1 CGHC010064162021 2026:CGHC:36981 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 209 of 2021 National Insurance Company Limited Through The Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Ltd., Sirasar Chowk, Jagdalpur, District Bastar (Chhattisgarh) ... Appellant versus 1. Kanwalram Nag S/o Late Budhru Nag, Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Kalepal, Police Station Parpa, District Bastar (Chhattisgarh) 2. Jeevan Yadav S/o Late Ramji Yadav, Aged About 42 Years R/o Tankipara, Manpur, Police Station Manpur, District Rajnandgaon (Chhattisgarh)...........Vehicle Driver 3. Achyut Shekhar Nayak S/o Puranlal Nayak, Through Doctor Ravindra Kumar Nayak S/o A. S. Nayak, Primary Health Center, Darbha, District Bastar (Chhattisgarh) ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Ashish Gupta, Advocate For Respondents No.2 & 3 : Mr. Utkarsh Patel, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, J. Judgment on Board 18.08.2026 1. This appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, BHOLA NATH KHATAI Digitally signed by BHOLA NATH KHATAI Date: 2026.08.22 14:03:10 +0530 2 1988 has been preferred by the appellant–Insurance Company assailing the award dated 04.01.2021 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bastar place at Jagdalpur (CG), in Claim Case No. 193/2019, whereby the Tribunal has awarded a total compensation of Rs.4,28,000/- on account of the death of Lakhan Ram Nag, who succumbed to the injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 26.08.2013. 2. While passing the impugned award, the Tribunal has fastened the liability of payment of compensation upon the Insurance Company. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal has been filed. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant–Insurance Company assails the impugned award on two grounds. Firstly, respondent No.2, who was driving the offending vehicle, did not possess a valid and effective driving licence to drive the said vehicle. It is submitted that the driving licence, marked as Ex.D-1, authorised respondent No.2 to drive only a Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) and transport vehicle, whereas the offending vehicle was a motorcycle. Therefore, in the absence of any endorsement authorising him to drive a motorcycle, he could not be said to possess a valid and effective driving licence as required under Section 3 of the Act of 1988. Learned counsel further submits that Prakash Chandra Dhruv (NAW-1), who was examined on behalf of the Insurance Company, has categorically stated that the driving licence, Ex.D-1, was not valid for driving a motorcycle. It is, therefore, contended that the Tribunal ought to have exonerated the Insurance Company from its liability. 4. Secondly, the claimant Kanwalram, being the elder brother of the deceased and aged about 35 years, was not dependent 3 upon the deceased and, therefore, was not entitled to the compensation awarded by the Tribunal. On these two grounds, it is submitted that the impugned award deserves to be set aside to the extent of the liability fastened upon the Insurance Company. 5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.2 and 3 submits that the impugned award passed by the Tribunal is just, proper and in accordance with law and does not call for any interference by this Court. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions and perused the record of the Tribunal with due care. 7. The first ground for consideration is as to whether respondent No.2 possessed a valid and effective driving licence to drive the offending motorcycle at the time of the accident. 8. The driving licence of respondent No.2 has been brought on record and marked as Ex.D-1. A perusal thereof shows that the licence authorised him to drive an LMV and transport vehicle. Prakash Chandra Dhruv (NAW-1), Assistant Grade-II, District Transport Office, Kanker, has been examined on behalf of the Insurance Company. In paragraph - 2 of his deposition, he has categorically stated that the driving licence, Ex.D-1, was valid for LMV and transport vehicle, but was not valid for driving a motorcycle. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Zaharulnisha & Ors, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 385 has held that where the driver possessed a driving licence for a different class of vehicle and was driving a vehicle of another class without having a valid and effective licence to drive such vehicle, the 4 Insurance Company cannot be held liable to indemnify the insured, the same being a violation of the provisions of Section 10(2) of the Act of 1988. The relevant paragraph 21 of the said judgment reads as under: “21. In the light of above settled proposition of law, the appellant Insurance Company cannot be held liable to pay the amount of compensation to the claimants for the cause of death of Shukurullah in road accident which had occurred due to rash and negligent driving of scooter by Ram Surat who admittedly had no valid and effective licence to drive the vehicle on the day of accident. The scooterist was possessing a driving license of driving HMV and he was driving a totally different class of vehicle, which act of his is in violation of Section 10(2) of the MV Act.” 10. In the case in hand, the evidence available on record clearly establishes that respondent No.2 possessed a driving licence authorising him to drive an LMV and transport vehicle, but did not possess a valid and effective driving licence to drive the offending motorcycle. Thus, the vehicle in question was being driven in breach of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited (supra), the finding of the Tribunal fastening the liability upon the Insurance Company cannot be sustained and the Insurance Company is entitled to exoneration from the liability of payment of compensation. 11. However, the fact remains that the offending vehicle was duly insured with the appellant–Insurance Company at the time of the accident. Therefore, in view of the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Amrit Paul Singh and Another v. TATA AIG General Insurance Company Limited and Others, reported in (2018) 7 SCC 5 558, ordering the insurance company to pay first and then recover and also taking note of the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is directed that the appellant–Insurance Company shall first satisfy the award by paying the compensation amount to the claimant and shall thereafter be entitled to recover the same from the driver/owner of the offending vehicle, in accordance with law. 12. The next ground for consideration is whether the claimant, Kanwalram Nag, being the elder brother of the deceased Lakhan Ram Nag, is entitled to receive compensation on account of the accidental death of his younger brother. 13. Section 166(1) of the Act of 1988 specifies the persons who may maintain an application for compensation. In the case of death resulting from an accident, the provision permits an application to be made by “all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased”. Section 166(1)(c) reads as under: “166. Application for compensation.-(1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 165 may be made- (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be” 14. The expression “legal representative” has not been defined under the Act of 1988. Therefore, recourse may be had to 6 Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which defines “legal representative” as follows: “11. “legal representative” means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued;” 15. The scope and ambit of the expression “legal representative” in the context of motor accident claims fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and Another, reported in (1987) 3 SCC 234, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para-13 has held as follows:- “13. We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by Sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in Section 110-B of the Act and to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation 7 payable and its apportionment as required by Section 110B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed under Section 110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers' children and some times foster children live together and they are dependent upon the bread-winner of the family and if the bread- winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicles accidents. We express our approval of the decision in Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai, AIR 1977 Guj 195 and hold that the brother of a person who dies in a motor vehicle accident is entitled to maintain a petition under Section 110-A of the Act if he is a legal representative of the deceased.” 16. Similarly, in Manjuri Bera (Smt.) v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Another, reported in (2007) 10 SCC 643, in paragraphs – 12 & 15, it has been held as under: “12. As observed by this Court in Custodian of Branches of BANCO National Ultramarino v. Nalini Bai Naique [1989] Supp (2) SCC 275 the definition contained in Section 2(11) CPC is inclusive in character and its scope is wide, it is not confined to legal heirs only. Instead it stipulates that a person who may or may not be legal heir competent to inherit 8 the property of the deceased can represent the estate of the deceased person. It includes heirs as well as persons who represent the estate even without title either as executors or administrators in possession of the estate of the deceased. All such persons would be covered by the expression 'legal representative'. As observed in Gujarat SRTC V. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai (1987) 3 SCC 234 a legal representative is one who suffers on account of death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child. 15. Judged in that background where a legal representative who is not dependent files an application for compensation, the quantum cannot be less than the liability referable to Section 140 of the Act. Therefore, even if there is no loss of dependency the claimant if he or she is a legal representative will be entitled to compensation, the quantum of which shall be not less than the liability flowing from Section 140 of the Act. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. There will be no order as to costs. We record our appreciation for the able assistance rendered by Shri Jayant Bhushan, the learned Amicus Curiae.” 17. In view of the aforesaid statutory provisions and the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the claimant is not entitled to maintain the claim merely because he was the elder brother of the deceased and was not dependent upon him, cannot be accepted. 18. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the deceased Lakhan Ram Nag was unmarried and the claimant 9 Kanwalram Nag, being his elder brother, falls within the category of his legal representative/legal heir. The mere fact that the claimant was not financially dependent upon the deceased would not, by itself, disentitle him from maintaining a claim under Section 166 of the Act of 1988. Therefore, the learned Tribunal was justified in holding the claimant as a legal representative of the deceased and awarding compensation in his favour. Consequently, the second ground raised by the appellant–Insurance Company is rejected. 19. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is partly allowed. The impugned award dated 04.01.2021 is modified to the extent that, the appellant–Insurance Company is exonerated from its liability on account of the breach of the policy conditions. However, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Amrit Paul (supra), the appellant– Insurance Company shall first pay the awarded compensation to the claimant(s) in terms of the impugned award and shall thereafter be entitled to recover the said amount from the driver/owner of the offending vehicle, in accordance with law. The remaining terms and conditions of the impugned award shall remain unaltered. 20. The record of the Tribunal, along with a copy of this judgment, be sent back forthwith for information, compliance and necessary action, if any. Sd/- (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Judge Khatai