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2026 DAILYLAW 32553 (CHH)

SANJEEVAN TOPPO v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

CRMP/2192/2026 · 2026-08-19

Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal

Transfer Petitionbody2026

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

1 CGHC010316372026 2026:CGHC:37266-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2192 of 2026 Sanjeevan Toppo S/o- Reenwa Toppo, Aged About 36 Years R/o- Shantpara, Village Bhatko, Post Batauli, Bhatko Surguja Police Station- Gandhinagar, District- Surguja (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station- Gandhinagar, District- Surguja (C.G.) 2 - X Y Z Nil ... Respondents ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Petitioner : Mr. Amit Tirkey, Advocate For Respondent No.1/State : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Government Advocate ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hon'ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 20.08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Amit Tirkey, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent No.1. 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner under Section 528 of the Bharariya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 with the following prayer :- ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA 2 “1. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the FIR No. 0278/2026 dated 15.05.2026 registered at Police Station (C.G.) and Chargesheet No. 267/2026 filed before Chief Judicial Magistrate Ambikapur in July 2026 (date of filing of charge sheet not mention) [ANNEXURE P-2] and also quash the first order taking cognizance by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambikapur District Surguja (C.G.) order dated 13.07.2026 [ANNEXURE P-1] in the Criminal Case No. 7051/2026 namely State of Chhattisgarh Vs Sanjeevan Toppo by virtue of which the learned trial court has registered criminal case for an offence punishable under Section 69, 351 (3) of BNS, 2023 against the petitioner and to quash the entire subsequent criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner; 2. Any other relief/relief's which this Hon'ble Court may think fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case along with cost of the petition may also be granted to the petitioner, in the interest of justice.” 3. As per the prosecution case, the complainant and the petitioner were allegedly in a relationship for about three years, from 15.02.2023 to 30.03.2026. It is alleged that during the said relationship, the petitioner promised to marry the complainant and, on the basis of such promise, established sexual relations with her on several occasions. Subsequently, when the complainant asked the petitioner to marry her, he allegedly refused. On 15.05.2026 at about 20:42 hrs., the complainant lodged an FIR at Police Station Gandhinagar, Ambikapur, District 3 Surguja (C.G.), alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 69 and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The petitioner was arrested on 16.05.2026 and was subsequently granted bail on 17.06.2026 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Ambikapur, District Surguja (C.G.). 4. After completion of investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet before the competent Court in July 2026. Pursuant thereto, Criminal Case No. 7051/2026 was registered and the subsequent criminal proceedings were initiated against the petitioner. The petitioner, who is posted as Veterinary Assistant Surgeon at Government Poultry Farm, Sakalo, Ambikapur, has challenged the FIR, charge-sheet, registration of Criminal Case No. 7051/2026 and the entire consequential criminal proceedings, alleging that the case is false and frivolous. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the impugned FIR and the subsequent criminal proceedings are nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is submitted that the petitioner and respondent No.2 were admittedly in a consensual relationship for a long period of approximately three years, i.e. from 15.02.2023 to 30.03.2026. During such a prolonged relationship, the parties voluntarily continued their association and, therefore, the allegation that the petitioner had from the very inception intended to deceive the complainant on the false promise of marriage is inherently improbable. It is further submitted that mere failure or refusal to marry subsequently 4 cannot, by itself, constitute an offence under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. According to learned counsel, the essential ingredient of Section 69 is that the promise to marry must have been made without any intention of fulfilling the same and that such promise must have been the means by which sexual intercourse was obtained. A subsequent failure to honour a promise, according to the petitioner, is only a breach of promise and cannot automatically be converted into a criminal offence. It is also submitted that the complainant remained in the relationship for more than three years and herself continued the relationship till 30.03.2026. Such conduct, according to the petitioner, prima facie indicates a consensual relationship rather than a relationship induced by deceit from its inception. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner is a Veterinary Assistant Surgeon serving at Government Poultry Farm, Sakalo, Ambikapur, District Surguja, and has already remained in custody from 16.05.2026 till he was enlarged on bail on 17.06.2026. It is contended that continuation of the criminal proceedings would cause serious prejudice to the petitioner, affect his service career and amount to unnecessary harassment, therefore, he prays that the FIR, charge-sheet, registration of Criminal Case No.7051/2026 and all consequential criminal proceedings be quashed in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. 6. Per contra, learned State counsel opposes the petition and submits that the prayer for quashing is misconceived. It is 5 contended that the allegations contained in the FIR, when taken at their face value, clearly disclose the commission of cognizable offences and make out a prima facie case against the petitioner. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 8. The principal question which arises for consideration is whether, on the allegations contained in the FIR and the material collected during investigation, the criminal proceedings against the petitioner warrant interference in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. 9. It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction for quashing criminal proceedings, the Court is required to examine whether the allegations, if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, disclose the commission of an offence. The Court is not required to undertake a meticulous examination of the evidence or conduct a mini-trial at this stage. 10. The principles governing exercise of such jurisdiction were authoritatively laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335. The categories indicated therein are illustrative and not exhaustive. Quashing is justified only where the allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, fail to disclose an offence or where continuation of the proceedings would otherwise amount to a clear abuse of the process of law. 6 11. The same principle has been reiterated in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasised that, ordinarily, criminal investigation and prosecution should not be interdicted at the threshold when the FIR discloses a cognizable offence. The High Court is not required to examine the merits of the allegations as if conducting a trial. 12. In the present case, the FIR contains a specific allegation that the petitioner was in a relationship with the complainant, promised to marry her and, on the basis of such promise, established sexual relations with her on several occasions. It is further alleged that subsequently the petitioner refused to marry her. These allegations, taken at their face value, cannot be said to be so inherently absurd or improbable that no prudent person could reach a conclusion that an offence is disclosed. 13. The contention of the petitioner that the relationship continued for approximately three years and was consensual, and therefore the allegation of a false promise to marry is not believable, cannot be conclusively accepted at this stage. The duration of the relationship may constitute a relevant circumstance, but it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the intention of the petitioner at the inception of the promise. 14. At the same time, it is correct that mere subsequent refusal to marry does not automatically establish a false promise to marry. The distinction between a false promise made from the 7 very inception and a subsequent breach of a genuine promise is well recognised. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2019) 9 SCC 608, the Supreme Court held that the promise must have been false from the beginning, made in bad faith and without intention of being adhered to, and must bear a direct nexus with the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. 15. The same distinction has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions. In Prithivirajan v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 696, the Supreme Court reiterated that merely because physical relations were established on the basis of a promise to marry, the same does not automatically amount to an offence; the necessary question is whether the promise was false from the inception and whether it directly induced the sexual relationship. 16. However, the aforesaid principles do not assist the petitioner at the present stage because the allegation in the FIR is not merely that the petitioner subsequently failed to marry the complainant. The specific prosecution case is that the petitioner promised marriage and obtained sexual relations on the basis of such promise. Whether the petitioner possessed the intention to marry when the promise was made is essentially a question of fact which may require consideration of the statements of the complainant, the petitioner, surrounding circumstances and other evidence collected during investigation. 8 17. Section 69 of the BNS is a specific statutory provision which came into force with effect from 01.07.2024. It criminalises sexual intercourse by deceitful means or on a promise to marry made without intention of fulfilling the same, where such intercourse does not amount to rape. Judicial decisions considering the new provision have recognised that allegations of sexual intercourse on a false promise of marriage may constitute a prima facie case under Section 69 BNS. 18. It is, however, clarified that the alleged acts falling prior to 01.07.2024 cannot be retrospectively brought within Section 69 BNS merely because the relationship continued thereafter. The applicability of Section 69 must necessarily be confined to conduct occurring after the BNS came into force. This aspect, if specifically arising from the charge-sheet, shall be considered by the learned trial Court in accordance with law. The introduction of Section 69 BNS cannot have retrospective operation. 19. So far as Section 351(3) BNS is concerned, the prosecution case and the material collected during investigation disclose allegations which have been considered sufficient by the investigating agency for submission of the charge-sheet. The exact ingredients and evidentiary value of the allegations are matters to be considered by the trial Court after the parties lead evidence. 20. The fact that the petitioner is a Government employee and is presently posted as a Veterinary Assistant Surgeon also cannot, by itself, constitute a ground for quashing criminal proceedings 9 when a prima facie case is disclosed. His arrest on 16.05.2026 and subsequent release on bail on 17.06.2026 are likewise not circumstances which determine whether the FIR and charge- sheet are legally sustainable. 21. It is also significant that the investigation has already culminated in filing of a charge-sheet. The material collected by the investigating agency is therefore required to be considered by the competent Court at the appropriate stage. This Court, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, would not ordinarily substitute its own appreciation of disputed facts for that of the trial Court. 22. The defence of the petitioner that the relationship was consensual, that the promise to marry was genuine and that the prosecution is false or frivolous are matters which may constitute a defence during trial. At the stage of quashing, such disputed questions of fact cannot ordinarily be adjudicated on the basis of competing versions of the parties. The present case, therefore, does not fall within the exceptional categories warranting exercise of inherent jurisdiction under the principles laid down in Bhajan Lal. Nor can it be said, at this stage, that continuation of the proceedings would necessarily amount to abuse of the process of law. 23. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the allegations contained in the FIR, read with the material collected during investigation and the charge-sheet, disclose a prima facie case requiring adjudication by the 10 competent trial Court. The defence raised by the petitioner involves disputed questions of fact, particularly regarding the nature of the relationship, the circumstances in which the promise of marriage was made, the intention of the petitioner at the time of making such promise and the circumstances in which the petitioner subsequently declined to marry the complainant. Such questions cannot appropriately be determined in proceedings seeking quashing of the criminal case. 24. Consequently, no ground is made out for quashing the FIR, charge-sheet, registration of Criminal Case No.7051/2026 or the consequential criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. 25. However, it is made clear that the observations made herein are confined to the adjudication of the present petition and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case. The learned trial Court shall decide the matter independently on the basis of the evidence adduced before it and in accordance with law. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Chandra