Research › Search › Judgment

High Court of Chhattisgarh · body

2026 DAILYLAW 3302 (CHH)

SMT. SANTOSHI COUHAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

WPS/1038/2025 · 2026-01-01

Shri Narendra Kumar Vyas

body2026

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

1 2026:CGHC:92 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 1038 of 2025 Order Reserved on : 11.12.2025 Order Delivered on : 02.01.2026 1. Smt. Santoshi Couhan W/o Shri Ashok Kumar Chouhan Aged About 30 Years (Daughter Of Anil Kumar Chouhan) Working As Aagan Badi Worker R/o Village Bhawanipur Tahsil Lailunga District - Raigarh (C.G.) --- Petitioner versus 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary Department Of Women And Child Development Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya New Raipur District - Raipur (C.G.) 2. Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat Lailunga District - Raigarh (C.G.) 3. Smt. Bhagyawati Chouhan Daughter Of Babulal Chouhan R/o Village Bhawanipur Tahsil Lailunga District - Raigarh (C.G.) --- Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Shashi Kumar Kushwaha, Advocate For State : Mr. Kanwaljeet Singh Saini, Panel Lawyer For Respondent No. 3 : Ms. Bulbul Agrawal, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas (CAV Order) 1. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 17.01.2025 MANISH YADAV Digitally signed by MANISH YADAV Date: 2026.01.02 13:20:47 +0530 2 passed by the Commissioner Bilaspur, Division Bilaspur (C.G.) by which revision filed by the petitioner has been rejected. 2. Brief facts as projected by the petitioner are:- (a) An advertisement was issued on 23.12.2015 by the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat Lailunga, Integrated Child Development Project/Janpad Panchayat Lailunga, District Raigarh (C.G.) (hereinafter referred to as “Chief Executive Officer”) for appointment on the post of Aanganbadi Karyakarta. The petitioner and respondent No. 3 have submitted their applications for the above post and the petitioner was appointed as Aanganbadi Karyakarta vide order dated 29.12.2016. The respondent No. 3 has challenged the order of appointment of the petitioner before this Court by filing a writ petition which has been registered as Writ Petition (S) No. 1178/2017, but the same was withdrawn on 09.03.2017 with liberty to file an appeal before the appellate authority. (b) It has been contended that as per Section 4 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995, period of limitation to file an appeal before Collector, District - Raigarh (C.G.) is 30 days, but the appeal was filed by respondent No. 3 on 25.04.2017 i.e. after 5 months from the date of appointment order dated 29.12.2016, without any condonation of delay application and the appeal has been allowed. The appellate authority has allowed the appeal and taken note of the fact that the respondent No. 3 has preferred a writ petition before this Court and this Court has granted liberty to the respondent No. 3 3 to file an appeal, as such, it has condoned the delay. On merit it has been held that the petitioner’s parental house is Bhawanipur and after marriage she has gone to Katkaliya, as such, after marriage she was not the resident of village Bhawanipur, as such, her appointment being resident of Bhawanipur is illegal, accordingly, her appointment has been quashed and it has been directed that who placed below the petitioner may be appointed as Aanganbadi Karyakarta. (c) Being aggrieved with this order, the petitioner has preferred revision under Section 91 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 before the Commissioner, Bilaspur Division (C.G.) mainly contending that before the appellate authority the respondent No. 3 has not preferred any application for condonation of delay though the appeal was barred by limitation. On merit it has also been contended that the petitioner after marriage being resident of Katkaliya she has started living at her parental house at Village Bhawanipur with her husband. It has also been contended that the Project Officer has conducted enquiry about the resident of petitioner wherein it has been found that she is residing at Bhawanipur only, despite that clinching material the appellate Court has erred in recording its finding that the petitioner is resident of village Katkaliya, as such, she is non-resident of Bhawanipur and on perverse finding her appointment order has been quashed. It has also been contended that the respondent No. 3 has passed class 10th only whereas she has cleared 12th examination, as such, she is more 4 eligible. Thus, it has been prayed for quashing of the order passed by the appellate authority. (d) The revisional authority vide order dated 17.01.2025 has rejected the same. The revisional authority has also taken note of the fact that the petitioner has preferred writ petition(S) No. 2419/2018 against the order passed by the Collector, District - Raigarh (C.G.) dated 24.02.2018 by which the appeal has been allowed and this Court vide its order dated 15.06.2024 has disposed of the petition granting liberty to the petitioner to prefer revision within a period of 15 days and the same has to be decided within 90 days and the interim order passed by this Court in favour of the petitioner will be remained effective for further period of 15+90 days. Thereafter, the revisional authority has decided the revision by recording its finding that the petitioner Santoshi Chouhan is resident of Katkaliya, as such, she is not resident of Bhawanipur, therefore, the appellate authority has not committed illegality in allowing the appeal filed by the respondent No. 3 and accordingly, it has dismissed the revision. Being aggrieved with the order passed by the revisional authority, the petitioner has preferred this petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner filed revision petition before the Commissioner Bilaspur, Division Bilaspur (C.G.) raising the ground that the appeal of the private respondent before the learned Collector was time barred and no condonation of delay application was filed and hence the appeal was not maintainable but the Collector without any application for 5 condonation of delay has heard the matter finally which is illegal. Even the revisional Court has not taken into consideration this legal ground raised by the petitioner, therefore, the order passed by the revisional authority is liable to be quashed by this Court. On merit it has been contended that the petitioner was having more qualification than the respondent No. 3, therefore, the petitioner should have been considered for appointment. It has also been contended that after marriage, the petitioner was residing at village Bhawanipur with her husband and her name is also in the voter list of Bhawanipur and also in the Aadhar Card address of village Bhawanipur has been mentioned, as such, she has domicile certificate of Bhawanipur. It has also been contended that in the enquiry it has been found that she was resident of Bhawanipur, therefore, the impugned orders suffer from perversity and illegality warranting interference by this Court. 