1 CGHC010056032023 2026:CGHC:35790 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 786 of 2023 Order Reserved on 23.07.2026 Order Delivered on 13.08.2026 1 - Arihant Mahila Mandal Through Its President- Chandni Singrol W/o Prabhat Singrol, Aged About 30 Years, R/o Near Congress Bhawan, Gwalapara Durg Police Station Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh --- Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Food Supplies And Consumer Protection, Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya Atal Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - The Director Of Food Civil Supplies And Sonsumer Protection, Block-2, 3rd Floor, Indrawati Bhawan, Mantralaya Atal Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - The Collector (Food) Office Of The Collectorate Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh VISHAKHA BEOHAR Digitally signed by VISHAKHA BEOHAR 2 4 - Food Controller Office Of The Collectorate Campus Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent(s) WPC No. 1084 of 2023 1 - Maa Shitla Mahila Swa Sahayta Samuh Through Its President Sunita Mishra W/o Shri Omkarnath Mishra Aged About-54 Years, R/o Mohan Nagar, Ward No. 13, Old Amapara, Near Danteshwari Temple, Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ---Petitioner(s) Versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Food Supplies, And Consumer Protection, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - The Director Of Food Civil Supplies And Consumer Protection, Block-2, Third Floor, Indravati Bhavan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - The Collector (Food) Office Of The Collectorate, Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh 4 - Food Controller Office Of The Collectorate, Campus, Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from the Case Information System) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Petitioners :- Mr. Shayon Kar, Advocate 3 For State :- Mr. Shreyansh Mehta, P.L. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SB- Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad CAV Order 1. Since common issue is involved in both the petitions, they are being decided by this common order. 2. Since the controversy involved, the issues raised and the reliefs sought in both the connected writ petitions are substantially similar and arise out of the same impugned advertisement dated 30.01.2023, WPC No. 786 of 2023 (Arihant Mahila Mandal vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others) has been treated as the lead case. 3. Accordingly, for the sake of convenience and to avoid repetition, the facts and reliefs as pleaded in WPC No. 786 of 2023 (Arihant Mahila Mandal vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others) are being referred to and considered as the lead case. The reliefs sought therein are reproduced hereunder:- “10.1 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records relating with the Instant Petition. 10.2 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the impugned Advertisement dated 30.01.2023 (Annexure P-1). 4 10.3 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents to allow the petitioner's society to continue their previous allotted shop without any hindrance. 10.4 The Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to pass any other orders/direction that, this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case.” 4. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is a registered Co-operative Society under the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Co- operative Societies Act, 1973, having been registered on 14.07.2004 bearing Registration No. 4981. Pursuant to the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2004, respondent No. 4 allotted a fair price shop in favour of the petitioner's society by agreement dated 25.10.2005 (21/28.10.2005), whereafter the petitioner has been continuously operating the said fair price shop without any complaint or adverse action from the authorities. The petitioner asserts that the allotment has never been cancelled, suspended or terminated and that the Civil Supplies Corporation has continued to supply essential commodities to the petitioner's society for distribution under the Public Distribution System. While the allotment remained valid and 5 subsisting, respondent No. 4 issued an advertisement dated 30.01.2023 inviting applications for fresh allotment of various fair price shops under the Municipal Corporation, Durg, wherein the petitioner's existing fair price shop was also included despite the absence of any order cancelling the petitioner's allotment or any prior notice, show-cause notice or opportunity of hearing. The petitioner contends that it came to know of the proposed fresh allotment only upon publication of the impugned advertisement and was taken by complete surprise, although it continues to run the shop uninterruptedly. Significantly, shortly thereafter, respondent No. 4 itself issued a certificate dated 07.02.2023 certifying that the petitioner's society has been continuously operating the allotted fair price shop since 21.10.2005, thereby acknowledging the subsistence of the petitioner's authorization. Aggrieved by the inclusion of its existing fair price shop in the impugned advertisement, without cancellation of its allotment and without adherence to the principles of natural justice, particularly the requirement of affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing before taking any action adversely affecting its rights, the petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court seeking quashment of the impugned advertisement to the extent it relates to the petitioner's fair price shop. 5. Mr. Shayon Kar, learned counsel