1 CGHC010335562025 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Order reserved on 13.05.2026 Order pronounced on 13.08.2026 Order uploaded on 13.08.2026 WPL No. 171 of 2025 The General Manager, Hasdeo Area of Secl, PO South Jhagrakhand Colliery, Distt. Surguja (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1.Hind Mazdoor Kisan Panchayat (H.M.K.P.) Organiser, Shri Taran Singh, H.M.K.P. Bijuri, PO- South Jhagrakhand Colliery, Distt. Shahdol (M.P.) 2.Government of India, Through its Desk Officer, Ministry Of Labour and Employment, New Delhi. ... Respondents For Petitioner : Shri Vivek Ranjan Tiwari, Sr. Advocate with Shri Vinod Deshmukh and Shri Ritesh Giri, Advocates For Interveners : Shri Gary Mukhopadhyay, Advocate For Respondent No.2 : Shri Pramod Shrivastava, Advocate (Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput) C A V Order The petitioner in this Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has called in question the legality, validity and propriety of the award dated 02.05.2024 passed by learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal (“CGIT” for short) Jabalpur in Case No. CGIT/LC/R/96/2008 which has been published in the official gazette on 15.06.2024 and received by Hasdeo Area on 20.06.2025. By the 2 impugned award it has been held by the CGIT that the action of the SECL in disengaging 132 contract workers is unjustified. It further held that those disengaged workers are entitled for a lump sum compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- each to be paid to them by the management within a period of 30 days from the date of publication of award in the official gazette. It also imposed the cost of litigation of Rs. 50,000/-. 2. Heard on (IA No. 05/2025) has been filed by the intervenors for dismissal of the writ petition. 3. In the said application, the operative portion of the impugned award dated 02.05.2024 passed by learned CGIT has been referred to where it has been held as under:- “A. The action of of SECL in disengaging the 132 workers and not regularizing them is held unjustified in law and fact. B. The aforesaid workers are held entitled to get Rs. 2 lac (Rs. 2,00,000/-) per person as lump sum compensation in adjustment of their rights, to be paid to them by management within 30 days from the date of publication of Award in Official Gazette, failing which interest @ of 8% per annum from the date of Award till payment. C. The cost of the litigation Rs. 50,000/- (Fifty thousand only) will also be paid by Management of SECL to the workmen/Union.” 4. According to the intervenors, the workers, 132 in number, were engaged by the management for work at open excavation of No. 1 and No. 2 incline C-Seam, Somna – Incline of Bijuri Sub-Area which falls in Madhya Pradesh. Bijuri is a coal mines area of South Eastern Coalfields Limited which is one of the sub area of Hasdeo Area and a town and a Municipal Council in Anuppur district in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Application for execution of the award has also been filed before the CGIT which has been transferred to Additional District and Sessions Court, Kotma, Madhya Pradesh. Referring to clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the intervenors have taken a stand that the present writ 3 petition is not maintainable before this Court as it has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the same for the reason that the whole cause of action has arisen within the State of Madhya Pradesh. It is vehemently submitted on behalf of the intervenors that just because the headquarters of Hasdeo Area or the Headquarters of SECL are situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Chhattisgarh, the petitioner is not entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court, and being so the petition is liable to be dismissed. In support of his submissions reliance is placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matter of Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Kalyan Banerjee reported in (2008) 3 SCC 456, in the matter of State of Goa v. Summit Online Trade Solutions (P) Ltd. reported in (2023) 7 SCC 791 and on the decision of this Court in the matter of Gajanand Wadnekar v. SECL (WPS No. 1981/2008). 5. In order to rebut the argument advanced by counsel for the intervenors as to jurisdiction, learned counsel for the petitioner took this Court through clause 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which for ready reference is quoted as under:- "226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.- (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories." It is thus submitted that under clause (1-A) (renumbered as clause (2) by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act), if the cause of action arises, wholly or in part, within the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court, it may issue a writ against a person or authority resident within the jurisdiction of other High Courts. Thus, as a 4 result of insertion of the instant clause, a petition under Article 226 can be presented before any of the High Courts under the following heads: - (i) The High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction, the person or authority against whom relief is sought resides or is situate. (ii) The High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action in respect of which relief is sought under Article 226 has arisen, wholly or in part. This submission is based on the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra and others reported in (2000) 7 SCC 640. 10. According to Senior counsel for the petitioner, this Court is having a territorial jurisdiction to entertain the instant Writ Petition against impugned award passed by the CGIT Jabalpur, for the following reasons:- (A) Order dated 09.07.2008 (Annexure P-8) has been issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment on an administrative side only on the basis of a judicial order passed by the High Court of CG Bilaspur in WP No. 1758/1998 by which the disputes was referred to the CGIT Jabalpur for adjudication. (B) Vide impugned award dated 02.05.2024 passed by CGIT (Annexure P-1) the General Manager Hasdeo area of SECL, Post South Jhagrakhand Colliery District Sarguja (Now MCB) (C.G.) was impleaded as a Second Party/Management as per cause title of the award which is located in territorial jurisdiction of the state of CG holding that the action of the SECL in disengaging 132 contract workers is unjustified in law and facts and further holding that the aforesaid workers are entitled to get Rs 2 lac (2,00,000/-) per person as a lump sum compensation in adjustment of their rights to be paid to them by management within 30 days from the date of publication of award in official gazette and also impose the cost of litigation of Rs 50,000/- to the workmen/union. 5 (C) The Head Quarter of the SECL as well as General Manager Hasdeo area SECL and other areas of SECL and Unit Head Quarter of Bijuri Area are situated in State of CG. (D) Vide Annexure P/4 the work order was allotted to one Shri Hasanand S, contractor for execution of work by the office of SECL, Chief General Manager Hasdeo area under whom the alleged contract labourers were working at relevant point of time, now office of SECL, Chief General Manager Hasdeo area comes under the territorial boundaries of State of Chhattisgarh. Thus the gist of the stand taken by the petitioner is that this Writ Petition is entertainable by this Court. 6. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner submits that in the first round of litigation when the Central Government had refused to refer the dispute involved in the instant case for its adjudication vide order date 02-12-1993, the respondent No. 1 Union had approached the High Court of Madhya Pradesh by filing W.P. No 1758/1998 which subsequently was transferred to this Court where vide order dated 05-03-2008 the same was allowed and the Central Government/Union of India was directed to refer the matter to the CGIT. Accordingly, vide order dated 09-07-2008 the dispute was referred to the CGIT for its adjudication. Being this, it is submitted that now at this stage when the award of CGIT is under challenge before this Court, the intervenor cannot take objection about territorial jurisdiction of this Court and for that, this Writ Petition is very much maintainable. 7. Senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that some of the documents filed before the CGIT, Jabalpur, in respect of the dispute are also issued by the SECL Headquarters, Bilaspur (C.G.) as well as by the Hasdeo Area which shows that the part of cause of action also arises in the areas/boundaries of State of Chhattisgarh. In support of his submissions, reliance is placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matter of Navinchandra N. Majithia (supra) and in the matter of Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India and others reported in (2014) 9 SCC 329. 6 8. Heard learned Senior counsel for the petitioner as well as learned counsel appearing for the intervenors on the question of territorial jurisdiction, and perused the documents on record. 9. The instant Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India questioning the legality, validity and propriety of the award dated 02.05.2024 passed by the learned CGIT in Case No. CGIT/LC/R/96/2008. Article 226(2) of the Constitution undoubtedly confers jurisdiction upon a High Court to entertain the matters where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within its territorial jurisdiction. It is a well settled legal position that the expression "cause of action" means a bundle of material facts which the petitioner is required to establish in order to obtain the relief claimed. Mere existence of some connection with the territory of a High Court or the presence of an office of the employer within such territory would not by itself confer territorial jurisdiction unless the facts relied upon have a direct nexus with the lis involved in the writ petition. 10. In Eastern Coalfields Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court considered a similar objection in the context of an employee of Eastern Coalfields Limited. Though the Head Office of the Company was situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, the entire cause of action relating to the employee's service and termination had arisen in the State of Jharkhand. The Supreme Court held that the mere location of the Head Office, which had nothing to do with the order of punishment would not confer territorial jurisdiction upon the Calcutta High Court. The principle has subsequently been reiterated by the Supreme Court in State of Goa (supra) where it has been emphasized that for determining territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2), it is only those facts which have a nexus with the lis and are relevant for grant of the relief can be taken into consideration for constituting a part of the cause of action. Relevant portion of the decision in the matter of Eastern Coal fields Ltd (supra) reads as under:- “13. In view of the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the entire cause of action arose in Mugma Area 7 within the State of Jharkhand, we are of the opinion that only because the Head Office of the appellant company was situated in the State of West Bengal, the same by itself will not confer any jurisdiction upon the Calcutta High Court, particularly when the Head Office had nothing to do with the order of punishment passed against the respondent.” 11. Further almost the same thing has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the mater of State of Goa (supra), relevant portion thereof reads as under:- “21. Even otherwise, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the interim applications. Assuming that a slender part of the cause of action did arise within the State of Sikkim, the concept of forum conveniens ought to have been considered by the High Court. As held by this Court in Kusum Ingots Vs. Union of India reported in (2004) 6 SCC 254 and Ambica Industries Vs. CCE reported in (2007) 6 SCC 769, even if a small part of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of a high court, the same by itself could not have been a determinative factor compelling the High Court to keep the writ petitions alive against the appellant to decide the matter qua the impugned notification, on merit.” 12. The decision relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner in Navinchandra N. Majithia (supra), undoubtedly lays down that even where a part of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, such High Court would have jurisdiction under Article 226(2) notwithstanding that the seat of the authority against whom the writ is sought is situated outside its territorial jurisdiction. However, the said proposition does not dispense with the requirement that the fact relied upon must constitute a material and relevant part of the cause of action. 13. In the present case, the reference made to the learned CGIT, Jabalpur was in respect of the demand of Hind Mazdoor Kisan Panchayat for regularisation of 132 workers. The workers concerned were engaged in connection in the work at Open Excavation No. 1 and No. 2 Incline, C-Seam, Somna-Incline of Bijuri Sub-Area. It is not in dispute that the said place of employment is situated in the State of Madhya 8 Pradesh. The grievance which ultimately culminated in the industrial dispute was thus connected with the engagement, the disengagement and claim for regularisation of the said workers at the aforesaid establishment in Madhya Pradesh. The adjudication was also undertaken by the CGIT at Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh, and the impugned award has been passed by the said Tribunal. 14. Much emphasis has been laid by learned Senior counsel for the petitioner on the fact that the General Manager, Hasdeo Area, SECL, has been arrayed as the Management/Second Party in the award and that the Head Office of SECL is situated at Bilaspur in the State of Chhattisgarh. Reliance has also been placed upon the fact that certain documents relating to the contract/work order were issued from the Hasdeo Area. 15. In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid facts, even if accepted, do not constitute a material part of the cause of action in the present writ petition. The question before this Court is not as to where the administrative office of the employer is situated but as to where the material facts giving rise to the industrial dispute and the relief granted by the impugned award arose. Merely because the Head Office of SECL or the office of the General Manager, Hasdeo Area is situated within the State of Chhattisgarh, the same would not confer territorial jurisdiction upon this Court particularly when the employment in question, the place of work, the alleged disengagement of the workmen and the industrial adjudication are all substantially connected with the State of Madhya Pradesh. 16. The fact that a work order may have been issued by an office situated in Chhattisgarh also cannot in the facts of the present case be treated as an independent and material part of the cause of action. The work order is, at best, a piece of evidence relevant to the relationship between the parties. Likewise, the earlier proceedings before this Court arising out of W.P. No.1758/1998 and the consequential order dated 05.03.2008 directing the Central Government to refer the dispute for adjudication cannot confer territorial jurisdiction upon this Court in 9 perpetuity because the said proceedings constitute a previous stage in the litigation. The present writ petition seeks judicial review of the award subsequently passed by the CGIT, Jabalpur. Territorial jurisdiction for the present proceedings has to be determined with reference to the cause of action giving rise to the present challenge and not merely on the basis of the forum in which an earlier proceeding was entertained. Being this, the submission that the petitioner cannot now be permitted to raise the question of territorial jurisdiction because the earlier proceedings had been entertained by this Court is, therefore, without substance. Jurisdiction under Article 226 is traceable to the Constitution and the mere fact that a previous proceedings between the parties were entertained by a particular High Court cannot confer territorial jurisdiction where none otherwise exists in respect of the subsequent cause of action. 17. The decision of the Supreme Court in Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra) relied upon by learned Senior counsel for the petitioner does not advance the petitioner's case because the said decision itself enunciates that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit, and in appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens.” 18. In the facts of the present case, the intervenors have specifically pleaded that the concerned workmen were working at Bijuri/Somna-Incline, Madhya Pradesh, and that the dispute relating to their engagement and disengagement too arose there. The petitioner has not been able to demonstrate any material event forming part of the impugned industrial dispute which occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The mere fact that the award directs the management of SECL including the General Manager, Hasdeo Area to make payment of compensation, or that the said management has its office within the State of Chhattisgarh cannot alter the above conclusion for the reason that if it is allowed to be done, every industrial dispute involving a multi-State commercial intercourse 10 could be litigated before the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction its Head Office happens to be situated notwithstanding the fact that the entire industrial dispute arose elsewhere. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Eastern Coalfields Ltd. (supra). 19. Consequently, this Court holds that no material or integral part of the cause of action giving rise to the present challenge to the award dated 02.05.2024 is shown to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The writ petition is, therefore, not maintainable before this Court for want of territorial jurisdiction. 20. This Court is of the considered view that the objection raised by the intervenors deserves acceptance. In view of the finding recorded here-in-above, it is not necessary for this Court to examine the merits of the impugned award or the other grounds raised in the writ petition. Consequently I.A. No.5/2025 filed by the intervenors is allowed to the extent indicated above. As a consequence thereof, the writ petition is dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction. The petitioner would however have the liberty to avail such remedy as may be available to it before the High Court having territorial jurisdiction in accordance with law. 21. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the impugned award dated 02.05.2024 and that all questions on merits are left open to be adjudicated upon by the competent Court, if approached. 22. The writ petition, as already said, stands dismissed in the aforesaid terms. 23. No order as to cost. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge Jyotishi AVANISH JYOTISHI Digitally signed by AVANISH JYOTISHI Date: 2026.08.13 16:51:17 +0530