[2026:RJ-JP:18216] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 2097/2023 Mahendra Singh Kohli S/o Late Shri Pratap Singh Kohli, R/o Vallabhbari, Gumanpura, Kota, Rajasthan. ----Petitioner/Revisionist Versus Abdul Rahuf S/o Mohamad Ibrahim, R/o Madari Dargah Ki Gali, Masjid ke samne Gulabbari, Thana Kotwali, Kota (Raj). ----Respondent/Non-Revisionist For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Harshita Sharma and Ms. Swadha Bhargava for Dr. Mahesh Sharma For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rhishi Raj Singh Rathore, PP HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA PRAKASH SHRIMALI Order 1. Arguments Concluded On: 18.04.2026 2. Order Reserved On: 18.04.2026 3. Full Order/Operative Part Pronounced: Full Order 4. Pronounced On: 30.04.2026 1. The present criminal misc. petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been preferred by the petitioner for quashing and setting aside the order dated 01.03.2023 passed by the learned Session Judge, Kota in Criminal Revision No. 185/2022, whereby the revision petition filed by the petitioner has been dismissed and the order dated 23.03.2022 passed by the learned Special Judicial Magistrate (N.I. Act Cases) No.3, Kota in Criminal Case No. 187/2016 has been affirmed. [2026:RJ-JP:18216] (2 of 6) [CRLMP-2097/2023] 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 has been filed by the respondent-complainant against the present petitioner and the same is pending adjudication before the learned trial Court. 3. During the pendency of the said proceedings, the petitioner moved an application seeking direction to the complainant to produce documents evidencing his financial capacity to advance the alleged loan amount. 4. The learned trial Court, after affording opportunity of hearing to both the parties, dismissed the said application vide order dated 23.03.2022. Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred a revision petition before the learned Revisional Court, which too came to be dismissed vide order dated 01.03.2023. Hence, the present petition has been filed invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Courts below have committed a manifest error in law in dismissing the application preferred by the petitioner. It is contended that in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa reported in 2019 Cr.L.R. (SC) 383 and John K. Abraham vs. Simon C. Abraham & Anr. reported in (2014) 2 SCC 236, the complainant is under an obligation to establish his financial capacity when the same is specifically questioned by the accused. [2026:RJ-JP:18216] (3 of 6) [CRLMP-2097/2023] 6. It is further contended that failure of the complainant to produce relevant documents creates serious doubt regarding the existence of legally enforceable debt and, therefore, the application deserved to be allowed. 7. Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondent has supported the impugned orders and submitted that the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act operates in favour of the complainant and the burden lies upon the accused to rebut the same during trial. It is argued that the application filed by the petitioner was premature and intended to delay the proceedings. 8. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon the following judgment in support of his contention: 1: “Basalingappa Vs Mudibasappa” reported in 2019 Cr.L.R. (SC) 383 order dated 09.04.2019. 9. I have considered the submissions advanced at the Bar and perused the material available on record. 10. At the outset, it is to be noted that the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are governed by statutory presumptions as envisaged under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act. Once the issuance of cheque is admitted, a presumption arises in favour of the complainant that the cheque was issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability. In the case of “Sri Om Sales Vs Abhay Kumar Alias Abhay Patel” reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2897, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 18 of the judgment held as under: [2026:RJ-JP:18216] (4 of 6) [CRLMP-2097/2023] 18. Having regard to the aforesaid decisions of this court as also the provisions of section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, we are of the considered view that the High Court committed an error by conducting a roving enquiry, at the pre-trial stage, as regards the cheque being issued for the discharge of debt or liability. Such an exercise, in our view, was not merited in exercise of power under section 482 of the Code more so when the complaint allegations disclosed that the cheque was issued for discharge of liability. As fulfilment of the necessary ingredients of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, are prima facie made out from the complaint allegations, in our view, neither the summoning order nor the complaint could have been quashed by the High Court at the pre-trial stage. 11. The question as to whether the complainant possessed the requisite financial capacity to advance the alleged loan is essentially a matter of evidence, which is required to be adjudicated upon during the course of trial. The accused is well within his right to challenge the financial capacity of the complainant and to rebut the statutory presumption by leading cogent evidence at the appropriate stage. It would be appropriate to cite the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Tedhi Singh vs. Narayan Dass Mahant” (Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.1963 of 2019) order dated 07.03.2022, the Hon’ble Court in para 9 of the judgment held as under: “9. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have noted that in the case under Section 138 of the N. I. Act the complainant need not show in the first instance that he had the capacity. The proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is not a civil suit. At the time, when the complainant gives his evidence, unless a case is set up in the reply notice to the statutory notice sent, that the complainant did not have the wherewithal, it cannot be expected of the complainant to initially lead evidence to show that he had the financial capacity. To that extent the Courts in our view were right in holding on those lines. However, the accused has the right to demonstrate that the complainant in a particular case did not have the capacity and therefore, the case of the accused is acceptable which he can do by producing independent materials, namely, by examining his witnesses and producing documents. It is [2026:RJ-JP:18216] (5 of 6) [CRLMP-2097/2023] also open to him to establish the very same aspect by pointing to the materials produced by the complainant himself. He can further, more importantly, achieve this result through the cross examination of the witnesses of the complainant. Ultimately, it becomes the duty of the Courts to consider carefully and appreciate the totality of the evidence and then come to a conclusion whether in the given case, the accused has shown that the case of the complainant is in peril for the reason that the accused has established a probable defence”. 12. In the considered opinion of this Court, the application preferred by the petitioner seeking a direction to the complainant to produce documents regarding his financial capacity at a preliminary stage is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The learned trial Court has rightly held that such issues are to be tested during trial and cannot be adjudicated in a piecemeal manner at an interlocutory stage. 13. The inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are to be exercised sparingly and with great caution, only to prevent abuse of process of law or to secure the ends of justice. In the present case, no such circumstance is made out warranting interference by this Court. 14. The findings recorded by the Courts below do not suffer from any illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error so as to call for interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 15. Accordingly, the present petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. 16. It is, however, made clear that any observation made herein shall not prejudice either party during the course of trial and the [2026:RJ-JP:18216] (6 of 6) [CRLMP-2097/2023] learned trial Court shall decide the case strictly in accordance with law on the basis of evidence available on record. 17. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of. (CHANDRA PRAKASH SHRIMALI),J GARIMA /6/res.