for the petitioners submits 6 that the impugned advertisement dated 30.01.2023 issued by respondent No. 4 inviting applications for allotment of fair price shops is wholly illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional and contrary to the settled principles of law, insofar as it includes the fair price shop already allotted to and being continuously operated by the petitioner's society. It is submitted that the petitioner's society was granted allotment of the fair price shop on 25.10.2005 under the provisions of the Public Distribution System Order, 2004 and since then has been continuously running the said shop without any interruption. Learned counsel contends that the allotment in favour of the petitioner has never been cancelled nor has any order been passed terminating or suspending the petitioner's authorization. Even as on the date of filing of the petition, the petitioner continues to operate the fair price shop and the competent authorities, including the Civil Supplies Corporation, are regularly supplying essential commodities to the petitioner's society for distribution to the beneficiaries under the Public Distribution System. It is further submitted that despite the subsisting allotment, respondent No. 4, by issuing the impugned advertisement dated 30.01.2023, included the petitioner's fair price shop for fresh allotment without issuing any prior notice, show-cause notice or affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. According to learned counsel, the petitioner came to know about the inclusion of its 7 shop in the impugned advertisement only after its publication and was taken by complete surprise. Such action, it is argued, has been taken behind the back of the petitioner and is violative of the fundamental principles of fairness governing administrative action. 6. Learned counsel further submits that the impugned advertisement has been issued by placing reliance upon the Public Distribution System Order, 2016, whereas the petitioner's allotment was made under the Order of 2004. It is contended that the provisions of the Order, 2016 cannot be applied retrospectively so as to adversely affect vested rights which had accrued in favour of the petitioner under the earlier statutory regime. In the absence of any express provision conferring retrospective operation upon the Order, 2016, respondent No. 4 could not have sought to disturb an allotment validly granted in the year 2005 by initiating a fresh process of allotment. Consequently, the impugned advertisement, to the extent it includes the petitioner's fair price shop, is liable to be quashed. Learned counsel also submits that the action of the respondents is in clear violation of the principles of natural justice, particularly the rule of audi alteram partem, which mandates that no person should be condemned unheard. It is argued that before taking any action having the effect of depriving the petitioner of its existing allotment or creating competing rights in favour of third parties, the respondents were under a legal obligation to issue a 8 notice and provide an effective opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 7. In support of the aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, wherein the Apex Court held that the rule of audi alteram partem is an integral facet of the principles of natural justice and ordinarily no adverse administrative action affecting the rights of a person can be taken without affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing. It is submitted that although the application of the rule may admit of limited exceptions in exceptional circumstances, no such exceptional circumstance exists in the present case so as to justify dispensing with the requirement of notice and hearing. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel submits that the impugned advertisement dated 30.01.2023, insofar as it seeks fresh allotment of the fair price shop already allotted to and operated by the petitioner's society, deserves to be set aside being arbitrary, illegal, violative of the principles of natural justice and unsustainable in law. 8. Mr. Shreyansh Mehta, learned State counsel, opposing the writ petitions, submits that the petitions are wholly misconceived, devoid of any merit and liable to be dismissed at the threshold. It is contended that the petitioners have failed to demonstrate infringement of any legal or vested right warranting interference by 9 this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned State counsel further submits that the writ petitions are not maintainable in view of the availability of an efficacious alternative statutory remedy under Clause 18 of the Chhattisgarh Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016. It is argued that Clause 18 provides a complete appellate mechanism, enabling any aggrieved person to prefer an appeal before the Collector against an order passed by the designated authority and thereafter a second appeal before the State Government. According to the State, the petitioners have deliberately bypassed the statutory remedy and have directly approached this Court by incorrectly stating that no alternative remedy is available. It is further submitted that the petitioners were fully aware of the statutory appellate mechanism, having availed the same in earlier proceedings, and therefore the present writ petitions deserve to be dismissed on the ground of availability of an efficacious alternative remedy alone. 9. On merits, learned State counsel submits that the petitioners' principal grievance proceeds on an erroneous assumption that the impugned advertisement dated 30.01.2023 seeks to cancel the allotment of their existing fair price shops. It is contended that no such cancellation has ever been made. The petitioners continue to operate their respective fair price shops and their allotments 10 remain intact. The impugned advertisement merely invites applications for establishment of additional fair price shops under the rationalization policy framed by the State Government and does not disturb the existing authorization granted in favour of the petitioners. Learned State counsel submits that the impugned action has been taken strictly in accordance with Rule 8(a) of the Chhattisgarh Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016, which authorizes the District Collector to determine the number and location of fair price shops. Under the said provision, it is contemplated that, ordinarily, one fair price shop should cater to approximately 500 ration cards in urban areas so as to ensure convenient and effective distribution of essential commodities to the beneficiaries. Since several existing fair price shops were catering to substantially more than 500 ration cards, the competent authority decided to establish additional fair price shops in the interest of efficient public distribution. 10. It is further submitted that the decision to establish additional fair price shops is a policy decision taken in larger public interest pursuant to the rationalization policy dated 22.06.2020. The object of the policy is to improve accessibility of beneficiaries to essential commodities, reduce overcrowding at existing fair price shops, ensure timely distribution of food grains and make the Public Distribution System more efficient. The advertisement has thus 11 been issued solely for achieving administrative efficiency and public convenience and not with any intention of affecting the rights of the existing shop operators. Learned State counsel submits that the Public Distribution System is a welfare measure intended for effective distribution of food grains to eligible beneficiaries and not for securing commercial or proprietary rights in favour of the operators of fair price shops. Though the economic viability of fair price shops is kept in view while framing policy, the paramount consideration remains the convenience of the beneficiaries. With the continuous increase in population and corresponding increase in the number of ration card holders, a single fair price shop catering to an excessive number of beneficiaries causes inconvenience, delays and practical difficulties in distribution. It was, therefore, considered necessary to increase the number of fair price shops while maintaining approximately 500 ration cards per shop, thereby ensuring efficient implementation of the Public Distribution System. 11. Learned State counsel further submits that the challenge raised by the petitioners is no longer res integra. The validity of the rationalization policy dated 22.06.2020 was already questioned before this Court in WPC No. 1385 of 2022 and other connected matters. The said batch of writ petitions came to be dismissed by order dated 23.01.2023, wherein this Court upheld the policy and 12 observed that the authorities are competent to establish additional fair price shops in accordance with the policy guidelines. The said judgment was thereafter affirmed by the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 138 of 2023 (Chhattisgarh Mahila Prathmik Upbhokta Sahkari Bandar Maryadit-Kashinagar District Korba v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others) by judgment dated 24.03.2023, wherein it was observed that the High Court cannot, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, direct the State to maintain a particular profit margin for fair price shop operators. In view of the aforesaid binding precedents, the challenge to the impugned advertisement deserves to be rejected. Lastly, learned State counsel submits that since the impugned advertisement has been issued strictly in conformity with the provisions of the Control Order, 2016 and the policy decision of the State Government, and as no existing allotment of the petitioners has been cancelled or interfered with, no violation of the principles of natural justice arises in the facts of the case. It is, therefore, prayed that the writ petitions, being devoid of merit, be dismissed. 12. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 13. At the outset, it is not in dispute that the petitioners were granted authorization to operate fair price shops under the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Public Distribution System (Control) 13 Order, 2004 and have been continuously operating the same. It is equally undisputed that till date no order cancelling, suspending or terminating the authorization granted in favour of the petitioners has been passed by the competent authority. In fact, the petitioners themselves have specifically pleaded that they continue to run their respective fair price shops and that the Civil Supplies Corporation is continuously supplying essential commodities to them for distribution amongst the beneficiaries. Thus, the very foundation of the petitioners' challenge that their allotment stands adversely affected by the impugned advertisement is factually incorrect. 14. The impugned advertisement dated 30.01.2023, on its plain reading, merely invites applications for establishment of additional fair price shops within the Municipal Corporation area pursuant to the rationalization policy framed under the Chhattisgarh Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016. The advertisement neither cancels the petitioners' authorization nor directs closure of their existing shops. Therefore, the petitioners cannot be heard to contend that any vested or accrued right has been taken away merely because an additional fair price shop is proposed to be established in the same locality. 15. The principal submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that before issuing the impugned advertisement, the 14 respondents ought to have issued a notice and afforded an opportunity of hearing in view of the principles of natural justice as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248. This submission, in the considered opinion of this Court, deserves to be rejected. The doctrine of audi alteram partem is attracted only where an administrative or quasi-judicial decision visits a person with civil consequences or adversely affects an existing legal right. In the present case, the respondents have neither cancelled the petitioners' authorization nor altered any condition of their existing allotment. The petitioners continue to operate their fair price shops exactly in the same manner as they were doing prior to issuance of the advertisement. The impugned advertisement merely contemplates opening of another fair price shop for administrative convenience and effective implementation of the Public Distribution System. Such a policy decision does not cast any civil consequences upon the petitioners so as to require a pre- decisional hearing. Consequently, the reliance placed upon Maneka Gandhi is wholly misplaced. 16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd., (1987) 2 SCC 720, has categorically held that legislative or policy decisions of general application ordinarily do not attract the rules of natural justice unless the statute specifically 15 provides otherwise. Similarly, in State of Punjab v. Tehal Singh, (2002) 2 SCC 7, it has been held that where the decision is legislative or taken in exercise of policy-making powers affecting the public generally, the rule of prior hearing has no application. The present advertisement is merely an implementation of the State policy for rationalization of fair price shops and is therefore not amenable to challenge on the ground of non-observance of audi alteram partem. 17. This Court further finds substance in the submission advanced by the learned State counsel that the impugned advertisement has been issued in exercise of powers conferred under Rule 8(a) of the Chhattisgarh Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016, which authorizes the District Collector to determine the number and location of fair price shops keeping in view the convenience of the beneficiaries. Rule 8 specifically contemplates that ordinarily one fair price shop should cater to about 500 ration cards in urban areas. The object behind the provision is to ensure convenient and efficient distribution of food grains and to avoid overcrowding at existing fair price shops. The material placed on record indicates that the petitioners' fair price shops were catering to substantially more than the prescribed number of ration cards and therefore the competent authority, in furtherance of the policy of rationalization, decided to establish 16 additional fair price shops. Such action is clearly traceable to the statutory power vested in the authority and cannot be termed arbitrary or unreasonable. 18. It is well settled that the scope of judicial review in matters involving governmental policy is extremely limited. The Court does not sit in appeal over administrative or economic policy decisions. Unless the policy is shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or violative of any statutory or constitutional provision, judicial interference is unwarranted. 19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Akola Municipal Corporation and Another vs. Zishan Hussain Azhar Hussain and Another 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2729 has held as under:- “20. This Court in a catena of decisions has held that the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or its agents as to matters within the province of either. In this respect, we may gainfully refer to the observations of a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (1990) 3 SCC 223 “57. Judicial review is not concerned with matters of economic policy. The court does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or its agents as to matters within the province of either. The court does not supplant the “feel of the expert” by its own views. When the legislature acts within the sphere of its authority and delegates power to an agent, it may empower the agent to make 17 findings of fact which are conclusive provided such findings satisfy the test of reasonableness. In all such cases, judicial inquiry is confined to the question whether the findings of fact are reasonably based on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. As stated by Jagannatha Shetty, J. in Gupta Sugar Works [1987 Supp SCC 476, 481 : (1988) 68 STC 407]: (SCC p. 479, para 4) “… the court does not act like a chartered accountant nor acts like an income tax officer. The court is not concerned with any individual case or any particular problem. The court only examines whether the price determined was with due regard to considerations provided by the statute. And whether extraneous matters have been excluded from determination.” 58. Price fixation is not within the province of the courts. Judicial function in respect of such matters is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions reached by the concerned authority. ………” 21. This Court has also held that judicial interference by way of public interest litigation is available only if there is injury to public because of dereliction of constitutional obligations on the part of the Government. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be exercised in public interest for questioning the economic/fiscal policy or reforms sought to be undertaken by the Government or its functionaries. In this regard, we may gainfully refer to the following observations made by a three- Judge Bench of this Court in the case of BALCO 18 Employees' Union v. Union of India (2002) 2 SCC 333:- “93. Wisdom and advisability of economic policies are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless it can be demonstrated that the policy is contrary to any statutory provision or the Constitution. In other words, it is not for the courts to consider relative merits of different economic policies and consider whether a wiser or better one can be evolved. For testing the correctness of a policy, the appropriate forum is Parliament and not the courts. Here the policy was tested and the motion defeated in the Lok Sabha on 1-3-2001. [……….] 97. Judicial interference by way of PIL is available if there is injury to public because of dereliction of constitutional or statutory obligations on the part of the Government. Here it is not so and in the sphere of economic policy or reform the court is not the appropriate forum. Every matter of public interest or curiosity cannot be the subject-matter of PIL. Courts are not intended to and nor should they conduct the administration of the country. Courts will interfere only if there is a clear violation of constitutional or statutory provisions or non-compliance by the State with its constitutional or statutory duties. None of these contingencies arise in this present case. 98. In the case of a policy decision on economic matters, the courts should be very circumspect in conducting any enquiry or investigation and must be 19 most reluctant to impugn the judgment of the experts who may have arrived at a conclusion unless the court is satisfied that there is illegality in the decision itself.” [Emphasis supplied] 22. Recently, in the case of Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (2025) 1 SCC 695, this Court held as below:— “54. The doctrine of judicial restraint, which is central to this discussion, emphasizes that courts should exercise caution and avoid involvement in policy decisions, as these are complex judgments that require a balancing of diverse and often competing interests. Policies are crafted based on thorough analysis of social, economic, and political factors, considerations beyond the court's purview. The court is tasked with ensuring that policies do not breach constitutional provisions or statutory limits; however, they should not replace policymakers' judgments with their own unless absolutely necessary. 55. Policy decisions often require the expertise of professionals and specialists in fields such as economics, public health, national security, and environmental science. These domains involve specialized knowledge that judges, as generalists in legal matters, may lack. For instance, in economic policy, the executive may decide on trade tariffs or subsidies based on extensive data and projections that aim to balance domestic industry support with global trade commitments. The courts, lacking the same level of economic expertise and without the 20 authority to make trade-offs among competing policy objectives, is typically not equipped to second-guess these kinds of decisions. 56. While courts have the power of judicial review to ensure that executive actions and legislative enactments comply with the Constitution, this power is not absolute. Judicial review is meant to act as a safeguard against actions that overstep legal boundaries or infringe on fundamental rights, but it does not entail a comprehensive re- evaluation of the policy's wisdom. The judicial review of policy decisions is limited to assessing the legality of the decision making process rather than the substantive merits of the policy itself. For example, if a government policy infringes on fundamental rights or discriminates against a particular group, the courts have a duty to strike down such policies. However, in the absence of constitutional or legal violations, the courts should respect the policy choices made by the executive or legislature. 57. The duty of the court in policy-related cases is primarily to determine whether the policy falls within the scope of the authority granted to the relevant body. If the policy decision is within the executive's legal authority and has been made following proper procedures, the courts should defer to the expertise and discretion of the policy-makers, even if the policy appears unwise or imprudent. This restraint ensures that the courts do not impose its own perspective on policy 21 matters that are rightly the responsibility of other branches. 58. Economic and social policies often involve significant redistribution of resources, prioritization of interests, and balancing of public needs, which requires careful consideration by those with specialized knowledge and broad perspectives. In the realm of economic policy, for instance, questions regarding the allocation of subsidies, fiscal deficits, or budget allocations are best managed by the executive, which has access to economic data and is accountable to the public for its financial management. Judicial interference in such areas risks creating disruptions in the economic balance that policymakers are trying to achieve. 59. Courts should assume that policy- makers act in good faith unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. As long as the policy does not contravene the Constitution or violate statutory provisions, it is not the role of the courts to question the wisdom or fairness of such policy. 60. While judicial restraint is essential in respecting the boundaries of each branch of government, it does not mean that courts abdicate their responsibility to protect constitutional rights. The courts must still intervene if a policy infringes on fundamental rights, discriminates unfairly, or breaches statutory provisions. The role of the court in such instances is to protect individuals and groups from unlawful actions while maintaining the overall 22 integrity of the policy-making process. This balance ensures that while courts do not interfere in matters of policy wisdom, they remain vigilant guardians of constitutional rights.” [Emphasis supplied] 26. In light of the above express admissions, it becomes evident that the power of the appellant- Corporation to revise the rate of municipal taxes was never the subject matter of challenge before the High Court. The only issue that was urged before the High Court pertained to the procedure and mode adopted by the appellant-Corporation while effecting such revision. In the absence of any challenge to the substantive authority of the appellant-Corporation to revise municipal taxes, the scope of scrutiny before the High Court stood confined solely to examining whether the statutory procedure had been complied with. We are of the considered view that the High Court ought not to have embarked upon a roving inquiry into the merits or wisdom of the decision to revise the tax rates unless it was demonstrated that the procedure adopted by the appellant-Corporation was ex-facie arbitrary, perverse, unreasonable or in blatant derogation of the governing statutory provisions. No such material was placed before the Court, nor does the record disclose any such infirmity. In these circumstances, the High Court transgressed the permissible limits of judicial review in interfering with the decision of the appellant-Corporation to revise the rate of property taxes.” 20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in BALCO Employees' Union v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333, has held that courts should refrain from interfering with policy decisions unless they are demonstrably arbitrary, unconstitutional or contrary to law. 23 Likewise, in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664, it has been held that matters involving governmental policy and administrative wisdom are ordinarily outside the scope of judicial review unless the decision-making process is shown to be illegal or arbitrary. 21. In the present case, no material has been brought on record to demonstrate that the policy of rationalization or the impugned advertisement suffers from arbitrariness, mala fides or violation of any statutory provision. On the contrary, the advertisement has been issued in larger public interest with the object of ensuring better accessibility and timely distribution of essential commodities to the beneficiaries under the Public Distribution System. 22. This Court also finds that the very policy dated 22.06.2020, on the basis whereof the impugned advertisement has been issued, has already been upheld by this Court in WPC No.1385 of 2022 and connected matters decided on 23.01.2023, wherein it was held that the authorities are competent to establish additional fair price shops while uniformly adhering to the policy guidelines. The said judgment has further been affirmed by the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.138 of 2023, wherein it has been observed that the High Court cannot, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, direct the State to maintain a particular profit margin for existing fair price shop operators. The issue, therefore, is no longer res integra and 24 this Court sees no reason to take a different view. 23. The contention that the Control Order, 2016 cannot be applied to the petitioners because their allotments were made under the Control Order, 2004, also deserves rejection. The respondents have not sought to retrospectively alter or cancel the petitioners' allotment under the 2004 Order. The 2016 Control Order merely governs the future establishment and location of fair price shops and regulates the Public Distribution System prospectively. Since no vested right of the petitioners has been taken away, the question of retrospective application of the 2016 Order does not arise. 24. Another important aspect which cannot be ignored is that authorization to operate a fair price shop does not confer any proprietary or exclusive right upon the allottee to prevent establishment of another fair price shop in the vicinity. The authorization is granted solely to facilitate implementation of the Public Distribution System, which is a welfare measure intended for the benefit of ration card holders and not for guaranteeing monopoly or commercial profits to the operator. Public interest must necessarily prevail over any individual expectation of continuing exclusive operation. 25. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the 25 considered opinion that the petitioners have failed to establish infringement of any legal or fundamental right warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The impugned advertisement dated 30.01.2023 has been issued in accordance with the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016, pursuant to a valid policy decision taken in public interest for rationalization of fair price shops. The advertisement neither cancels the petitioners' authorization nor visits them with any civil consequences requiring compliance with the principles of natural justice. 26. Accordingly, finding no illegality, arbitrariness or infirmity in the impugned advertisement warranting interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction, both the writ petitions are hereby dismissed. 27. No order as to costs. sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Vishakha