1 CGHC010247652023 2026:CGHC:35264 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 3535 of 2023 The Bengalee Kali Bari Samiti, Kalibadi Chowk, Raipur (C.G.) Through Its Secretary - Vijay Bhattacharya, S/o Late A.K. Bhattacharya, Nehru Nagar, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Chhattisgarh State Information Commission Through State Information Commissioner, Sector 19, North Block, Nava Raipur - Atal Nagar , Chhattisgarh – 492002. 2 - Jaydeep Chakraborty S/o Shri Ashok Chakraborty Aged About 40 Years R/o R D A Colony, Qtr No. A - 15, Tikerapara, P.S. - Tikerapara, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh, Presently Residing At - Anandam, C - 12, Tagore Nagar, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Registrar, Firms And Societies, Indravati Bhawan, Block - 1, 3rd Floor, Nava Raipur Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from CIS System) For Petitioner : Mr. Ayush Mittal, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Sunny Agrawal, Advocate For Respondents/State : Dr. Arham Siddiqui, Advocate For Respondent No. 1 : Mr. Anumesh Shrivastava, Advocate appears Digitally signed by AMIT PATEL 2 through V.C and Mr. Syed Jayed Jiya Ali, Advocate For Respondent No. 2 : Mr. Yogesh Pandey, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 11.08.2026 1. The present petition has been filed assailing the order dated 10.04.2023 passed by respondent No.1–Chhattisgarh State Information Commission in Complaint Case No.A/254/2023, whereby, taking cognizance of the complaint preferred by respondent No.2, respondent No.1 has held that the petitioner-Society is a “public authority” within the meaning of Section 2 (h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short, the RTI Act’) and is, therefore, amenable to the provisions of the said Act. While recording the aforesaid finding, respondent No.1 directed respondent No.3 to declare the petitioner- Society as a “public authority” and further directed the petitioner- Society to appoint a Public Information Officer under Section 5(1), an Assistant Public Information Officer under Section 5(2) and a First Appellate Authority under Section 19(2) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, within a period of 45 days. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner-Society has preferred the present petition seeking the following reliefs:- “10.1 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the records pertaining to the petitioner and the respondents from the court below. 3 10.2 That the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to set- aside the impugned order dated 10.04.2023 (Annexure P/1) passed by respondent No. 1. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner-Society is an unaided private society registered under the Chhattisgarh Societies Registration Act, 1973. It was granted permanent lease of Nazul land admeasuring 1,03,080 sq. ft. in the year 1924, which has been renewed from time to time. The said premises are being utilized for the objects of the Society, including a temple and community hall, where religious and cultural events are organized. The petitioner-Society contends that it has never received any substantial financial assistance or funding from the Government. Respondent No.2 sought information from the petitioner- Society under the Right to Information Act, 2005 regarding expenditure incurred on religious and cultural events. On denial of the information, a complaint under Section 18 of the Act was preferred before respondent No.1. Initially, the complaint was rejected vide order dated 15.12.2021 holding that the petitioner-Society was an unaided private society. However, pursuant to the order dated 02.03.2022 passed by this Court, the matter was remanded to respondent No.1 for fresh consideration after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Upon reconsideration, respondent No.1, vide impugned order dated 10.04.2023, held the petitioner-Society to be a “public authority” under Section 2(h) of the Act, principally on the ground that the Nazul land had been allotted to it at a concessional rate and directed it to appoint the requisite authorities under the Act. Aggrieved thereby, the present petition has been filed. 4 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order has been passed without proper consideration of the relevant facts and without establishing that the petitioner-Society has been substantially financed by the Government, directly or indirectly. It is submitted that mere allotment of land on lease or any alleged concession cannot, by itself, amount to substantial financing so as to bring the Society within the definition of “public authority” under Section 2(h) of the Act. Accordingly, the petitioner seeks quashing of the impugned order. 4. It is further submitted that mere grant of any subsidy, concession, exemption or other benefit does not, by itself, amount to “substantial financing” under Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. It is submitted that the financing must be actual, existing, positive and substantial, so as to demonstrate that the body substantially depends upon such Government funding for its existence. It is further submitted that the petitioner-Society neither receives substantial Government funding nor is substantially controlled by the Government, and therefore cannot be treated as a “public authority” merely on the basis of the alleged concession in respect of the leased land. The impugned order, having failed to establish the requisite substantial financing, is contrary to law and facts and is liable to be set aside. Reliance has been placed upon the decision rendered by this Court in the matter of Bhat Khande vs. Chhattisgarh Information Commission and another connected matter passed in WPC No. 1332 of 2008 vide order dated 25.09.2018. 5. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1–Chhattisgarh State Information Commission submits that the petitioner-Samiti has been in 5 occupation of 1,03,080 sq. ft. of Government (Nazul) land at Kalibadi Chowk, Raipur, since 1924, on payment of a nominal annual rent of Rs.74/-, whereas the same land, as per the Raipur Collector's own guideline valuation for the year 2019-20, is presently valued at approximately Rs.57.10 crore. The petitioner conducts its temple, community hall and commercially let-out premises, including an SBI ATM, coaching institutes and a marriage hall, entirely upon the said land. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 further submits that by the impugned order dated 10.04.2023 passed in Complaint Case No.A/254/2023, pursuant to the remand by this Hon'ble Court vide order dated 02.03.2022 passed in W.P.