1 CGHC010248882026 2026:CGHC:35489-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 746 of 2026 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary Department Of Women And Child Welfare Department, Mahanadi Bhawan Naya Raipur Mantralaya, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - Director Department Of Woman And Child Welfare Department Indrawati Bhawan, Block-1 2nd Floor Naya Raipur Chhattisgarh 3 - The Collector District Bastar, Jagdalpur District Bastar Chhattisgarh 4 - District Program Officer Department Of Women And Child Welfare Jagdalpur District Bastar Chhattisgarh 5 - High Level Caste Scrutiny Committee Through Its Chair Person, Pandit Dindayal Upadhyay Nagar, Sector- 4 Raipur, District- Raipur Chhattisgarh ... Appellants versus Laxmi Thakur Wd/o Subhash Thakur Aged About 42 Years Presently R/o At Atal Bihari Vajpeyi Ward Dharampura No. 1 Ashram Road, P.S. Dharampura, Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Appellants : Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, Deputy A.G. For Respondent : Mr. Pallav Mishra, Advocate VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.08.14 13:14:19 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J. 12/08/2026 1. Heard Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the appellants on I.A. No. 1 of 2026, which is an application for condonation of delay of 602 days in preferring the instant appeal. Also heard Mr. Pallav Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. The appellants have filed this writ appeal against an order dated 18.09.2024, passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge, in WPC No. 1249/2015 (Laxmi Thakur v. State of Chhattisgarh and others), by which the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner. 3. Learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the appellants/State submits that the present writ appeal has been preferred by the appellants/State against the judgment and order dated 18.09.2024 passed by the learned Single Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 1249/2015. He would submit that the State is a multi-functioning body and is required to follow the prescribed procedure for obtaining necessary administrative sanction and approval for preferring an appeal. He further submits that, after passing of the impugned judgment, the Director, Directorate of Women & Child Development, vide communication dated 19.11.2024, sought guidance and opinion from the Secretary, Department of Women and Child Development, 3 who thereafter sought opinion from the Secretary, Department of Law and Legislative Affairs. Subsequently, an opinion was also sought from the Office of the Advocate General regarding the feasibility of preferring an appeal. Learned State counsel would further submit that the Office of the Advocate General recorded its opinion on 12.01.2026 in favour of preferring a writ appeal and, thereafter, the Department of Law granted approval and permission for filing the writ appeal vide order dated 03.06.2026. He submits that the delay in filing the appeal has thus occurred on account of the bona fide completion of various administrative and procedural formalities at different levels of the Government machinery and was neither deliberate nor attributable to any negligence or mala fide intention on the part of the appellants. He further submits that the appellants have a strong and substantial case on merits and that the impugned judgment is legally unsustainable, inter alia, as it relies upon judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which have subsequently been overruled. Therefore, refusal to condone the delay would result in a meritorious matter being shut out at the threshold and cause serious prejudice to the public interest. 4. Learned State counsel would further submit that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132, has held that while considering an application for condonation of delay, a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted, particularly having regard to the functioning of the Government as an impersonal machinery. He also places reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107, G. 4 Ramegowda v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (1988) 2 SCC 142, and State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752, in support of the proposition that procedural delays in Government functioning, where bona fide and satisfactorily explained, ought not to defeat substantial justice. He, therefore, submits that the delay of 602 days in preferring the present writ appeal deserves to be condoned in the larger interest of justice and public interest. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the writ appeal is barred by delay and laches and further there is no cogent reason or explanation has been given in the delay and laches application filed for condonation of delay. Hence, the appeal is not liable to be entertained. 6. On a pointed query being put to the learned counsel for the appellants/State as to why the appellants have approached this Court against the impugned judgment and order dated 18.09.2024 after an inordinate delay of 602 days, learned counsel for the appellants/State has submitted that the delay occurred on account of the administrative and procedural formalities involved in obtaining the requisite approvals and sanctions from the concerned authorities. He has, therefore, sought to justify the delay on the ground of the time consumed in the decision-making process of the State Government. 7. The question for determination before this Court is, whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for condonation of delay. 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “Union of India and 5 others v. Tarsem Singh” (2008) 8 SCC 652 summarized the settled principles in the following manner:- “7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion,etc.., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of 6 the writ petition.” 9. The Supreme Court in the matter of “C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and others” (2008) 10 SCC 115, having found that the employee suddenly brought up a challenge to the order of termination of his services after 20 years and claimed all consequential benefits, held that the relief sought for was inadmissible. The legal position in this regard was laid out in the following terms:- “10. Every representation of the Government for relief, may not be applied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the Department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the Department or to inform the appropriate Department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim. 11. When a decision is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits,being under the impression that failure to do so may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of “acknowledgement of a jural relationship” to give rise to a fresh cause of 7 action. 12. When a government abandons service to take alternative employment or to attend to personal affairs, and does not bother to send any letter seeking leave or letter of resignation or letter of voluntary retirement, and the records do not show that he is treated as being in service, he cannot after two decades, represent that he should be taken back to duty. Nor can such employee be treated as having continued in service, thereby deeming the entire period as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. That will be a travesty of justice. 13. Where an employee unauthorisedly absents himself and suddenly appears after 20 years and demands that he should be taken back and approaches the court, the department naturally will not or may not have any record relating to the employee at that distance of time. In such cases, when the employer fails to produce the records of the enquiry and the order of dismissal/removal, court cannot draw an adverse inference against the employer for not producing records, nor direct reinstatement with back wages for 20 years, ignoring the cessation of service or the lucrative alternative employment of the employee. Misplaced sympathy in such matters will encourage discipline, lead to unjust enrichment of the employee at fault and result in drain of public exchequer. Many a time there is also no application of mind as to the extent of financial burden, as a result of a routine order for back wages.” 10. In the light of the principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme 8 Court in the aforementioned judgments (supra), and upon due consideration of the grounds urged in I.A. No. 1 of 2026, we find that the delay of 602 days in preferring the writ appeal has not been satisfactorily explained with any cogent or plausible reason. The appellants have failed to demonstrate sufficient cause so as to justify condonation of such delay. Therefore, no ground is made out to exercise our discretion in favour of the appellants for condoning the delay. 11. Consequently, I.A. No. 1 of 2026 seeking condonation of delay is hereby rejected. As a natural corollary thereto, the writ appeal also stands dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice ved