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2026 DAILYLAW 32670 (CHH)

SANTOSH CHOUHAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

CRA/836/2021 · 2026-08-11

Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal

Criminal Appealbody2026

Judgment text

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1 CGHC010196202021 2026:CGHC:35522-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 836 of 2021 Santosh Chouhan S/o Shri Chottelal Chouhan Aged About 28 Years R/o Budhwari Bazaar, Korba, Police Station- Kotwali, Korba, Presently Residing At Dewangan Para, P.S.- Kotwali, Kawardha, District- Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh., District : Kawardha (Kabirdham), Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Of Police Station- Kawardha, District- Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh., District : Kawardha (Kabirdham), Chhattisgarh --- Respondent (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Ashutosh Shukla, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Sumit Singh, Deputy A.G. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri R avi ndra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 12/08/2026 1. Present is a criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 30.07.2021, passed by the learned Special Judge (Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.08.14 13:16:08 +0530 2 2012) Fast Track Court, Kabirdham, in Special Sessions Case No. 77 of 2019, arising out of the Crime No. 382 of 2019, registered at police station Kawardha, District Kabirdham, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner:- Conviction Sentence U/s. 376(3) of Indian Penal Code Life imprisonment till natural death and fine of of Rs. 2000/-, in default of payment of fine additional R.I. for 3 months. U/s. 4(2) of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 No separate sentence has been awarded. 2. The brief facts of the case are that, the father of the victim (PW-4) lodged a report to the police on 20.08.2019 that, he is residing in a rented house at Dewangan Para and the appellant was also a tenant residing just beside his house and having good familiar terms. On 16.08.2019, when his minor daughter had gone to the house of the appellant to return the utensils, the appellant committed rape upon her. Based on the complaint made by PW-4, the FIR (exhibit P-10) was registered against the appellant for the offence under Section 376 of IPC and Section 4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short ‘POCSO Act’). The victim was sent for her medical examination to District Hospital, Kawardha, where she was medically examined by Dr. Sushila Kindo (PW-8), who gave her report (exhibit P-9). While medically examining the victim, she noticed the history of rape (one episode), her hymen was ruptured, however no external injury on her body. She opined that ‘opinion 3 after chemical report’. Two vaginal slides have been prepared, sealed and handed over to it for chemical examination. Spot map (exhibit P-1) was prepared by patwari and exhibit P-5 was prepared by the police. With respect to the age and date of birth of the victim, the police has seized the school register vide seizure memo (exhibit P-3) and after retaining its attested true copy (exhibit P-2C) the original register was returned back to the school. As per the school register, the date of birth of the victim is 13.07.2007. The underwear of the victim has also been seized vide seizure memo (exhibit P-4). The 164 CRPC statement of the victim (exhibit P-7) has also been recorded by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kabirdham. The appellant was arrested on 22.08.2019 and he too was sent for his medical examination to District Hospital, Kawardha, where he was medically examined by the doctor, who found him capable for performing sexual intercourse. The underwear of the appellant has also been seized vide seizure memo (exhibit P-13). The vaginal slide of the victim, pubic heirs, underwear of the victim and under wear of the appellant were sent for its chemical examination to State FSL Raipur, from where report (exhibit P-26) was received and no semen or sperms were found on the sent articles. 3. Statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of CRPC have been recorded and after completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant for the offence under Section 376 of IPC and Section 5(m), 6 of POCSO Act before the learned trial Court. 4 4. The learned trial Court framed charge against the appellant for the offence of Section 376(3) of IPC and Section 4(2) of POCSO Act. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial. 5. In order to prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 9 witnesses. Statement of the appellant under section 313 of CRPC has also been recorded, in which he denied the circumstances, appears against him, plead innocence and has submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence. One defence witness (DW-1) has been examined by the appellant in his defence. 6. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgement. Hence this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses, which cannot be made basis to convict the appellant in the offence in question. There is no legally admissible document with respect to the age and date of birth of the victim. The school record produced by the prosecution has not been proved in accordance with law. The author of the school record has not been examined and the basis on which the entries have been made in it has also not been produced by the prosecution. In absence of any cogent and clenching evidence with respect to the age of the victim, she cannot 5 be treated as minor. He would further submit that there is no evidence that the victim raised any alarm or protested at the time of alleged incident, as no one has heard any noise from the house of the victim. Her house is situated in a closed vicinity and if she would have raised any alarm, it should be heard by her neighbors. No external injury has been found on the body of the victim at the time of her medical examination. The report has been lodged after about 4 days and there is no explanation for lodging of the delayed report. The dispute between the appellant and the complainant is with respect to the rented house and therefore, the appellant has falsely been implicated in the offence. In absence of any cogent and clinching evidence the appellant cannot be convicted and he is entitled for acquittal. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes and has submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. But for minor omissions or contradictions, the evidence of prosecution witnesses are fully reliable. The age of the victim has been proved by producing school records, which is the admissible piece of evidence and the same has been proved by PW- 2, who is the incharge Headmaster of the school. As per the school record, the victim was minor on the date of incident and she was subjected to rape by the appellant. In the MLC report, the hymen of the victim was found ruptured, though no external injury has been found on her body and the doctor has also noticed the history of rape (one episode) in her MLC report (exhibit P-9). There is no reason for false implication of the appellant, as the father of the victim himself 6 has stated that the relation between both the families were good. But for minor omission or contradiction, which are trivial in nature, the evidence are sufficient and reliable to hold the appellant guilty for the alleged offence. The learned trial Court after due appreciation of evidence, convicted and sentenced the appellant, which needs no interference. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 10. The first and foremost question for consideration would be the age of the victim, as to whether she was minor on the date of incident or not? 11. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the school register (exhibit P- 2C), which has been proved by the incharge Headmaster (exhibit P- 2). He stated in his evidence that after retirement of the Headmistress in the school, he is working as incharge Headmaster of the school. The police has seized the school register with respect to the age and date of birth of the victim vide seizure memo (exhibit P- 3) and after retaining its attested true copy (exhibit P-2C), the original register was returned. He brought the original school register with him, which is (exhibit P-2). In the school register the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 13.07.2007. Though in cross-examination, he admitted that he was not posted in the school at the time of admission of the victim and who had taken her to school for admission, he did not know. He also did not know, as to what document was produced in the school, at the time of her admission. 7 However, there is no suggestion in his cross-examination that, the date of birth of the victim has been wrongly recorded in the school register or her date of birth is incorrect. 12. The admissibility and evidentiary value of the school register have been considered by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, 2013 (7) SCC 263, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Para 22 to 24 held that:- “22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007 Rules). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under : “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.? (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the 8 child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining – (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. 9 and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule. (6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the 10 provisions contained in sub- rule(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW- PW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. 11 In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion. 24. Following the scheme of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, it is apparent that the age of the prosecutrix VW - PW6 could not be determined on the basis of the matriculation (or equivalent) certificate as she had herself deposed, that she had studied upto class 3 only, and thereafter, had left her school and had started to do household work. The prosecution in the facts and circumstances of this case, had endeavoured to establish the age of the prosecutrix VW-PW6, on the next available basis, in the sequence of options expressed in Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules. The prosecution produced Satpal (PW4), to prove the age of the prosecutrix VW – PW6. Satpal (PW4) was the Head Master of the Government High School, Jathlana, where the prosecutrix VW - PW6 had studied upto class 3. Satpal (PW4) had proved the certificate Exhibit- PG, as having been made on the basis of the 12 school records indicating, that the prosecutrix VW - PW6, was born on 15.5.1977. In the scheme contemplated under Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules, it is not permissible to determine age in any other manner, and certainly not on the basis of an option mentioned in a subsequent clause. We are therefore of the view, that the High Court was fully justified in relying on the aforesaid basis for establishing the age of the prosecutrix VW – PW6. It would also be relevant to mention, that under the scheme of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, it