1 CGHC010445822025 2026:CGHC:35823 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 5472 of 2025 Order Reserved on 17.07.2026 Order Delivered on 13.08.2026 1 - Sitaram Matolia S/o Late Shri Durgadutt Matolia Aged About 80 Years R/o Sarju Bagicha, Bilaspur, Tehsil And District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Urban Administration And Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Capital Complex, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - Municipal Corporation Bilaspur Through Its Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 3 - Commissioner Municipal Corporation Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 4 - Collector Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh VISHAKHA BEOHAR Digitally signed by VISHAKHA BEOHAR 2 5 - Tehsildar Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 6 - Bilaspur Smart City Company Limited Through Its Managing Director, Vikas Bhawan, Nehru Chowk, Bilaspur, District - Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 7 - Shri Amit Kumar (I A S) Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from the Case Information System) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Petitioner :- Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Amit Soni, Advocate For State :- Dr. Arham Siddiqui, P.L. For Respondents No. 2 & 3:- Mr. Divy Jha, Advocate on behalf of Mr. S.S. Marhas, Advocate ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SB- Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad CAV Order 1. By way of the present writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the proposal letter dated 07.08.2025 issued by respondent No. 2 and the terms and conditions of the lease agreement dated 18.08.2025 executed between the petitioner and respondent No. 2, particularly insofar as they relate to the period of lease, fixation of rent and the conditions imposed for running the hotel. The case of the petitioner is that the respondents ought 3 to have granted the lease of the newly allotted shop for the unexpired period of the earlier lease in terms of the policy decision dated 26.03.2024. It is further contended that the rent fixed for the new shop is arbitrary, excessive and unreasonable and is contrary to the terms and conditions of the earlier lease deed. The petitioner also seeks a direction permitting him to continue his hotel business from the said premises. 2. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:- “1. That, to issue a suitable writ/direction to quash the impugned proposal letter dated 07.08.2025 (Annexure P/1) issued by respondent no. 2, insofar as it limits the lease period to 3 years and fixes the monthly rent at Rs. 24,443/+GST. 2. That, to issue a suitable writ/direction to quash the conditions no. 2, 5, 8, 16 and 17 of agreement dated 18.08.2025. 3. That, to issue a suitable writ/direction directing the respondent authorities to execute a fresh lease deed in favour of the petitioner for the allotted shop no. 2 for the remaining period of the original lease, i.e., up to 20.08.2036, and to fix the rent in accordance with the terms and 4 conditions of the original lease deed dated 21.08.2006 or in alternative the authorities may kindly be directed to re-consider the matter so far as it relates to fixing the reasonable monthly rent under rehabilitation. 4. That the respondent authorities may kindly be directed to delete condition no. 2, 5, 8, 16 and 17 of agreement dated 18.08.2025 and they may further be directed to execute the registered leased deed in favour of the petitioner as per direction issued by this Hon'ble Court. 5. That, any other further order(s) as deemed fit and necessary by this Hon'ble Court in the interest of justice.” 3. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging the legality and validity of the proposal letter dated 07.08.2025 issued by respondent No. 2 and the subsequent lease agreement dated 18.08.2025, particularly with regard to the period of lease, fixation of rent and other conditions imposed for running the business from the allotted shop. The petitioner was granted a registered lease of Shop No. A-1 situated at Imlipara Road, Old Bus Stand, Bilaspur (C.G.), admeasuring 718 sq. ft. (G+1), by the Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, vide lease deed dated 21.08.2006 for a period of 30 years, which was valid up to 20.08.2036. The petitioner was carrying on his business in 5 the name and style of "Rajasthan Jalebi Wala" from the said premises and was regularly paying rent to the Municipal Corporation. During the subsistence of the lease period, the Municipal Corporation decided to demolish the petitioner's shop for the purpose of road widening, pursuant to which the petitioner approached this Court by filing WPC No. 1517/2021. In the said proceedings, the Municipal Corporation, in its reply, specifically undertook that the petitioner, being an existing leaseholder, would be allotted a new shop in the newly constructed complex as a measure of rehabilitation. Thereafter, the lease granted in favour of the petitioner was cancelled vide order dated 14.02.2025, which was challenged by the petitioner in WPC No. 1027/2025. During the pendency of the said writ petition, the respondent authorities took a policy decision dated 26.03.2025 to allot newly constructed shops to existing valid leaseholders for the remaining period of their respective lease. Accordingly, a committee was constituted for fixation of rent and other terms for fresh allotment. The petitioner contends that such fixation was applicable only to fresh allotments and could not be applied to rehabilitation of existing leaseholders having subsisting lease rights. Subsequently, the petitioner was allotted Shop No. 2 in the newly constructed commercial 6 complex at Imlipara, Bilaspur through lottery proceedings held on 04.08.2025. However, respondent No. 2 issued the proposal letter dated 07.08.2025 proposing execution of a fresh lease only for a period of three years and imposed excessive financial conditions, including enhanced monthly rent of Rs.20,035/- plus GST, operation and maintenance charges of Rs.2,68,871/- and security deposit of Rs.2,68,871/-. Thereafter, pursuant to the order dated 11.08.2025 passed in WPC No.1027/2025, the petitioner deposited the demanded amount under protest and took possession of the newly allotted shop, whereafter an agreement dated 18.08.2025 was executed between the petitioner and respondent No.2. The grievance of the petitioner is that the respondents, contrary to their own policy decision and the original lease deed, have reduced the lease period from the remaining period up to 2036 to only three years and have arbitrarily fixed an exorbitant rent and imposed unreasonable conditions in the agreement dated 18.08.2025, thereby adversely affecting the petitioner's existing lease rights and his right to carry on business. Hence, the petitioner has approached this Court challenging the aforesaid actions of the respondent authorities. 7 4. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Advocate along with Mr. Amit Soni, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner is a lawful lessee of the premises in question and has been in peaceful possession and enjoyment thereof for several years. It is submitted that the petitioner was granted lease of Shop No. A-1 situated at Imlipara Road, Old Bus Stand, Bilaspur by a registered lease deed dated 21.08.2006 for a period of 30 years, which was valid up to 20.08.2036. Therefore, the petitioner continues to have subsisting lease rights over the said premises. 5. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the petitioner was carrying on his business in the name and style of "Rajasthan Jalebi Wala" for the last several decades and the said business is the source of his livelihood. It is contended that the right to livelihood forms an integral part of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the right to property is protected under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. The respondents, being State instrumentalities, are required to act fairly, reasonably and in a non-arbitrary manner and cannot deprive the petitioner of his lawful rights. It is submitted that by way of the present writ petition, the petitioner is not challenging all the terms and conditions incorporated in the proposal letter dated 8 07.08.2025 and the subsequent agreement dated 18.08.2025. The petitioner has restricted his challenge only to the extent that the lease in respect of the newly allotted shop be granted/executed for the remaining and unexpired period of the original lease, i.e. up to 20.08.2036, instead of restricting the same to a period of three years. It is further submitted that the petitioner is also seeking a direction to the respondent authorities to provide essential basic amenities, namely electricity and water supply, to the newly allotted shop, as despite handing over possession, the said facilities have not been provided till date. 6. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the original shop of the petitioner was demolished by the Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur for the purpose of road widening. Being aggrieved by the proposed demolition, the petitioner had approached this Hon'ble Court by filing WPC No. 1517 of 2021, wherein an interim order dated 17.03.2021 was passed. During the pendency of the said proceedings, the Municipal Corporation itself placed an affidavit before this Hon'ble Court stating that the petitioner, being a leaseholder for a period of 30 years, would be rehabilitated and allotted a shop in the newly constructed complex and that no such shop would be auctioned. It is further submitted that during the pendency of 9 the aforesaid proceedings, the lease of the petitioner was cancelled vide order dated 14.02.2025 on the ground that the petitioner had kept dustbin and gas outside the shop, which according to the Corporation amounted to encroachment and caused traffic obstruction. The said action was challenged by the petitioner by filing WPC No. 1027 of 2025 before this Hon'ble Court. During the pendency of the said writ petition, the Municipal Corporation itself undertook before this Hon'ble Court that the petitioner would be allotted a newly constructed shop. Thereafter, by order dated 21.02.2025, this Hon'ble Court directed the petitioner to cooperate with the administration and police authorities till allotment of a new shop in the newly constructed complex. 7. Learned Senior Counsel submits that during the pendency of WPC No. 1027 of 2025, the Municipal Corporation, through its Mayor-in-Council/General Body meeting dated 26.03.2025, took a conscious policy decision whereby five valid and subsisting leaseholders, including the present petitioner, were decided to be allotted shops in the newly constructed Imlipara Commercial Complex for the remaining/unexpired lease period. It is submitted that the petitioner was placed at Serial No. 1 in Category "A" of valid leaseholders. Thus, the respondent Corporation itself recognized the status of the 10 petitioner as a valid leaseholder and resolved to rehabilitate him for the remaining lease period. It is submitted that thereafter, pursuant to the said policy decision, the petitioner was called upon to participate in the lottery proceedings for allotment of shop on 04.08.2025 and Shop No. 2 in the newly constructed complex was allotted to him. The petitioner accepted the said allotment believing that the same was being made in furtherance of the policy decision dated 26.03.2025, whereby allotment was contemplated for the remaining lease period. 8. However, learned Senior Counsel submits that to the utter surprise of the petitioner, thereafter proposal letter dated 07.08.2025 was issued by respondent No. 2 stipulating that only a fresh lease for a period of three years would be executed and imposing substantial financial liabilities towards operation and maintenance charges, security deposit and monthly rent. It is contended that such restriction to a period of three years is contrary to the Corporation's own resolution dated 26.03.2025 and contrary to the legitimate expectation created in favour of the petitioner. It is submitted that WPC No. 1027 of 2025 was thereafter disposed of by this Hon'ble Court vide order dated 11.08.2025, directing the petitioner to deposit the amount as per the proposal letter dated 11 07.08.2025 for securing possession, while granting liberty to the petitioner to approach this Hon'ble Court in case of any fresh cause of action. In compliance thereof, the petitioner deposited the requisite amount under protest and thereafter has also continued to pay rent; however, despite handing over possession, essential facilities such as electricity and water supply have not been provided, due to which the petitioner has been unable to commence his business from the newly allotted shop. 9. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the restriction of lease period to three years was not confined only to the petitioner but was imposed upon all five valid leaseholders included in Category "A", which itself demonstrates that the respondent Corporation has acted contrary to its own policy decision. It is submitted that two other leaseholders, namely Sushil Samnani and Rani Samnani, also challenged the said action by filing WPC No. 4503 of 2025 before this Hon'ble Court. It is submitted that in the said writ petition, the Municipal Corporation had taken a stand that since the property was situated over Nazul land, the Corporation had no authority to execute a long-term lease and therefore a three-year management agreement was the appropriate mechanism. However, this very stand was considered by this Hon'ble 12 Court in WPC No. 4503 of 2025, wherein vide order dated 28.10.2025, this Hon'ble Court held that the petitioners therein were valid leaseholders and that the allotment could not be restricted merely to three years on account of administrative convenience. The Court directed that the period of allotment be determined keeping in view the original lease tenure and the subsisting rights of the leaseholders. 10. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the aforesaid order dated 28.10.2025 has subsequently been affirmed by the Hon'ble Division Bench in WA No. 397 of 2026 vide order dated 08.05.2026, wherein it has been held that the directions issued by the learned Single Judge only protect the legitimate expectation and preferential entitlement arising from the subsisting lease and the assurances/resolution of the Corporation. It is contended that the present petitioner stands on an identical footing, being one of the valid leaseholders covered under the resolution dated 26.03.2025. Therefore, the petitioner is also entitled for allotment of the shop for the remaining/unexpired period of the original lease. 11. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that once the Municipal Corporation itself had passed a resolution for allotment of shops to valid leaseholders for the remaining 13 lease period and had acted upon the said resolution by allotting a shop to the petitioner, it cannot subsequently take a contrary stand and restrict the lease period to only three years. Such action is contrary to the principles of administrative fairness, legitimate expectation and non- arbitrariness. 12. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand and Others v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd. Ranchi and Another, (2023) 10 SCC 634, wherein it has been held that the State and its instrumentalities are bound to honour their policy decisions and representations made in the public domain and cannot act arbitrarily to the prejudice of citizens who have acted upon such representations. Learned Senior Counsel submits that no separate issue survives regarding cancellation of the earlier lease, as the subsequent resolution passed by the Municipal Corporation itself demonstrates that the Corporation had, in substance and effect, accepted the entitlement of the petitioner for rehabilitation as a valid leaseholder. The respondents cannot be permitted to take mutually inconsistent stands by first recognizing the petitioner as a valid leaseholder entitled for rehabilitation and thereafter restricting the benefit contrary to their own resolution. It is 14 further submitted that despite handing over possession of the newly allotted shop, the respondents have failed to provide electricity and water supply from the very date of delivery of possession. The petitioner has already approached this Hon'ble Court by filing an interim application, wherein the Corporation submitted that installation of transformer was to be undertaken by the Electricity Department and that necessary steps would be taken. However, till date, no effective steps have been taken and the petitioner is unable to commence his business in absence of basic amenities. 13. In view of the aforesaid submissions, learned Senior Counsel prays that the respondent Corporation be directed to execute/grant lease of the newly allotted shop in favour of the petitioner for the remaining period of the original lease up to 20.08.2036, in terms of the policy decision dated 26.03.2025, and further be directed to forthwith provide electricity and water supply to the allotted shop so that the petitioner may resume his business. 14. Mr. Divy Jha, Advocate on behalf of Mr. S.S. Marhas, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2 and 3 submits that the present writ petition is not maintainable, as the grievance raised by the petitioner pertains to the terms 15 and conditions of a lease agreement executed between the parties, which is contractual in nature. It is submitted that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a public law remedy and cannot be invoked for enforcement or modification of contractual obligations. The petitioner, if so advised, may avail the appropriate remedy before the competent civil forum. It is submitted that the petitioner has already been granted Shop No. 2 situated at New Commercial Complex, Imlipara Road, Bilaspur, and a lease agreement was executed by the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, in favour of the petitioner for a period of three years. The petitioner, after accepting the terms and conditions of the lease agreement, has taken possession of the said shop. It is contended that the petitioner voluntarily entered into the agreement and, after accepting the benefits arising therefrom, cannot now challenge the terms and conditions of the same. Learned counsel submits that the earlier lease granted in favour of the petitioner was already cancelled vide order dated 14.02.2025 on account of violation of the terms and conditions of the lease deed. The said cancellation order was challenged by the petitioner in WPC No.1027/2025; however, the said writ petition was disposed of on 11.08.2025 and the order of cancellation was 16 neither quashed nor interfered with. Therefore, the earlier lease stood terminated and the petitioner cannot claim continuation of the earlier lease period up to 2036. 15. It is further submitted that the allotment of the new shop was a fresh arrangement made in favour of the petitioner as a rehabilitation measure and not a continuation of the earlier lease. The petitioner, along with other similarly situated persons, was called for allotment proceedings through lottery on 04.08.2025. Before the allotment process, the terms and conditions of the proposed lease were duly explained to the participants, and the petitioner's representative participated in the proceedings and accepted the conditions. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner did not raise any objection at the time of execution of the lease agreement and voluntarily accepted the terms thereof. The petitioner is, therefore, estopped from challenging the same after taking possession of the premises. The allegations that the terms and conditions are arbitrary, oppressive or contrary to legitimate expectation are misconceived. 16. Learned counsel submits that the fixation of rent for Shop No. 2 in the newly constructed commercial complex has been done after considering various factors, including the 17 expenditure incurred in construction of the complex, overhead expenses and maintenance charges. The rent so fixed cannot be termed as arbitrary or unreasonable. It is further submitted that the earlier rent payable under the old lease cannot be compared with the rent fixed for a newly constructed commercial complex. Learned counsel also submits that the petitioner has wrongly relied upon the policy decision dated 26.03.2025 and the proceedings of the earlier writ petition. The said policy decision was applicable to rehabilitation of eligible leaseholders; however, the allotment of the new shop was subject to execution of a fresh lease agreement and the terms and conditions mentioned therein. It is further submitted that the order dated 11.08.2025 passed in WPC No.1027/2025 only granted liberty to the petitioner to approach this Court in case any fresh cause of action arose and cannot be interpreted as conferring any right upon the petitioner to challenge the terms of the lease agreement which were already within his knowledge and accepted by him. It is submitted that the petitioner continues to carry on his business and the respondents have provided an alternative shop as a rehabilitation measure. Therefore, the claim that the petitioner's livelihood has been affected is wholly misconceived. 18 17. Dr. Arham Siddiqui, learned State counsel submits that, though the dispute in the present matter is essentially between the petitioner and the Municipal Corporation, which is arrayed as respondent No. 2, the State Government through the Secretary, Department of Urban Administration and Development, has supervisory control over the functioning of the Municipal Corporation. It is submitted that, having regard to the nature of the dispute and upon consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the lease agreement executed between the petitioner and the Municipal Corporation, it is apparent that the petitioner had accepted the terms and conditions incorporated therein and thereafter taken possession of the allotted premises. Once the petitioner has voluntarily accepted the terms and conditions of the agreement, he cannot be permitted to turn around and challenge the same after deriving benefits under such agreement. Learned State counsel further submits that the petitioner, having entered into a contractual arrangement with open eyes and without any objection, is bound by the terms and conditions of the agreement and cannot seek modification or alteration thereof through a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of 19 India. Therefore, the present writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 18. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as learned counsel appearing for the respondents and have carefully perused the pleadings, documents placed on record and the submissions advanced by the respective parties. 19. I have heard learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.2 and 3 as well as learned State counsel, and have perused the pleadings, documents brought on record and the authorities relied upon by the respective parties. 20. The principal grievance of the petitioner is that though he was a valid leaseholder under the registered lease deed dated 21.08.2006 valid till 20.08.2036 and was allotted an alternative shop pursuant to demolition of the earlier premises for public purpose, the respondent-Municipal Corporation has arbitrarily restricted the fresh allotment to a period of three years and has imposed onerous financial conditions, contrary to the policy decision dated 26.03.2025. On the other hand, the stand of the respondent-Corporation is that the earlier lease already stood cancelled; thereafter, a fresh contractual 20 arrangement came into existence which was voluntarily accepted by the petitioner without protest and, therefore, the petitioner cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court to alter the contractual terms. 21. Upon consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that it is not in dispute that after issuance of the proposal letter dated 07.08.2025, the petitioner deposited the amount demanded therein, accepted possession of the newly allotted shop and thereafter executed the lease agreement dated 18.08.2025. The petitioner has admittedly entered into the contractual arrangement and has continued to remain in possession of the allotted premises under the said agreement. The challenge raised in the present petition substantially relates to the tenure of the lease, fixation of rent and certain terms and conditions incorporated in the agreement. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of St. Mary’s Education Society and Another vs. Rejendra Prasad Bhargava and Others (2023) 4 SCC 498 has held as under:- “75. We may sum up our final conclusions as under: 21 75.1. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against a person or a body discharging public duties or public functions. The public duty cast may be either statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the person must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to the public involving the public law element. Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be established that the body or the person was seeking to achieve the same for the collective benefit of the public or a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public. 75.2. Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element as its integral part cannot be rectified through a writ petition under Article 226. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either the service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of “State” within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was 22 found that the action complained of has public law element. 75.3. It must be consequently held that while a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions becoming amenable to judicial review by a constitutional court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of matter relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. An educational institution may perform myriad functions touching various facets of public life and in the societal sphere. While such of those functions as would fall within the domain of a “public function” or “public duty” be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service.” 23. It is well settled that the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is essentially a public law remedy. Ordinarily, disputes arising purely out of 23 contractual obligations, particularly where the parties have consciously entered into a contract and the controversy relates to interpretation, enforcement or modification of its terms, are not amenable to writ jurisdiction unless the action complained of is shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory or violative of any statutory or constitutional provision. Whether the petitioner is entitled to continuation of the original lease till 20.08.2036, whether the fresh allotment should be treated as a continuation of the earlier lease, or whether the conditions incorporated in the agreement deserve to be modified are essentially questions flowing from contractual rights and obligations, which require adjudication on facts and interpretation of the contractual documents. Such issues are more appropriately examined before the competent civil forum and not in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Government of Tamil Nadu and others vs. P.R. Jaganathan and others, 2025 SCC Online SC 2496, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “21. Once such an agreement is arrived at, it becomes a concluded contract under Section 3 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The rights and liabilities of the parties would only be governed by the terms of the 24 contract. Hence, a contract voluntarily entered into between the parties, shall not be disturbed by taking recourse to the statutory provisions, which are sought to be excluded by such contract. A party to a contract cannot be permitted to have recourse to two different modes, especially after having accepted the compensation under the contract without any demur or protest. It is not open to either of the parties to resile from the terms of the agreement arrived at. We may note that the issues of rent and compensation were raised even earlier. These issues were put to an end through the agreement. Therefore, the private respondents are totally estopped from seeking any relief beyond the terms of the contract. 23. It is not as if the agreement has been entered into by force or deceit. There is no suppression of fact or any element of fraud. Therefore, it can be seen that the private respondents were initially inclined to accept the amount determined by way of a final agreement. It is only thereafter, wisdom dawned upon them to seek interest. Thus, it is a clear case of approbation and reprobation. The said doctrine of approbate and reprobate has been enunciated by this Court in the case of Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25: “Approbate and reprobate: 26. These phrases are borrowed from the Scots law. They would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The principle behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate. Once again, 25 it is a principle of equity coming under the contours of common law. Therefore, he who knows that if he objects to an instrument, he will not get the benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the fruits. One cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the rest. A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an instrument while questioning the same. Such a party either has to affirm or disaffirm the transaction. This principle has to be applied with more vigour as a common law principle, if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully and on near completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter questions the other part. An element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle. It is also a species of estoppel dealing with the conduct of a party. We have already dealt with the provisions of the Contract Act concerning the conduct of a party, and his presumption of knowledge while confirming an offer through his acceptance unconditionally.” (emphasis supplied) 25. The reliance placed by the petitioner upon the policy decision dated 26.03.2025 and the earlier orders passed by this Court has also been considered. However, once the petitioner consciously entered into the subsequent agreement and accepted possession of the premises thereunder, the rights and liabilities of the parties thereafter became governed by the terms of the said agreement. This Court, while exercising writ jurisdiction, would not rewrite the contractual 26 terms or substitute a different bargain between the parties. The petitioner, if so advised, is always at liberty to question the validity or enforceability of the contractual stipulations before the competent forum in accordance with law. This Court, therefore, refrains from expressing any opinion on the merits of the petitioner's claim regarding continuation of the lease till 20.08.2036 or the validity of the impugned contractual clauses, lest it may prejudice either party in any future proceedings. 26. However, one aspect of the matter stands on an entirely different footing. It is an admitted position that after allotment of the shop and execution of the agreement, the respondent- Municipal Corporation has not provided the petitioner with essential amenities such as electricity and water supply, which are indispensable for making the premises functional. Simultaneously, the respondents are insisting upon payment of rent and other charges in terms of the agreement. Such a course of action cannot be countenanced. An allottee cannot reasonably be expected to pay rent for a commercial premises which has not been rendered fit for commercial use on account of failure of the allotting authority itself. The obligation to provide minimum civic amenities is incidental to the allotment itself and cannot be divorced from the demand 27 of rent. The respondent-Corporation, being a statutory local authority, is expected to act fairly and reasonably and cannot compel the petitioner to perform his contractual obligations while itself failing to discharge the corresponding obligations necessary to make the premises usable. 27. In the considered opinion of this Court, therefore, while no interference is warranted with respect to the contractual terms governing the lease period, rent and other conditions contained in the agreement dated 18.08.2025 in exercise of writ jurisdiction, the respondent-Municipal Corporation is duty- bound to ensure that the allotted premises are made functional by providing electricity connection, water supply and all other basic amenities necessary for carrying on the business for which the shop has been allotted. 28. Consequently, respondent No.2-Municipal Corporation is directed to provide electricity connection, water supply and all other essential civic amenities to the shop allotted to the petitioner within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, if the same have not already been provided. 29. It is made clear that this Court has not adjudicated upon the petitioner's claim regarding continuation of the lease for 28 the remaining period of the original lease, the legality of the lease period fixed under the agreement dated 18.08.2025, the fixation of rent or any other contractual stipulation, and the petitioner shall be at liberty to avail such remedy as may be available to him in accordance with law before the appropriate forum. 30. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition stands disposed of. 31. No order as to costs. sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Vishakha