1 CGHC010316282026 2026:CGHC:36140-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2138 of 2026 Rekha Nair D/o Shri Remakantan Nair, Aged About 49 Years (Wrongly Mentioned As Nayak), Resident Of H - 19, Maruti Solitatire, Kachna Road, Khamhardih, Raipur (C.G.). ... Petitioner(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Anti-Corruption Bureau / Economic Offences Wing (A C B / E O W), Raipur, District - Raipur (C.G.). ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Rajeev Shrivastava, Sr. Adv. Along with Mr. Kaif Ali Rizvi, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Praveen Das, Add. A.G. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 14.08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Rajeev Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate Along with Mr. Kaif Ali Rizvi, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2026.08.14 16:59:38 +0530 2 heard Mr. Praveen Das, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent / State. 2. The petitioner has filed this petition with following prayer: “It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may 'kindly be pleased to set aside the order dated 23.07.2026 passed by the learned Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Raipur (C.G.) in Special Case No. 02/2023; quash/set aside the Sanction Order dated 06.03.2020 issued by the Law and Legislative Department, Government of Chhattisgarh; quash/set aside order dated 21.07.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge in Special Case No.02/2023 and quash the charge-sheet no.10/2020 filed in FIR/Crime No.08/2019 dated 27.02.2019 in Police Station, State Economic Offence Investigation Bureau, and pass such other order(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice.” 3. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner joined Government service on 02.12.1997 as Assistant Sub-Inspector (M) in the office of the Superintendent of Police, Durg, and was thereafter transferred to the Special Branch, Police Headquarters, Raipur, vide order dated 12.05.2003. During her posting there, she was promoted as Sub-Inspector (M) on 01.03.2004 and thereafter as Subedar (M) on 08.07.2011. On 01.06.2011, she was appointed as System Administrator in the Special Branch, Police 3 Headquarters, and subsequently, vide order dated 25.08.2015, was transferred to the State Economic Offences Investigation Bureau, Raipur. The petitioner claims to have maintained an unblemished service record. In 2017, the Chhattisgarh Lok Aayog initiated Enquiry No.154/2017 concerning allegations of acquisition of disproportionate assets and called upon her to furnish details regarding certain properties. The petitioner, vide reply dated 01.12.2017, categorically denied any connection with the properties in question and alleged that false information had been supplied with an intention to harass and defame her. An anonymous complaint dated 19.02.2018 containing further allegations regarding properties allegedly standing in her name and in the names of her family members was also received. After examination of the petitioner’s explanation, income and expenditure and verification conducted by the State Economic Offences Investigation and Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Lok Aayog, vide order dated 09.01.2019, recorded that no inference could be drawn that the petitioner had acquired assets disproportionate to her income or committed any misconduct. The said findings were also reflected in the 17th Annual Report of the Lok Aayog placed before the Legislative Assembly. Despite the aforesaid proceedings, after change of Government in the State in 2018, FIR No.06/2019 was registered concerning alleged illegal interception by officers of the Special Branch, in which the petitioner was subsequently implicated. The investigation in the 4 said FIR was stayed by the Supreme Court on 02.09.2019. The petitioner alleges that during the investigation she was pressurized to make statements against higher officials and, upon refusing to do so, her child care leave was cancelled. Thereafter, on 28.01.2019, she was served with a notice by the Anti- Corruption Bureau concerning allegations of disproportionate assets, to which she sought a copy of the complaint and pointed out that similar allegations had already been examined by the Lok Aayog. 4. Subsequently, on the basis of another complaint, Preliminary Inquiry No.03/2019 was registered by the State Economic Offences Investigation Bureau and, after obtaining approval under Section 17-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Crime No.08/2019 was registered on 27.02.2019 under Sections 13(1) (b) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, alleging that during the check period from 01.03.2011 to 20.02.2019 the petitioner possessed movable and immovable assets valued at approximately Rs.1,21,67,652/- which were disproportionate to her known sources of income. The properties relied upon by the prosecution substantially included the very properties which had earlier been examined by the Lok Aayog. During the subsequent process of obtaining prosecution sanction, the Law and Legislative Affairs Department repeatedly returned the proposals submitted by the prosecuting agency. The initial proposal dated 20.12.2019 was returned on 26.12.2019 after deficiencies were 5 noticed in the records and the investigation was found incomplete. The proposal was again submitted on 27.12.2019, whereafter, on 03.01.2020, the Department pointed out serious defects in the income-expenditure calculation, including failure to take into account the income and expenditure of the petitioner’s husband while considering those of other family members, and expressly recorded that the investigation appeared to have been forwarded for sanction without completion. Despite these objections, the proposal continued to be processed between the Law and Legislative Affairs Department, Home Department and Police Headquarters. The Police Headquarters gave its opinion on 09.01.2020 and the Home Department conveyed its consent on 20.01.2020. However, even thereafter, when the prosecuting