1 CGHC010273602026 2026:CGHC:35442-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 689 of 2026 Rameshwar Jaiswal S/o Shri B L Jaiswal Aged About 58 Years R/o Village Sothi, Via Balod, Tahsil Seepat, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh (Resp. No. 3) ... Appellant versus 1 – Dr. Raghvendra Kumar Gouraha S/o Shri T P Gouraha Aged About 58 Years Presently Working As Principal, Government Higher Secondary School, Darriaghat, Bilaspur District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh (Petitioner No. 01) 2 - Kamleshwar Bairagi S/o Shri Vriksharam Biaragi Aged About 56 Years Presently Working As Block Education Officer, Takhatpur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh (Petitioner No. 02) 3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary School Education Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Atal Nagar, District - Raipur Chhattisgarh (Resp. No. 01) 4 - Director Public Instructions, Indrawati Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur Chhattisgarh (Resp. No. 02) ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Arpan Verma, Advocate For Respondents No.1 & 2 : Mr. Jitendra Pali, Advocate For State : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Additional Advocate General ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.08.13 10:16:28 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 12.08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Arpan Verma, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Jitendra Pali, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 and 2 as well as Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State. 2. By filing the present intra-Court writ appeal, the appellant, who was respondent No.3 before the learned Single Judge, has called in question the interim order dated 10.07.2026 passed in WPS No.4926 of 2026, whereby the learned Single Judge stayed the effect and operation of the order dated 10.06.2026, by which the appellant had been entrusted with the charge of In-charge District Education Officer, Bilaspur, and further observed that the State would be at liberty to pass an appropriate order regarding the posting of the In-charge District Education Officer, Bilaspur, keeping in view the Government circulars referred to in the impugned order. The appellant has prayed for following relief(s):- “1. It is therefore, humbly prayed that the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the instant appeal and set aside the order dated 10.07.2026 passed in WPS No.4926 of 2026 whereby the learned Single Judge has stayed the effect and operation of the order dated 10.06.2026 and 3 further observed that: "the State is at liberty to pass an appropriate order in respect of posting of the In-charge D.E.O., Bilaspur keeping in mind the aforesaid circulars issued by the Government from time to time" passed in case of "Dr. Raghvendra Kumar Gouraha v. State of Chhattisgarh & others" and further direct for the expeditious disposal of the present petition by affording opportunity to the appellant (respondent no. 03), in the interest of justice. 2. That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to pass any other relief as it deem appropriate in the interest of justice.” 3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, assisted by Mr. Arpan Verma, learned counsel, submits that the impugned order, though styled as an interim order, has the effect of substantially and finally prejudicing the rights of the appellant. It is submitted that the appellant was appointed as In- charge District Education Officer, Bilaspur pursuant to the order dated 10.06.2026 issued by the competent authority upon consideration of the administrative requirements of the department, and the writ petitioners have merely questioned the said order on the ground that they are senior to the appellant and, according to certain Government circulars, a junior officer ought not to be entrusted with charge when a senior officer is available. It is pointed out that the writ petitioners have not sought any specific or positive relief for their own appointment or posting as In-charge District Education Officer. 4 4. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the learned Single Judge proceeded to consider and decide the prayer for interim relief even before service of notice upon the appellant, despite having directed issuance of notice to him as respondent No.3 and thereby recognising that the appellant was a necessary and affected party. According to him, the appellant was thus deprived of an opportunity of placing his case before the learned Single Judge before an order having serious civil consequences was passed against him. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge, while staying the order dated 10.06.2026, further granted liberty to the State Government to pass a fresh order regarding the posting of the In-charge District Education Officer, Bilaspur, which virtually enables the State to displace the appellant from the office even before the writ petition is finally adjudicated. 5. Learned Senior Counsel submits that such a direction cannot be regarded as a purely interlocutory order, since once the State acts upon the liberty granted by the learned Single Judge and passes a fresh posting order, the appellant would stand displaced and the existing factual position would be irreversibly altered. It is argued that the impugned direction has the effect of granting substantially the final relief claimed in the writ petition and may also render the writ petition itself substantially infructuous. The learned Single Judge, while exercising interim jurisdiction, ought only to have preserved the subject matter of the lis and could not have authorised the creation of a fresh factual situation which would have a direct 5 bearing upon the final adjudication. 6. Learned Senior Counsel, placing reliance upon the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Ajay Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, Writ Appeal No.255 of 2016, reported in (2017) 3 CGLJ 353, submits that although ordinarily an appeal does not lie against an interlocutory order, an intra-Court appeal would be maintainable where the order, notwithstanding its interlocutory form, vitally affects the rights of a party, has the trappings of finality, or its effect cannot be undone at the time of final hearing. It is submitted that the present case squarely falls within the exception carved out by the Full Bench, as the liberty granted to the State to make a fresh posting would have irreversible consequences for the appellant. 7. Learned Senior Counsel also places reliance upon the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Deoraj v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 4 SCC 697, to contend that an interim order which substantially grants the final relief is permissible only in rare and exceptional circumstances and upon satisfaction of stringent requirements, none of which have been recorded in the present case. 8. Per contra, Mr. Jitendra Pali, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 and 2/writ petitioners, opposes the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and submits that the present writ appeal itself is not maintainable. It is contended that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is only an interim order passed during the pendency of the writ petition and does not finally 6 adjudicate the rights of the parties. According to learned counsel, no final relief has been granted to the writ petitioners and the learned Single Judge has merely protected their interest pending adjudication of the writ petition. It is, therefore, submitted that the appeal is barred by the proviso to Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006 and deserves to be dismissed. 9. Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, learned State counsel submits that the State has acted in accordance with the administrative requirements of the department and that the question relating to entrustment of charge of the post of In-charge District Education Officer is essentially an administrative matter. It is submitted that the State would abide by any direction issued by this Court and that the writ petition itself is pending consideration before the learned Single Judge. It is, therefore, submitted that no interference is warranted at this stage. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the impugned order as well as the material placed on record. 11. At the outset, the objection regarding maintainability of the present writ appeal deserves consideration. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that, by virtue of the proviso to Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006, an appeal does not ordinarily lie against an interlocutory order passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, the said statutory bar is 7 not attracted to every order merely because the order is described as an "interim" or "interlocutory" order. The nature, substance, effect and consequence of the order have to be examined to ascertain whether the order is truly interlocutory or whether it possesses an element of finality affecting the substantive rights of a party. 12. The aforesaid issue stands authoritatively settled by the Full Bench of this Court in Ajay Gupta (supra). The Full Bench, after considering the scope of the proviso to Section 2(1) of the 2006 Act, held that the statutory bar operates against orders which are totally interlocutory in nature, do not decide matters of moment and do not possess an element of finality. Conversely, where an interim order vitally affects the rights of the parties, has a bearing upon the final adjudication, or its effect cannot be undone at the stage of final hearing, such an order cannot be treated as a mere interlocutory order and an intra-Court appeal would lie. The Full Bench further explained that the test is not to be applied merely by looking at the nomenclature of the order. What is required to be examined is the actual effect of the order. If an order produces an irreversible consequence which cannot effectively be undone when the writ petition is finally decided, the order carries an element of finality and falls outside the category of purely interlocutory orders. Thus, the jurisdiction to entertain an intra-Court appeal depends upon the substance and impact of the order rather than the label attached to it. 13. Tested on the aforesaid principle, we find that the present appeal 8 cannot be non-suited merely on the ground that the order dated 10.07.2026 has been described as an interim order. The appellant was admittedly not the writ petitioner but was impleaded as respondent No.3 before the learned Single Judge because the order dated 10.06.2026 had entrusted him with the charge of In-charge District Education Officer, Bilaspur. The challenge in the writ petition was directed against the said order. Therefore, the appellant was directly and substantially affected by the lis pending before the learned Single Judge. 14. More importantly, the learned Single Judge did not merely stay the operation of the order dated 10.06.2026. The impugned order further permitted the State Government to pass an appropriate order regarding the posting of the In-charge District Education Officer, Bilaspur, keeping in view the Government circulars referred to therein. This portion of the order assumes considerable significance. The effect of such liberty is that the State is enabled to make a fresh arrangement in respect of the very office which was the subject matter of the challenge before the learned Single Judge. The consequence may be the displacement of the appellant and appointment or posting of another person in his place. 15. In our considered opinion, such a direction travels beyond the limited object of preserving the subject matter of the writ petition. An interim order is ordinarily intended to maintain the existing position so that the final adjudication does not become illusory. It should not ordinarily create a new state of affairs which may itself alter the very 9 substratum of the dispute. Here, the order dated 10.06.2026 had created an existing arrangement by entrusting the appellant with the charge. Once the operation of that order was stayed and, simultaneously, liberty was granted to the State to make a fresh posting arrangement, the position existing prior to the institution of the writ petition was not merely preserved; rather, a new factual situation was authorised to be brought into existence. 