1 CGHC010248582026 2026:CGHC:34431-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 668 of 2026 1 - Surendra Kumar Dewangan S/o Hira Singh Dewangan Aged About 49 Years R/o Pujaripara, Tong Kongera, P.O. Mangnar, Block Bakawand, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Dr. Lilesh Kumar Sahu S/o Late Prabhu Lal Sahu Aged About 49 Years R/o Rest House Road, Antagad, Kanker, District Kanker, Chhattisgarh. ...Appellants versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department of Panchayat and Rural Development Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2 - Commissioner Bastar Division, Jagdalpur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Chief Executive Officer Zila Panchayat Jagdalpur, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh 4 - Office of The Lok Ayukt Jagdalpur, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh 5 - Smt. Bharti Deewan W/o Late Shri S. K. Deewan, Aged About 53 Years, R/o Amapara, Kothari Chowk, Near Petrol Pump, Kanker, District Kanker, Chhattisgarh. 6 - Smt. Bhavna Dubey Sharma W/o Vimal Sharma, Aged About 46 Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2026.08.11 20:27:20 +0530 2 Years, R/o Rajeev Lochan Chowk, Rajim Gariyaband, District- Gariyaband Chhattisgarh. 7 - Smt. Anshu Minz W/o T. K. Minz, Aged About 48 Years, R/o G.H.S.S. Gangalur, Bijapur, District Bijapur, Chhattisgarh. 8 - Mohammad Salim S/o S. A. Shaikh Mohideen, Aged About 45 Years, R/o Behind Hotel Reekha, Frezerpur, Shanti Nagar, Ward Jagdalpur, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh 9 - Raj Kumar Shukla S/o Shri Shiv Kumar Shukla, Aged About 50 Years, R/o House No. 625, Kargil Chowk, Sunder Nagar, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 10 - Seema Siwana D/o Sunder Lal Siwana, Aged About 42 Years, R/o Ekta Nagar, Thelka Board, P.O. Govindpur, Kanker, District Kanker, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents For Appellants : Mr. Tikeshwar Prasad Kaushik, Advocate. For Respondents/State : Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General. For Respondent No.3 : Mr. Sahdev Yadav, Advocate on behalf of Mr. C.Jayant K. Rao, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J. 06.08.2026 1. Mr. C.Jayant K. Rao, learned counsel for respondent No.3 is stated to be on adjustment till 12.08.2026 and on his behalf Mr. Sahdev Yadav has appeared for respondent No.3. However, 3 considering the fact that no notice has been issued to respondent No.3 in the present appeal, we proceed to hear the matter. 2. Heard Mr. Tikeshwar Prasad Kaushik, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for respondents/State on I.A. No.01/2026, which is an application for condonation of delay of 32 days in preferring the instant appeal. 3. Considering the submission made by the appellants and for the reasons mentioned in the application, I.A. No.01/2026 is allowed and delay of 32 days in filing the present writ appeal is condoned. 4. The appellants have filed this writ appeal against the impugned order dated 09.04.2026, passed by learned Single Judge in WPS No. 3667 of 2022 (Smt. Bharti Deewan and others Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others), by which the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioners. 5. The petitioners had approached the learned Single Judge seeking the following reliefs: “(i) That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to consider claim/representation of the petitioners for reinstatement and to take decision on reinstatement in view of subsequent development i.e. order of acquittal passed by the learned Special Judge and further direction may be issued for reinstatement of the petitioners with all consequential benefit within stipulated time, in the interest of justice. 4 (ii) Any other relief which may be suitable in the facts and circumstances of the case, may also be granted.” 6. The facts giving rise to the litigation are that the appellants/petitioners were appointed on the posts of Shiksha Karmi Grade-I and Grade-II vide appointment order dated 22.07.1998. Subsequently, the Commissioner, Division Jagdalpur, in exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction in Revision Case No. 8/A-89-A/1998-99, cancelled their appointments vide order dated 11.10.1999, on the ground that the documents placed before the Selection Committee had been manipulated. Pursuant thereto, a criminal case was also registered against the appellants. It is not in dispute that the appellants were subsequently acquitted in the said criminal proceedings. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that the criminal proceedings against the appellants have culminated in their acquittal and, therefore, the circumstances which had weighed against them at the relevant point of time no longer survive. It is further submitted that the appointment orders were cancelled without affording the appellants an adequate opportunity of hearing. According to learned counsel, in view of the subsequent acquittal, the appellants are entitled at least to consideration of their claim for reinstatement by the competent authorities. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants would further submit that the appellants had submitted representations before the respondent 5 authorities seeking reinstatement in view of their acquittal, and the relief sought before the learned Single Judge was essentially for consideration and decision upon such representation. It is contended that the appellants are not seeking to bypass the statutory authorities but only seek a direction for consideration of their claim in the light of the subsequent development. On these grounds, it is submitted that the learned Single Judge ought not to have dismissed the writ petition solely on the ground of delay and laches. 9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State would support the order passed by the learned Single Judge. It is submitted that the appellants were appointed as far back as on 22.07.1998 and their appointments were cancelled by the Commissioner, Jagdalpur Division, on 11.10.1999. Despite the cancellation of their appointments, the appellants did not challenge the said order for more than two decades. He would further submit that the writ petition was instituted only in the year 2022, whereas the foundational order cancelling the appointments dated 11.10.1999 has never been challenged. The appellants cannot, by merely seeking consideration of a representation, indirectly seek revival of an appointment which stood cancelled more than twenty years ago. It is therefore contended that the learned Single Judge was fully justified in refusing to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction in favour of the appellants on account of gross and unexplained delay and laches. 6 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the material available on record as well as the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 11. The undisputed chronology of events assumes significance. The appellants were appointed in the year 1998. Their appointments were cancelled by the competent authority vide order dated 11.10.1999. The said order of cancellation was not challenged by the appellants at the relevant point of time. They approached this Court only in the year 2022, i.e. after a lapse of more than two decades. 12. It is true that the appellants seek to rely upon their subsequent acquittal in the criminal case. However, the subsequent acquittal, by itself, cannot obliterate the order dated 11.10.1999 cancelling their appointments, particularly when the said order has remained unchallenged for such a long period. The validity of the cancellation order cannot be indirectly reopened merely by seeking a direction to the authorities to consider a representation for reinstatement. The plea that there is no delay in filing the writ petition cannot be accepted merely because the appellants seek consideration of a representation. The cause of action, if any, substantially arose when their appointments were cancelled on 11.10.1999. A representation made subsequently cannot revive a stale cause of action or extend the period for approaching the constitutional Court. 7 13. The learned Single Judge has considered the matter in the light of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in Bichitrananda Behera v. State of Orissa and others, reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 883, Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648, Union of India v. N. Murugesan, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 25, and Chairman, State Bank of India v. M.J. James, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 301. 14. The principles emerging from the aforesaid judgments are that a belated service-related claim is ordinarily liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches. Though an exception may be made in cases involving a continuing wrong, such exception cannot be invoked where the claim seeks to reopen an old and concluded order affecting settled rights. The doctrine of laches is founded upon equitable considerations and requires the Court to take into account not only the length of delay but also the conduct of the claimant and the prejudice which may result from entertaining a stale claim. 15. In Chairman, State Bank of India v. M.J. James (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphasized that what constitutes reasonable time depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and that a right not exercised for a long period may not be permitted to be enforced through a belated proceeding. The principles of delay, laches and acquiescence are intended to prevent a party from approaching the Court after having remained inactive for an unreasonable period, particularly where such 8 belated intervention may unsettle matters which have attained finality. 16. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, we find no error in the approach adopted by the learned Single Judge. The appellants remained silent for more than twenty years after the cancellation of their appointments. They did not challenge the order dated 11.10.1999 at any stage within a reasonable period. The writ petition filed in the year 2022, therefore, suffers from gross delay and laches. 17. The contention regarding the subsequent acquittal also does not assist the appellants in overcoming the bar of delay and laches. The criminal proceedings and the departmental/administrative action resulting in cancellation of appointment operate in distinct fields. In any event, the appellants were required to challenge the order of cancellation within a reasonable period if they intended to question its legality. Having failed to do so, they cannot seek revival of their appointments after an extraordinary lapse of time merely on the basis of a subsequent development. Equally, the submission that the cancellation order was passed without affording an opportunity of hearing cannot, at this stage, furnish a ground to entertain the writ petition. If the appellants intended to challenge the order on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, such challenge ought to have been brought before the Court within a reasonable period. A stale challenge cannot be 9 resurrected indirectly by seeking consideration of a representation. 18. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the learned Single Judge rightly declined to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court in favour of the appellants. No perversity, illegality or jurisdictional error is demonstrated in the impugned order warranting interference in intra-Court appellate jurisdiction. 19. The writ appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Aadil