agency submitted another proposal dated 22.01.2020, the Law and Legislative Affairs Department, vide communication dated 31.01.2020, again found substantial defects in the revised ACB report and directed that the facts be examined carefully and a properly revised report be submitted. Ultimately, the prosecuting agency submitted another memorandum dated 03.03.2020 and the Law and Legislative Affairs Department issued the prosecution sanction dated 06.03.2020 under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The petitioner contends that the sanction was granted mechanically on substantially the same material which had repeatedly been found defective and without any meaningful rectification of the deficiencies or consideration of the earlier Lok 6 Aayog exoneration. Thereafter, charge-sheet No.10/2020 was filed and the proceedings came to be registered as Special Case No.02/2023 before the learned Special Judge (P.C. Act), Raipur, against the petitioner and her family members for offences under Sections 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Sections 109 and 120-B of the IPC. 5. During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioner, upon inspection of the list of un-relied documents supplied by the prosecution and through information obtained under the Right to Information Act, came to know of the correspondence revealing that the proposal for sanction had repeatedly been returned by the competent Department on account of incomplete investigation, defective Bureau Reports and erroneous computation of income and expenditure. The petitioner therefore moved an application under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C./Section 94 of the BNSS seeking production of the complete original sanction file, inter- departmental correspondence, note-sheets, proposals and the Lok Aayog record, and also filed an application under Section 19(1) read with Section 19(4) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. seeking summoning and examination of the sanctioning authority to ascertain whether there had been independent application of mind before grant of sanction. The petitioner contended that the documents sought went to the root of the validity of sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and that the prosecution had failed to 7 disclose material documents forming part of the investigation. It was further contended that the Lok Aayog’s order dated 09.01.2019, whereby the allegations concerning the same properties had been found unsubstantiated, was material and exculpatory and had not been placed before the sanctioning authority. The petitioner also relied upon the circumstances surrounding the repeated departmental enquiries, notices and proceedings initiated against her after the change of Government, alleging that she had been subjected to harassment and pressure for refusing to make statements against higher officials. The learned Special Judge, by the impugned order dated 23.07.2026, dismissed both applications, principally holding that the earlier order dated 22.10.2024 had attained finality, that the sanction order contained sufficient recitals indicating application of mind, and that summoning of the sanction file or sanctioning authority was not warranted at the stage of arguments before charge. According to the petitioner, the earlier order dated 22.10.2024 related to a distinct application and could not bar the subsequent application under Section 94 of the BNSS, which arose upon discovery of the previously undisclosed sanction-related correspondence. The petitioner further relies upon her earlier WPCR No.182/2019, whereby she had challenged FIR No.08/2019 and which was disposed of on 16.06.2023 as having become infructuous in view of completion of investigation, with liberty to challenge the charge-sheet in accordance with law. 8 Aggrieved by the rejection of her applications and contending that the validity of the prosecution sanction is a foundational issue requiring examination of the original sanction record and the sanctioning authority, the petitioner has preferred the present petition before this Court. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Trial Court has committed a manifest error in dismissing the petitioner’s applications under Section 94 of the BNSS and Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, as the documents sought by the petitioner are directly relevant to the validity of the prosecution sanction. It is submitted that the record subsequently obtained by the petitioner clearly demonstrates that the proposal for sanction was repeatedly returned by the Law and Legislative Affairs Department on 26.12.2019, 03.01.2020 and 31.01.2020 on the ground that the investigation was incomplete, the Bureau Reports suffered from serious defects and the computation of income and expenditure was erroneous. Despite the aforesaid objections, sanction was ultimately granted on 06.03.2020, while the final report was filed only on 21.07.2023. Learned counsel submits that the original sanction file, note-sheets, inter-departmental correspondence and Bureau Reports are therefore essential to ascertain whether the sanctioning authority had before it the complete and relevant material and had independently applied its mind before granting sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is further submitted that the Chhattisgarh Lok 9 Aayog had, vide order dated 09.01.2019, already examined substantially the same allegations and properties and had found no material to conclude that the petitioner possessed assets disproportionate to her known sources of income, but the said exculpatory material was not placed before the sanctioning authority. According to learned counsel, the mere recital in the sanction order that the documents were perused cannot cure the fundamental defect of non-application of mind when the contemporaneous record itself reveals repeated rejection of the sanction proposal. 7. Lounsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Trial Court has committed a manifest error in dismissing the petitioner’s applications under Section 94 of the BNSS and Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, as the documents sought by the petitioner are directly relevant to the validity of the prosecution sanction. It is submitted that the record subsequently obtained by the petitioner clearly demonstrates that the proposal for sanction was repeatedly returned by the Law and Legislative Affairs Department on 26.12.2019, 03.01.2020 and 31.01.2020 on the ground that the investigation was incomplete, the Bureau Reports suffered from serious defects and the computation of income and expenditure was erroneous. Despite the aforesaid objections, sanction was ultimately granted on 06.03.2020, while the final report was filed only on 21.07.2023. Learned counsel submits that the original sanction file, note-sheets, inter-departmental 10 correspondence and Bureau Reports are therefore essential to ascertain whether the sanctioning authority had before it the complete and relevant material and had independently applied its mind before granting sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is further submitted that the Chhattisgarh Lok Aayog had, vide order dated 09.01.2019, already examined substantially the same allegations and properties and had found no material to conclude that the petitioner possessed assets disproportionate to her known sources of income, but the said exculpatory material was not placed before the sanctioning authority. According to learned counsel, the mere recital in the sanction order that the documents were perused cannot cure the fundamental defect of non-application of mind when the contemporaneous record itself reveals repeated rejection of the sanction proposal. 8. Learned counsel further submits that the learned Trial Court erroneously relied upon the earlier order dated 22.10.2024, as the subsequent applications were based upon material which came to the knowledge of the petitioner only after inspection of the prosecution’s un-relied documents and obtaining information under the RTI Act, and therefore constituted a distinct and subsequent cause for seeking production of the original record. It is contended that the prosecution cannot be permitted to withhold material documents relating to sanction and thereafter oppose their production when the petitioner seeks to establish that the 11 statutory safeguard under Section 19 has not been complied with. Learned counsel submits that sanction must be preceded by genuine and independent application of mind on the basis of complete and relevant material. It is further submitted that no prejudice would be caused to the prosecution if the original sanction file is summoned, whereas refusal to produce the same would seriously prejudice the petitioner and may compel her to face trial on the basis of an invalid sanction. Learned counsel, therefore, prays that the impugned order dated 23.07.2026 be set aside and the original sanction file and connected records be directed to be produced and the sanctioning authority be permitted to be examined in accordance with law. 9. On the other hand, learned State counsel submits that the learned Special Judge has rightly rejected the application preferred by the petitioner under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C./Section 94 of the BNSS seeking production of the entire prosecution-sanction file and connected documents. It is submitted that the prosecution has already placed on record the prosecution sanction order dated 06.03.2020 issued by the competent authority under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, in respect of Crime No.08/2019. The said sanction order specifically records that the facts collected during investigation and the evidence and documents mentioned in the schedules appended thereto were examined before according sanction for prosecution. According to learned State counsel, the sanction order itself contains the 12 particulars of the material considered by the competent authority and, therefore, there is no justification for summoning the entire original sanction file, internal notings and inter-departmental correspondence at the stage of arguments before charge. It is further submitted that the question at the present stage is whether the material placed along with the charge-sheet discloses sufficient ground for proceeding against the petitioner and not to conduct a roving or fishing inquiry into the administrative process leading to the grant of sanction. Learned State counsel submits that the petitioner would have full opportunity to raise all permissible objections regarding the legality, validity or sufficiency of the sanction while advancing arguments before charge, and the mere assertion that certain correspondence exists between the departments cannot, by itself, render the sanction order invalid or create an automatic right in favour of the accused to summon the entire official record. It is therefore submitted that the learned Trial Court, upon examining the sanction order and the documents referred to therein, has correctly concluded that production of the entire sanction file was neither necessary nor desirable at that stage and has rightly rejected the application under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C./Section 94 of the BNSS. 10. Learned State counsel further submits that the second application preferred by the petitioner under Section 19(1) read with Section 19(4) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 311 of the 13 Cr.P.C. seeking summoning and examination of the sanctioning authority was also rightly rejected. It is contended that the petitioner had earlier filed an application seeking substantially the same relief, namely, summoning and examination of the sanctioning authority for questioning the validity and application of mind in granting prosecution sanction, which was rejected by the learned Trial Court vide order dated 22.10.2024. The said order was admittedly not challenged before the High Court and, therefore, attained finality between the parties. According to the learned State counsel, the petitioner cannot be permitted to repeatedly reagitate an issue which has already been adjudicated merely by filing another application at a subsequent stage. It is further submitted that the sanction order dated 06.03.2020 was passed by the competent authority after considering the facts, evidence and documents collected in Crime No.08/2019 and the schedules appended to the sanction order demonstrate the material which was placed for consideration. Thus, the sanction order, on its face, indicates due consideration of the relevant material and cannot be discarded merely because the petitioner disputes the conclusion reached by the sanctioning authority. Learned State counsel submits that Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked as a matter of right to summon the sanctioning authority merely for the purpose of testing or questioning the administrative satisfaction recorded in the sanction order, particularly when no specific circumstance has been 14 demonstrated warranting such examination at the pre-charge stage. It is therefore submitted that the learned Trial Court was justified in holding that there was no sufficient ground to summon the sanctioning authority or permit its examination before framing of charge. 11. Learned State counsel also submits that the reliance placed by the petitioner upon the correspondence whereby the sanction proposals were allegedly returned on earlier occasions does not, at this stage, establish that the final sanction dated 06.03.2020 was invalid. It is contended that the fact that the prosecuting agency may have been directed to cure certain deficiencies in an earlier proposal does not mean that the competent authority was precluded from subsequently granting sanction after considering the material ultimately placed before it. The final sanction order is required to be examined on the basis of the material and circumstances existing when the sanction was ultimately granted and not merely on the basis of earlier correspondence. It is further submitted that the petitioner seeks to rely upon the order dated 09.01.2019 passed by the Chhattisgarh Lok Aayog, but such proceedings cannot, by themselves, determine the legality of a criminal prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, particularly when the investigating agency subsequently collected material and filed a charge-sheet alleging commission of offences under Sections 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption 15 Act. According to the State, the findings in proceedings before the Lok Aayog and the criminal prosecution are distinct in nature and operate in different fields, and the mere fact that certain properties were earlier examined by the Lok Aayog does not extinguish the criminal liability alleged on the basis of the material collected during investigation. Learned State counsel therefore submits that the petitioner’s reliance upon the Lok Aayog proceedings and the alleged defects in earlier sanction proposals cannot, at the stage of pre-charge arguments, furnish sufficient justification for summoning the entire sanction record or the sanctioning authority. 12. Learned State counsel lastly submits that the impugned order dated 23.07.2026 is a reasoned and speaking order in which the learned Special Judge has considered the rival submissions, examined the sanction order and the material placed on record, and thereafter exercised judicial discretion in refusing to summon additional documents and witnesses at the pre-charge stage. It is submitted that the petitioner has not demonstrated any jurisdictional error, perversity or failure to exercise jurisdiction warranting interference by the High Court. The learned Trial Court has rightly observed that the sanction order itself refers to the facts, evidence and documents considered by the competent authority and that the petitioner would have an opportunity to advance her objections while making submissions on charge. It is therefore contended that allowing the present petition would 16 unnecessarily delay the proceedings and permit the petitioner to reopen matters which have already been considered by the Trial Court. Learned State counsel, accordingly, supports the impugned order dated 23.07.2026 and prays that the petition be dismissed, leaving the petitioner to raise all legally permissible objections regarding the prosecution sanction at the appropriate stage of the proceedings. 13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with petition. 14. The legal position on the issue of quashing of criminal proceedings is well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, FIR or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases and Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the investigations of cognizable offences. However, where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the FIR or the charge-sheet may be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of the B.N.S.S.). 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill reported in (1995) SCC (Cri) 1059, Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi reported in (1999) 3 SCC 259 and Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E Ltd. & Ors 17 reported in 2000 SCC (Cri) 615, the Supreme Court clearly held that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence, Court should not quash the complaint. However, it was held that if the allegations do not constitute any offence as alleged and appear to be patently absurd and improbable, Court should not hesitate to quash the complaint. The note of caution was reiterated that while considering such petitions the Courts should be very circumspect, conscious and careful. Thus, there is no controversy about the legal proposition that in case a prima facie case is made out, the FIR or the proceedings in consequence thereof cannot be quashed. 16. In Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has authoritatively settled the scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). The Apex Court has held that the power to quash criminal proceedings is required to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and only in the rarest of rare cases. It has been categorically observed that while considering a prayer for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings, the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry into the reliability, genuineness or otherwise of the allegations contained in the FIR, nor can it appreciate the evidence or conduct a mini trial. The Court is only required to examine whether the allegations, if taken at their face 18 value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The Supreme Court further emphasized that criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the threshold, that investigation into cognizable offences should ordinarily be permitted to proceed unhindered, and that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be exercised with great caution and self- restraint, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in manifest miscarriage of justice. 17. Very recently, in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 02.09.2025), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the aforesaid principles and further held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS), the High Court cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact or evaluate the evidentiary worth of the material collected during investigation. Unless all these parameters are cumulatively satisfied, the High Court ought not to interfere in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, leaving the parties to establish their respective cases before the trial Court in accordance with law. 18. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order dated 23.07.2026, the applications preferred by the petitioner, the prosecution sanction order dated 06.03.2020 and the material available on record. The principal grievance of the petitioner is that the learned Special Judge ought to have summoned the original sanction file, 19 including the inter-departmental correspondence, note-sheets and other connected documents, and ought to have permitted examination of the sanctioning authority before consideration of charge. However, from the record, it is apparent that the prosecution sanction order dated 06.03.2020 has already been brought on record and the said order specifically records that the facts collected in Crime No.08/2019 and the evidence and documents referred to in the schedules appended thereto were perused and considered by the competent authority before according sanction. The mere fact that certain earlier proposals for sanction were returned with observations or that the petitioner seeks to rely upon such correspondence does not, by itself, establish that the final sanction was granted without application of mind. At this stage, the Court is not required to conduct a roving or fishing inquiry into the internal administrative correspondence preceding the final order of sanction, particularly when the sanction order itself records consideration of the material forming the basis of the prosecution. The learned Special Judge has considered the necessity and relevance of the documents sought by the petitioner and has recorded cogent reasons for declining to summon the entire sanction file at the stage of arguments before charge. We find no perversity or jurisdictional error in such finding. 19. We further find that the application seeking examination of the sanctioning authority under Section 19(1) read with Section 19(4) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. 20 was also rightly rejected. The record demonstrates that the petitioner had earlier preferred an application seeking substantially the same relief, which came to be rejected by the learned Special Judge vide order dated 22.10.2024. The said order was not challenged before this Court and, therefore, attained finality. The petitioner cannot be permitted to repeatedly reagitate the same issue merely by filing another application at a subsequent stage, unless a legally sustainable subsequent circumstance is demonstrated warranting reconsideration. The reliance placed upon the earlier correspondence relating to the sanction proposal and upon the order dated 09.01.2019 passed by the Chhattisgarh Lok Aayog may be relied upon by the petitioner for raising appropriate objections in accordance with law, but such material, by itself, does not render the subsequent prosecution sanction dated 06.03.2020 void or non-existent. The validity and effect of the Lok Aayog proceedings, as also the allegations arising out of the subsequent investigation, are matters which can be considered on the basis of the material available before the Trial Court at the appropriate stage. At present, we are concerned only with the legality of the impugned order refusing to summon the documents and the sanctioning authority. Having regard to the reasons recorded by the learned Special Judge and the nature of the applications preferred by the petitioner, we find that the discretion exercised by the Trial Court does not suffer from any illegality, perversity or material 21 irregularity warranting interference in exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court. 20. It is also pertinent to observe that the petitioner would not be rendered remediless by dismissal of the applications. All permissible objections relating to the validity, sufficiency or legality of the prosecution sanction can be raised by the petitioner at the appropriate stage in accordance with law. The mere availability of certain additional documents or the petitioner’s assertion that such documents may assist her in challenging the sanction cannot, in the facts of the present case, constitute sufficient ground for directing production of the entire sanction record or examination of the sanctioning authority before framing of charge. The learned Special Judge has neither foreclosed the petitioner’s right to raise her objections on merits nor recorded any finding finally adjudicating the validity of the sanction so as to prejudice the petitioner at the subsequent stage. Consequently, we find no ground to interfere with the impugned order dated 23.07.2026. The present petition, being devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet