1 CGHC010229282015 2026:CGHC:34868 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 2253 of 2015 1 - Jasvir Singh Gurudatta S/o Baldeo Singh Gurudatta, Aged About 58 Years Removed Upper Divison Teacher Mahasamund Present Address Mahasamund Collectorate Road, In Front Of State Bank Of India Bhawan Mahasamund Civil And Revenue District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh , Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - The Sanchalak Lok Shikshan Chhattisgarh Directorate And Ors. S/o Directorate Rajdhani Raipur Civil And Revenue District Raipur Chhattisgarh , Chhattisgarh 2 - The District Education Officer, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh , District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary School Education Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, New Mantralaya, Naya Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh , District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4 - The Collector Mahasamund, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh SUGUNA DUBEY Digitally signed by SUGUNA DUBEY Date: 2026.08.11 11:25:26 +0530 2 5 - The Deputy Director Lok Shikshan Directorate Rajdhani Raipur , District Raipur Chhattisgarh , District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 6 - The Sahayak Sanchalak School Education Department, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh , District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 7 - The Principal Govt. Higher Secondary School Mahasamund District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh , District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 8 - The Union Of India Through The Secretary Education Department New Delhi, Delhi ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Bhupendra Singh, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Ghanshyam Kashyap, Dy.GA (Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Order on Board 07/08/2026 The petitioner has filed the present petition claiming the following reliefs: 10.1 That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus/certiorari/prohibition, directing that the order contained in Annexure P-1 be not acted upon and that the petitioner be permitted to join and continue in service on the post of Teacher pursuant to the appointment order dated 05.04.1983 (Annexure P-3). The subsequent application of the Chhattisgarh Shiksha Karmi Rules, which came into force after the year 2000/2002, to the petitioner’s case on the ground of overage may kindly be held inapplicable, arbitrary and illegal, and the 3 impugned order be quashed accordingly. 10.2 That this Hon’ble Court may further be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, direction or order directing the respondents to permit the petitioner to join and continue in service as Teacher. The Committee constituted by the State of Chhattisgarh under the Chairmanship of the Collector of the concerned District, particularly the Committee constituted for District Mahasamund, which passed the order dated 22.03.2011 (Annexure P-2), may kindly be directed to reconsider/modify the said order and hold that the petitioner’s claim could not have been rejected merely on the ground of overage, particularly when, as recorded in Annexure P-2, the petitioner was 26 years of age at the time of his appointment and was only 54 years of age on the date of the order dated 22.03.2011, having not attained the prescribed age of retirement. 10.3 That this Hon’ble Court may further be pleased to direct the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner at par with other similarly situated teachers, more than 25 of whom, appointed pursuant to the order dated 05.04.1983 (Annexure P-3), were granted appointment/reappointment by the Collector’s Committee. Although the petitioner was otherwise found eligible and qualified for appointment, his claim has been rejected solely on the ground of overage by applying the Chhattisgarh Shiksha Karmi Rules framed after the formation of the new State of Chhattisgarh in the year 2000, which, being subsequent to the petitioner’s appointment, could not have been retrospectively applied for determining his eligibility or age for appointment. The petitioner is therefore entitled to equal and non- discriminatory treatment in accordance with law. 10.4 That the order dated 22.03.2011 (Annexure P-2), passed by the respondent 4 authorities/Collector, whereby the petitioner has been held to be overage and dehors the Rules of the Chhattisgarh Shiksha Karmi, deserves to be quashed and set aside. The respondents may further be directed to release salary and all consequential service benefits, prepare the petitioner’s pension records, and continue payment of monthly salary in future, in the interest of substantial justice. 10.5 That despite several representations dated 29.04.2015 made by the petitioner, and despite the letters issued by the State of Chhattisgarh and the Union of India making the petitioner a party respondent, the respondents have failed to consider or dispose of the representation till date. 10.6 That the records, registers, and other relevant documents concerning the petitioner, as well as other teachers appointed under the order dated 05.04.1983, be called for and examined, as the petitioner has been wrongfully denied reappointment only on the ground of overage, whereas other similarly situated teachers have been reappointed 10.7 That any other writ, direction, or order which this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was initially appointed on 11.01.1983 on the post of Upper Division Teacher for a period of 90 days and was thereafter again appointed vide order dated 05.04.1983, which remained operative up to 30.04.1983. It is contended that the petitioner had been continuously pursuing his claim for reinstatement/reappointment and that, despite his repeated representations, the authorities failed to consider his case in its proper 5 perspective. It is further submitted that the subsequent rejection of the petitioner’s claim on the ground of age is unsustainable, as the Rules relied upon by the respondents came into force subsequent to his initial appointment and could not have been retrospectively applied to his case. 3. Per contra, learned State counsel opposes the petition and submits that the petitioner’s engagement was purely temporary/ad hoc and was initially made only for a limited period of 90 days. Thereafter, his appointment was extended only up to 30.04.1983, and there is no material demonstrating any continuation of his service thereafter. It is submitted that the petitioner approached the authorities after an extraordinary and unexplained lapse of several decades, and even the representation relied upon by him was made only in the year 2015. It is, therefore, contended that the claim is hopelessly stale and is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material available on record, this Court finds substance in the objection raised by the respondents. 5. From the documents placed on record, it appears that the petitioner was initially appointed on 11.01.1983 for a period of 90 days and was thereafter appointed for a further limited period vide order dated 05.04.1983, which was operative only up to 30.04.1983. There is no contemporaneous document on record demonstrating that the petitioner continued in service thereafter or that he challenged the 6 discontinuance of his engagement before any competent judicial or statutory forum within a reasonable period. 6. The petitioner seeks to overcome the enormous delay by contending that he had been making representations from time to time. However, the mere submission of representations, after the cause of action has become stale, cannot revivedead claim. The Supreme Court in C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining, (2008) 10 SCC 115, has categorically held that a belated representation relating to a stale claim does not furnish a fresh cause of action. The said principle has subsequently been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59. Similarly, in the matter of Bichitrananda Behera v. State of Orissa & Others, 2023 INSC 902, Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25 and Chairman, State Bank of India v. M.J. James, (2022) 2 SCC 301, the Supreme Court, while considering a dispute relating to appointment in an educational institution, reiterated that a belated service claim is liable to be non-suited on the ground of delay and laches, particularly where the belated assertion has the potential of unsettling the rights and status of persons who have remained in service in the interregnum. The Court further explained that acquiescence, when coupled with prolonged inaction, may operate as a bar against subsequently asserting the alleged right. 7. In the present case, the petitioner’s alleged discontinuance dates back to the year 1983, whereas the representation relied upon by him is of the year 2015. Thus, there is a lapse of more than three decades 7 between the alleged cessation of service and the first representation relied upon by the petitioner. Such an extraordinary delay cannot be brushed aside merely by asserting that the petitioner continued to pursue his representation. Significantly, there is no material on record demonstrating that the petitioner had approached any competent judicial or quasi-judicial forum during the intervening period or that any proceeding concerning his alleged right to continue in service remained pending. 8. The subsequent consideration or rejection of the representation by the authorities cannot, in the opinion of this Court, breathe fresh life into an otherwise stale claim. A representation made after an inordinate lapse of time cannot be employed as a device to circumvent the doctrine of delay and laches. The law is well settled that a stale claim does not become a live claim merely because the authority chooses to consider and reject a subsequent representation. 9. There is yet another aspect which cannot be lost sight of. The relief sought by the petitioner is not confined to a mere correction of a recurring monetary benefit; rather, the petitioner seeks reinstatement/reappointment and continuation of service with consequential benefits on the basis of an engagement which came to an end more than three decades ago. Granting such relief at this belated stage would necessarily have implications for the settled service position of other employees and would unsettle matters which have long since attained finality. 8 10. The petitioner’s reliance upon his alleged representations, therefore, does not furnish a satisfactory explanation for the extraordinary delay in invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court. A person who has remained dormant for an unreasonably long period cannot ordinarily seek to invoke such jurisdiction after the passage of decades, particularly when the rights and service arrangements of third parties may have intervened. 11. In view of the foregoing discussion and having regard to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in C. Jacob (supra), M.K. Sarkar (supra), Bichitrananda Behera (supra) N. Murugesan, (supra) and M.J. James (supra) this Court is of the considered opinion that the claim of the petitioner is grossly belated, stale and barred by the principles of delay and laches and therefore he is not entitled for reinstatement to the post of Upper Division Teacher. No satisfactory explanation has been furnished for the extraordinary delay of several decades in approaching this Court. Consequently, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Accordingly, it is dismissed as such. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge