SHRI.GAUTAM BANERJEE v. THE HONBLE LT.GOVERNOR AND ORS.
WPA/280/2026 · 2026-08-01
Rajasekhar Mantha
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 31947 (CAL) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 31947 (CAL) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA [ CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR ] *** WPA/280/2026
Shri. Gautam Banerjee
Vs. The Honble Lieutenant Governor and Ors. Mr. G. Binnu Kumar
Ms. Vinita Devi
… for the petitioner
Ms. Babita Das
… for the respondent
August 01, 2026 [SR] Item No. 1
1. The subject matter of challenge in the writ petition is substantially deal with b a Coordinate Bench has, vide order dated 15th June, 2026, recorded all the facts of the case. Prima facie observations have also been recorded. 2. Affidavits have been exchanged by and between the parties and CAN/1/2026 has also been filed by the petitioner to bring on record subsequent events. CAN/1/2026 was to be considered at the time of final hearing. 3. Today, learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Gopala Binnu Kumar has placed the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Swati Priyadarshini vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others (2024 INSC 620). 4. Paragraph 33 of the said judgment which has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Shamser Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (1974) 2 SCC 831 and para 34 has extracted a portion of the previous decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Parshotam Lal Dingra v. Union of India reported at (1957) SCC OnLine SC 5. 2
5. Para 34 is set out herein:-
“34. It is profitable to refer to what five learned Judges of this Court laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v Union of India, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 5:
“28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. Union of India [(1953) 1 SCC 420: (1953) SCR 655]. Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1955) 1 SCR 26].
In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India [LR 58 Bom 673 : AIR (1956) Bom 455] wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, terminated cannot than for services otherwise misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article 311, for it operates as a forefeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career.
A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank
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will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences. Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. The use of the expression “terminate” or “discharge” is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to?
If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of the rules and Article 311, which give protection to government servant have not been complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional servant.” right of the (emphasis supplied)
6. What follows from the aforesaid judgment is that whenever an order of termination is issued, not being an order of dismissal/removal or reduction in rank, it must be assessed as to whether there any stigma attached to such termination. If stigma is found, Article 311 of the Constitution is attracted. 7. Even in the case of a non-renewal of a contractual engagement, as in the instant case it was found that the same has been occasioned by reason of unsatisfactory performance,
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non-compliance with directions or causing inconvenience to the employer in its functions, the same would ipso facto attract stigma. For that matter, denial, refusal to pay any benefits arising out of a contractual service would also amount to a stigma thereby attracting Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 8. The employer would therefore be required to initiate an appropriate disciplinary proceeding, to prove the allegation against the employee. It is only after a lawful proceedings against an employee and affording him an opportunity to defend himself in adherence with the principles of natural justice, that the termination can be given effected to. 9.
In the instant case, this Court clearly find that there was show cause notice issued to the petitioner on 04.04.2026, where the allegations against him are; (a) Delay in publication of vacancy notice for the DAY- NRLM Scheme, which has adversely affected the recruitment process and may lead to setbacks in implementation of the DAY-NRLM programme. (b) Lack of adherence to prescribed instructions and time lines by the petitioner. (c) Improper handling of human resource functions and delay in releasing of Revolving Fund (RF) and Community Investment Fund (CIF) and implementation of CRP and delay in implementation. 5
(d) There was serious lapses in performance, planning and adherence to timelines by the petitioner, which have impacted the implementation of government programmes, scheme and missions. 10. The allegations apart from being vague are clearly and unequivocally found to be stigmatic. Even the notice of termination dated 29th May, 2026 has found against the petitioner are as follows:-
(i) Breach of obligation under confidentiality clause; (ii) Failure to observe the terms of agreement or lawful directions/orders of the Director (otherwise called insubordination). (iii) Obstructing the performance of the functions of ANIRLM. (iv) Causing damage to prestige or reputation of the functions under ANIRLM. (v) Unsatisfactory performance. 11. A termination notice can be no more stigmatic than what clearly appears from the impugned order dated 29.05.2026. Some findings in the Show Cause Notice were not even part of the Notice to Show Cause. The said Show Cause Notice dated 04th April, 2026 and order of termination dated 29th May, 2026 are ex facie illegal and void, being vague, devoid of particulars and without a lawful departmental inquiry. Rights of the petitioner under Article 311 of the Constitution have been violated. 6
12.
At the time of passing the impugned order, a Coordinate Bench has rightly held that the interim order of stay of the notice of termination dated 29.05.2026 would not create any equity in favour of the petitioner nor would it create any liability or obligation on the authorities to extend the contract of the petitioner which has already expired. 13. During the pendency of the writ petition, the respondents have issued a fresh order dated 18.06.2026 wherefrom it clearly appears that the writ petitioner’s engagement would not be extended after expiry of his contract on 28.06.2026. The said
order passed on the basis of the interim order already passed is not stigmatic and is a case of non-renewal of contract service simpliciter.
14. In view of the above order, the impugned orders dated 04.04.2026 and 29.05.2026 shall sand quashed and set aside.
15. The respondent shall remove the said orders from the records of contractual service rendered by the petitioner to them. The said order shall not be cited by the respondents against any future reference from any quarter.
16. The order dated 18.06.2026 shall be reissued by the respondent without reference to any of the orders and proceedings passed by this Court.
17. Mr. Gopala Binnu Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner however submits that the notice period for one month has not been given to him.
18. In the light of aforesaid orders being quashed and a fresh
order of termination simpliciter having been passed, the
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respondent shall therefore pay him one month remuneration that he was ordinarily getting during the term of his contract in lieu of notice.
19. Let such payment be made within a period of two weeks from date.
20. With the aforesaid observations, WPA/280/2026 stands
disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.
21. All parties are directed to act on a server copy of this
order duly downloaded from the official website of this Court.
( Rajasekhar Mantha, J. )