JUDGMENT : EASWARAN S., J. 1. M.S.A.Nos.9/2026 and 11/2026 are directed against an order dated 07.01.2026 in I.A.Nos.257/2025 & 258/2025 in I.A.No.422/2024 in I.A.No.360/2024 in REFA No.141/2024 and M.S.A.No.12/2026 is against an order dated 04.03.2026 in REFA No.141/2024. 2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of these appeals are as follows: The appeal, i.e. REFA No.141/2024, before the Kerala Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam, arises out of a dismissal of a complaint before the Adjudicating Officer attached to the Kerala Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Thiruvananthapuram. The Adjudicating Officer of the Kerala Real Estate Regulatory Authority, upon the complaint, refused to accept the plea of the complainant on the ground that no oral evidence was adduced by him to substantiate the claim for compensation. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint, REFA No.141/2024 was filed with an application for condoning the delay of 42 days in filing the appeal. The said application, i.e. I.A.No.360/2024, was not prosecuted properly and hence, it was dismissed for default and consequently, the appeal was also dismissed for default. Thereafter, I.A.No.422/2004 was filed to restore the delay condonation application and the said application was dismissed for default on 30.12.2024. Later, I.A.No.128/2025 to condone the delay of 64 days in filing an application for restoration and I.A.No.129/2025 seeking restoration of the earlier petition to condone the delay in filing the appeal (I.A.No.360/2024) were filed on 04.04.2025. Subsequently, these applications were not pressed on 04.06.2025. Later, fresh applications, as I.A.No.257/2025 seeking to restore the restoration petition (I.A.No.422/2024) & I.A.No.258/2025 seeking to condone the delay in filing I.A.No.257/2025 were filed. These applications were taken up for consideration together and by order dated 07.01.2026, the tribunal took a lenient view and imposed an exemplary cost of Rs.1,00,000/- on the appellant/respondent herein to be paid to the respondent/appellant herein. The respondent/appellant before the tribunal complied with the aforesaid direction, but then the appellant herein did not accept the above cost. Subsequently, the matter was posted to 11.02.2026, and thereafter to 04.03.2026. The tribunal finding that the appellant herein did not appear before the tribunal on 04.03.2026, proceeded to allow the appeal and remanded the matter back to the Adjudicating Officer for a fresh consideration of the complaint. The order passed in the appeal along with the order passed in the interlocutory applications are challenged in these appeals. 3. Heard, Adv.C.S.Manu – learned counsel appearing for the appellant in these appeal. The order passed in the appeal along with the order passed in the interlocutory applications are challenged in these appeals. 3. Heard, Adv.C.S.Manu – learned counsel appearing for the appellant in these appeal. 4. Adv.C.S.Manu - learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the tribunal erred egregiously in allowing the application for restoration. Even if the tribunal was inclined to allow the application for restoration, necessarily the appellant herein should have been put on notice and thereafter, the appeal should have been considered on merits. He further pointed out that, once an application is dismissed for default by the tribunal, there is no power to the tribunal to restore the said application unless otherwise specifically conferred with the power. In support of his contention, he relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajeev Hitendra Pathak & Ors. v. Achyut Kashinath Karekar & Anr. 2011 (9) SCC 541 . According to the learned counsel, the divergent views prevailing were set at right by the Supreme Court and it was held that, in the case of a complaint ordered exparte, the District Forums and State Consumer Commissions does not have the power to review the said order or recall the order passed. The learned counsel drew parallels to the powers of the Consumer Redressal Forum conferred under the Consumer Protection Act with that of the powers conferred upon the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal under the provisions of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 . Therefore, it is submitted that the tribunal erred in allowing the application for restoration, as well as the appeal. 5. I have considered the submissions raised across the Bar and is of the view that no substantial question of law arises for consideration in these appeals for the following reasons: a. True that, an application for condonation of delay was dismissed for default and that an application for restoration of that I.A. was filed with a delay of 401 days. The tribunal in its wisdom has chosen to exercise the discretion and condone the delay in filing the appeal by imposing an exemplory cost of Rs.1 lakh. This Court sees no reason to interfere with the exercise of the discretion by the tribunal. It does not appear to this Court that the said order is vitiated by any perversity. The tribunal in its wisdom has chosen to exercise the discretion and condone the delay in filing the appeal by imposing an exemplory cost of Rs.1 lakh. This Court sees no reason to interfere with the exercise of the discretion by the tribunal. It does not appear to this Court that the said order is vitiated by any perversity. b. The failure on the part of the appellant to challenge the said order on time is also a factor which should be taken note by this Court. Pertinently, order on the interlocutory applications were passed on 07.01.2026 and the matter was posted before the tribunal on 11.02.2026 and thereafter, to 04.03.2026. If the appellant had any cause to be agitated against the order passed on interlocutory applications, necessarily he should have questioned it at the appropriate time and not after the final orders are passed in the appeal. c. The reason stated before this Court that the appellant could not obtain the certified copy of the order passed in the interlocutory applications also does not appear to be genuine. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the order passed on the interlocutory applications at this point of time. d. As regards the final order passed on 04.03.2026 in the appeal, it is clear that the tribunal had allowed the appeal in the absence of the appellant. As a matter of fact, if the appellant was prevented for sufficient reasons from appearing before the tribunal on 04.03.2026, he could have very well brought to the notice of the tribunal by invoking the power of review under Section 53 (4)(e) of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 . Instead of that, the appellant has directly approached this Court, which is impermissible. e. The tribunal in effect had only remanded the matter back to the Adjudicating Officer for a fresh consideration of the complaint allowing the parties to adduce fresh evidence. The prejudice caused to the appellant is not shown before this Court. As a matter of fact, if the appellant has sustained any prejudice because of the orders passed by the tribunal, it was perfectly open for him to move the tribunal under Section 53 (4) (e) by an approriate review application. In the above circumstances, M.S.A.Nos.9/2026 and 11/2026 are found to be without any merit and accordingly, the same are dismissed. As a matter of fact, if the appellant has sustained any prejudice because of the orders passed by the tribunal, it was perfectly open for him to move the tribunal under Section 53 (4) (e) by an approriate review application. In the above circumstances, M.S.A.Nos.9/2026 and 11/2026 are found to be without any merit and accordingly, the same are dismissed. As far as M.S.A.No.12/2026 is concerned, this Court sees no reasons to interfere with the order passed by the tribunal on 04.03.2026 in exercise of its second appellate jurisdiction. If the appellant had sufficient reason not to appear before the tribunal on the date on which the appeal was disposed of, it is open for him to move the tribunal with an approriate application for review. Accordingly, M.S.A No.12/2026 is also dismissed, subject to the liberty granted to the appellant to move an appropriate application for review before the tribunal. If such an application is filed and if the same is within time, the tribunal is free to dispose of the same, in accordance with law. The time taken for prosecuting these appeals will stand excluded, provided the review application is filed within one week from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment. If the said review application is filed, the same shall be considered untrammelled by any of the observations made in this judgment.