would have been improper for the High Court to rely on any other material including the ossification test, for determining the age of the prosecutrix VW-PW6. The deposition of Satpal- PW4 has not been contested. Therefore, the date of birth of the prosecutrix VW - PW6 (indicated in Exhibit P.G., as 15.7.1977) assumes finality. Accordingly it is clear, that the prosecutrix VW- PW6, was less than 15 years old on the date of occurrence, i.e., on 25.3.1993. In the said view of the matter, there is no room for any doubt that the prosecutrix VW - PW6 was a minor on the date of occurrence. Accordingly, we hereby endorse the conclusions recorded by the High Court, that even if the prosecutrix VW-PW6 had accompanied the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh of her own free will, and had had consensual sex with him, the same would have been clearly inconsequential, as she was a minor.” 13. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the victim (PW-3) has stated that her date of birth is 13.07.2007. In cross-examination she stated that, she was taken by her mother to the school for her admission. She denied that in the school register, her date of birth 13 has wrongly been recorded. From her evidence, there is no rebuttal of her date of birth, which she stated in her examination-in-chief. 14. PW-4 is the father of the victim, who stated that the victim was aged about 13 years at the time of incident. She is his fifth daughter. He admitted in his cross-examination that, at the time of lodging of the report, he disclosed her age by enhancing 4-5 years. He took his daughter for her admission in the school. 15. PW-5 is the sister of the victim, who stated that she is aged about 14 years. In cross-examination, she admitted that her father has taken the victim to the school for her admission. 16. From these evidences, the prosecution has proved the age of the victim that she was less than 16 years of age on the date of incident, supported by the school record (exhibit P-2C). The learned trial Court has also held that the victim was aged about 12 years, 01 months and 03 days on the date of incident, in which we do not find any perversity and such finding is recorded on the basis of cogent evidence produced by the prosecution. 17. With respect to the allegation of rape is concerned, we again examined the evidence of victim (PW-3). She stated in her evidence that they were residing in a rented house at Dewangan Para, as their own house was collapsed. The appellant was also residing in a rented house adjoining to their house. On the date of incident, at about 11:00 AM, she had gone to the house of appellant to return the utensil. At that time, the wife of the appellant was not present in his house and the appellant caught hold her, thrown her on the bed and 14 committed rape upon her. She started crying and informed the incident to one of her sisters, who is residing in the same vicinity and then, they informed it to her father and thereafter the report has been lodged. In cross-examination she admitted that, she and the appellant were the tenant in the vicinity and he was residing along with his wife. She denied that, at the time of incident, the wife of the appellant was also present in the house. She voluntarily stated that she had already gone outside. She also stated that, when the appellant caught her hold, she started crying for help, but no one came there. She admitted that on the date of incident itself, she informed the incident to her sisters. She also denied that her family members demanded Rs. 50,000/- from the appellant for not lodging the report. She admitted that her father has lodged the report after about 04 days. She voluntarily stated that since she was afraid of, therefore, the report was lodged on 20.08.2019. From her entire evidence, the substantive allegation of rape upon her by the appellant could not be rebutted and she firmly stated that she was subjected to rape by the appellant, when she had gone to his house to return the utensils. Her evidence does not suffer from any material discrepancies or contradictions, or even any abnormal conduct of the victim. 18. In the case of State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, 1996(2) SCC 384, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:- “21. …….. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The Courts, therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while trying an 15 accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The Courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspirers confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the Court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.” 19. In the case of State of Himanchal Pradesh v. Sanjay Kumar, 2017(2) SCC 51, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:- “30. By no means, it is suggested that whenever such charge of rape is made, where the victim is a child, it has to be treated as a gospel truth and the accused person has to be convicted. We have already discussed above the manner in which testimony of the prosecutrix is to be examined and analysed in order to find out the truth therein and to ensure that deposition of the victim is trustworthy. At the same time, after taking all due precautions which are necessary, 16 when it is found that the prosecution version is worth believing, the case is to be dealt with all sensitivity that is needed in such cases. In such a situation one has to take stock of the realities of life as well. Various studies show that in more than 80% cases of such abuses, perpetrators have acquaintance with the victims who are not strangers. The danger is more within than outside. Most of the time, acquaintance rapes, when the culprit is a family member, are not even reported for various reasons, not difficult to fathom. The strongest among those is the fear of attracting social stigma. Another deterring factor which many times prevent such victims or their families to lodge a complaint is that they find whole process of criminal justice system extremely intimidating coupled with absence of victim protection mechanism. Therefore, time is ripe to bring about significant reforms in the criminal justice system as well. Equally, there is also a dire need to have a survivor centric approach towards victims of sexual violence, particularly, the children, keeping in view the traumatic long lasting effects on such victims. 31. After thorough analysis of all relevant and attendant factors, we are of the opinion that none of the grounds, on which the High Court has cleared the respondent, has any merit. By now it is well settled that the testimony of a victim in cases of sexual offences is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of a statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of a sexual assault alone to convict the accused. No doubt, 17 her testimony has to inspire confidence. Seeking corroboration to a statement before relying upon the same as a rule, in such cases, would literally amount to adding insult to injury. The deposition of the prosecutrix has, thus, to be taken as a whole. Needless to reiterate that the victim of rape is not an accomplice and her evidence can be acted upon without corroboration. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness does. If the court finds it difficult to accept her version, it may seek corroboration from some evidence which lends assurance to her version. To insist on corroboration, except in the rarest of rare cases, is to equate one who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman that her claim of rape will not be believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars, as in the case of an accomplice to a crime. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The plea about lack of corroboration has no substance {See Bhupinder Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2003) 8 SCC 551}. Notwithstanding this legal position, in the instant case, we even find enough corroborative material as well, which is discussed hereinabove.” 20. PW-8, Dr. Sushila Kindo, who medically examined the victim, though has not found any external injury on her body, however, she noticed, 18 her hymen was ruptured and observed the history that the victim was suffered the incident of rape (one episode). Though in cross- examination she admitted that, if a girl of 12 to 15 years would suffer by forceful sexual intercourse, there is every possibility of injuries on her genital organs. However, she did not notice any external injury. Although no external injury has been found on the body of the victim,, but absence of injuries is always not the determinative factor to disbelieve the evidence of the victim. 21. In the case of Satyapal v. State of Haryana, 2009(6) SCC 635, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:- “18. In Modi's Medical Jurisprudence, 23rd Edn., at pp. 897 and 928, it is stated: "To constitute the offence of rape, it is not necessary that there should be complete penetration of the penis with the emission of semen and the rupture of hymen. Partial penetration of the penis within the labia majora or the vulva or pudenda, with or without the emission of semen, or even an attempt at penetration is quite sufficient for the purpose of law. It is, therefore, quite possible to commit legally, the offence of rape without producing any injury to the genitals or leaving any seminal stains." 22. In the recent judgment in the case of Lok Mal @ Loku v. State of Uttar Pradesh,(2025)4 SCC 470, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that absence of injuries on the private parts of the prosecutrix cannot, by itself, be treated as a ground to disbelieve her 19 testimony or to hold that rape was not committed as observed in paragraph no. 13 that:- “13. Merely because in the medical evidence, there are no major injury marks, this cannot be a reason to discard the otherwise reliable evidence of the prosecutrix. It is not necessary that in each and every case where rape is alleged there has to be an injury to the private parts of the victim and it depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. We reiterate that absence of injuries on the private parts of the victim is not always fatal to the case of the prosecution. According to the version of the prosecutrix, the accused overpowered her and pushed her to bed in spite of her resistance and gagged her mouth using a piece of cloth. Thus, considering this very aspect, it is possible that there were no major injury marks.” 23. PW-4 is the father of the victim, he stated in his evidence that on the date of incident, the victim had gone to the house of the appellant and at that time, the appellant committed rape upon her. When he returned back from his work, his son-in-law informed about the incident, at that time the appellant was not found in his house and was absconded, then he lodged the report. In cross-examination, he shown his ignorance as to the house, in which they were residing on rent was owned by the landlord or not. He did not know, who informed the incident to his son-in-law. He could not explain any reason for delay of 04 days in lodging the report. Since, he deposed on the basis of the incident disclosed before him by his son-in-law, his evidence has no much significant with respect to the substantive 20 allegation of rape, but relevant regarding the presence of the appellant on the spot. 24. PW-5, sister of the victim has stated in her evidence that on the date of incident, her another sister informed her that the appellant committed rape upon the victim, when she had gone to his house to return the utensils. She later on declared hostile. However, she stated that on 3rd day of the date of incident, when they had gone to the house of the appellant, he starting quarreling them and the victim was crying. Due to the incident, they left the rented house and had gone to their own house, which was under construction. In cross- examination, she reiterated that she came to know about the incident from her another sister. She also denied that due to the dispute about rent, they have falsely implicated the appellant in the offence. She also denied that the victim was having love affair with the appellant. 