1 CGHC010123912022 2026:CGHC:34731-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 636 of 2022 Hiralal Netam S/o Sri Punauram Netam Aged About 36 Years R/o Gudripara Pandeyaathgaon, Police Station Farasgaon, District Kondagaon, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Outpost Farasgaon, District Kondagaon, Chhattisgarh ...Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Ms. Anubhuti Marhas, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Sumit Singh, Deputy Advocate General. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 07 .08.2026 1. Heard Ms. Anubhuti Marhas, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Sumit Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondent. BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2026.08.14 10:34:47 +0530 2 2. This criminal appeal, preferred under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "the CrPC"), is directed against the impugned judgment dated 25.02.2022 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Kondagaon, District Kondagaon (C.G.) (for short, "the trial Court"), in POCSO Case No. 30 of 2019, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as follows: Conviction under Section Sentence Section 450 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) Rigorous imprisonment (for short, ‘R.I.’) for 05 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, 01 year R.I. more. Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘POCSO Act’) R.I. for 05 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, 01 year R.I. more. Section 376(3) of the IPC R.I. for 20 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, 03 years R.I. more. Section 376(3)/511 of the IPC R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, 03 years R.I. more. All sentences to run concurrently 3. The brief facts of the prosecution case are that on 10.08.2019, the complainant (PW-1) appeared at Police Station Farasgaon and lodged a written report stating that on 08.08.2019, at about 4:20 p.m., his sister, 3 the victim (PW-4), was alone in her house. At that time, the appellant, Hiralal Netam, entered the kitchen of the house and, with the intention of committing a sexual assault upon the victim, removed her clothes, pressed her breasts and pulled her legs. At that very moment, the complainant, who is the brother of the victim, arrived at the spot, whereupon the appellant fled from the place of occurrence. 4. On the basis of the written report lodged by the complainant, Crime No. 63/2019 was registered at Police Station Farasgaon against the appellant, Hiralal Netam, for the offences punishable under Sections 450, 375(C)/376(3), 354-B and 511 of the IPC and Section 8 of the POCSO Act, and investigation was taken up. 5. During the course of investigation, the statements of the complainant, the victim and other witnesses were recorded. The place of occurrence was inspected and a spot map, Ex.P/10, was prepared. The victim was medically examined and her medical examination report, Ex.P/7, was obtained. Her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., was also recorded. A requisition was issued to the Patwari for preparation of the site map, Ex.P/13, and seizure proceedings were conducted vide seizure memos, Exs.P/2, P/3 and P/6. 6. Upon completion of the investigation, the investigating agency found sufficient material against the appellant and, accordingly, he was arrested on 10.08.2019 and sent to judicial custody. Thereafter, charge- sheet No. 56/2019 dated 13.09.2019 was prepared and filed before the learned trial Court. 4 7. The learned trial Court framed charges against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 450, 354(A)(i), 376(3), 376(3) read with Section 511 of the IPC and Section 8 of the POCSO Act. The charges were read over and explained to the appellant, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 8. In order to bring home the charges against the appellant, the prosecution examined 09 witnesses and exhibited 13 documents. After the prosecution evidence was concluded, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. 9. In his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the appellant denied all the incriminating circumstances put to him and pleaded that he was innocent and had been falsely implicated in the case. The appellant did not examine any witness in his defence. 10. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in paragraph 02 of the impugned judgment. Being aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and the consequent order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court are contrary to law and the evidence available on record and, therefore, are liable to be set aside. It is contended that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. According to learned counsel, the 5 testimony of the victim suffers from material inconsistencies and does not inspire confidence, and the other evidence adduced by the prosecution does not furnish reliable corroboration to the material allegations against the appellant. It is further submitted that the circumstances appearing on record have not been properly appreciated by the learned trial Court and that the conviction has been recorded on the basis of assumptions and inferences rather than cogent, reliable and legally admissible evidence. Learned counsel, therefore, prays that the appeal be allowed, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence be set aside, and the appellant be acquitted of all the charges. 12. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State opposes the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and submits that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence available on record and has recorded the conviction on the basis of cogent and reliable evidence. It is contended that the testimony of the victim is trustworthy and finds material corroboration from the testimony of her brother, the complainant (PW-1), who is an eyewitness to the occurrence. Learned State counsel submits that PW-1 had reached the spot during the incident and had seen the appellant in the house of the victim, whereupon the appellant fled from the spot. It is further submitted that the victim was a minor girl aged 13 years, 01 month and 27 days on the date of the incident and, therefore, was a “child” within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act. Learned State counsel further submits that the victim is deaf and dumb, and 6 therefore, her evidence has to be appreciated keeping in view her special circumstances. It is argued that the evidence of the victim, read with the testimony of PW-1 and the other circumstances brought on record by the prosecution, establishes the involvement of the appellant in the commission of the offence. It is further submitted that the discrepancies, if any, pointed out by the defence are minor and do not affect the substratum of the prosecution case. Accordingly, learned State counsel submits that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are based on proper appreciation of the evidence and do not warrant any interference by this Court. The appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have considered their rival submissions made hereinabove. We have also carefully and meticulously gone through the original record of the learned trial Court. 14. The first question that arises for consideration before this Court is whether the learned trial Court was justified in holding that the victim was a minor on the date of the incident. 15. When an accused is charged with an offence punishable under the POCSO Act, determination of the age of the victim assumes considerable significance, as the applicability of the statutory provisions of the POCSO Act depends upon the victim being a “child” within the meaning of Section 2(d) thereof. Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines “child” to mean any person below the age of eighteen years. Therefore, 7 determination of the age of the victim as on the date of the alleged occurrence is an essential aspect for examining the applicability of the provisions of the POCSO Act. 16. In the present case, the prosecution has asserted that the date of birth of the victim is 11.06.2006. In order to establish her age, the prosecution has produced the Admission and Discharge Register (Ex.P/5C) pertaining to Class-I of Primary School, Gudripara Pandeyaathgaon, District Kondagaon (C.G.). The said document has been exhibited through PW-6, who was a Teacher of the said school. PW-6 has stated that the victim was admitted to Class-I on 02.07.2012 and that her date of birth was recorded in the school register as 11.06.2006. 17. However, in his cross-examination, PW-6 has admitted that he was not aware of the basis or source on the basis of which the date of birth of the victim was entered in the school register. It is also noteworthy that neither the victim (PW-4) nor her mother (PW-3) has stated anything regarding the date of birth of the victim in their respective depositions. The prosecution has not examined any person who had furnished the particulars of the date of birth at the time of the victim's admission in the school, nor has any document been produced to establish the source or basis of the entry regarding her date of birth in the school register. 18. Thus, although the school register (Ex.P/5C) records the date of birth of the victim as 11.06.2006, the testimony of PW-6 indicates that 8 he had no personal knowledge regarding the basis on which the said date of birth was entered in the register. Therefore, the evidentiary value of the said entry requires examination in the light of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for determination of the age of a child. 19. If the date of birth recorded in Ex.P/5C is accepted, the age of the victim on the date of the incident, i.e. 08.08.2019, would be 13 years, 01 month and 27 days. However, in view of the admission made by PW-6 regarding his lack of knowledge as to the source or basis of the date of birth recorded in the school register, it is necessary to examine whether such entry, by itself, can be safely relied upon for conclusively determining the age of the victim. 20. In Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 263, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering the question of determination of the age of a child, laid down the guiding principles to be followed in this regard. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court read as follows: “22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007 Rules). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under : 9 “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.? (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining – (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; 10 (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. 11 (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule. (6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub- rule(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW-PW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in 12 a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion.” 21. In Jarnail Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in determining the age of a child, the Court is required to follow the procedure prescribed for determination of age and to give due weight to reliable documentary evidence relating to the date of birth. The object is to arrive at the most probable and reliable age of the child on the date of occurrence. 13 22. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, the prosecution has relied upon the Admission and Discharge Register (Ex.P/5C) of Primary School, Gudripara Pandeyaathgaon, wherein the date of birth of the victim has been recorded as 11.06.2006. The said document has been exhibited through PW-6, who was a Teacher of the concerned school. PW-6 has categorically stated that the victim was admitted in Class-I on 02.07.2012 and that her date of birth was recorded in the school register as 11.06.2006. 23. It is true that PW-6, in his cross-examination, has stated that he was not aware as to the basis on which the date of birth of the victim was entered in the school register. However, merely because PW-6 was not personally aware of the source from which the particulars of the date of birth were supplied, the entry made in the official school record cannot, by itself, be discarded. The fact remains that the relevant school record has been produced by the prosecution and proved through the competent witness. The defence has not brought any material on record to demonstrate that the entry regarding the date of birth of the victim was incorrect, manipulated or fabricated. 24. It is also significant that the defence has neither disputed the admission of the victim in the said school nor produced any contrary documentary or oral evidence regarding her date of birth. No suggestion has been put forth by the defence indicating any other date of birth of the victim. Thus, there is no competing material on record which may create a reasonable doubt regarding the date of birth recorded in 14 Ex.P/5C. 25. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, therefore, the date of birth of the victim recorded in Ex.P/5C, i.e. 11.06.2006, deserves to be accepted for the purpose of determining her age. On that basis, on the date of the incident, i.e. 08.08.2019, the victim was aged 13 years, 01 month and 27 days. She was, thus, admittedly below eighteen years of age and fell within the definition of “child” under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act. 26. Accordingly, we find no error or infirmity in the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the victim was a minor on the date of the incident. The first issue is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the prosecution. 27. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the acts alleged against him and, consequently, whether the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court under Section 8 of the POCSO Act and the other charged offences is sustainable. 28. In order to prove the aforesaid charge, the prosecution has principally relied upon the testimonies of the victim (PW-4) and her brother, the complainant (PW-1), who is an eyewitness to the incident. 29. The victim (PW-4), in her examination-in-chief, stated that she knew the appellant, Hiralal Netam. The incident had taken place about five months prior to her deposition. At the relevant time, she was alone 15 in her house and it was evening. The appellant came to her house, caught hold of her neck from behind and tore the clothes she was wearing. Thereafter, he made her fall on the ground, caught hold of her breasts and removed the clothes worn by her below the waist. He tied her mouth with a piece of cloth, removed his lower garment and got upon her. At that very moment, her brother arrived at the spot, whereupon the appellant fled from there. 30. She further stated in her examination-in-chief that, at that time, three girls also came there. In the evening, her mother returned from the field, whereupon she informed her mother about the incident. Subsequently, the police came to the spot and she showed them the place of occurrence. At her instance, the police prepared the spot map, Ex.P/5. She also handed over to the police the clothes which she had been wearing at the time of the incident, which were seized vide seizure memo, Ex.P/3. 31. The aforesaid testimony of the victim remained substantially unshaken in her cross-examination. Nothing material has been elicited in her cross-examination so as to render her testimony unreliable or to create any reasonable doubt regarding the truthfulness of her version. 32. PW-2, Shailendra Mishra, a teacher for hearing-impaired children, stated that he communicated with the victim through gestures and signs. The victim communicated to him that, when she was alone in her house, her distant maternal uncle had come there, pressed her breasts and caught hold of her legs and made her fall on the ground. She 16 further communicated that she was wearing a semiz and a bra and that the appellant had attempted to remove the same and commit a wrongful act with her. At that time, her brother arrived at the house, whereupon the appellant fled from the spot. She also communicated that she thereafter informed her mother and other family members about the incident. 33. The complainant (PW-1), who is the brother of the victim, stated in his examination-in-chief that, while returning from school on the date of the incident, he came home and saw the appellant in the kitchen, holding his sister from behind and pulling her clothes. He immediately rushed towards them, whereupon the appellant fled from the house. He further stated that the victim is deaf and dumb by birth and was studying in Class VIII. After the appellant fled, he asked his sister about the incident, whereupon she communicated to him that the appellant had caught hold of and pulled her leg. 34. PW-1 further stated that, on the following day, he, along with his parents, the Sarpanch, the Kotwar and the victim, went to the police station and lodged the written report, Ex.P/1. The police seized the mark-sheet and Aadhaar card of the victim vide Ex.P/2 and also seized the kurta, bra, semiz and leggings worn by her vide Ex.P/3. 35. As PW-1 did not fully support the prosecution case on certain aspects, he was declared hostile. In response to the questions put by the prosecution, he admitted that, when he saw his sister, she was wearing only a chaddi and her semiz had slipped down from her chest 17 towards her waist. He further admitted that the appellant was wearing a sweater and only a chaddi. He also stated that Riteshwari, Meenakshi and Kuleshwari had seen the appellant fleeing from the spot. He further admitted that, when his mother returned in the evening, the victim communicated through gestures that the appellant had entered the kitchen from behind, caught hold of her arms, thrown her to the ground, removed her clothes and pressed her breasts. When she attempted to flee, the appellant caught hold of her leg and pulled her back, and at that very moment, her brother arrived, whereupon the appellant fled. 36. The aforesaid evidence of PW-1, particularly his presence at the spot and his having seen the appellant immediately before he fled from the house, lends material corroboration to the testimony of the victim. The version regarding the victim's communication through gestures is also consistent with the testimony of PW-2. The prosecution case is further supported by the testimony of the victim's mother (PW-3) and Riteshwari Markam (PW-5). 37. PW-7, Dr. Jyotirmay Prabhavati, stated that on 10.08.2019, at about 7:00 p.m., she examined the victim, who was deaf and dumb. During the examination, the victim communicated through gestures that the appellant had removed her clothes and attempted to commit a sexual act upon her. She also complained of pain at the back of her neck, chest, breasts and lips. However, no visible injury was found on her body. The medical examination report is Ex.P/7. 38. In her cross-examination, PW-7 admitted that no visible injury was 18 found on the body of the victim and that no specialist trained in communicating with deaf and dumb persons was accompanying her at the time of examination. She further admitted that the report did not specify whether the pain complained of by the victim was recent or old. 39. In the Indian society refusal to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. A girl or a woman in the tradition bound non-permissive society of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. She would be conscious of the danger of being ostracized by the society and when in the face of these factors the crime is brought to light, there is inbuilt assurance that the charge is genuine rather than fabricated. Just as a witness who has sustained an injury, which is not shown or believed to be self-inflicted, is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of sex offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. A woman or a girl who is raped is not an accomplice. Corroboration is not the sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. The observations of Vivian Bose, J. in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan, reported in (AIR 1952 SC 54) were: “The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge.…” 19 40. Crime against women in general and rape in particular is on the increase. It is an irony that while we are celebrating women's rights in all spheres, we show little or no concern for her honour. It is a sad reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society towards the violation of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must remember that a rapist not only violates the victim's privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical assault - it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The Court, therefore, shoulders a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The Courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the victim, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the victim inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the Court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the victim must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial Court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestation. This position was highlighted in State of Punjab v. 20 Gurmeet Singh, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 384. 41. A victim of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the victim. There is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short ‘Evidence Act’) similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the victim it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the victim must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But, if a victim is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is own to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case discloses that the victim does not have a strong motive to falsely involve 21 the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. 42. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam, reported in AIR 1998 SC 635 has held that the evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. It must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime, but is a victim of another person’s lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. 43. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rai Sandeep @ Deenu v. State of NCT of Delhi, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 21 held as under:- “In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling witness’ should be of a very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The Court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the Court. It should be natural and 22 consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as, the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and everyone of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other similar such tests to be applied, it can be held that such a witness can be called as a ‘sterling witness’ whose version can be accepted by the Court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the Court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 44. Upon a comprehensive appreciation of the entire evidence 23 available on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the involvement of the appellant in the incident beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of the victim (PW-4), who was a minor girl aged 13 years, 01 month and 27 days on the date of the incident and is deaf and dumb by birth, inspires confidence. She has given a consistent account of the incident and has specifically attributed the acts of removing her clothes, pressing her breasts and attempting to commit a sexual act upon her to the appellant. Her testimony further establishes that the appellant fled from the spot immediately upon the arrival of her brother. 