1 CGHC010310892019 2026:CGHC:36832 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPL No. 217 of 2019 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - Secretary, Water Resources Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, Chhattisgarh. (Petitioner No. 1 Was Not A Party Before The Appellate Authority, But Has Been Impleaded As Petitioner No. 1 Herein As It Is Necessary Secretary Of Concerned Department.), District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - The Sub Divisional Officer Tandula Water Resources, Sub Division No. 1 Aadmabad, Tahsil And District - Durg, Chhattisgarh., District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Smt. Khem Bai W/o Late Hardelal R/o Village Gastitola, Post Jamruwa, Tahsil And District - Balod, Chhattisgarh., District : Balod, Chhattisgarh 2 - The Appellate Authority Under The Payment Of Gratuity Act 1972 And Deputy Labour Commissioner, Office Of The Labour Commissioner, Chhattisgarh, Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - The Controlling Authority Under The Payment Of Gratuity Act 1972, Balod, District - Balod, Chhattisgarh., District : Balod, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioners/State : Shri Kanwaljeet Singh Saini, Dy.G.A. For Respondent/s : None. NIRMALA RAO 2 Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 18/08/2026 1. The petitioners have filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ in the nature of certiorari/mandamus and quash / set-aside the order dated 30.09.2015 (Annexure P/1) passed by learned Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 in Appeal Case No. 99/PGA/2015, consequentially resulting in the dismissal of the order dated 14.11.2014 (Annexure P/4) and the claim of the respondent No.1 regarding payment of gratuity, being illegal and bad in law. 10.2 Any other relief, which Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case and petition, may kindly be allowed with costs.” 2. The facts, in brief, are that the husband of respondent No.1 was initially appointed and worked as a daily-wage employee from 9.5.1980 to 17.8.2004, i.e. for more than 28 years and 3 months, and received gratuity of Rs.44,843/- calculated on the basis of a wage of Rs.2,776. He thereafter served in the Work-Charged Establishment from 18.8.2008 till his death on 21.9.2012, i.e. for a period of 4 years, 3 months and 15 days, and was drawing a last wage of Rs.11,404/-. 3 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the husband of respondent No.1 was not eligible for gratuity for the period of his service in the Work-Charged Establishment, as his service was less than five years under the Gratuity Rules, 1962, and the period of his service as a daily-wage employee did not constitute a legal or regular appointment. He would further submit that respondent No.1 filed an application under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 before the Controlling Authority (respondent No.3), claiming gratuity on behalf of her deceased husband, Late Hardelal (Mate/Mason). The petitioner/Workman herein filed its reply; thereafter, the Controlling Authority, vide order dated 14.11.2014, allowed the application and determined the total gratuity to the tune of Rs.2,08,062/-. The Controlling Authority directed payment of the remaining amount of Rs.1,63,219/-, after deducting Rs.44,843/- already paid, along with interest at the rate of 10% from 22.10.2012, within a period of 30 days. He would argue that sufficient cause was assigned by the petitioners in the memo of appeal to condone the delay but the Appellate Authority rejected the same. He would further argue that since the penalty was inflicted upon respondent No.1, she was not entitled to payment of gratuity but the Controlling Authority ignored this fact and directed the petitioners herein to pay gratuity to the tune of Rs.2,08,062/- alongwith interest @ 10% per annum. He would pray to set aside the orders passed by the Controlling Authority as well as the Appellate Authority. 4 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners at length and perused the documents placed on record. 5. It is not in dispute that the appeal under Section 7(7) of the Act, 1972 was preferred by the petitioners against the order passed by the Controlling Authority dated 14.11.2014 after a delay of 10 months. The Appellate Authority considered the submissions advanced by the petitioners and thereafter, dismissed the appeal, holding that delay beyond 60 days cannot be condoned. 6. The short question which arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether the Appellate Authority, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'PG Act") is empowered to condone the delay beyond sixty days in filing the appeal. 7. To appreciate the issue in hand, it would be apposite to refer to Section 7(7) of the PG Act, which reads as follows:- "7. Determination of the amount of gratuity.- (1) xxx xxx xxx xxx (2) xxx xxx xxx xxx (3) xxx xxx xxx xxx (7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4), may, within sixty days from the date of receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, if it is 5 satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days.” 8. The opening portion of Section 7(7) of the PG Act clearly lays down that any person aggrieved by an order of authority passed under Section 7(4) may prefer appeal to the appropriate Government or authority. The Limitation prescribed for filing such appeal is sixty days starting from the date of receipt of order from which the appeal is preferred. The proviso to this Section lays down that the appellate authority, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause for preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, may extend the period for a further period of sixty days. 9. It is thus clear that the limitation for filing an appeal is sixty days and the limitation starts to run from the date of receipt of the order of the appropriate authority. If the appeal is not filed within sixty days, then appellant shall have to satisfy the Appellate Authority that there was sufficient cause for delay in filing the appeal. However, the legislature in its wisdom has clearly laid down in the proviso to Section 7(7) of the PG Act that the appellate authority cannot extend the period beyond another sixty days, which means the outer limitation is 60+ 60 = 120 days. If the appeal is filed on 121 days, then the appellate authority cannot condone the delay. 6 10. It must be remembered that the appeal is creation of statute. Law makers lay down the period of limitation. In case there was no outer limitation provided in the proviso, I could have taken recourse to the Limitation Act and held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be applicable. However, in the PG Act, which is a special piece of legislation, the legislature in its wisdom has clearly laid down that delay can be condoned only up to sixty days and that no further delay can be condoned. Therefore, the Appellate Authority is powerless to condone the delay when the delay is beyond sixty days. 11. The provision of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as follows:- "29 (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." 12. The Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Zila Sahakari Kendriya Bank Maryadit Vs. Ram Briksha Singh (Dead) through L.Rs. and others, reported in 2016 (148) FLR 789 wherein after making reference of the Calcutta High Court in the 7 matter of City College Vs. State of West Bengal & others, reported in (1987) 1 LLJ 41 (Cal) and the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the matter of Shri Gurudeo Ayurved Mahavidyalaya vs. Madhav Naraya Mahakode and others, reported in 1994 Lab.I.C. 1542 held that the appellate authority is powerless to condone the delay beyond sixty days. The High Court of Calcutta & the High Court of Bombay have held that in view of special provision under Section 7(7) of the PG Act, the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act could not be invoked by the Appellate Authority under the PG Act for condoning the delay beyond 120 days. 13. Similarly in the matter of Western Coalfields Ltd. Vs. Controlling Authorities & others, reported in 2000(3) MPLJ 63 the Madhya Pradesh High Court also held that the Appellate Authority cannot condone the delay or extend the period of limitation beyond the period prescribed under Section 7(7) of the PG Act. 14. The Andhra Pradesh High Court took a similar view in the matter of Warangal District Co-Operative Society Ltd. Vs. Appellate Authority under Payment of Gratuity Ac, 1972, reported in (2002) III LLJ 616 and held that it is settled principle of interpretation of statutes that if there are two mandates, the general must give a way to the special and, therefore, it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot apply in such cases 8 and condonation of delay thereof shall be governed by the provisions of Section 7(7) of the PG Act. 15. Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above-referred cases, no case is made out for interference. 16. Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Nimmi