(C) No.451/2022, respondent No.1 has rightly held the petitioner to be a body “indirectly substantially financed” by the State and, therefore, a “public authority” within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. Accordingly, the petitioner has been directed to appoint a Public Information Officer, an Assistant Public Information Officer and a First Appellate Authority. The present petition, assailing the said finding, is misconceived both on facts and in law and, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. In support of his contention he relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of D.A.V. College Trust and Management Society vs. Director of Public Instructions 1 , Thalappalam Service Coop. Bank Ltd. vs. State of Kerala 2 & CBSE vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay 3 and the judgement passed by the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the matter of Century Club vs. S. 1 2019 (9) SCC 185 2 2013 (16) SCC 82 3 2011 (8) SCC 497 6 Umapathy 4 6. It is submitted that the law on “substantially financed” under Section 2(h)(d)(ii) of the RTI Act, 2005, stands settled by D.A.V. (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “substantial” need not mean majority financing and may include indirect assistance, such as Government land provided free of cost or at a concessional rate. This principle, following Thalappalam (supra), requires financing to be actual, existing, positive and real, without any fixed percentage or threshold. 7. The same principle was applied in the directly analogous case of Centuru Club (supra), where the Karnataka High Court held that an institution intrinsically linked to Government land and deriving disproportionate benefit therefrom may constitute substantial financing. The present case is stronger: the Petitioner pays only Rs. 74/- annual rent for land valued at Rs. 57.10 crore as per the Collector’s guideline rate and commercially exploits the land through SBI ATM, coaching institutes and a marriage hall. The impugned order dated 10.04.2023 therefore rightly applied the settled law, based substantially on the Petitioner’s own pleadings. The objections regarding concessional allotment, valuation and the RTI applicant’s motive are untenable, as the valuation is based on the Government’s own published guideline rate and motive is irrelevant under Section 6(2) of the RTI Act, as held in CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay, (2011) 8 SCC 497. The writ petition is accordingly devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. 8. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.2 & 3 respectfully submit that the petitioner-Society is not an unaided private society, as contended by the petitioner. The Government has allotted Nazul land to 4 2025 SCC OnLine Kar1161 7 the petitioner-Society at a highly concessional rate. In respect of an area measuring 1,03,080 sq. ft., the State Government is charging an annual rent of only Rs.74/-. Apart from the aforesaid concession, the petitioner-Society has also received grants in cash from Sansad Nidhi as well as from the State Government. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 further submits that the remaining contentions raised by the petitioner are also denied. Respondent No.1 has passed a well- reasoned order after affording full opportunity of hearing to the parties and has strictly followed the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.A.V. College (supra). Therefore, no interference is called for with the impugned order. 9. It would be apposite, at this stage, to refer to the relevant statutory provisions governing the field. Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, which defines the term “public authority”, reads as under: “2 (h) “2(h) ‘public authority’ means any authority or body or institution of self-government established or constituted— (a) by or under the Constitution; (b) by any other law made by Parliament; (c) by any other law made by State Legislature; (d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government, and includes any- i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed; (ii) non-Government organisation substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government.” 8 10. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it abundantly clear that a body or institution would fall within the ambit of “public authority” not only if it is created by the Constitution or by statute, but also if it is owned, controlled, or substantially financed, directly or indirectly, by the appropriate Government. Thus, the determinative factors for bringing an institution within the fold of the Act are ownership, control, or substantial financing by the State or its instrumentalities. 11. It is also relevant to take note of Section 5 of the Right to Information Act, 2005, which deals with the designation of Public Information Officers. The said provision reads as under:- “5. Designation of Public Information Officers-(1) Every public authority shall within me hundred days of the enactment of this Act, designate as many officers as Central Public Information Officers or State Public Information Officers, as the case may be, in all administrative units or offices under it as may be necessary to provide information to persons requesting for the information underr this Act. (2)Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), every public authority shall designate an officer, within one hundred days of the enactment of this Act, at each sub- divisional level or other sub-district level as a Central Assistant Public Information Officer or a State Assistant Public Information Officer, as the case may be, to receive the applications for information or appeals under this Act for forwarding the same forthwith to the Central Public 9 Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or senior officer specified under sub-section (1) of section 19 or the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be: Provided that where an application for information or appeal is given to a Central Assistant Public Information Officer or a State Assistant Public Information Officer, as the case may be, a period of five days shall be added in computing the period for response specified under sub-section (1) of section 7. (3) Every Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, shall deal with requests from persons seeking information and render reasonable assistance to the persons seeking such information. (4) The Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, may seek the assistance of any other officer as he or she considers it necessary for the proper discharge of his or her duties (5) Any officer, whose assistance has been sought under sub-section (4), shall render all assistance to the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, seeking his or her assistance and for the purposes of any contravention of the provisions of this Act, such other officer shall be treated as a Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the 10 case may be. 12. From a conjoint reading of Sections 2(h) and 5 of the RTI Act, it is manifest that the obligation to furnish information under the Act arises only in respect of a “public authority”, and the mechanism of designation of a Public Information Officer or even the deeming fiction under Section 5(4) and 5(5) of the RTI Act operates strictly within the framework of such public authority. Therefore, unless an institution is first shown to fall within the definition of “public authority” under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, the provisions relating to furnishing of information and the consequences flowing therefrom cannot be invoked against it. 13. Lastly, in Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while elaborately interpreting the scope and ambit of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, has conclusively settled the legal position with regard to what constitutes “substantial financing”, particularly in the context of private bodies and educational institutions receiving limited or deficit-based assistance. The Court has authoritatively held as under:— 48. Merely providing subsidiaries, grants, exemptions, privileges etc., as such, cannot be said to be providing funding to a substantial extent, unless the record shows that the funding was so substantial to the body which practically runs by such funding and but for such funding, it would struggle to exist. The State may also float many schemes generally for the betterment and 11 welfare of the cooperative sector like deposit guarantee scheme, scheme of assistance from NABARD etc., but those facilities or assistance cannot be termed as "substantially financed" by the State Government to bring the body within the fold of "public authority" under Section 2(h)(d) (i) of the Act. But, there are instances, where private educational institutions getting ninety five per cent grant-in-aid from the appropriate government, may answer the definition of public authority under Section 2(h)(d)(i)....” 14. In the backdrop of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. (supra), the expression “substantially financed” has been interpreted to mean such degree of financial support which renders the body practically dependent upon such funding for its very existence and continued operation. 15. Having considered the rival submissions and the material available on record, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner-society cannot be brought within the definition of “public authority” as contained in Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. The petitioner is a society registered under the Chhattisgarh Society Registration Act. Mere registration of the petitioner-society under the said enactment does not, by itself, render it a “public authority” within the meaning of Section 2(h) 12 of the RTI Act. The statutory test is whether the petitioner is owned, controlled or substantially financed, directly or indirectly, by the appropriate Government. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Thalappalam (supra) has authoritatively held that the expression “controlled” occurring in Section 2(h) contemplates control of a substantial nature and that mere supervision or regulation under a statute would not amount to such control. Likewise, the expression “substantially financed” requires actual, existing, positive and real financial assistance to a substantial extent. Mere grants, subsidies, exemptions, privileges or other incidental financial assistance would not constitute substantial financing unless the body is practically dependent upon such funding for its existence and functioning. In the present case, there is no material on record to establish that the petitioner-society is owned by the Government or that the Government exercises any deep, pervasive or dominant control over its management and affairs. Equally, there is no material demonstrating that the petitioner-society is substantially financed, either directly or indirectly, from Government funds. On the contrary, the petitioner is an independently constituted society and is not dependent upon Government funding for its existence or continued functioning. The mere fact that the petitioner is registered under the Chhattisgarh Society Registration Act and may be subject to statutory supervision or regulatory requirements cannot be equated with substantial governmental control contemplated under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. The distinction between regulatory supervision and substantial control has been clearly recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thalappalam (supra). 16. The aforesaid principle has also been applied by the Chhattisgarh High 13 Court in DAV Public School v. Central Information Commission, WPC No.3145 of 2020 and connected matters, decided on 18.06.2026. In that case, this Court held that a private unaided institution receiving only limited financial assistance or reimbursement could not be regarded as “substantially financed” in the absence of deep and pervasive governmental control, and consequently could not be treated as a “public authority” under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. 17. This Court further finds that the impugned order dated 10.04.2023 proceeds substantially on the basis of the notional/guideline value of the Government land without determining the actual financial assistance received by the Petitioner-Society or demonstrating how such assistance is substantial. Such an approach amounts to equating concessional occupation with substantial financing, which is not the test laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The finding is therefore unsupported by sufficient material and warrants interference. 18. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the Petitioner-Society has not been shown to satisfy the statutory requirement of being “substantially financed” by the appropriate Government under Section 2(h)(d)(ii) of the RTI Act. The impugned order dated 10.04.2023 is accordingly unsustainable and is liable to be set aside, with the consequential directions issued thereunder also liable to be quashed. 19. Accordingly, the instant petition stands allowed. 20. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge AMIT PATEL