1 CGHC010289452026 2026:CGHC:35454-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2118 of 2026 1 - Pardeshi Ram Sonkar Son of Sakharam Sonkar, Aged About 58 Years Resident of Sarona, Near B.S.U.P. Colony, Police Station D.D.Nagar Raipur District, Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - Jagat Ram Sonkar, Son of Shakharam Sonkar, Aged About 61 Years Resident of B.S.U.P. Colony, Police Station D.D.Nagar, Raipu,r District, Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioners versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through- Police Stastion D.D. Nagar Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Mahendra Sachdev, Son of Late Trilokchand Sachdev, Aged About 50 Years Resident of Fafadih Raipur District Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Petitioners : Mr. Purnendra Khichariya, Advocate For Respondent No.1/State : Mr. Saumya Rai, Dy. Govt. Advocate ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hon'ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 12.08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Purnendra Khichariya, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Mr. Saumya Rai, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent No.1. 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioners under Section 528 of the Bharariya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 with the following prayers :- ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA 2 “i. That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the instant petition under section 528 of B.N.S.S. 2023 filed by the petitioner in the interest of justice. ii. The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the F.I.R. bearing no. 159/2023 registered as police station D.D. Nagar Raipur u/s 420, 34 of I.P.C in the interest of justice. iii. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash/set-aside the cognizance taken by the Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Raipur has taken cognizance on 29.01.2024 u/s 420, 34 of I.P.C. in Criminal Case No. 696/2024 before Learned JMFC Raipur District Raipur (C.G.) in the interest of justice. iv. That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly pleased to quash the entire charge sheet filed on dated 05.09. 20.03.2023 before learned JMFC Raipur District 4 Raipur (C.G.), (in Criminal Case No. 696/2024) for the offence committed under Section 420, 34 of IPC in the interest of justice. v. That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly pleased to quash the entire Criminal proceeding initiated in Criminal Case No. 696/2024 for the offence committed under 420, 34 of IPC arising out of the FIR No. 159/2023 registered at Police station D.D. Nagar Raipur u/s 420, 34 of I.P.C. in the interest of justice.” 3. As per the prosecution story, the complainant, namely Mahendra Sachdev, appeared before Police Station D.D. Nagar, Raipur and submitted a written complaint stating that he is an agriculturist and is also engaged in the business of brick manufacturing/ construction. It is alleged that the petitioners approached the complainant and offered to sell their land bearing Khasra No.827, 3 admeasuring 0.247 hectare, situated at Sarona, Patwari Halka No.104 (New Revenue Circle No.56), R.N.M. No.01, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. It is further alleged that the petitioners, along with their sisters, being co-owners of the aforesaid property, held discussions with the complainant and agreed to sell the land for a total consideration of Rs.50,00,000/-. Pursuant thereto, the complainant allegedly paid an earnest amount of Rs.10,00,000/- and received the Rin Pustika relating to the land, and thereafter allegedly issued two cheques of Rs.5,00,000/- each dated 10.02.2019 and 22.04.2019, out of which an amount of Rs.5,50,000/- was allegedly withdrawn, with the parties allegedly agreeing to execute the sale deed on or before 30.07.2019. It is also an admitted circumstance that the complainant was engaged in the business of bricks and, during the course of the dealings between the parties, bricks worth Rs.3,80,000/- were agreed to be supplied/sold to the petitioners. It is the case of the petitioners that the proposed sale of the land was subject to the consent of the other co-owners and that, on the date fixed for registration, due to a misunderstanding and failure on the part of the complainant to make payment of the remaining agreed consideration, the sale deed could not be executed. The petitioners had already paid/adjusted an amount of approximately Rs.23,80,000/- towards the transaction, as asserted by them. Thereafter, being aggrieved by the non-execution of the sale deed, the complainant submitted a complaint before the police on 4 10.11.2022, and subsequently, on the basis of the written report dated 05.09.2023, FIR bearing Crime No.159/2023 was registered at Police Station D.D. Nagar, Raipur for offences punishable under Sections 420 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur, wherein congizance has been taken on 29.01.2024 and fixed the matter for argument on charge dated 12.08.2026. Being aggrieved by the same instant petition has been filed filed petitioners with the aforesaid prayers. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the present criminal prosecution against the petitioners is nothing but an abuse of the process of law, as the allegations contained in the FIR, even if taken at their face value, essentially disclose a dispute arising out of a proposed sale transaction relating to immovable property and do not disclose the essential ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. He further submitted that it is an admitted position from the prosecution story itself that the parties had entered into negotiations regarding sale of the land bearing Khasra No.827 and that the complainant had paid certain amounts towards the proposed transaction, thereby demonstrating that the transaction was a consensual commercial transaction between the parties. There is no allegation supported by any specific material showing that, at the very inception of the transaction, the petitioners had a 5 fraudulent or dishonest intention to deceive the complainant or that they had induced the complainant to part with money by making a false representation which they knew to be false. He also submitted that the petitioners are ready to execute the sale deed in favour of the complainant, but since the co-owners are not agree to sell the said property, which is an ancestral property, they could not execute the same. He contended that the complainant himself admits the existence of negotiations, payment of consideration/earnest money and an agreement regarding execution of the sale deed, which clearly establishes that the dispute arose subsequently in relation to completion of the transaction. The mere fact that the sale deed was not ultimately executed cannot automatically lead to an inference that the petitioners had dishonest intention from the beginning. It is further submitted that the allegations against the petitioners do not disclose any specific act of deception, fraudulent representation or dishonest inducement attributable to any particular petitioner. The invocation of Section 34 IPC also cannot cure the absence of the substantive ingredients of Section 420 IPC, since common intention cannot create an offence where the foundational offence itself is not made out. The considerable delay between the alleged transaction of the year 2019 and the lodging of the complaint in 2022, followed by registration of the FIR only in 2023, further demonstrates that the criminal proceedings have been initiated after considerable lapse of time and appear to be an attempt to 6 exert pressure upon the petitioners in relation to a disputed property transaction. It is therefore submitted that the present case falls within the settled principles governing exercise of inherent jurisdiction, as continuation of criminal proceedings in respect of what is essentially a contractual/civil dispute, without the necessary dishonest intention from inception, would amount to abuse of the process of law. 5. Per contra, learned State counsel opposed the petition and submitted that the allegations made in the FIR and the material collected during investigation prima facie disclose the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners. He further submitted that the complainant had paid substantial amounts towards the proposed sale consideration and, despite receipt of the same, the petitioners failed to execute the sale deed, thereby causing wrongful loss to the complainant. It was contended that the question whether the petitioners had dishonest intention from the inception, whether the amount was actually received towards the sale transaction, and whether the petitioners were responsible for non-execution of the sale deed are matters requiring appreciation of evidence and cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court. He further submitted that after completion of investigation, charge-sheet has already been filed and cognizance has been taken by the learned Trial Court, and therefore, there is sufficient prima facie material to 7 proceed against the petitioners. Accordingly, learned State counsel prayed for dismissal of the petition. 6. We have heard rival submission advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned FIR, charge-sheet as well as order taking cognizance. 7. The scope of interference under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court is well settled. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon'ble Supreme Court illustratively enumerated the categories of cases wherein the extraordinary power to quash criminal proceedings may be exercised. The Court simultaneously cautioned that such power is to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, and only in the rarest of rare cases. The present case does not fall within any of the categories formulated in Bhajan Lal (supra) warranting interference. 8. Likewise, in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that while exercising jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings, the High Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial or evaluate the correctness of the allegations. If the allegations in the First Information Report, taken at their face value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the Court should ordinarily refrain from stalling the prosecution. The Court further held that disputed questions of fact and the defence of the accused are matters to be considered during trial and not at the stage of quashing. 8 9. Very recently, in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 02.09.2025), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the aforesaid principles and further held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS), the High Court cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact or evaluate the evidentiary worth of the material collected during investigation. The Court reaffirmed the test laid down in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor and observed that criminal proceedings can be quashed at the threshold only when the material relied upon by the accused is of sterling and impeccable quality, completely demolishes the prosecution case, remains incapable of being refuted by the prosecution, and continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of Court. Unless all these parameters are cumulatively satisfied, the High Court ought not to interfere in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, leaving the parties to establish their respective cases before the trial Court in accordance with law. 10. In the present case, the prosecution alleges that the petitioners entered into an agreement/understanding with the complainant for sale of the property, received substantial amounts towards the proposed sale consideration and thereafter failed to execute the sale deed. The contention of the petitioners that they had no dishonest intention from the inception and that the sale could not be completed because of the non-consent of the other co-owners 9 constitutes a matter of defence which requires appreciation of the evidence and cannot be conclusively adjudicated in the present proceedings. 11. It is true that, for an offence under Section 420 IPC, dishonest or fraudulent intention must exist at the inception of the transaction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karnataka Bank Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others, 2024 INSC 49, has reiterated that dishonest intention at the time of inducement is an essential ingredient of cheating. However, whether such dishonest intention existed in the present case is itself a disputed question of fact which cannot be determined merely on the basis of the defence set up by the petitioners. The prosecution material, taken at its face value, contains allegations regarding payment of substantial consideration, the proposed sale of the property and subsequent failure to execute the sale deed. Thus, it cannot be said at this stage that the allegations are inherently absurd, inherently improbable or that no offence is disclosed against the petitioners. 12. The mere existence of a civil remedy or the fact that the dispute arises from a property transaction does not, by itself, bar criminal prosecution where the factual allegations also prima facie disclose the ingredients of a criminal offence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh & Another, and in several subsequent decisions, has consistently recognised that the same set of facts may, in an appropriate case, give rise to both civil and criminal consequences, and the existence of a civil dispute cannot 10 by itself be a ground for quashing criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court has also observed that the real question is whether the allegations disclose the ingredients of the alleged criminal offence. 13. In the present case, the plea of the petitioners that they were ready and willing to execute the sale deed but could not do so because the property was ancestral and the other co-owners were not agreeable is a matter which can be established by leading appropriate evidence before the learned Trial Court. Likewise, the effect of the payments allegedly made by the complainant, the circumstances in which such payments were received, the terms of the proposed transaction, the role of each petitioner and the reason for non-execution of the sale deed are all matters of evidence. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot embark upon an enquiry into the correctness or otherwise of such disputed factual assertions. 14. The delay in lodging the complaint, though relied upon by the petitioners, is also not by itself sufficient to conclude that the prosecution is false or malicious, particularly when the charge- sheet has already been filed and the learned Trial Court has taken cognizance of the offences. It is further relevant that the matter is presently at the stage of consideration of charge and the learned Trial Court is competent to examine whether the material collected during investigation is sufficient to proceed against the petitioners. 11 15. The principles governing exercise of inherent jurisdiction cannot be invoked for the purpose of conducting a detailed appreciation of evidence or determining the probable defence of the accused. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphasised that the High Court, while considering a petition for quashing, must not enter into disputed questions of fact or evaluate the evidence as if conducting a trial. Therefore, at this stage, this Court finds that the case does not fall within any of the exceptional categories recognised in Bhajan Lal (supra) warranting interference with the criminal proceedings. The material on record, when considered in its entirety and at its face value, prima facie discloses the commission of the alleged offences and the defence raised by the petitioners cannot be accepted at this stage so as to terminate the prosecution. Consequently, this Court is not inclined to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in favour of the petitioners. 16. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed. 17. Registrar (Judicial) is directed to send a copy of this order to the concerned Trial Court today itself informing it that the present petition filed by the petitioners has been dismissed by this Court and today is the date fixed for argument on charge, the Trial Court may proceed with the framing of charge. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Chandra