- 1 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF JULY, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 2244 OF 2026 C/W CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 2247 OF 2026 IN CRL.P No. 2244/2026 BETWEEN: 1. SRI K.C.RAVICHANDRA S/O K.P.CHIKKARANGAPPA, AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS RESIDING AT NO.56, 2ND CROSS, VIRUPAKSHAPURA, KODIGEHALLI, BENGALURU NORTH, VIDYARANYAPURA, BENGALURU, KARNATAKA – 560 097. 2. SMT. RAJESHWARI R., W/O K.C.RAVICHANDRA AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS RESIDING AT NO.56, 2ND CROSS, VIRUPAKSHAPURA, KODIGEHALLI, BENGALURU NORTH, VIDYARANYAPURA, BENGALURU, KARNATAKA – 560 097. …PETITIONERS (BY SRI SHATHABISH SHIVANNA, ADVOCATE A/W SRI ABISHEK JANARDHAN, ADVOCATE AND Digitally signed by PADMAVATHI B K Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 SRI SAMRUDH HEGDE, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY CHANNAMMANAKERE ACHU KATTU PS REPRESENTED BY THE SPP OFFICE, HIGH COURT BUILDING, BENGALURU – 560 001. 2. XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.RASHMI PATEL, HCGP FOR R-1; SRI BHADRINATH R., ADVOCATE FOR R-2) THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 528 OF BNSS PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CR.NO.4/2026 DATED 12.01.2026 PURSUANT TO COMPLAINT DATED 12.01.2026 REGISTERED BY THE 1st RESPONDENT CHANNAMANAKERE ACHUKATTU P.S., FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 49 AND 69 OF BNS, 2023, AND SECTION 67(A) OF I.T ACT, 2000, PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE 37TH ACJM, NRUPATHUNGA ROAD, BANGALORE CITY. IN CRL.P NO. 2247/2026 BETWEEN: 1. SRI PURUSHOTHAM R., S/O RAVICHANDRA K.C., AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS - 3 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 RESIDING AT NO.56, 2ND CROSS, VIRUPAKSHAPURA, KODIGEHALLI, BENGALURU NORTH, BENGALURU, KARNATAKA – 560 097. ...PETITIONER (BY SRI SHATHABISH SHIVANNA, ADVOCATE A/W SRI ABISHEK JANARDHAN, ADVOCATE AND SRI SAMRUDH HEGDE, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY CHANNAMMANAKERE ACHU KATTU PS REPRESENTED BY THE SPP OFFICE, HIGH COURT BUILDING, BENGALURU – 560 001. 2. XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX ...RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.RASHMI PATEL, HCGP FOR R-1; SRI BHADRINATH R., ADVOCATE FOR R-2) THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.528 BNSS PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CRIME NO.4/2026 DATED 12.01.2026 PURSUANT TO COMPLAINT DATED 12.01.2026 REGISTERED BY THE 1st RESPONDENT CHANNAMANAKERE ACHU KATTU POLICE STATION FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 49 AND 69 OF THE BNS 2023 AND SEC.67(A) OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE 37TH ACJM NRUPATHUNGA ROAD, BENGALURU CITY. - 4 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 THESE PETITIONS, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioners, in Crl.P.No.2244 of 2026 are accused Nos.2 and 3 and petitioner in Crl.P.No.2247 of 2026 is accused No.1, in respect of the crime in Crime No.4 of 2026 registered for offences punishable under Sections 49 and 69 of the BNS and Section 67A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The complainant is common in both the cases. 2. Heard Sri Shathabish Shivanna, learned counsel appearing for petitioners, Smt Rashmi Patel, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri Bhadrinath R., learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2. 3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: The petitioner/accused No.1 and the complainant are said to have got introduced to each other for the talks of marriage. - 5 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 The talks of marriage also result in a betrothal ceremony being held and later, about 4 months thereafter, the relationship between the two flounders. Floundering of the relationship between the two is on account of manifold circumstances, which need not be narrated in the subject order. However, the talks of marriage break and the relationship eventually ends. The ending of the relationship results in the complainant registering the crime for the aforesaid offences. 4. The learned counsel appearing for petitioners would submit that the ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioners are not found in the case at hand. There is no overt act indicated against the petitioners in the complaint. The offence under Section 69 of the BNS inter alia has sprung only on the score that the talks of marriage failed and the relationship between accused No.1 and the complainant breaks. Learned counsel would also submit that the offence under Section 69 of the BNS cannot be alleged against the parents of accused No.1. - 6 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 5. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2/complainant would submit that a perusal at the complaint would indicate that the ingredients of the offence under Section 69 of the BNS inter alia are found. Learned counsel would submit that the matter is still at the crime stage and investigation cannot be interdicted at the hands of this Court. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 7. The afore-narrated facts and link in the chain of events are a matter of record and would require only a skeletal iteration. Accused No.1 and the complainant are introduced to each other for the talks of marriage and get engaged to each other. Thereafter, the relationship between the two flounders. Floundering of the relationship leads to the registration of the complaint in the subject crime. Since the entire issue is triggered from the registration of the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. The complaint reads as follows: - 7 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 "Date: 12.01.2026 To, Inspector of Police, Chennamanakere Achukattu Police Station Bengaluru City SUBJECT : Complaint against Purshotham R and Mr.K C Ravichandran & Mrs. R. Rajeshwari Dear Sir, 1. On 5th September,2025 my marriage was fixed with one Mr.Purshotham R in the presence of the elders of both families at our home. Subsequent to this on our Engagement was fixed on 26.10.2025 which was held at Gayathri Vihar, Palace Grounds. A demand was made by Mr.Purshotham'sParents that we were to take care of all the expenses which were arising out of this event. My family has spent more than 4crores on this event and upcoming wedding events. The engagement invitation & Photograph is attached as Annexure – A. Soon after my marriage was fixed, Purshotham used to visit my house XXXX quite often almost on a daily basis. On 25.11.2025 the said Mr.Purshotham came to my house and he committed an act of sexual intercourse, I agreed as I was to get married to him. 2. On 21.10.2025, the said Mr. Purshotham asks me to book a hotel room at Hotel White Rock which is situated at 7th block, 4th phase, BSK 3rd Stage. We meet here and I was told by Purshotham that anyways we were to get engaged in few days' time so let us get to know each other better and thereafter, we meet each other and he demanded that I must engage in sexual act, despite my strong refusal he still forcibly committed an act of sexual intercourse on me at the said hotel. The Hotel Receipt is produced as Annexure – B. 3. On 16.11.2025, Purshotham again wants to meet me and I agree to meet him as he was by then officially my fiancé. On this day Purshotham asks me to books a hotel room at Rajathadri Royal Inn which is situated at - 8 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 Banashankri 6th stage. Purshotham also send his money to me so that I can book this hotel room. Thereafter, as we were engaged and we were to marry, Purshotham asks me to engage in sexual act, here also he performs sexual intercourse on me several times. The Hotel Receipt is Produced as Annexure - C. 4. On 20.11.2025, We meet again in an Hotel Called Shetty Gardenia which is situated at Basavanagudi. Here also Purshotham insists that we must engage ourself in sexual acts and performs sexual intercourse on me several times. The Hotel Receipt is Produced as Annexure-D. 5. Again on 23.11.2025 we meet at the same hotel and we indulge in an act of sex upon the insistence of Mr.Purshotham. The Hotel Receipt is Produced as Annexure-E. 6. On 04.12.2025 and once again we met at the same hotel Shetty Gardenia and Purshotham had sexual intercourse with me several times. The hotel receipts are produced as Annexure-F. 7. Apart from all of this time again the said Purshotham R has forced me to send naked pictures of myself to him through Whatsapp. He has constantly demanded that I send these naked pictures almost on a daily basis, and he kept blackmailing me that if I don't send these naked pictures, he shall post all the other naked pictures on social media, this has caused serious impact on my mental health, The Screen Shots of these Whatsapp Conversations are produced as Annexure-G. 8. On 16.12.2025, to my utter shock and horror Purshotham and his family calls off the engagement and tell us that that the Mr.Purshotham does not want to marry me for reasons best known to him. There after the said Purshotham blocks my phone number and also blocks the numbers of all my family members. Ever since then he is unable to be contacted through phone. Numerous times we have tried to reach his parents but they also tell that their son does not want to marry me. After this date it has become very clear that Mr.Purshotham R has been absconding and we are unable to track his location. He - 9 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 has cheated me and exploited me sexually and now he has gone missing. The Photocopy of the Marriage Invitation which was to be held on 25th January 2026 is produced as Annexure -H. 9. Parents of Mr.Purshotham, Mr.K C Ravichandran & Mrs. R. Rajeshwari have constantly supported him to exploit me and my family. Even now they are not willing to come and speak with us. It becomes evident that Mr.K C Ravichandran & Mrs. R. Rajeshwari have had ill intentions against me and they have played a crucial role in influencing their son to sexually exploit me and then call off the marriage. Listening to his parents Mr.Purshotham later broke the wedding. They have always made a constant demand that we spend all the money on marriage and wanted a lavish wedding in Palace Grounds and they were not willing to settle for anything less. Mr.K C Ravichandran & Mrs. R. Rajeshwari they are also responsible for the mental trauma which me and my family are undergoing today. It is very clear that Mr.Purshotham has sexually exploited me and performed an act of sexual intercourse several times on the false promise to marry me. I was also of that belief that anyways I was to marry the said Purshotham so I was succumbed to have sex with him. Now it is very clear that the said Purshotham always wanted to take benefit and sexually exploit me, I have no other choice but to lodge this Complaint. The said act of crime committed by Mr.Purshotham and his parents are Punishable u/s 69, 49 of BNS Act-2023 and Section 67A of Information Technology Act, 2008. We thought that we could resolve this matter through discussions in presence of elders as these deliberations caused delay and failed now, I am lodging this complaint. Through this complaint I kindly request the Police to take legal action against Purshotham and his parents Mr.K C Ravichandran & Mrs. R. Rajeshwari in the interest of Justice an Equity." - 10 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 8. The issue now would be, whether the allegations made would amount to an offence under Section 69 of the BNS. Section 69 of the BNS reads as follows: “69. Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means, etc.—Whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, has sexual intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—“deceitful means” shall include inducement for, or false promise of employment or promotion, or marrying by suppressing identity.” Section 69 would punish a person who would indulge in sexual intercourse with the victim by deceitful means, or a false promise of marriage. It is not a case where the petitioner/accused No.1 had indulged in a false promise of marriage. It was, in fact, the talks of marriage gives rise to introduction between the accused No.1 and the complainant. The talks of marriage fail on account of manifold reasons, as observed hereinabove, which would not mean that the petitioner/accused No.1 or the parents/accused Nos.2 and 3 - 11 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 should be held for the offence punishable under Section 69 of the BNS. 9. Jurisprudence is replete with the law laid down by the Apex Court observing that consensual acts or the mere breaking up of a relationship cannot become an offence. 9.1. The Apex Court in the case of SAMADHAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA1, has held as follows: “…. …. …. 25. The allegation of rape in the present case hinges entirely on respondent No. 2's claim that appellant established physical relations with her on false pretext of marriage. It is alleged by the appellant that respondent No. 2 opposed the idea of marriage whenever the appellant broached the said idea; however, the appellant kept on insisting possibly this was because her first marriage was in subsistence. It is, however, not clear as to why, despite being opposed to the idea of marriage, respondent No. 2 continued to meet the appellant and indulged in physical relations with him even though she was already married. …. …. …. 27. In this regard, it becomes relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398, (“Mahesh Damu”) wherein the following observations were made: 1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528 - 12 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 “27. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or consideration. A woman may have reasons to have physical relationship other than the promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal marital ties. 28. Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the physical relationship without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact.” (underlining by us) 28. We find that the present case is not a case where the appellant lured respondent No. 2 solely for physical pleasures and then vanished. The relationship continued for a period of three long years, which is a considerable period of time. They remained close and emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage. 29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken relationships are given the colour of criminality. The offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases where - 13 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 there exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter of profound concern and calls for condemnation. 30. In Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764, this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed that a mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage. The relevant portion is extracted as under: “20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n)IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's statement under Section 164CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship. Further, both parties are now married to someone else and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present case would amount to - 14 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 a gross abuse of the process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution.” (underlining by us) 31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in which, in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage holds deep social and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not uncommon for a woman to repose complete faith in her partner and to consent to physical intimacy on the assurance that such a relationship would culminate in a lawful and socially recognised marriage. In such circumstances, the promise of marriage becomes the very foundation of her consent, rendering it conditional rather than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such consent may stand vitiated where it is established that the promise of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The law must remain sensitive to such genuine cases where trust has been breached and dignity violated, lest the protective scope of Section 376 of the IPC be reduced to a mere formality for those truly aggrieved. At the same time, the invocation of this principle must rest upon credible evidence and concrete facts, and not on unsubstantiated allegations or moral conjecture. 32. Upon a careful consideration of the record in the present case, we are unable to discern any material that would warrant the invocation of Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. The facts of the present case unmistakably indicate that it is a classic instance of a consensual relationship having subsequently turned acrimonious. …. …. …. 34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled respondent No. 2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor does it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her presence there. Therefore, the only logical inference that emerges is that - 15 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 respondent No. 2, of her own volition, visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It is also borne out from the record that whenever the appellant brought up the subject of marriage, respondent No. 2 herself opposed the proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of respondent No. 2 that the physical relationship between the parties was premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of merit and stands unsustainable. …. …. …. 37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in question itself reveals that the relationship between the parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent No. 2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the marriage of respondent No. 2 was subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the material on record, it is manifest that the relationship between the parties was consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasised in the impugned order, cannot be held against the appellant when the same can be otherwise clearly discerned. 38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of this Court in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations were made: “29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to amount to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such consent was given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak - 16 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660], in which it was held as follows : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) “21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. xxx - 17 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The ‘failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance’. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.”.” 9.2. The Apex Court in the case of MANISH YADAV v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH2, has held as follows: “…. …. …. 14. In our opinion, it is clearly discernible that both the appellant and the complainant were major and thus, both were competent enough to make rational decisions. As per the statement of the complainant (supra), their initial physical relations were consensual in nature, and without there being any promise of marriage being offered by the appellant. While it can be said that initially the relationship between the complainant and appellant 2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 363 - 18 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 had developed on the basis of mutual attraction and affection, the same cannot by any stretch of imagination fall within the ambit of a relationship flowing from a promise to marry. 15. The criminal jurisprudence on the scope of ‘consent’ in cases where sexual intercourse took place on the promise of marriage has been well established through a catena of judgments by this Court. In Uday v. State of Karnataka8, this Court acquitted the accused based on the reasoning that the prosecutrix, a mature college student, consented to sexual intercourse with the accused of her own free will. The Court found that she was fully aware of the consequences of her actions and held that her consent was not based on any misconception of fact. In Uday (supra), the Court noted that: “21. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no straitjacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by the courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them.” - 19 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 (emphasis supplied) 16. This Court, in the case of Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana9, while discussing the nature of the ‘consent’ in cases where sexual intercourse occurs on the promise of marriage, distinguished between a mere ‘breach of promise’ and ‘not fulfilling a false promise’. The Court held as follows: “21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. - 20 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” (emphasis supplied) 17. Moreover, in Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar10, the Court acquitted and set aside the conviction of the accused while holding that while there was a breach of promise to marry, it was not a case of false promise to marry. The relevant extract is produced hereinunder: “35. The remaining question is whether on the basis of the evidence on record, it is reasonably possible to hold that the accused with the fraudulent intention of inducing her to sexual intercourse, made a false promise to marry. We have no doubt that the accused did hold out the promise to marry her and that was the predominant reason for the victim girl to agree to the sexual intimacy with him. PW 12 was also too keen to marry him as she said so specifically. But we find no evidence which gives rise to an inference beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had no intention to marry her at all from the inception and that the promise he made was false to his knowledge. No circumstances emerging from the prosecution evidence - 21 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 establish this fact. On the other hand, the statement of PW 12 that “later on”, the accused became ready to marry her but his father and others took him away from the village would indicate that the accused might have been prompted by a genuine intention to marry which did not materialise on account of the pressure exerted by his family elders. It seems to be a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false promise to marry. On this aspect also, the observations of this Court in Uday case [(2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775 : (2003) 2 Scale 329] at para 24 come to the aid of the appellant.” (emphasis supplied) 18. Applying the above principle to the case at hand, it is clearly discernible that in the present case, the complainant had agreed to indulge in intimate relations with the appellant on the accord of her own desires and not on the basis of any false promise of marriage made by the appellant. Therefore, while the present case may involve a breach of promise, it does not constitute a case of an inherently false promise to marry. Based on the circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the appellant obtained the complainant's consent to engage in a physical relationship under the pretext of a false promise of marriage.” (Emphasis supplied at each instance) In the light of the afore-quoted judgments of the Apex Court, permitting further investigation would become an abuse of the process of the law and result in the miscarriage of justice. Therefore, I deem it appropriate to obliterate the crime qua the petitioners. - 22 - HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010106732026 NC: 2026:KHC:36191 CRL.P No. 2244 of 2026 C/W CRL.P No. 2247 of 2026 10. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) Criminal Petitions are allowed. (ii) FIR in Crime No.4 of 2026 pending on the file of 37th Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru stands quashed. Consequently, pending applications if any, also stand disposed. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE BKP List No.: 2 Sl No.: 99