1 CGHC010219292023 2026:CGHC:35545-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1426 of 2023 1 - Anis Lakra S/o Shri Athnas Lakra Aged About 24 Years R/o Dugoli, Bijapur, Dist. Bijapur (C.G.) ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate, Bijapur, District Bijapur (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) (cause title taken from CIS) For Appellant (s) : Mr. Ishan Verma, Advocate For State For Complainant/ Victim : : Ms. Anusha Naik, Dy. Govt. Advocate Mr. Ashutosh Mishra, Advocate Hon'ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 12.08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Ishan Verma, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Ms. Anusha Naik, Dy. Govt. Advocate for the Respondent/ State and Mr. Ashutosh Mishra, leaned counsel for the complainant/ victim. 2. Mr. Aditya Kumar Mishra, arguing counsel for the appellant is on SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2026.08.19 15:03:14 +0530 2 adjustment today and Mr. Ishan Verma, Advocate is appeared to argue the appeal on behalf of the appellant. The appellant is in jail since 16.01.2022. Considering his period of incarceration, and in view of the fact that his application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, has already been rejected, with the consent of the parties, the present appeal has been heard finally. 3. The present criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant under Section 374(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 19.04.2023 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC) South Bastar, Dantewada, in Special Sessions (POCSO) Case No. 11/2022 (Crime No. 35/2021, P.S. Naimed) whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced under Section 376 (3) of IPC and Section 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012 (in short ‘POCSO Act’) and sentence him R.I for 20 years and a fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine, further R.I for 1 year. 4. The case of the prosecution is that the victim (PW/1) was acquainted with the appellant, who was her neighbour, and according to her version, she had a love affair with the appellant since the year 2017. It is alleged that on the pretext of marrying her, the appellant established physical relations with her repeatedly, as a consequence of which she became pregnant. When the victim asked the appellant to marry her, he refused and allegedly asked her to take medicines for termination of the pregnancy and threatened her. It is further alleged that the appellant came to the house of the victim and torn her Class-III, Class- VIII and Class-X marksheets and the passbook of Central Bank and also snatched her mobile phone. On the basis of the written complaint 3 submitted by the victim on 27.12.2021, the Police registered FIR (Ex.P/2) at Police Station Naimed, District Bijapur, initially for the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. During the course of investigation, the victim and her relatives were examined and her medical examination was conducted by PW/7 with their consent. The Investigating Officer seized the documents relating to the age of the victim, including the Dakhil-Kharij Panji, and prepared the spot map. The statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was also recorded. The medical report was marked as Ex.P/18, while the sonography reports were marked as Ex.P/19 and Ex.P/20. The appellant was thereafter arrested on 16.01.2022 and was medically examined by PW/8 Dr. Rao Saheb, who opined vide Ex.P/10 that the appellant was capable of performing sexual intercourse. After completion of the investigation, the Police filed the charge-sheet against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 427 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. 5. The learned Trial Court framed charges against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376(3), 506 Part-II and 427 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The appellant abjured his guilt, denied the charges levelled against him, and claimed to be tried. 6. In order to prove the charges against the appellant, the prosecution examined as many as 09 witnesses. The statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also recorded, wherein he denied the incriminating circumstances 4 appearing against him, pleaded innocence and stated that he had not committed the alleged offence. 7. After appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant and sentence him as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment, hence this appeal. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the present case. The prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and that the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are contrary to the evidence available on record. It is argued that the learned Trial Court has erred in holding the victim to be a minor and has relied upon the Dakhil-Kharij Panji (Ex.P/23-C), though PW/9 admitted that she had not herself entered the date of birth in the said register and that the basis on which the date of birth was recorded was not mentioned therein. It is further submitted that the parents of the victim had also not disclosed her date of birth and that the prosecution failed to establish the age of the victim in accordance with law. It is submitted that the victim herself, in her deposition, stated that the appellant had established physical relations with her about five years prior to her examination and that, if her date of birth is taken as 10.05.2004, the occurrence would relate to the year 2017, when she was approximately 17 years of age, and therefore the conviction under Section 376(3) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act is not sustainable. Learned counsel would further submit that the evidence of the victim clearly indicates that she and the appellant were in a love affair, used to move together and that she voluntarily maintained 5 physical relations with the appellant without any resistance. It is further submitted that the victim herself stated that she still desired to marry the appellant, which supports the defence case regarding their consensual relationship. Learned counsel would further submit that the victim has, in fact, married the appellant when the appellant was released on parole and is presently residing in the house of the appellant along with his parents, which further demonstrates the continuing relationship between the parties. It is argued that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate these material circumstances and erroneously treated the consent of the victim as wholly irrelevant. In these circumstances, it is submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence deserves to be set aside and the appellant deserves to be acquitted of the charges levelled against him. 9. Per contra, learned State counsel supports the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence and submits that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt by leading cogent, convincing and reliable oral as well as documentary evidence. It is submitted that the age of the victim has been duly established from the Dakhil-Kharij Panji (Ex.P/23-C), which records her date of birth as 10.05.2004, and the said document has been duly proved through the testimony of PW/9, the Head Mistress, as well as the evidence of the Investigating Officer. On the date of the incident in the year 2018, the victim was below 16 years of age and, therefore, any alleged consent on her part is of no legal consequence. It