25. PW-6 is another sister of the victim, to whom the incident was disclosed by the victim immediately after the incident. She stated in her evidence that since the house of her parents was collapsed, they were residing in a rented house in Dewangan Para. At about 12:00 noon, the victim came to her by crying and informed that the appellant committed rape upon her, when she had gone to his house to return the utensils. He was alone in his house. Since her parents had gone to their work, she informed her elder sister in the night and also informed her parents. On the next day, her parents had gone to the house of the appellant, but he was not found in the house. Later on, leading question was asked from her and then she stated that when the victim was crying, her husband took her to her house and 21 then, she informed about the incident. When they asked from the appellant on the next day, he admitted that he committed rape with the victim and they can do, whatever they want to do. In cross- examination she too has denied that, they were falsely implicated the appellant in the offence. She too remained firm in saying that, immediately after the incident, the victim informed her about the same. 26. The defence taken by the appellant that the alleged incident is said to have been committed on 16.08.2019, but the report has been lodged on 20.08.2019 and there is no explanation for delayed lodging of the report, however from the evidence, it surfaced that the alleged incident is of 16.08.2019, immediately the incident was informed to PW-6 by the victim. Her parents had gone to their work and in the night, they were informed by PW-6. On the next day, they had gone to the house of the appellant and when they asked from him, he challenged them, they can do whatever they want to do. Thereafter the report has been lodged. In the sequence of events, it cannot be said that the delay in lodging the report has not been explained. There is no abnormal delay in lodging the report. In the offence of rape, such a small delay does not dilute the allegation as the same affects the chastity of a girl. The victim (PW-2) has explained in her evidence that, since she was afraid of by the incident, therefore, the report was lodged on 20.08.2019. 27. In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gian Chand, (2001) 6 SCC 71, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that delay in lodging the FIR in a case of sexual assault cannot be mechanically treated 22 as a ground to discard the prosecution case. The Court is required to consider the explanation offered for such delay in the backdrop of the facts and circumstances of the case. In cases involving sexual offences, the victim and her family members may take some time to overcome the trauma, fear, social stigma and apprehension associated with reporting the incident. Therefore, a delayed FIR, if otherwise satisfactorily explained, does not by itself create a doubt about the veracity of the prosecution case. The Court has to examine whether the delay has resulted in embellishment or fabrication and, if the explanation is found natural and reasonable, the prosecution case cannot be rejected merely on the ground of delay. 28. In view of the aforesaid evidence, the testimony of the victim (PW-3) inspires confidence and finds substantial corroboration from the evidence of PW-6, to whom she immediately disclosed the incident, as well as from the surrounding circumstances. The delay of about four days in lodging the FIR has been satisfactorily explained by the prosecution and, in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be treated as fatal to the prosecution case. It is well settled that in an offence of rape, delay in lodging the FIR, by itself, is not sufficient to discard an otherwise trustworthy testimony of the victim, particularly when the delay is reasonably explained. The absence of external injuries on the person of the victim also does not discredit her testimony regarding commission of rape. Her evidence is consistent on the material particulars and remains unshaken despite detailed cross-examination. The prosecution has also established beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was below 16 years of age on the 23 date of the incident. Thus, upon a cumulative appreciation of the entire evidence, we find that the prosecution has successfully established the charge of rape against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, and the learned trial Court has committed no error in recording his conviction. We do not find any scope for interference in the present appeal. Accordingly, the present appeal fails and hereby dismissed. 29. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 22.08.2019. He shall serve the entire sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court. 30. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 31. Let a copy of this judgment and the original records be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice ved