4. Learned State counsel opposing the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is unable to show the existence of any right in her favour for the enforcement of which a writ may be issued by this Court and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for respondent No. 3 would submit that the order passed by the appellate authority and affirmed by the revisional authority is legal and justified. She would further submit that once the liberty has been granted by this Court, therefore, the limitation will start from the date of granting liberty i.e. 09.03.2017 and the respondent No. 3/appellant has filed appeal on 25.04.2017 after 6 excluding the period in obtaining certified copy of the order. Thus, it has been prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record annexed with the writ petition. 7. The record of the case clearly demonstrates that against the order passed by the appellate authority, the petitioner has preferred writ petition before this Court in WP(S) No. 2419/2018 wherein this Court has directed to decide the revision petition within 105 days, but the same was not decided by the revisional authority, therefore, the respondent No. 3 has filed WA No. 436/2024 wherein the Hon’ble Division has directed the authority to decide the revision within 10 days from the date of order and thereafter, the revision has been decided on 17.01.2025. This Court while disposing of the writ petition has not considered the submissions of the petitioner that the appellate authority without insisting for condoning the delay has decided the appeal and while disposing of the petition has also not given any direction to the revisional authority to consider the same, as such, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that before deciding the appeal, the appellate authority should have considered the condonation application and in absence of condonation application the appeal should not have been decided by the appellate authority which has lost its significance. Even otherwise, the appellate authority in terms of the liberty granted by the High Court has condoned the delay as reflected in the order itself which reads as under: 7 “mijksDr foospuk ls Li"V gks x;k gS fd mRrjoknh Ø- 01 xzke Hkokuhiqj dh fuoklh ugha gS] mldh voS/kkfud fu;qfDr dh xbZ Fkh] ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; }kjk vihykFkhZ dks vihy dk mipkj izkIr djus gsrq funsZf’kr fd;k x;k gS] vr% izdj.k ds lEiw.kZ rF;ksa ds en~nsutj vihykFkhZ }kjk vihy izLrqr djus esa gq, foyEc dks {kek fd;k tkrk gSA” 8. Thus, the appellate authority has rightly condoned the delay in preferring the appeal. Thereafter, the revisional authority has also considered the fact that the delay has been duly condoned by the appellate authority and has rightly dismissed the revision, as such, there is no perversity and illegality warranting interference in the order passed by the revisional authority, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed. Even on the merit of the case the petitioner has not placed any record to demonstrate that after marriage she was residing at Bhawanipur though it has been alleged that the Project Officer while conducting an inquiry has recorded its finding that after marriage she was not residing at Bhawanipur, but no material was placed on record to substantiate this fact, as such, the findings recorded by the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority that the petitioner is not resident of Bhawanipur cannot be held to suffer from perversity and illegality warranting any interference by this Court. 9. It is well-established principle that the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot reappreciate the evidence and arrive at a finding of fact unless the authorities below had either exceeded its jurisdiction or acted perversely. 10. On the said settled proposition of law, this Court must make 8 reference to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram repoted in 1986 (4) SCC 447. The relevant portion thereof reads as under: “16. … It is well settled that the High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of fact of an appropriate court if there was no evidence to justify such a conclusion and if no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the courts below have come or in other words a finding which was perverse in law. This principle is well settled. In D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee [(1952) 2 SCC 619] it was laid down by this court that unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention it was not for the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere. If there is evidence on record on which a finding can be arrived at and if the court has not misdirected itself either on law or on fact, then in exercise of the power under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court should refrain from interfering with such findings made by the appropriate authorities. …” 11. The above said proposition of law was reiterated in case of Shamshad Ahmad v. Tilak Raj Bajaj reported in 2008 (9) SCC 1 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, wherein it was observed that: “38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law.” 12. Thus, I am of the view that there is no error of law and facts in setting aside the findings in the order passed by the revisional authority, as such there is no basis for this Court to ignore the findings of the authority and come to its own conclusion by 9 appreciating the evidence on record. The same was outside the purview of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the absence of any perversity or illegality afflicting the findings of the authority. 13. Thus, the writ petition being devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed. 14. The interim order passed by this Court on 06.02.2025 is vacated. Sd/- (Narendra Kumar Vyas) Judge Manish