1 CGHC010255492026 2026:CGHC:35777-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 705 of 2026 Atmaram Yadav S/o Suderam Yadav Aged About 60 Years Panchayat Secretary, Gram Panchayat- Mohdi, Janpad Panchayat Dhamda, R/o Village-Kherdha, Post-Surdung, Tahsil-Ahiwara, District-Durg (Chhattisgarh) ... Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Chhattisgarh Department Of Panchayat And Rural Development, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhavan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District- Raipur (Chhattisgarh) (Respondent No. 1) 2 - Director Department Of Panchayat And Rural Development, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhavan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District- Raipur, (Chhattisgarh) (Respondent No. 2) 3 - Deputy Director Zila Panchayat, Durg, District- Durg, (Chhattisgarh) (Respondent No. 3) 4 - Chief Executive Officer Zila Panchayat, Durg District- Durg, (Chhattisgarh) (Respondent No. 4) 5 - Committee For Deciding The Grievance Of Panchayat Sachiv Through Its Chairman, Panchayat And Rural Development Department, Mantralaya, Nava Raipur, District Raipur, (Chhattisgarh) (Respondent No. 5) ... Respondents For Appellant : Mr.Pankaj Singh, Advocate For Respondents : Mr.Shashank Thakur, Additional Advocate BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2026.08.13 17:29:40 +0530 2 No.1 to 3/State General Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 13.08.2026 1. Heard Mr.Pankaj Singh, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr.Shashank Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for respondents No.1 to 3/State on I.A.No.01/2026, which is an application for condonation of delay of 02 days in filing the present appeal. 2. On due consideration, I.A.No.01/2026 is allowed. Delay is condoned. 3. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the writ appeal is heard finally. 4. The appellant has filed this writ appeal against the order dated 15.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.4232/2026 by which the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner / appellant herein. 5. Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that the impugned order proceeds on a fundamental misconception of the nature of the present writ petition. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable on the premise that the relief sought therein was substantially similar to the relief claimed in 3 W.P.(S.) No.3000 of 2025. Such an approach is contrary to the pleadings and the actual reliefs sought in the two proceedings. It is submitted that the earlier writ petition and the present writ petition arose from entirely distinct causes of action. In W.P.(S.) No.3000 of 2025, the Appellant had merely sought consideration of his representation by the competent authority. Pursuant thereto, the competent authority was directed to consider the Appellant's representation. The said proceedings, therefore, stood concluded with such direction. 6. Learned counsel submits that the present writ petition was not instituted for reconsideration, review or modification of the earlier order. It was necessitated by subsequent developments which occurred after disposal of the earlier writ petition. The Respondents themselves disclosed during the subsequent contempt proceedings that the Appellant's claim could not be decided because the issue had been placed before the State- Level Committee constituted by the Government vide order dated 24.03.2025. Thus, it is submitted that a fresh administrative process had intervened between the two proceedings. Once the Government itself constituted a State-Level Committee for considering the issue of regularization of Panchayat Secretaries, and the Respondents took the stand that the Appellant's claim was pending before the said Committee, the Appellant acquired a fresh and independent cause of action on account of the Committee's failure to take a decision within a reasonable period. Learned 4 counsel further submits that the relief sought in the present writ petition was extremely limited. The Appellant did not seek a mandamus directing his straightaway regularization, nor did he seek adjudication of the policy issue by the High Court. The prayer was essentially for a direction to the State-Level Committee and the concerned authorities to conclude the proceedings expeditiously and take a decision in accordance with law. It is therefore submitted that the learned Single Judge completely misread both the pleadings and the prayers. Had the pleadings been considered in their proper perspective, it would have been apparent that the earlier writ petition concerned consideration of the Appellant's representation by the competent authority, whereas the subsequent proceedings concerned the prolonged inaction of the State-Level Committee constituted thereafter by the Government itself. 7. Learned counsel submits that the constitution of the State-Level Committee, the stand taken by the Respondents before the Contempt Court, and the continued failure of the Committee to conclude the exercise are material subsequent events. These facts were neither in existence nor capable of being agitated in the earlier writ petition. Consequently, the doctrine of finality of litigation could have no application so as to extinguish a cause of action which arose subsequently. It is further submitted that the present case involves continuing administrative inaction. Once the Respondents admitted that the matter was pending before the 5 State-Level Committee and no definite timeline had been prescribed for conclusion of the exercise, each further period of unexplained inaction continued to prejudice the Appellant. The cause of action, therefore, could not be treated as exhausted merely because an earlier proceeding between the parties had been disposed of on a different issue. Learned counsel submits that the authorities against whom relief was sought were also materially different. The earlier proceedings culminated in a direction to the Deputy Director to consider the Appellant's representation. The present proceedings, however, sought appropriate directions concerning the State-Level Committee constituted by the Government for taking a decision on the issue of regularization. The authority, decision-making process, subsequent facts and relief were thus distinct. 8. It is submitted that the finding recorded in the impugned order that the present writ petition involved "substantially similar relief" is conclusory and unsupported by any comparative analysis of the pleadings, prayers, orders passed in the earlier proceedings and the subsequent events. The learned Single Judge has not identified which particular relief in the present petition was identical to the relief already adjudicated upon, nor has any reason been assigned for treating the subsequent cause of action as barred. Learned counsel further submits that Article 226 confers wide constitutional jurisdiction upon this Hon'ble Court to examine arbitrary and unreasonable administrative inaction. The Appellant's 6 grievance was not merely against an adverse decision but against the absence of any decision despite the Government having itself constituted a mechanism for considering the grievance. The State, having voluntarily initiated a decision-making process through the State-Level Committee, cannot keep such process pending indefinitely. The power and duty to consider the Appellant's grievance carry with them a corresponding obligation to take a decision within a reasonable period. Administrative inaction for an indefinite duration, particularly where civil and service consequences are involved, is amenable to judicial review. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to examine the constitutional dimension of the grievance. The Appellant had specifically raised the issue of arbitrary and unreasonable administrative delay and its consequences under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Instead of examining whether the prolonged inaction was arbitrary, the writ petition was dismissed at the threshold on an erroneous assumption concerning maintainability. 9. Learned counsel particularly emphasizes that the Appellant is nearing superannuation. The continued pendency of the regularization issue has direct and serious consequences upon his service status and consequential retiral and pensionary benefits. In such circumstances, an indefinite wait for the State-Level Committee to conclude its proceedings causes continuing and irreparable prejudice to the Appellant. It is further submitted that the pleadings regarding the Respondents' own statement before 7 the Contempt Court were material and went to the very root of the present cause of action. The Respondents had admitted that the matter was pending before the State-Level Committee and that no time frame had been prescribed for completion of the exercise. These material facts have not been dealt with in the impugned order. Learned counsel submits that the principle of finality of litigation cannot be applied mechanically to defeat a subsequent cause of action based upon subsequent events. Finality attaches to the controversy actually adjudicated upon; it cannot prevent a litigant from approaching the constitutional court when a fresh grievance subsequently arises because of the conduct or inaction of the State. Most importantly, the impugned order becomes difficult to sustain in view of the contemporaneous order passed by the same learned Single Judge in W.P.(S.) No.4211 of 2026, namely, Suresh Kumar Sahu & Others v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, decided on 15.05.2026. In the said matter, the learned Single Judge entertained a writ petition concerning the very same State-Level Committee constituted for considering the grievance of Panchayat Secretaries and granted judicial protection by directing the competent authorities to take a decision within forty-five days. Learned counsel submits that the Appellant does not contend that the said order automatically governs the merits of his case. However, when the same learned Single Judge, on the same date, entertained a petition seeking a time-bound decision from the very same State-Level Committee, the Appellant's petition could not 8 have been dismissed as not maintainable merely by recording that the relief was substantially similar to that claimed earlier, without identifying any distinguishing circumstance. The contemporaneous decision in W.P.(S.) No.4211 of 2026 demonstrates that a direction for expeditious consideration by the State-Level Committee was itself considered an appropriate relief under Article 226. The Appellant, therefore, respectfully submits that at the very least his writ petition ought to have been examined on its own pleadings and subsequent cause of action rather than being rejected at the threshold. Learned counsel accordingly submits that the impugned order has resulted in denial of adjudication of the Appellant's substantive grievance on an erroneous technical premise. The Appellant has not sought to reopen the concluded proceedings; he seeks consideration of a grievance arising from the subsequent inaction of a Committee constituted after the earlier proceedings. In these circumstances, it is respectfully submitted that the impugned order dated 15.05.2026 deserves to be set aside. 10.On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and submits that the learned Single Judge after considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant, in which no interference is called for. 11.We have learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order and other documents appended with writ appeal. 9 12.The principal contention of learned counsel for the Appellant is that the present writ petition was founded upon a fresh cause of action arising out of the subsequent constitution of the State-Level Committee and the alleged inaction on the part of the said Committee. It has also been contended that the earlier writ petition, i.e. W.P.(S.) No.3000 of 2025, was confined to a direction for consideration of the Appellant's representation and that the subsequent contempt proceedings also came to be concluded. According to the Appellant, the present proceedings were therefore directed against a subsequent administrative inaction and could not have been dismissed on the ground of maintainability. 13.We are unable to accept the aforesaid submissions. 14.It is not in dispute that the Appellant had earlier approached this Court by filing W.P.(S.) No.3000 of 2025, wherein he sought consideration of his grievance/representation. The said writ petition was disposed of on 30.04.2025 with a direction to the Deputy Director, being the competent authority, to consider and decide the representation of the Appellant within the stipulated period. It is further not in dispute that, alleging non-compliance with the said direction, the Appellant thereafter instituted Contempt Case No.1323 of 2025. The said contempt proceedings were also considered and disposed of by this Court on 17.02.2026 on the basis of the submissions made by learned counsel for the respective parties. 10 15.Thus, the grievance of the Appellant with regard to consideration of his representation had already been the subject matter of adjudication and appropriate directions had been issued by this Court in the earlier round of litigation. The Appellant, having availed the said remedy and having thereafter also invoked the contempt jurisdiction of this Court, cannot maintain a fresh writ petition seeking substantially the same ultimate relief by merely describing the subsequent developments as constituting a fresh cause of action. 16.Considering the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, perusing the documents appended in writ petition as also in writ appeal and also considering the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has not committed any illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order warranting interference by this Court. 17.Accordingly, the writ appeal deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bablu