45. The testimony of the victim receives material corroboration from the evidence of her brother, the complainant (PW-1), who is an eyewitness to the occurrence. PW-1 has categorically stated that, upon returning from school, he saw the appellant in the kitchen holding the victim from behind and pulling her clothes. On seeing him, the appellant immediately fled from the house. Though PW-1 was declared hostile on certain aspects, his presence at the spot and the fact that he had seen the appellant with the victim immediately before the appellant fled have remained intact. His testimony, therefore, provides material corroboration to the version of the victim. 46. The testimony of PW-2, Shailendra Mishra, also lends assurance to the testimony of the victim. PW-2 was a teacher for hearing-impaired children and communicated with the victim through gestures and signs. The victim communicated to him that the appellant had pressed her 24 breasts, caught hold of her legs, made her fall on the ground and attempted to remove her semiz and bra and commit a wrongful act with her. The said version is substantially consistent with the account given by the victim before the trial Court. The testimony of the victim's mother (PW-3) and Riteshwari Markam (PW-5) also lends further support to the prosecution case. 47. The medical evidence does not disclose any visible injury on the body of the victim. However, the absence of external injuries, by itself, cannot be treated as a circumstance sufficient to discard an otherwise trustworthy testimony of the victim, particularly when the allegation relates to an attempt of sexual assault and the occurrence was interrupted by the arrival of her brother. PW-7, Dr. Jyotirmay Prabhavati, has stated that during medical examination the victim complained of pain at the back of her neck, chest, breasts and lips and, through gestures, communicated that the appellant had removed her clothes and attempted to commit a sexual act upon her. The medical evidence, therefore, does not contradict the ocular version of the prosecution. 48. The fact that the victim is deaf and dumb by birth also assumes significance while appreciating her evidence. The prosecution has examined PW-2, a teacher trained in dealing with hearing-impaired children, who communicated with the victim through gestures and signs and deposed regarding the disclosure made by her. The evidence of PW-2, read with the testimony of the victim and PW-1, provides assurance to the core of the prosecution case. The minor variations in 25 the narration of the incident do not affect the substratum of the prosecution case. 49. The defence has not been able to bring on record any material circumstance which would render the testimony of the victim inherently unreliable or establish any plausible reason for her false implication of the appellant. The appellant has also not adduced any defence evidence. The fact that the appellant fled from the spot immediately upon the arrival of PW-1 is a relevant circumstance which lends further assurance to the prosecution version. On an overall assessment of the evidence, the core version of the victim regarding the appellant entering the house, subjecting her to the alleged acts and fleeing from the spot upon the arrival of her brother remains consistent. 50. Applying the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurmeet Singh (supra), Ranjit Hazarika (supra) and Rai Sandeep @ Deenu (supra), we are of the considered opinion that the testimony of the victim is of such a nature as inspires confidence and does not suffer from any material infirmity affecting its core. Her testimony is further corroborated by the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 and the surrounding circumstances. The discrepancies pointed out by the defence are not of such a nature as to create a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution case. 51. In view of the foregoing discussion and upon re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, we are of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court has committed no error, either of law or on facts, in 26 recording the finding of guilt against the appellant. The prosecution has established the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, therefore, do not warrant any interference by this Court. 52. Consequently, the appeal, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. 53. It is stated at the Bar that the appellant is presently in jail. He shall serve out the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court. 54. The Registry is directed to transmit the original record to the concerned trial Court for necessary information and compliance. The Registry shall also send a certified copy of this judgment to the Superintendent of the Jail concerned, where the appellant is undergoing sentence, for service upon the appellant, informing him that he is at liberty to challenge the present judgment before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of the High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan