- 1 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 13TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 5591 OF 2025 BETWEEN: RANJITH G.R., S/O. RAJU G.S., AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS, R/AT PAVANDRA HOBLI, PIRIYAPATNA TALUK, MAKODO POST, MYSORE DISTRICT - 571 234. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. LETHIF B., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, REPRESENTED BY KUSHALNAGAR TOWN POLICE STATION, KOGAGU DISTRICT, REPRESENTED BY SPP, HIGH COURT BUILDING, BANGALORE - 560 001. 2. VIDHYA G, D/O GANGADHAR K.G, AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS, R/AT NO.1683, K BLOCK, Digitally signed by PADMAVATHI B K Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 RAMAKRISHNA NAGAR, MYSURU CITY - 570 022. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.WAHEEDA M.M., HCGP FOR R1; SRI.SUMANTH ULLOD, ADVOCATE FOR R2) THIS CRL.P. IS FILED U/S 482 OF CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNSS) PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CR.NO.19/2025 FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 69, 115(2), 351(2), 352 OF BNS AND SEC.3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(w), 3(2)(v) OF SC/ST POA ACT OF KUSHAL NAGAR TOWN P.S. ON THE FILE OF PRL.DISTRICT AND SESSION JUDGE KODAGU WHICH IS PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE - A. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioner is before the Court calling in question registration of a crime in Crime No.19/2025 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 69, 115(2), 351(2), 352 of the BNS, 2023 and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(w) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. - 3 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 2. Heard Sri. B. Lethif, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Smt. Waheeda M.M., learned HCGP appearing for respondent No.1, Sri. Sumanth Ullod, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 and have perused the material on record. 3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: The petitioner is the accused and respondent No.2 is the complainant. The petitioner and the complainant known to each other, were in a relationship for over 8.5 years prior to the registration of the complaint. It transpires that during the said period, the relationship between the petitioner and the complainant was physical as well. A complaint comes to be registered by respondent No.2 on the score that for all the years the relationship was on the pretext of marriage and the petitioner has breached the promise of marriage and therefore, it would become an offence under Section 69 of the BNS, 2023. The registration of the crime has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. - 4 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the relationship between the two was close to 9 years and never on the pretext of marriage. Therefore, the said consensual acts on all these 9 years is now projected to become a crime for offence punishable under Section 69 of the BNS, 2023. He would seek quashment of the same. 5. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 - the complainant would submit that she is not interested in pursuing the matter and has filed an application seeking compounding of the offence or withdrawal of the complaint, as the case would be. It reads as follows: "AFFIDAVIT I, Ranjith GR, S/o. Late Raju, Aged about 30 years, R/at: Omkar Extension, Kushal Nagar, Kodagu District- 571234 now at Bengaluru do hereby solemnly affirm and state on oath as hereunder: 1. I state that I am the petitioner in the above case and I know the facts of the case. Hence, I am deposing hereunder. 2. I state that, the second respondent lodged the complaint on 16.03.2025 alleging that I had promised to marry her and that we were in a consensual relationship for a considerable period. In this regard FIR came to be registered in Crime No.19/2025 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 69, 115(2), 351(2) and 352 of the - 5 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Sections 3(s) 3(1)(r) 3(1)(s) 3(1)(w) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 3. I state that, the 2nd respondent filed a complaint under misconception and due to the ill-advice of certain friends and relatives. Now both of us have resolved all our disputes amicably. We no longer have any grievance or claim against each other. 4. I state that, the second respondent has voluntarily agreed to the settlement and has expressed her no objection to the quashing of the FIR and all consequential proceedings arising there from. 5. I state that, I am serving in the Police Department. Due to the registration of the above FIR, departmental disciplinary proceedings have also been initiated against me, which are presently pending. The second respondent has also agreed that she has no objection if the criminal proceedings are quashed and that she will not pursue any grievance in connection with the departmental proceedings. 6. I state that, I am presently married to my wife, Smt. K.L. Sindhu and since the date of my marriage, I have been leading a peaceful and happy matrimonial life with her. I have no intention whatsoever of interfering with the life of the second respondent in any manner. 7. I hereby undertake that I shall immediately return to the second respondent all her belongings, documents or articles, if any, which may be in my possession. 8. I further undertake that I do not possess, nor shall I retain, any photographs, videos or other personal data belongs to the second respondent. In the event any such material is available in my electronic devices or storage, I undertake to permanently delete the same forthwith and not to - 6 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 preserve, circulate, publish or misuse the same in any manner whatsoever. 9. I further undertake that I shall never interfere with the peaceful life of the second respondent, nor shall I contact, threaten, intimidate, harass or cause any inconvenience to her in future. 10. I state that, the present settlement has been arrived at voluntarily, out of the free will of both parties, without any force, coercion, undue influence or pressure from any quarter. The continuation of the criminal proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only result in unnecessary hardship to both parties. Wherefore; I humbly pray that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to permit the parties to compound the offence, consequently quash the FIR in Crime No.19/2025 for the offences punishable under section 69, 115(2), 351(2), 352 of BNS and Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(w), 3(2)(v) of SC and the ST (PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES) Act, 1989 of Kushalnagar Town Police Station on the file of I Additional District and Session Judge, Kodagu, in the interests of justice. " 5. Both on the issue that the settlement has been arrived at between the parties and the facts in the case at hand would not even meet the ingredients of the offences under Section 69 of the BNS, 2023, the crime requires to be obliterated. 6. The view of mine, is in consonance with the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of: - 7 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 i) PRADEEP KUMAR KESARWANI V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADES AND ANOTHER1, wherein at paragraph-18 has held as follows: "18. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case where there is a promise of marriage, the Court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls in the ambit of cheating or deception." ii) SAMADHAN V. STATE OF MAHARASTHRA AND ANOTHER2, wherein it has held as follows: "28. We find that the present case is not a case where the appellant lured respondent No. 2 solely for physical pleasures and then vanished. The relationship continued for a period of three long years, which is a considerable period of time. They remained close and emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage. 1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947 2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528 - 8 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken relationships are given the colour of criminality. The offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases where there exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter of profound concern and calls for condemnation. 30. In Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764, this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed that a mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage. The relevant portion is extracted as under: “20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n)IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's statement under Section 164CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage from - 9 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship. Further, both parties are now married to someone else and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution.” (underlining by us) 31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in which, in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage holds deep social and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not uncommon for a woman to repose complete faith in her partner and to consent to physical intimacy on the assurance that such a relationship would culminate in a lawful and socially recognised marriage. In such circumstances, the promise of marriage becomes the very foundation of her consent, rendering it conditional rather than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such consent may stand vitiated where it is established that the promise of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The law must remain sensitive to such genuine cases where trust has - 10 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 been breached and dignity violated, lest the protective scope of Section 376 of the IPC be reduced to a mere formality for those truly aggrieved. At the same time, the invocation of this principle must rest upon credible evidence and concrete facts, and not on unsubstantiated allegations or moral conjecture. 33. The appellant has unequivocally asserted that, during the subsistence of the relationship, no grievance or allegation was ever raised by respondent No. 2 regarding the absence of consent in their physical relations. It was only upon the appellant's refusal to fulfil her demand for payment of the sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- that the present criminal proceedings came to be instituted. Furthermore, the alleged incidents are stated to have occurred between 12.03.2022 and 20.05.2024; however, the FIR was lodged only on 31.08.2024, i.e. nearly three months after the last alleged act of sexual intimacy. 34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled respondent No. 2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor does it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her presence there. Therefore, the only logical inference that emerges is that respondent No. 2, of her own volition, visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It is also borne out from the record that whenever the appellant brought up the subject of marriage, respondent No. 2 herself opposed the proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of - 11 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 respondent No. 2 that the physical relationship between the parties was premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of merit and stands unsustainable. 35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of this Court in Rajnish Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 197, whereby it was held that when a woman who willingly engages in a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully aware of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show that such relationship was induced by misconception of fact or false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the inception, the man cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of the IPC. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as under: “33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006 onwards, the complainant and the appellant were residing in different towns. The complainant is an educated woman and there was no pressure whatsoever upon her which could have prevented her from filing a police complaint against the accused if she felt that the sexual relations were under duress or were being established under a false assurance of marriage. On many occasions, she even portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant thereby, dispelling the allegation that the intention of the appellant was to cheat her right from the inception of the relationship. 34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it was mostly the complainant who used to travel to meet the appellant at his place of posting. Therefore, - 12 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 we are convinced that the relationship between the complainant and the appellant was consensual without the existence of any element of deceit or misconception. 35. Further, the application filed by the complainant at One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3- 2022, makes it abundantly clear that she was in a consensual relationship with the appellant since 2006. It is alleged in the complaint that when she had proposed that they should marry and live together, the appellant physically abused her and beat her up. If at all there was an iota of truth in this allegation then the FIR should have been registered immediately after this incident. However, it is only when it came to the knowledge of the complainant that the appellant was getting married to another woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she filed aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Centre wherein she also admitted that she was equally guilty as the appellant and therefore, his marriage must be stopped. xxx 39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court has also recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused.” (underlining by us) 36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High Court observed that although it was contended on - 13 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 behalf of the appellant that the relationship between him and respondent No. 2 was consensual in nature, no such categorical statement was made by him in the memo of application and that the plea of consent was merely inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed by the High Court on the case of Ganga Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 7 SCC 278 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 505 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 314, wherein this Court had stated that unless there was a specific defence of a consensual relationship, such a defence cannot be inferred. 37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in question itself reveals that the relationship between the parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent No. 2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the marriage of respondent No. 2 was subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the material on record, it is manifest that the relationship between the parties was consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasised in the impugned order, cannot be held against the appellant when the same can be otherwise clearly discerned. - 14 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of this Court in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations were made: “29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to amount to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such consent was given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660], in which it was held as follows : (SCC pp. 682- 84, paras 21 & 24) “21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved - 15 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. xxx 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The ‘failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance’. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very - 16 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” (underlining by us)" iii) ANKIT TOMAR V. STATE OF HARYANA3, wherein it has held as follows: "5. We have gone through the FIR in the above case, wherein the complainant was working in a Massage Parlour and was also in-charge of the same; having been so entrusted by the owner. The appellant is alleged to have come to the Parlour as a customer and then had a physical relationship with her. It is stated that the relationship continued for some time and the complainant permitted the relationship only because the appellant had promised to marry her. It is also alleged that despite the promise made to the complainant, the appellant married another girl and hence the said complaint is filed. 6. The contention of the appellant is that the appellant had consensual relationship with the complainant and later married another on 12.03.2024 when the complaint was raised. It is the specific defence that the complainant was married and had two children and there was no reason for the appellant to extend a promise of marriage, which in any event would not have been possible. 7. We are unable to find any distinction insofar as the application of the principles declared in Amol Bhagwan Nehul. Looking at the facts of the said case, this Court was persuaded to quash the complaint on four grounds. Firstly, the Court noticed that even if the allegations in the FIR are true and correct, there appears to be consent on the part of the complainant. Especially when she admits that they fell in love and interacted frequently and 3 2026 SCC OnLine SC 436 - 17 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 engaged in a physical relationship. Then, it was noticed that the consent as coming out from the facts and circumstances cannot be said to be either on ‘inducement or misrepresentation’ or on the basis of a ‘coercion or threat of injury’. Lastly, it was found that the complainant being married and having a child of four years, there is no possibility of a deception having been employed in the form of a promise to marry, for engaging in physical relationship. 8. The reading of the FIR indicates that the dictum is squarely applicable. The complainant was employed in a massage parlour and was also entrusted with the running of the same. The appellant had visited the parlour as a customer and it was within the premises of the parlour, where the complainant was in charge, the couple had physical relationship, even as per the allegation in the FIS. The relationship is said to have commenced in August 2023 and is said to have continued till March 2024; obviously and admittedly consensual. It is also the case of the prosecutrix that on 15.03.2024, she informed the appellant about her pregnancy and then he quarrelled with her. Admittedly the marriage of the appellant took place on 12.03.2024 after which the FIR was registered alleging a quarrel on 15.03.2024, three days after the marriage. The complainant is married and a mother of two children, as the FIS itself indicates. There is no allegation that she was divorced from her husband or even separated from him. We are convinced that as in the cited decision, there was a consensual relationship, neither inducement nor threat and no possibility of a deception luring the complainant into a physical relationship on the pretext of marriage. 9. We are of the opinion that there is no reason to wait for the FSL report since even if the child, who passed away, is found to be of the appellant, the consent demolishes the case of the complainant that there was rape on the promise of marriage. We hence find absolutely no reason to sustain the order of the High Court. We set aside the order of the High Court and quash the criminal proceedings in FIR No. 127 dated 28.03.2024 of the Police Station Kheripul, District - Faridabad and - 18 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010258252025 NC: 2026:KHC:42985 CRL.P No. 5591 of 2025 there shall be no further proceedings on the said FIR. The bail bonds executed by the appellant shall stand cancelled." 7. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) The petition is allowed. (ii) Proceedings in Crime No.19/2025 stand quashed qua the petitioner. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE SJK List No.: 1 Sl No.: 3