16. We are conscious of the fact that the learned Single Judge has not finally adjudicated the legality of the order dated 10.06.2026. We are also not expressing any opinion on the rival claims of the parties regarding seniority, eligibility, administrative experience, or the applicability of the Government circulars referred to in the impugned order. Those questions are squarely within the domain of the learned Single Judge in the pending writ petition. Our consideration is confined only to the nature and effect of the impugned interim order for the purpose of determining the maintainability of the present appeal. 17. The circumstances of the present case are also materially different from an ordinary case where an interim order merely stays an order subject to the final result of the writ petition. If the State were to exercise the liberty granted by the impugned order and issue a fresh posting order, the appellant would cease to hold the charge which he presently holds pursuant to the order dated 10.06.2026. Even if the appellant ultimately succeeds in the writ petition, the intervening administrative arrangement and the consequential displacement 10 may not be capable of being restored in the same factual form. Thus, the impugned direction has consequences which cannot be brushed aside as merely temporary or inconsequential. 18. The principle laid down by the Full Bench in Ajay Gupta (supra) squarely covers such a situation. The Full Bench has specifically recognised that an order which has an irreversible effect and which cannot effectively be undone at the time of final hearing possesses an element of finality and, notwithstanding its interlocutory form, is amenable to the appellate jurisdiction. 19. We may also observe that the reliance placed by learned Senior Counsel upon Deoraj (supra) is relevant to the limited extent that the Supreme Court has cautioned that an interim relief which virtually amounts to granting the final relief ought to be granted only in rare and exceptional circumstances, where the applicant establishes a very strong prima facie case and the balance of convenience and irreparable injury overwhelmingly warrant such relief. We, however, do not consider it necessary to examine at this stage whether the interim relief granted by the learned Single Judge satisfies those requirements, as the writ petition itself remains pending and is capable of being finally decided shortly. 20. There is yet another aspect which persuades us not to enter into the merits of the controversy. The learned Single Judge has already fixed WPS No.4926 of 2026 for consideration on 19.08.2026. The dispute, therefore, is ripe for final adjudication at a very early date. In these circumstances, it would neither be appropriate nor desirable 11 for this Court, in exercise of intra-Court appellate jurisdiction against an interim order, to enter into the merits of the rival claims relating to the posting of In-charge District Education Officer, Bilaspur. Any observation on the merits at this stage may prejudice the parties before the learned Single Judge. 21. We also find substance in the submission that the appellant, though a directly affected party and respondent No.3 in the writ petition, had not been afforded an effective opportunity of hearing before the impugned interim direction was issued. The record indicates that notice was directed to be issued to the appellant, yet the interim order was passed at the same stage. We do not propose to examine the legality of that course in detail, particularly when the learned Single Judge is already seized of the writ petition and the matter is fixed for final consideration on 19.08.2026. Suffice it to observe that the appellant's rights and contentions may appropriately be considered by the learned Single Judge at the time of final adjudication. 22. The writ petitioners' contention that the present appeal is barred merely because the impugned order is interlocutory in form, therefore, cannot be accepted in its absolute terms. The Full Bench decision in Ajay Gupta (supra) makes it clear that the bar under the proviso to Section 2(1) of the 2006 Act applies to an order which is purely interlocutory and does not carry any element of finality. Where the interim order vitally affects the rights of a party or creates consequences which cannot effectively be undone at the stage of 12 final hearing, the order falls outside the category of a purely interlocutory order. 23. In the present case, however, having regard to the fact that the writ petition itself is already fixed for final consideration on 19.08.2026, we are of the considered view that the ends of justice would be adequately met by requesting the learned Single Judge to finally decide the writ petition on the date already fixed, after affording due opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties. 24. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of WPS No.4926 of 2026 or on the respective claims of the parties. The learned Single Judge shall decide the writ petition independently, in accordance with law, without being influenced by any observation contained in the present order. 25. We, therefore, deem it appropriate not to interfere with the matter on merits at this stage. Instead, in view of the short date already fixed before the learned Single Judge, we request the learned Single Judge to take up WPS No.4926 of 2026 on 19.08.2026 and make an endeavour to decide the same finally, subject to the convenience of the Court and after affording adequate opportunity of hearing to the parties. The learned Single Judge may pass such consequential and appropriate orders as may be warranted in accordance with law. 26. With the aforesaid observations and request, the present writ appeal stands disposed of. We clarify that no opinion is being expressed by this Court on the merits of the writ petition, the validity of the 13 order dated 10.06.2026, the applicability of the Government circulars, or the rival entitlement of the parties to hold the charge of In-charge District Education Officer, Bilaspur. 27. All such questions are left open for consideration by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.4926 of 2026. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu