JUDGMENT : EASWARAN S., J. This appeal arises out of a concurrent finding in a suit for eviction and a permanent prohibitory injunction from interfering with the rights of the plaintiff over the property. According to the plaintiffs, as per a release deed executed on 24.02.1999, the plaint schedule property was released in favour of the first plaintiff. Thereafter, the plaintiffs had permitted the defendants to continue in the plaint schedule property. Though the plaintiffs intended to partition the property among themselves, it could not fructify because of the fact that the first defendant was occupying the plaint schedule property. Though several demands were made to the first defendant to surrender the plaint schedule property, the request was refused and hence the suit. Defendants 1,2,4 and 5 filed a written statement contending that the third defendant is a mentally retarded person and that there was no application to appoint a guardian to defend his case. It was further contended that there was an oral family settlement between the plaintiffs and defendants 1, 2 and 4, who then decided to release their right over the property to the second defendant and as per the family settlement defendant 1 and 2 renovated the old house with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs by spending around an amount of Rs.20,40,000/- (Rupees Twenty lakhs forty thousand only). According to them, the release deed dated 24.02.1999 is a forged deed and the same is void ab initio. On behalf of plaintiffs PW1 was examined and Exts.A1 to A7 documents were produced. On behalf of defendants Exts.B1 to B3 documents were produced and DW1 to DW6 were examined. Ext.C1, Ext.C1(a) and Ext.C1(b) are the report of the Advocate Commissioner. The trial court, on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence came into conclusion that the possession of the defendants is purely permissive and that the plea of the defendant that the suit is barred and that the defendants had perfected the title by adverse possession cannot be sustained and accordingly decreed the suit and directed the defendants to hand over the plaint schedule property within 45 days. Aggrieved the defendants preferred A.S.No.46 of 2020, which was dismissed by the Additional District Court-III, Mavelikara, on 26.09.2025 and hence the appeal. 2. Aggrieved the defendants preferred A.S.No.46 of 2020, which was dismissed by the Additional District Court-III, Mavelikara, on 26.09.2025 and hence the appeal. 2. Heard Sri.V.Philip Mathews, learned counsel for the appellants, Sri.D.Kishore, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 3 to 7 and respondents 11 to 13, who appears on caveat and Sri.S.V.Balakrishna Iyer, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 10 th respondent in the appeal who could not join the appellants in this appeal. 3. Sri.V.Philip Mathews, learned counsel for the appellants contended that there was no opportunity given by the trial court to adduce evidence and they were not prepared to take out an Advocate Commission for proving the nature of construction. It is further pointed out that the release deed executed by the first defendant is a forged one and therefore it is void ab initio. Alternatively, it is contended that the defendants possession is that of a licensee and therefore, they are entitled for the benefit of Section 6o(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 . The defendants having constructed the house which is situated in the plaint schedule property are entitled to the protection from eviction and ultimately, if it is found that the plaintiffs are entitled for eviction, the defendants are entitled for the compensation under the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958 . 4. Per contra, Sri.D.Kishore, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs contended that the construction made by the defendants in the plaint schedule property is without the permission of the plaintiffs and therefore no case of the irrevocability of the license under Section 60 (b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 , can be made out. When the defendants have executed the release deed in the year 1999, they have been divested with the right title and interest over property. If that be so, the possession of the defendants over the plaint schedule property can only be viewed as permissive in nature, and thus the plea of adverse possession is also not available to them. 5. Sri.S.V.Balakrishna Iyer, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 10 th respondent supported the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants and contended that in order to sustain the plea of a license and an irrevocability of the license, no permission from the licensor is required. 5. Sri.S.V.Balakrishna Iyer, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 10 th respondent supported the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants and contended that in order to sustain the plea of a license and an irrevocability of the license, no permission from the licensor is required. Once it is proved that the constructions were made by the defendants, necessarily, they must get the benefit of the Section 60 (b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 . 6. I have considered the submissions raised across the Bar and is of the considered view that there is no substantial question of law arising for consideration in the present appeal. Admittedly, the plaintiffs derived the title over the property by virtue of the release deed dated 24.02.1999. The contention of the defendants 1,2,4 and 5 is that the release deed is forged one and void ab initio and is not supported by any cogent evidence. That apart, there is no counter claim lodged in the suit in order to declare the release deed as void nor to set aside the same. What is now projected is, notwithstanding the execution of the release deed, there was a family settlement between the parties, which resulted in the plaintiffs permitting the defendants to continue in the property and based on such oral family settlement, constructions were made by them. Once the plea of a family settlement is raised by the defendants, necessarily, the plea based on the occupation as a license and that a further claim of irecoverability of a license under Section 60 (b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 , erodes. In fact, these two contentions are mutually destructive. 7. That apart, no evidence is adduced in order to substantiate the plea that the defendants have spent Rs.20,40,000/- (Rupees Twenty lakh forty thousand only) for the purpose of the construction. It must be remembered that the specific case of the plaintiffs is that the defendants had constructed a house in the plaint schedule property without the consent of the plaintiffs. The mere failure of the plaintiffs to object to such construction will not ipso facto enable the defendants to claim either permanency of their possession or for that matter, irrevocability of the license. 8. The mere failure of the plaintiffs to object to such construction will not ipso facto enable the defendants to claim either permanency of their possession or for that matter, irrevocability of the license. 8. As regards the contention that sufficient opportunity was not given to the defendants to adduce such evidence, Sri.D.Kishore, learned counsel for the plaintiffs brings to the notice of this Court the judgment rendered in O.P.(C)No. 3034 of 2016 dated 20.1.2017, wherein this Court had set aside the order passed by the trial court dismissing the application filed by the defendants on 23.11.2016. 9. A perusal of the judgment shows that the application, I.A.No.940/2016 was allowed and the court below was directed to depute an Advocate Commission in order to ascertain the matters which the defendants had sought for. It is further pointed out by Sri.D.Kishore that though this Court allowed the application, pursuant to the said direction, the Advocate Commissioner had visited the property and the report was not accepted by the trial court for the reasons which are evident from the discussions in the judgment. 10. Hence, this Court is not inclined to accept the contention of the appellants that they were not given sufficient opportunity to contest the matter and lead evidence. 11 As an upshot of these discussions, this Court is of the considered view that the judgments rendered by the courts below do not call for any interference since the same is not vitiated by any peculiar irregularity or perversity. Resultantly, finding that no substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. 12. However, the dismissal of the second appeal will not stand in the way of the appellants to initiate appropriate proceedings to recover the amount which they have stated to have spend in construction of the house if permissible under law. Contentions of both parties are left open. If such proceedings are initiated, the jurisdictional court shall decide the respective contentions untrammelled by the observations made by this Court as well as the judgments rendered by the courts below.