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2026 DAILYLAW 3196 (CHH)

THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH v. TULSI GUPTA,

ACQA/88/2021 · 2026-02-19

Shri Radhakishan Agrawal, Smt Rajani Dubey

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Judgment text

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1 2026:CGHC:8989-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 88 of 2021 • The State of Chhattisgarh, Through - Police Station Chalgali, District Balrampur Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh. ...Appellant versus • Tulsi Gupta, S/o Chandrika Gupta, aged about 38 Years, R/o Village Manikpur, Police Station Chalgali, District Balrampur Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Appellant/State : Mr. Ram Narayan Sahu, Deputy Government Advocate. For Respondent : None. Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey & Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal Judgment on Board 20.02.2026 Per Radhakishan Agrawal, J. Heard on admission. 1. This acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/State arises out of the judgment dated 29.02.2020 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ramanujganj, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj (C.G.), in Sessions Case No. R-99/2017, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent of the charges under Sections 457, 354, 354-A, 506 Part II, 450 and 376(2)(f) of the Indian Penal Code (for short, “IPC”) on the basis of benefit of doubt. AKHILESH BEOHAR Digitally signed by AKHILESH BEOHAR Date: 2026.02.23 17:17:53 +0530 2 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that prosecutrix, aged about 22 years, lodged a written report (Ex.P-1) at Police Station Chalgali alleging that on 07.05.2017, her husband had gone to Village Sabag for labour work and she was residing in her house along with her one-year-old son. It is alleged that on the intervening night of 11.05.2017, after having dinner, she was sleeping in her house. At about 12:00 midnight, accused/respondent, who is her brother-in-law (Jeth), came to her house and knocked on the door asking for drinking water and she opened the door. Immediately thereafter, the accused/respondent entered the house, caught hold of her hands, threw her on the cot with the intention of outraging her modesty and committed sexual assault upon her. When she resisted and started crying, the accused/respondent allegedly threatened to kill her if she disclosed the incident to anyone and thereafter fled from the spot. On the next morning, she informed her husband about the incident. On the basis of the said written report (Ex.P-1), FIR (Ex.P-2) was registered against the accused/respondent on 24.05.2017. 3. During the course of investigation, after obtaining consent, prosecutrix was sent for medical examination, whereupon PW-7 Dr. S.J. examined her and did not notice any injury over the person of the victim either externally or internally and also did not give any definite opinion regarding sexual intercourse and gave MLC report vide Ex.P-10. Accused/respondent was taken into custody vide Ex.P-11. 4. Statements of the witnesses were recorded and after completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused/respondent before the concerned trial Court. The accused/respondent abjured the guilt and prayed for trial. 3 5. The trial Court, after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused/respondent of the charges leveled against him. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the learned trial Court has erred in acquitting the accused/respondent of the aforementioned charges by recording perverse findings. He further submits that there is ample evidence available on record, particularly the testimony of PW-1 (prosecutrix), which clearly establishes that on the date of incident, accused/respondent forcibly entered her house with the intention of outraging her modesty, committed sexual assault upon her and extended threats to her life. Thus, the impugned judgment of acquittal suffers from perversity and illegality and is liable to be set aside. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the material available on record. 8. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:- “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 9. The question that arises for consideration is whether the respondent/accused is the perpetrator of the crime in question. 4 10.Case of the prosecution primarily rests upon the testimony of PW-1 (prosecutrix). In her deposition before the Court, prosecutrix stated that on the date of incident, when the accused/respondent knocked at the door, she did not open it and thereafter the accused/respondent kicked the door, forcibly entered the house, threw her on the cot, removed her clothes and committed sexual intercourse with her. She further deposed that accused/respondent threatened to kill her if she disclosed the incident to anyone. However, the aforesaid facts specifically do not find mention in her written report (Ex.P-1), FIR (Ex.P-2) and in her police statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. (Ex.D-1). In her cross-examination, she admitted that the written report (Ex.P-1) does not bear any date. She further admitted that the complaint was written by her husband (PW-2) on her dictation, however, PW-2 (husband) contradicted this version and deposed that the complaint was written by one Surendra of the village. Prosecutrix also admitted that neighbouring houses were situated nearby and that had she raised an alarm from the door, the neighbours could have heard her, however, she did not raise any alarm. She also admitted that she did not go to the house of any neighbour during the night to inform them about the alleged incident. Apart from this, PW-2 husband of the prosecutrix, admitted in his cross-examination that the prosecutrix did not inform him about the alleged rape over the phone. He further admitted that the report was lodged after a delay of 10–12 days from the date of the incident. He also admitted that when the complaint was initially written, there was no mention of alleged rape therein. 11.Thus, from perusal of the aforesaid evidence, it is evident that there are material contradictions and omissions in the statements of PW-1 (prosecutrix) and PW-2 (her husband) and their testimonies do not 5 corroborate each other, nor do they find support from the contents of the written report (Ex.P-1), FIR (Ex. P-2) and the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. (Ex.D-1) with regard to the alleged incident. Further, the evidence on record reveals that the prosecutrix herself admitted that the houses of neighbours were situated adjacent to her house. Had any such incident occurred in the manner alleged, it would likely have come to the notice of persons residing nearby. Furthermore, prosecutrix also admitted that she did not inform any neighbour about the incident during the night. Apart from this, PW-7 Dr. S.J., who medically examined the prosecutrix, did not notice any external or internal injury on her person. Moreover, the incident is alleged to have taken place on 11.05.2017, whereas the FIR (Ex.P-2) was lodged on 24.05.2017. No satisfactory explanation has been offered for the delay in lodging the FIR. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the allegation of forcible sexual assault is not proved against the accused/respondent. The learned trial Court, after elaborate discussion and proper appreciation of the evidence led by the prosecution, concluded that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and, accordingly, acquitted the accused/respondent of the charges by extending the benefit of doubt. 12.The Hon'ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 12.02.2024 passed in Criminal Appeal No.1162 of 2011 in case of Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka, has held in para 36 as under:- "36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:- "(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary; 6 (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;' (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court." 13. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jafarudheen & Mallappa (supra), the view taken by the learned trial Court appears to be a plausible and possible view. In the absence of any patent illegality or perversity, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment. 14.Accordingly, the acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/State against the acquittal of accused/respondent is hereby dismissed at the admission stage. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge Akhilesh