is further submitted that the testimony of the victim (PW/1) clearly establishes that the appellant, on the pretext of marriage, established physical relations with her and 6 that, as a consequence thereof, she became pregnant. Her testimony is corroborated by the evidence of her mother (PW/2) and the medical evidence on record. Learned State counsel further submits that the medical examination conducted by PW/7 Dr. Shilpa Nayak revealed that the victim was pregnant and that the pregnancy was of 21 weeks and 2 days, as confirmed by sonography, which materially corroborates the prosecution case. It is argued that the fact that the victim and the appellant were acquainted with each other and were in a love relationship, or that the victim did not resist the appellant, cannot exonerate the appellant when the victim was admittedly below the age prescribed by law. The learned State counsel would further submit that the subsequent conduct of the victim, including her expressed desire to marry the appellant, cannot retrospectively validate the sexual acts committed when she was a minor. It is further contended that the defence has not produced any reliable material to discredit the school record regarding the victim's date of birth or to establish that the said record was fabricated or otherwise unreliable. Learned State counsel submits that the learned Trial Court has carefully appreciated the oral, medical and documentary evidence available on record and has rightly concluded that the prosecution proved the charges under Section 376(3) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, beyond reasonable doubt. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is based on proper appreciation of evidence and does not call for any interference by this Court; accordingly, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7 10.Learned counsel appearing for the victim submits that the victim has no objection if the appellant is acquitted of the charges. It is submitted that during the pendency of the present appeal, when the appellant was released for a short period on parole, the appellant and the victim solemnized their marriage on 19.05.2025 and she since been residing in the house of the appellant together peacefully as husband and wife. In support of the aforesaid submission, learned counsel has placed on record the Marriage Registration Certificate, issued by the Registrar of marriages, District- Bijapur (CG) and an affidavit of the victim herself, wherein she has categorically affirmed that she voluntarily solemnized her marriage with the appellant on 19.05.2025. Learned counsel, therefore, prays that the aforesaid subsequent development, along with the Marriage Registration Certificate filed as (Annexure I/1), be taken into consideration while adjudicating the present appeal, as the same has a material bearing on the matter and deserves due consideration in the interest of justice. 11.We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the learned trial Court. 12.The first and the foremost question arises for consideration would be as to age of the victim whether she was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident or not. 13.The prosecution has mainly relied upon Ex.P/23-C, which is the attested true copy of the Dakhil-Kharij Panji (Admission Register) of the school, to establish the age of the victim. The said document has been sought to be proved through PW/9, the Head Mistress of the concerned school. PW/9 deposed that, pursuant to the requisition issued by the Police, she produced the original Dakhil-Kharij Panji 8 before the Investigating Officer, which was thereafter seized in accordance with the seizure proceedings, and the original register was subsequently handed over to her on Supurdnama. As per the relevant entry in the said register, the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 10.05.2004. However, in her deposition, PW/9 admitted that she had not herself made the entry regarding the date of birth of the victim in the said register. She further admitted that the basis on which the date of birth of the victim was recorded as 10.05.2004 was not mentioned in the Dakhil-Kharij Panji. It is also the specific case of the appellant that the parents of the victim had not disclosed her date of birth and that the prosecution did not examine the person who had actually made the relevant entry or the person who had furnished the information regarding the date of birth at the time of admission. Thus, the challenge raised by the appellant is that, apart from the certified copy of the Dakhil-Kharij Panji, no independent foundational document or evidence has been brought on record to establish the original source or basis of the date of birth recorded therein. 14.The Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the admissibility and evidentiary value of the school register with respect to the age of the victim. In paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: "40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under 9 Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as 10 exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regardto the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the victim although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded,the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 11 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 15. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under: "33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub- section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 12 2015 Act, declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and 13 other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015." 16. In case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : "14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 14 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the 15 provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3) (a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference." 17. Reverting to the facts of the present case, when we examine the testimony of the victim (PW/1), we find that she stated in her examination-in-chief that her date of birth is 10.05.2004. However, the victim did not state any facts indicating that she had personal knowledge of her exact date of birth or that the said date was within her independent knowledge. Her mother and sister, who were also examined by the prosecution, did not depose regarding the date of birth of the victim. Therefore, there is no independent evidence disclosing the original source or basis of the date of birth recorded therein. 18. PW-2, the mother of the victim, did not state anything regarding the date of birth or exact age of the victim. Similarly, the evidence of PW-3, the sister of the victim, also does not establish the date of birth of the victim. The prosecution has, therefore, not brought any oral evidence from the family members of the victim regarding her date of birth. 16 19.There is no other evidence like birth certificate or ossification test report to determine the age of the victim. As has been observed that the school record has not been proved in accordance with law, the victim and her parents have also not disclosed her date of birth, it cannot be said that the prosecution is able to prove that the victim was less than 18 years of age on the date of incident, yet the learned trial Court found her minor. Therefore, we disagree with the said finding of the learned trial Court. 20.So far as the offence under Section 376(3) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act are concerned, we have carefully examined the evidence of the victim (PW-1). 21.The victim (PW-1) has stated in her evidence that the appellant has made physical relation with her on the pretext of marriage. By the act of the appellant, she conceived pregnancy and delivered a male child. Thereafter, she lodged the report to the Police. At this stage, she was declared hostile and then she stated that the appellant forced her for abortion at the time when she conceived pregnancy and he torned her primary and high school mark-sheet. In cross examination, she admitted that she and the appellant were residing in the same vicinity and she knew him since his childhood. They are good friend and used to visit the houses of each other. They also used to visit various places together. She admitted that she has never resisted the appellant in making physical relation with her and she still wanted to marry with him. From the evidence of the victim, it clearly transpires that she was in love affair with the appellant and voluntarily engaged in making physical relation on her own will without raising any objection or pretext. When the prosecution has not proved that the victim was minor 17 and the evidence suggests that she consensually engaged in making physical relation as she was having love affair with him, she permitted the pregnancy to be continued up till its delivery and has not lodged any report. It clearly demonstrate that she was the consenting party in making physical relation with the appellant and she still wanted to marry with him. From the statement made by complainant, at the time of hearing of the appeal that the victim had married with the appellant at the time when she was temporarily released on parole and residing with his parents in his house which also supports the defence that the victim on her own will engaged in making physical relation with him. 22.In the matter of Dola @ Dolagobinda Pradhan Vs. State of Odisha, reported in (2018) 18 SCC 695, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Para 9 :- 9. However, as is also evident from the observations above, such reliance may be placed only if the testimony of the victim appears to be worthy of credence. In this regard, it is also relevant to note the following observations of this Court in Raju v. State of M.P. 4, which read thus: (SCC p. 141, paras 10-11) "10. The aforesaid judgments lay down the basic principle that ordinarily the evidence of a victim should not be suspected and should be believed, more so as her statement has to be evaluated on a par with that of an injured witness and if the evidence is reliable, no corroboration is necessary. Undoubtedly, the aforesaid observations must carry the greatest weight and we respectfully agree with them, but at the same time they cannot be universally and mechanically applied to the facts of every case of sexual assault which comes before the court. 11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the In the 18 matter of Dola @ Dolagobinda Pradhan Vs. State of Odisha, reported in (2018) 18 SCC 695, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Para 9 :- 9. However, as is also evident from the observations above, such reliance may be placed only if the testimony of the victim appears to be worthy of credence. In this regard, it is also relevant to note the following observations of this Court in Raju v. State of M.P. 4, which read thus: (SCC p. 141, paras 10-11) 23. "10. The aforesaid judgments lay down the basic principle that ordinarily the evidence of a victim should not be suspected and should be believed, more so as her statement has to be evaluated on a par with that of an injured witness and if the evidence is reliable, no corroboration is necessary. Undoubtedly, the aforesaid observations must carry the greatest weight and we respectfully agree with them, but at the same time they cannot be universally and mechanically applied to the facts of accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration." Having due regard in our mind to the abovementioned settled position in law, we have assessed the entire material on record meticulously. 24.In the case of Raju Vs. State of MP (2008) 15 SCC 133 in para 11, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against 19 the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration.” 25.PW/2, who is the mother of the victim, she stated in her evidence that the appellant used to come to her house in night. Her daughter gave birth to a child which is born from the appellant side. She also declared hostile and then she stated that her daughter informed her that she is liking the appellant and the appellant also likes her. They wanted to reside together and wanted to marry with each other. She convinced them that they were minor and they could marry only after attaining the age of majority despite that they used to meet each other. She further admitted that the appellant used to stay in the night in her house. In the month of July, 2021, her daughter informed her that the appellant made physical relation with her on the pretext of marriage and now she is engaged in someone else. At that time, her daughter was carrying pregnancy of about five months. In cross-examination, she admitted that the victim has never raised any objection and never made any complaint to her about forceful sexual intercourse by appellant. She too admitted that the victim and the appellant were in love affair. 26.PW/3, sister of the victim also stated that the appellant used to meet the victim and wanted to marry with her. At the time when the victim carrying pregnancy of about three months, the appellant refused to 20 marry with her and then report has been lodged. This witness too have declared hostile and she too have admitted that there was a love affair between the appellant and the victim, both of them having physical relation. In cross-examination, she also stated that the victim has never made any complaint that she was forcefully subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant rather she admitted that both of them were having love affair, due to which they engaged in making consensual physical relation. The victim has never made any complaint to anyone. 27.These evidences clearly comes to show that the victim was in love affair with the appellant and engaged in making consensual physical relation, by which she conceived pregnancy and ultimately delivered a child. Subsequent to that she has already married with the appellant when he was temporary released on parole and as per the statement made by learned counsel for the victim, she is still residing with the parents of the appellants. 28.The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of the victim's evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. There is contradiction and omissions in the statement of the victim and her parents. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges 21 levelled against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 29.Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellants are hereby Allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentences dated 19.04.2023 passed against the appellant are set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the charges. 30.The appellant is reported to be in jail since 16.01.2022. He shall be released forthwith if not required in any other case. 31.Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 32.The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Sagrika