbudas, Usha Kushwaha, Puja Kurre, Deepak, Shyam, Rukamani and Abhishek Sharma, submitted a written complaint before the In-charge, Police Station City Kotwali, Baikunthpur. The petitioner, who was the Principal of Marg Darshan College of Nursing, was arrested on the very same day at about 3:00 p.m., within a few hours of the complaint. Referring to the contents of the complaint, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the grievance of the students was essentially with regard to the non-issuance of admit cards for the third-year B.Sc. Nursing examination. It was alleged that the college administration had received 3 fees from the students towards submission of examination forms and practical examinations and that an additional amount of Rs.200/- per day was being demanded on account of shortage of attendance. According to the complainants, the students who failed to deposit the said amount were not issued admit cards and were consequently prevented from appearing in the third paper of Medical Surgical Nursing. 4. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the original tenor of the complaint was confined to the aforesaid grievance and the students had essentially sought intervention so that they could be permitted to appear in the examination. According to learned counsel, the allegations of fraud and the names of the accused appear to have been inserted subsequently at the bottom/margin of the complaint. It is pointed out that the alleged additional statement does not bear any separate signature or date and the names of the accused were allegedly written at the margin for want of space. He also submits that even during investigation no material has been collected to establish that any of the complainants actually paid the alleged amount pursuant to the demand made by the petitioner. The attendance registers of the concerned students were not seized to establish whether their attendance was in fact short. Likewise, no receipt, voucher or other documentary material has been collected to show that any amount was actually received by the petitioner or by the college administration pursuant to the alleged demand. 4 5. As regards Section 384 of the IPC, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that a demand for payment of an amount, by itself, does not constitute extortion. The prosecution must disclose the necessary element of intentionally putting the victim in fear of injury and thereby dishonestly inducing such person to deliver property or valuable security. It is submitted that the allegations in the present case do not disclose any threat or fear of injury of the nature contemplated by Section 383 of the IPC. While regard to Section 420 of the IPC, learned counsel submits that there is equally no allegation or material to demonstrate that the petitioner had deceived the complainants or had fraudulently or dishonestly induced them to deliver any property. The essential dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction is completely absent. The dispute, at its highest, relates to the demand of an amount towards shortage of attendance and the consequential withholding of admit cards. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the manner of arrest of the petitioner. It is submitted that the petitioner was arrested within a few hours of registration of the complaint without there being any material indicating that he was likely to abscond, evade investigation or tamper with the evidence. Reliance has been placed upon the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1, particularly paragraph 120.6, to contend that the question whether a preliminary inquiry is warranted depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and that the categories indicated therein 5 are illustrative and not exhaustive. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Siddharth v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2022) 1 SCC 676, particularly paragraph 9, to submit that arrest of an accused is not an inevitable consequence of filing of the charge-sheet and that where the investigating officer does not apprehend that the accused would abscond or disobey the summons, the accused need not necessarily be produced in custody. 7. Per contra, learned State counsel opposes the petition and submits that the present petition involves disputed questions of fact which cannot appropriately be adjudicated in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS). It is argued that the complaint specifically contains allegations that the petitioner and the college administration demanded an additional amount from the students on the ground of shortage of attendance and that admit cards were withheld when the students failed to pay the demanded amount. 8. Learned State counsel further submits that the allegations contained in the complaint, coupled with the material collected during investigation, disclose a prima facie case warranting trial. According to him, at the stage of considering a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS), the Court is not required to undertake a meticulous appreciation of the evidence or examine whether the prosecution would ultimately succeed at trial. The defence of the petitioner regarding the correctness of the attendance position, 6 the authority to levy the amount, the manner in which the complaint was prepared and the absence of receipts are all matters which, according to the State, can be properly tested during trial. 9. It is also submitted on behalf of the State that the fact that the petitioner was arrested on the date of registration of the FIR cannot, by itself, be a ground for quashing the criminal proceedings. Even assuming that the arrest was not warranted in the circumstances, the legality or propriety of the arrest is a separate issue and would not automatically efface the allegations or the material collected during investigation. On these grounds, learned State counsel submits that the petition deserves to be dismissed. 10. We have considered the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and have perused the material available on record. 11. The question which arises for consideration is whether, on a plain reading of the allegations contained in the FIR and the material collected during investigation, the essential ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 384 and 420 read with Section 34 of the IPC are disclosed against the petitioner. 12. It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS), this Court ordinarily does not undertake a meticulous appreciation of evidence or conduct a mini-trial. However, where the allegations taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged, or where the material collected during investigation does not disclose the basic 7 ingredients of the alleged offence, the High Court would be justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of the process of law. 13. So far as the offence punishable under Section 384 of the IPC is concerned, the allegation against the petitioner is essentially that an amount of Rs.200/- per day was demanded from the students towards shortage of attendance and that the admit cards of those students who did not deposit the said amount were not issued. 14. In order to constitute the offence of extortion, the prosecution must prima facie disclose that the petitioner intentionally put or attempted to put a person in fear of injury and thereby dishonestly induced such person to deliver any property or valuable security. The allegation of mere demand of money, by itself, therefore, cannot constitute extortion unless the necessary element of fear of injury and dishonest inducement resulting in delivery of property or valuable security is also disclosed. 15. In the present case, there is no specific allegation that the petitioner put any of the complainants in fear of injury of the nature contemplated by law. There is also no material showing that any complainant, being so put in fear, was dishonestly induced to deliver any property or valuable security to the petitioner. The allegation is confined to the demand of an amount on account of alleged shortage of attendance and the consequential non-issuance of admit cards. 16. Even assuming that the demand of such amount was 8 unauthorized, excessive or otherwise impermissible under the applicable rules, the same, without the necessary element of threat, fear of injury and dishonest inducement, would not by itself constitute the offence of extortion. The legality of the demand and the authority of the college administration to impose such amount may give rise to an administrative or other appropriate remedy, but the same cannot, in the absence of the statutory ingredients, automatically attract Section 384 IPC. 17. The allegation under Section 420 IPC also does not stand on a different footing. For constituting the offence punishable under Section 420 IPC, the prosecution must disclose that the accused, by deception, dishonestly induced the person so deceived to deliver any property or to make, alter or destroy a valuable security, or to do or omit an act which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm in the manner contemplated by law. 18. On a careful examination of the allegations in the present case, there is no specific assertion that the petitioner made any false representation or practised any deception upon the complainants and, by reason thereof, dishonestly induced them to deliver any money or other property. The complaint does not disclose what representation was made by the petitioner, when such representation was made, in what manner it was false, or how the complainants were induced by such deception to part with their property. 19. More importantly, the material collected during investigation does 9 not demonstrate that any of the complainants actually delivered the alleged amount to the petitioner pursuant to any deception or dishonest inducement. No receipt, voucher or other documentary material has been brought on record to establish that any amount was actually paid by any complainant to the petitioner on account of the alleged demand. 20. The prosecution case, therefore, essentially rests upon the allegation that the petitioner demanded an amount towards shortage of attendance and, upon non-payment, the admit cards were not issued. Such conduct, even if accepted as alleged, does not by itself disclose the ingredients of cheating punishable under Section 420 IPC in the absence of any allegation or material demonstrating deception and dishonest inducement resulting in delivery of property. 21. It is true that at the stage of consideration of a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS), this Court is not expected to examine the defence of the accused in minute detail or determine disputed questions of fact. However, the present case does not require any such appreciation of evidence. The Court is only required to examine whether the allegations and the material collected by the investigating agency disclose the basic ingredients of the offences for which the petitioner has been charge-sheeted. On such examination, the necessary ingredients of Sections 384 and 420 IPC are found to be lacking. 22. The manner in which the complaint came to be presented also assumes some significance. The principal grievance reflected in the 10 complaint was regarding the non-issuance of admit cards and the inability of the students to appear in the examination. The allegation that the college administration had committed fraud appears in two lines inserted at the bottom of the complaint, immediately before the signatures, while the names of the persons against whom action was sought were written at the margin. The said additional allegation does not contain the particulars necessary to demonstrate the alleged deception or dishonest inducement. 23. The absence of any separate signature or date beneath the alleged additional insertion, by itself, may not be sufficient to discard the prosecution case at the threshold. However, when this circumstance is considered along with the absence of any material showing actual payment of the alleged amount, absence of any receipt or voucher, and absence of any specific allegation of deception or threat, the prosecution case, even taken at its highest, fails to disclose the foundational ingredients of Sections 384 and 420 IPC. 24. The investigation also does not appear to have collected the attendance registers of the concerned students so as to establish whether their attendance was in fact short and whether the amount of Rs.200/- per day was demanded on that basis. The significance of this circumstance is not that this Court is required to determine whether the demand was legally justified, but that the prosecution has failed to collect material which would establish the factual basis of the alleged demand itself. 11 25. As regards the arrest of the petitioner on the very date of registration of the FIR, it is apparent from the record that the petitioner was arrested within a few hours of the complaint. The principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari (supra), and Siddharth (supra), make it clear that registration of an FIR and arrest of an accused are distinct matters and that arrest cannot be treated as an automatic consequence of registration of a criminal case. 26. However, this Court does not consider it necessary to determine the present petition solely on the issue of arrest. The manner of arrest may indicate the haste with which the investigation proceeded, but even leaving that aspect aside, the allegations contained in the FIR and the material collected during investigation do not disclose the essential ingredients of Sections 384 and 420 IPC. 27. The invocation of Section 34 IPC also does not improve the position of the prosecution. Section 34 IPC embodies the principle of joint liability for a criminal act done by several persons in furtherance of their common intention. It does not constitute an independent substantive offence. Where the basic ingredients of the substantive offences themselves are not disclosed against the petitioner, the mere invocation of Section 34 cannot sustain the prosecution. 28. The submission of learned State counsel that disputed questions of fact should ordinarily be left for determination by the trial Court is well founded as a general proposition. However, the present case is not being decided on the basis of any disputed defence version. The 12 prosecution allegations themselves, even if accepted in their entirety, do not disclose the essential ingredients of extortion or cheating. In such circumstances, compelling the petitioner to face a criminal trial would not advance the cause of justice. 29. The Court is also conscious that the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C (now Section 528 of the BNSS) is to be exercised sparingly and with due caution. Nevertheless, one of the recognized circumstances warranting interference is where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not constitute the offence alleged. The present case falls within such category. 30. On a cumulative consideration of the allegations contained in the complaint/FIR and the material collected during investigation, this Court finds that there is no material to establish that the petitioner intentionally put the complainants in fear of injury and dishonestly induced them to deliver property so as to attract Section 384 IPC. Likewise, there is no material to show that the petitioner, by deception, dishonestly induced the complainants to deliver any property so as to constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC. 31. The dispute, at its highest, relates to the demand of an amount towards alleged shortage of attendance and the consequential non- issuance of admit cards. Such circumstances may be examined in the appropriate forum in accordance with law, but in the absence of the necessary ingredients of the offences alleged, the same cannot be permitted to assume the character of a criminal prosecution for extortion 13 and cheating. 32. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. The case warrants interference in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS) to secure the ends of justice. 33. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. 34. Consequently, FIR No.303/2019 dated 16.11.2019 registered at Police Station City Kotwali, Baikunthpur, District Korea (C.G.), for offences punishable under Sections 384 and 420 read with Section 34 of the IPC, and the Final Report/charge-sheet No.103/2020 dated 30.06.2020, together with all consequential criminal proceedings arising therefrom and pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Baikunthpur, insofar as they relate to the present petitioner, are hereby quashed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan