1 CGHC010405852022 2026:CGHC:36345 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 8905 of 2022 1 - Dr. Rajesh Kumar Singh S/o Late Shri Sukhpal Singh, Aged About 48 Years Lecturer (Dravyagun) Shri Narayan Prasad Awasthi Government Ayurvedic College, G.E. Road, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - Its Secretary, Department Of Health And Family Welfare, Chhattisgarh Rajya Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, P.S. Mandir Hasaud, Naya Raipur, Atal Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - The Director, Directorate Of Ayurveda, Yoga And Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha And Homeopathy (Ayush), G.E. Road, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Dr. Om Prakash Raut Aged About 46 Years Reader Dravyagun, Shri Narayan Prasad Awasthi Government Ayurvedic College, G.E. Road, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr.A.S. Rajput, Advocate For State/Respondents : Mr.T.L. Bareth, Panel Lawyer For Respondent No.3 : Mr. Siddhant Das Advocate holding the brief of Mr. Gary Mukhopadhyay, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order On Board 14.08.2026 1) By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):- “i) That, this Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to issue a suitable writ or writs for directing the respondent no.1 to 2 promote the petitioner on the post of Reader from the post of Lecturer Dravyagun w.e.f. 24.01.19 since when the junior of the petitioner i.e. respondent no.3 has been promoted. ii) Any other relief / reliefs which may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, may also be allowed.” 2) The facts, in brief, are that the petitioner passed MD (AY) Dravyagun in the year 2007 and thereafter applied for registration under the Chhattisgarh Ayurvedic Tatha Unani Chikitsa Paddhati Evam Prakritik Chikitsa Board, Raipur, on 22.09.2009. He applied for appointment to the post of Lecturer (Dravyagun) pursuant to an advertisement issued by the Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission dated 27.08.2009. The petitioner participated in the recruitment process and was declared selected for said post, and his name was recommended by the PSC for appointment in the month of May, 2011. When order of appointment was not issued, he filed Writ Petition (S) No.3830 of 2012 seeking a direction to the Board to treat his registration from the date of submission of his application, which was disposed of vide order dated 19.10.2012. The petitioner preferred another writ petition, i.e. WP(S) No.1766 of 2012, seeking a direction to the respondents to issue an order of appointment to the post of Lecturer (Dravyagun), but said writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 25.04.2012. Thereafter, Writ Appeal No.294 of 2014 was filed, which was disposed of reserving liberty to the petitioner to make a representation. The representation of the petitioner was rejected vide order dated 02.04.2013. Thereafter, WPS No.3095 of 2014 was filed, and said writ petition was allowed and the order dated 02.04.2013 was quashed vide order dated 28.04.2015. The petitioner was offered appointment and posting vide 3 order dated 23.11.2015. A seniority list was published in the year 2016, wherein the name of the petitioner was placed at serial No.1 and the name of respondent No.3 at serial No.2. On 24.01.2019, respondent No.1 passed an order promoting respondent No.3 from the post of Lecturer (Dravyagun) to the post of Reader. 3) Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner was placed above respondent No.3 in the gradation list, but his name was not considered for promotion to the post of Reader. He would further submit that the petitioner made repeated representations on 23.02.2019, 31.05.2019 and 05.01.2022, but no heed was paid thereto. 4) On the other hand, learned Advocates appearing for the respondents would oppose the submissions made by Mr. Rajput. They would submit that the petitioner has claimed promotion with effect from 24.01.2019, whereas the present petition was filed on 06.12.2022, after a lapse of four years, without explaining any sufficient cause for such delay. It is also contended that respondent No.3 was appointed in the year 2012, whereas the petitioner was appointed in the year 2015, and respondent No.3 had completed the requisite eligibility criteria; therefore, his name was considered for promotion. They would submit that the present petition deserves to be dismissed. 5) Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record. 6) Admittedly, respondent No.3 was appointed in the year 2012 and, upon completion of five years of service, his name was considered for promotion in the year 2019, whereas, the petitioner was appointed in 4 the year 2015 and had not completed the requisite five years of service after completion of the probation period. Therefore, his name was not considered for promotion. 7) The petitioner has claimed promotion with effect from 24.01.2019 whereas filed this petition on 06.12.2022. 8) The repeated representations made before the respondent-authorities would not give rise to a fresh cause of action. 9) The Supreme Court in the matter of C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and others reported in (2008) 10 SCC 115 in para 11 held as under :- “11. When a decision is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits, being under the impression that failure to do so may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of “acknowledgment of a jural relationship” to give rise to a fresh cause of action.” 10) The Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 652 summarized the settled principles in the following manner:- “7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long 5 delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion,etc.., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 11) The Supreme Court in the matter of Mrinmoy Maity Vs. Chhanda Koley and others, reported in (2024) 15 SCC 215 in para 11 held as under :- “11.For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under 6 Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court.” 12) Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above-referred matters, this petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed on account of delay and laches. No costs. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE Rekha