- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18885 WP No. 32295 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA WRIT PETITION NO. 32295 OF 2025 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: 1. MR. RISHIKESH S/O KRISHNA MURARI, AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS, RESIDENT OF NO.H - 548, KAGZI MOHALLA, BIHARSHARIF, NALANDA, BIHAR - 803101 …PETITIONER (BY SRI. AJAY KADKOL T., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY JEEVAN BHEEMANAGAR POLICE STATION REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR BENGALURU CITY-560075. 2. ANKITA KUMARI D/O NIBHA RAI, AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS, R/O SRIRAMNAGAR BLOCK C, MADISON PG, KUNDAPUR, HYDERABAD CITY ANDHRA PRADESH - 500084. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. B.N. JAGADEESHA, ADDL. SPP FOR R1; SRI. B.N. SURESH BABU, ADVOCATE FOR R2) Digitally signed by SANJEEVINI J KARISHETTY Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18885 WP No. 32295 of 2025 THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 528 OF THE BNSS, 2023 PRAYING TO QUASH THE REGISTRATION OF THE FIRST INFORMATION REPORT DATED 18.08.2025 AND ALL FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE IN CRIME NO.202 OF 2025, REGISTERED AT JEEVANBHEEMANAGAR POLICE STATION, BANGALORE I.E., THE FIRST RESPONDENT POLICE HEREIN, ARRAIGNING THE PETITIONER HEREIN AS AN ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENCES MADE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 69 AND 351(1) OF THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023, WHICH IS PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-A. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioner is before this court seeking the following prayer: "a. issue a Writ, Order or direction of appropriate nature quashing the registration of the First Information Report dated 18.08.2025 and all further investigation of the case in Crime No.202 of 2025, registered at Jeevanbheemanagar Police Station, Bangalore i.e., the First Respondent Police herein, arraigning the Petitioner herein as an accused for the offences made punishable under Section 69 and 351(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which is produced as ANNEXURE - "A". 2. Heard Ajay Kadkol T, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri.B.N.Jagadeesha, learned Addl. SPP appearing - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18885 WP No. 32295 of 2025 for respondent No.1, Sri.B.N.Suresh Babu, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 and have perused the material on record. 3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: 3.1. The petitioner is the accused, respondent No.2-the complainant. The petitioner and the respondent-complainant, appear to have met for the first time on a matrimony app Jeevansathi.com. The meeting develops into friendship, friendship into relationship and the relationship between the two appears to have been physical as well. The relationship ends in the year 2024. For the first time, a complaint comes to be registered in the year 2025, alleging that the petitioner had had sexual relationship with the complainant on the pretext of promise of marriage and the said promise having been broken, has resulted in the registration of the crime for the aforesaid offence. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the acts between the two were consensual and - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18885 WP No. 32295 of 2025 there was no sexual assault upon the complainant, particularly on the pretext of promise of marriage. 5. The learned counsel for the complainant submits that she is not willing to pursue the matter any further and therefore, would leave the decision to the court. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The incident that has happened between the petitioner and the complainant are undoubtedly consensual, which occurred about 18 months prior to the registration of the complaint. The complaint is registered on 18.08.2025 for incidents that have taken place in 2024, that too, all being consensual. 8. In the light of the said circumstance, there can be no offence made out for the one punishable under Section 69 of the BNS. Jurisprudence is replete with judgments of the Apex Court on the issue. - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18885 WP No. 32295 of 2025 8.1. The Apex Court in the case of SAMADHAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA1, has held as follows: “…. …. …. 25. The allegation of rape in the present case hinges entirely on respondent No. 2's claim that appellant established physical relations with her on false pretext of marriage. It is alleged by the appellant that respondent No. 2 opposed the idea of marriage whenever the appellant broached the said idea; however, the appellant kept on insisting possibly this was because her first marriage was in subsistence. It is, however, not clear as to why, despite being opposed to the idea of marriage, respondent No. 2 continued to meet the appellant and indulged in physical relations with him even though she was already married. …. …. …. 27. In this regard, it becomes relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398, (“Mahesh Damu”) wherein the following observations were made: “27. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or consideration. A woman may have reasons to have physical relationship other than the promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal marital ties. 28. Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged 12025 SCC OnLine SC 2528 - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18885 WP No. 32295 of 2025 period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the physical relationship without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact.” (underlining by us) 28. We find that the present case is not a case where the appellant lured respondent No. 2 solely for physical pleasures and then vanished. The relationship continued for a period of three long years, which is a considerable period of time. They remained close and emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage. 29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken relationships are given the colour of criminality. The offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases where there exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter of profound concern and calls for condemnation. 30. In Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764, this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed that - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18885 WP No. 32295 of 2025 a mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage. The relevant portion is extracted as under: “20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n)IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's statement under Section 164CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship. Further, both parties are now married to someone else and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution.” (underlining by us) 31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in which, in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage holds deep social and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not uncommon for a woman to repose complete faith in her partner and to consent to physical intimacy on the assurance that such a relationship would culminate in a lawful and socially recognised marriage. In such circumstances, the promise of - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18885 WP No. 32295 of 2025 marriage becomes the very foundation of her consent, rendering it conditional rather than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such consent may stand vitiated where it is established that the promise of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The law must remain sensitive to such genuine cases where trust has been breached and dignity violated, lest the protective scope of Section 376 of the IPC be reduced to a mere formality for those truly aggrieved. At the same time, the invocation of this principle must rest upon credible evidence and concrete facts, and not on unsubstantiated allegations or moral conjecture. 32. Upon a careful consideration of the record in the present case, we are unable to discern any material that would warrant the invocation of Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. The facts of the present case unmistakably indicate that it is a classic instance of a consensual relationship having subsequently turned acrimonious. …. …. …. 34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled respondent No. 2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor does it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her presence there. Therefore, the only logical inference that emerges is that respondent No. 2, of her own volition, visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It is also borne out from the record that whenever the appellant brought up the subject of marriage, respondent No. 2 herself opposed the proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of respondent No. 2 that the physical relationship between the parties was premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of merit and stands unsustainable. …. …. …. 37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18885 WP No. 32295 of 2025 question itself reveals that the relationship between the parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent No. 2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire to meet her.Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the marriage of respondent No. 2 was subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the material on record, it is manifest that the relationship between the parties was consensual,and therefore, the absence of an express statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasised in the impugned order, cannot be held against the appellant when the same can be otherwise clearly discerned. 38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of this Court in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations were made: “29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to amount to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such consent was given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660], in which it was held as follows : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) “21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18885 WP No. 32295 of 2025 made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. xxx 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The ‘failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance’. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.”.” - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18885 WP No. 32295 of 2025 8.2. A little earlier to the judgment in SAMADHAN supra, the Apex Court in the case of PRADEEP KUMAR KESARWANI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH2, has held as follows: “…. …. …. 18. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case where there is a promise of marriage, the Court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls in the ambit of cheating or deception. 19. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon the decision of this Court in the case of Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, 2013 Cri LJ 2990. This Court made the following observations: “18. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within a ambit of cheating or deception. 22025 SCC OnLine SC 1947 - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18885 WP No. 32295 of 2025 There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accuse; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly, understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of mis-representation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. 21. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time, i.e. at initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term misconception of fact, the fact, the fact must have an immediate relevance.” Section 90, IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.”.” - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18885 WP No. 32295 of 2025 9. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER [I] Writ Petition is allowed. [II] The crime in Crime No.202/2025, pending before the 10th Addl. CMM Court, Mayo Hall, Bangalore City, for the offences punishable under sections 69 and 351(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, stands quashed qua the petitioner. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE CBC List No.: 3 Sl No.: 6