Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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CGHC010287422026
2026:CGHC:36155-DB
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 724 of 2026
1. Onkar Sinha S/o Dhruw Kumar Sinha Aged About 56 Years Working As Forest Guard, Dhamtari Division, Modi Range, Mahasamund, Distt. Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.
2. Panna Lal Soni S/o Ramlal Soni Aged About 58 Years Working As Forest Guard, Risgaon Range, Udanti Forest Division, Gariyaband, Distt. Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.
3. Pokhan Lal Sahu S/o Bishnu Ram Sahu Aged About 61 Years Working As Forest Guard, Dhamtari Division, Modi Range, Mahasamund, Distt. Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.
4. Dinesh Kumar Sahu S/o Gopinath Sahu Aged About 60 Years Working As Forest Guard, Dhamtari Division, Birgudi Range, Mahasamund, Distt. Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.
... Appellant(s) versus
1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Forest Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2. Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Aranya Bhawan, Medical College Road, Raipur, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
3. Chief Conservator Of Forest Raipur, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
4. Divisional Forest Officer Mahasamund, Distt. Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh.
...Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2026.08.14 18:54:10 +0530
2 For Appellants : Mr. K.P. Sahu, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Sumit Singh, Deputy Advocate General. Hon'ble Shri
Ramesh Sinha,
Chief Justice
Hon'ble
Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal
, Judge
Judgment
on Board
Per
Ramesh Sinha
, Chief Justice
14 .08.2026
1. Heard Mr. K.P. Sahu, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Sumit Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State on I.A. No. 1 of 2026, an application seeking condonation of delay.
2. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and considering the reasons assigned in the application, this Court is satisfied that sufficient cause has been shown. Accordingly, I.A. No. 1 of 2026 is allowed and the delay of 29 days in filing the appeal is condoned.
3. The present intra-Court appeal has been preferred by the appellants/writ petitioners against the order dated 07.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 3897 of 2018 (Onkar Sinha & Others vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others), whereby the writ petition filed by the appellants came to be dismissed.
4.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that the appellants were appointed as daily-wage employees in the year 1989 on Collector-rate basis and have continuously discharged their duties since their initial appointment with sincerity and honesty and to the satisfaction
3 of the superior authorities, without there being any stigma, adverse entry or complaint against them.
5. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that that the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh issued a notification dated 15.12.1992 providing that daily-wage employees who had completed three years of service would be entitled to the regular pay scale admissible to work-charged and contingency-paid employees. According to learned counsel, the appellants fulfilled the requisite conditions under the said notification, yet the benefit of regular pay scale was not extended to them. He also submits that several employees who were appointed along with the appellants and were similarly situated were granted the benefit of regular pay scale under the work-charged and contingency-paid establishment. It is, therefore, submitted that denial of the same benefit to the appellants, despite their identical status and length of service, is arbitrary and discriminatory.
6. It is further submitted by the learned counsel, appearing for the appellants that the appellants had earlier approached the State Administrative Tribunal by filing Original Application No.1076 of 1995. Upon reorganisation of the State, the matter came to be registered as WPS No.1095 of 2005. In the said proceedings, liberty was granted to the appellants to submit a representation before the competent authority, with a corresponding direction to the authority to consider and decide the same. Pursuant thereto, the appellants submitted a representation on 08.02.2011 claiming grant of regular pay scale with effect from 01.08.1992. However, despite the specific direction of this Court, no decision was taken
4 by the competent authority. The appellants were consequently compelled to submit a further representation on 26.04.2018, but even thereafter their claim remained undecided.
7.
Learned counsel for the appellants would further submit that, having been left with no effective remedy, the appellants approached this Court by filing WPS No.3897 of 2018, seeking consideration of their claim for regularization from the date on which similarly situated employees had been regularized, i.e. 01.08.1992, along with consequential benefits. It is urged that the learned Single Judge, while dismissing the writ petition on 07.05.2026, has principally relied upon the decision rendered by the Division Bench in WA No.692 of 2025, Nehru Lal Saral v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, without properly examining the appellants’ specific case and the documents demonstrating that similarly situated employees had in fact been extended the benefit claimed by them. Particular emphasis is placed on the case of Veejan Sharma, who was appointed on 19.10.1989, along with the appellants, and was granted the benefit of regularization under the work-charged and contingency-paid establishment vide order dated 11.11.1991. It is submitted that the document evidencing such grant of benefit was placed before the learned Single Judge, but the same has not been duly considered while adjudicating the appellants’ claim.
8. The appellants, therefore, contend that their claim cannot be rejected merely by applying the decision in Nehru Lal Saral (supra) without first examining whether the appellants stand on the same footing as the employees who were granted the benefit and whether the
5 respondents were justified in denying identical treatment to them. According to learned counsel, the material placed on record prima facie demonstrates discriminatory treatment and, at the very least, warranted
consideration of the appellants’ claim by the competent authority in accordance with the applicable policy and the treatment extended to similarly situated employees. It is also submitted that the appellants have been pursuing their claim before the appropriate forums and authorities for a considerable period and that their representations remained pending despite the earlier directions of this Court. The appellants cannot be made to suffer on account of the inaction of the authorities in considering and deciding their claim.
9. On these premises, learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the impugned order deserves to be interfered with and that the respondents may be directed to consider and extend to the appellants the benefit of regular pay scale/regularization from the date on which the same benefit was granted to similarly situated employees, together with all consequential benefits, in accordance with law.
10. Per contra, learned State counsel would submit that the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition by following the
judgment of the Division Bench in Nehru Lal Saral (supra), which covers the issue involved. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any legal right to claim retrospective regularization from 01.08.1992. No infirmity or perversity having been pointed out in the impugned order, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 11. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel
6 for the parties and have carefully perused the material available on record, including the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 12. The principal grievance of the appellants is that, despite their appointment as daily-wage employees in the year 1989 and completion of the requisite period of service, they have not been extended the benefit of regular pay scale/regularization from 01.08.1992, whereas, according to them, similarly situated employees appointed along with them have been extended such benefit. Reliance has also been placed upon the case of Veejan Sharma, who, according to the appellants, was appointed on 19.10.1989 and was subsequently granted the benefit under the work- charged and contingency-paid establishment. However, the aforesaid contention, by itself, does not confer upon the appellants an indefeasible right to claim regularization or regular pay scale retrospectively from a particular date. Grant of regularization from a particular date involves various relevant considerations, including availability of sanctioned posts, the applicable policy, the nature of appointment, inter se seniority and the rights of persons already appointed on regular basis. Merely because certain employees were granted such benefit from a particular date, the same cannot, in the absence of a corresponding statutory or enforceable right, be treated as creating an automatic right in favour of every other daily-wage employee to claim retrospective regularization from the very same date. 13. The learned Single Judge has considered the claim of the appellants in the light of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Nehru Lal Saral (supra). In the said case, while dealing with an identical
7 claim for retrospective regularization, the Division Bench, after considering the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, held that regularization from a particular date has several facets and that the determination of such date is essentially dependent upon the applicable policy and other relevant service conditions. It was further held that, in an intra-Court appeal, interference is not warranted unless palpable infirmity or perversity is found in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 14.
In the present case also, we do not find any distinguishing feature which would take the case of the appellants outside the ambit of the aforesaid decision. The learned Single Judge has rightly applied the principle laid down by the Division Bench in Nehru Lal Saral (supra) and has declined to grant retrospective regularization from 01.08.1992. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any palpable infirmity, perversity or error apparent on the face of the record in the order under appeal warranting interference in exercise of the intra-Court appellate jurisdiction. 15. The submission regarding the grant of benefit to Veejan Sharma and other allegedly similarly situated employees also does not persuade us to take a different view. The mere fact that some employees may have been extended a particular benefit cannot, in the absence of a clear legal or statutory entitlement, be a ground to direct the respondents to extend the same benefit retrospectively to the appellants, particularly when such relief would require determination of the appellants' entitlement to regularization from a particular cut-off date. 16. So far as the representations submitted by the appellants are concerned, the same cannot, by themselves, enlarge the substantive right
8 claimed by them. The earlier order passed in W.P.(S) No.1095 of 2005 merely afforded an opportunity to the appellants to approach the competent authority for consideration of their claim. Such liberty, however, cannot be construed as conferring upon the appellants a vested right to retrospective regularization from 01.08.1992. 17. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the learned Single Judge has rightly declined to interfere with the claim of the appellants and has correctly applied the law laid down by the Division Bench in Nehru Lal Saral (supra). The impugned order does not suffer from any jurisdictional error, perversity or palpable infirmity warranting interference by us in the present intra-Court appeal. 18. Consequently, finding no merit in the present writ appeal, the same is hereby dismissed. The order dated 07.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.3897 of 2018 is affirmed. 19. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan