1 CGHC010339762022 2026:CGHC:35224 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 4462 of 2022 1 - Tulsidas Markam S/o Shri Ramchandra Singh Aged About 43 Years Presently Posted As Tahsildar Tahsil Office Gourela, District : Gaurela- Pendra-Marwahi, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary Revenue And Disaster Management Department Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan Nawa Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - The Chief Information Commissioner Chhattisgarh State Informantion Commission, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - The Sub - Divisional Officer (Revenue) Marwahi (First Appellate Authority Under Rti Act), New, District : Gaurela-Pendra-Marwahi, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Harihar Prasad Gupta R/o 27 Kholi, Vikas Nagar, Near Gurudwara, Bilaspur, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) RAGHVENDRA JAT Digitally signed by RAGHVENDRA JAT 2 For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Pranoti Das, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, Advocate. For Respondent(s)/State : Mr. Abhyudhay Tripathi, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 11/08/2026 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, thereby setting-aside/quashing the impugned order dated 21.09.2022 (Annexure P/1) so far it relates to the imposition of cost of Rs. 25,000/- upon the petitioner. 10.2 That, any other relief/order which may deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case including award of the costs of the petition may be given.” 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order dated 21.09.2022, whereby a penalty of Rs.25,000/- has been imposed upon the petitioner for the alleged delay in furnishing information under the Right to Information Act, is arbitrary, unreasonable, illegal, unjust and contrary to the principles of natural justice and is, therefore, liable to be set aside. It is contended that the show-cause notice issued to the petitioner did not propose imposition of any cost or penalty and, 3 consequently, the petitioner was not afforded an effective opportunity to explain why such penalty should not be imposed. Learned counsel further submits that the RTI application submitted by respondent No.4 was received by the Clerk of the petitioner on 24.09.2019; however, owing to the illness of the concerned Clerk, the application was not placed before the petitioner. It is further submitted that, prior to the filing of the RTI application, the petitioner had already been transferred from Tahsil Marwahi to Tahsil Jashpur, District Jashpur, vide order dated 23.08.2019 and was ultimately relieved from Tahsil Marwahi on 18.10.2019, before expiry of the prescribed period of 30 days for furnishing the information. Learned counsel submits that these facts were specifically brought to the notice of respondent No.2 in the petitioner's reply to the show-cause notice, but the same were not duly considered. It is, therefore, contended that the delay in furnishing the information was neither deliberate nor attributable to any wilful omission on the part of the petitioner. Learned counsel further submits that respondent No.2, without properly considering the petitioner's explanation and without recording any finding of deliberate or wilful default, mechanically imposed a penalty of Rs.25,000/-, which is unsustainable in law. It is lastly submitted that an order imposing penalty carries serious civil and stigmatic consequences and, therefore, could not have been passed without affording the petitioner a proper and meaningful opportunity of hearing. Accordingly, learned counsel prays that the 4 impugned order dated 21.09.2022 be quashed and set aside. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the same. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material available on record. 5. It is noted that the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, while considering a similar issue in Nitin Singhvi (supra), has elaborately examined the scope and ambit of imposition of penalty under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act. The Division Bench has held that the power to impose penalty is not automatic or mechanical, but is conditioned upon the existence of cogent material demonstrating that the Public Information Officer has, without reasonable cause, either refused to furnish information, caused undue delay, or acted in a malafide manner. It has been further held that mere delay or inability to furnish certain information, particularly when such information is not available on record or lies with another authority, would not ipso facto attract penal consequences. The Court has emphasized that before imposing penalty, the Information Commission is under a statutory obligation to record a clear and reasoned finding with respect to the existence of malafide intent or lack of reasonable cause, and must also afford an effective opportunity of hearing to the concerned officer. The burden cast upon the Public Information Officer under the proviso to Section 20(1) is to establish that he acted reasonably and diligently; however, once such explanation 5 is furnished and remains uncontroverted, the Commission cannot proceed to impose penalty in a routine manner. 6. It has further been observed that where the Public Information Officer has taken steps in compliance with the provisions of the Act, such as transferring the application to the concerned department under Section 6(3) of the RTI Act or furnishing such information as is available on record, the same would constitute a reasonable and sufficient cause, insulating him from penal action. The Division Bench has cautioned that the penal provisions under the Act, being quasi-criminal in nature, must be invoked with due care and only in cases where the conduct of the officer is found to be contumacious or deliberately obstructive. In light of the aforesaid principles, the Division Bench set aside the penalty imposed therein, holding that in the absence of any finding of malafide or deliberate lapse, the order of penalty could not be sustained by observing as follows :- “12. The Supreme Court in the matter of Manohar v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 13 SCC 14 has held that the State Information Commission has been vested with wide powers including imposition of penalty or taking of disciplinary action against the employees and the provisions relating to penalty or to penal consequences have to be construed strictly. While dealing with Section 20(2) of the Act of 2005, their Lordships have observed in paragraph 16 as under :- 6 “16. The State Information Commission has been vested with wide powers including imposition of penalty or taking of disciplinary action against the employees. Exercise of such power is bound to adversely affect or bring civil consequences to the delinquent. Thus, the provisions relating to penalty or to penal consequences have to be construed strictly. It will not be open to the Court to give them such liberal construction that it would be beyond the specific language of the statute or would be in violation to the principles of natural justice.” 13. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have further held while dealing with initiation of departmental proceeding that the case of default must strictly fall within the specified grounds of the provisions of Section 20(2). This provision has to be construed and applied strictly. Its ambit cannot be permitted to be enlarged at the whims of the Commission. It has also been held that “negligence” per se is not a ground on which proceedings under Section 20(2) of the Act can be invoked and the Commission must return a finding that such negligence, delay or default is persistent (meaning: continuing for a long time or happening often, especially in a way that is unpleasant or annoying) and without reasonable cause. Paragraphs 31 and 33 of the report state as under:- “31. It appears that the facts have not been correctly 7 noticed and, in any case, not in their entirety by the State Information Commission. It had formed an opinion that the appellant was negligent and had not performed the duty cast upon him. The Commission noticed that there was 73 days delay in informing the applicant and, thus, there was negligence while performing duties. If one examines the provisions of Section 20(2) in their entirety then it becomes obvious that every default on the part of the concerned officer may not result in issuance of a recommendation for disciplinary action. The case must fall in any of the specified defaults and reasoned finding has to be recorded by the Commission while making such recommendations. ‘Negligence’ per se is not a ground on which proceedings under Section 20(2) of the Act can be invoked. The Commission must return a finding that such negligence, delay or default is persistent and without reasonable cause. In our considered view, the Commission, in the present case, has erred in not recording such definite finding. The appellant herein had not failed to receive any application, had not failed to act within the period of 30 days (as he had written a letter calling for information), had not malafidely denied the request for information, had not furnished any incorrect or misleading information, had not destroyed any information and had not obstructed the furnishing of the information. On the contrary, he had taken steps to facilitate 8 the providing of information by writing the stated letters. May be the letter dated 11th April, 2007 was not written within the period of 30 days requiring respondent No.2 to furnish details of the period for which such information was required but the fact remained that such letter was written and respondent No.2 did not even bother to respond to the said enquiry. He just kept on filing appeal after appeal. After April 4, 2007, the date when the appellant was transferred to Akola, he was not responsible for the acts of omissions and/or commission of the office at Nanded. 14. Their Lordships further held that the word “shall” appearing in Section 20(2) of the Act of 2005 before 'recommend' has to be read as “may” and their Lordships observed as under :- 33. All the attributable defaults of a Central or State Public Information Officer have to be without any reasonable cause and persistently. In other words, besides finding that any of the stated defaults have been committed by such officer, the Commission has to further record its opinion that such default in relation to receiving of an application or not furnishing the information within the specified time was committed persistently and without a reasonable cause. Use of such language by the Legislature clearly shows that the expression ‘shall’ appearing before ‘recommend’ has to be read and construed as ‘may’. There could be cases where there is 9 reasonable cause shown and the officer is able to demonstrate that there was no persistent default on his part either in receiving the application or furnishing the requested information. In such circumstances, the law does not require recommendation for disciplinary proceedings to be made. It is not the legislative mandate that irrespective of the facts and circumstances of a given case, whether reasonable cause is shown or not, the Commission must recommend disciplinary action merely because the application was not responded to within 30 days. Every case has to be examined on its own facts. We would hasten to add here that wherever reasonable cause is not shown to the satisfaction of the Commission and the Commission is of the opinion that there is default in terms of the Section it must send the recommendation for disciplinary action in accordance with law to the concerned authority. In such circumstances, it will have no choice but to send recommendatory report. The burden of forming an opinion in accordance with the provisions of Section 20(2) and principles of natural justice lies upon the Commission.” 7. Reverting to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the impugned order dated 21.9.2022 passed by respondent No. 2 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 8. In light of the law laid down by the Division Bench in Nitin 10 Singhvi (supra), as well as the principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manohar (supra), it is manifest that imposition of penalty under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act is not automatic and must be preceded by a clear and reasoned finding of malafide denial of information or delay without reasonable cause. In the present case, no such finding has been recorded by the State Information Commission. The impugned order proceeds in a mechanical manner, without adverting to the explanation furnished by the petitioner or the factual position that the information, to the extent available, had already been supplied. 9. This Court is of the considered opinion that the conduct of the petitioner does not fall within the mischief contemplated under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act. There is nothing on record to suggest that the petitioner had either deliberately withheld information, furnished misleading information, or acted in a contumacious manner so as to warrant imposition of penalty. On the contrary, the steps taken by the petitioner in transferring the application and facilitating supply of available information clearly demonstrate due diligence and bona fide discharge of his duties. 10. The State Information Commission, while exercising quasi-judicial powers entailing civil consequences, was under an obligation to record specific findings with regard to absence of reasonable cause and existence of malafide intent. The failure to do so vitiates the impugned order. The penalty imposed, therefore, appears to be punitive without any legal foundation and is liable to 11 be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 11. Consequently, the writ petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 21.9.2022 passed by respondent No. 2 is quashed and set aside, including any consequential recovery proceedings initiated pursuant thereto. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Raghu Jat