1 CGHC010115402022 2026:CGHC:34808 NAFR HIGH COURT of CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 2380 of 2022 Sakha Ram Shande S/o Shri Sewak Ram Shande Aged About 41 Years Executive Enginner Presently Posted At In The office Chief Engineering Center (Cet) Raipur, Caste- Schedule Cast R/o Village Bundela, District- Janjgir- Champa Chhattisgarh. 495556. ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department of Energy, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2 - General Manager Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd. Raipur Chhattisgarh. 492001. 3 - Executive Director (Department Inquiry) Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd. Raipur Chhattisgarh. 492001. 4 - Chief Vigilance officer C. S. P. D. C. L. Registered office, Daganiya, Raipur Chhattisgarh. 492001. 5 - Superintended Engineer C. S. P. D. C. L. Kanker Chhattisgarh. 494334. 6 - Executive Engineer C. S. P. D. C. L. Kanker Chhattisgarh. 494334. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Akhilesh Mishra, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Anil S. Pandey, Government Advocate For Respondents No.2-6: Mr. Varun Sharma, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 07/08/2026 1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief:- Digitally signed by NADIM MOHLE 2 “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the writ petition and direction to the respondent concern to re inquiry the matter by competent persons. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct to the appellate authority that there has no loss to CSPDCL therefore the major punishment impose to the petitioner should be put out 10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records relating to the matter. 10.4 Any other relief/relief's which may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be allowed.” 2. Facts, in brief, are that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Assistant Engineer in the year 2007 under respondent No. 2, thereafter he worked at various places in Chhattisgarh. In the year 2015, he was promoted to the post of Executive Engineer. While he was working in the office of the Chief Engineer, Training Center, Raipur, complaint was made by the President of the Janta Union Workers of CSPDCL, on 22.01.2015 alleging irregular payment to contractors for shifting electric meters. An article of charge was served upon the petitioner on 06.09.2017. A departmental inquiry was initiated and, after its conclusion, the major penalty of stoppage of two annual increments with cumulative effect was imposed by respondent No. 2 on 05.04.2021. A departmental appeal was preferred, which was dismissed vide order dated 08.02.2022. 3. Perusal of the pleadings made in the writ petition would make it clear that the petitioner has not challenged the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority or the order passed by the Appellate Authority. However, during the course of arguments, the petitioner challenged said orders. 3 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would argue that the statements of witnesses were not recorded properly in writing. He would further submit that the physical inquiry conducted by the respondent authorities appears to be doubtful, as they inspected and checked about 40 premises within a span of 4-5hours. The distance of Antagarh is about 80 kms from Kanker, therefore, it was not possible for officials to inspect 40 premises in such short span. It is also argued that the statements of the witnesses were not considered properly. He has placed reliance upon the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank1, Union of India v. H.C. Goel2, & Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance co. Ltd.3 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would oppose the submission made by counsel for the petitioner. 6. Mr. Varun Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No.2 to 6 would submit that a show-cause notice along with the article of charge was duly served upon the petitioner on 27.02.2016, wherein allegations of negligence in issuing work orders, authorizing meter- shifting work without ensuring completion of the work, and authorizing payment for incomplete work by treating it as completed were levelled against him. He would further submit that the petitioner was granted one month’s time to file his reply to the show-cause notice and subsequently he filed his reply on 07.05.2016, wherein he admitted his mistake and sought leniency, stating that it was his first lapse and he would not clear any bill in future without physical verification. He would argue that Inquiry officer and Presenting officer were duly appointed and the petitioner participated in the departmental inquiry and he was afforded sufficient opportunity of hearing. He would further argue that 1 (2009) 2 SCC 570 2 AIR 1964 SC 364 3 (2006) 4 SCC 713 4 the petitioner has not challenged the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and affirmed by the Appellate Authority on the ground of lack of competence or violation of the principles of natural justice; thus, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on file. 8. The order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the subsequent order passed by the Appellate Authority make it clear that there were irregularities in meter shifting and bills were generated prior to completion of the work. A show-cause notice was served upon the petitioner along with supporting documents, and a detailed reply was filed by him wherein he admitted his mistake. 9. There is no allegation in the writ petition that the Inquiry officer or the Presenting officer was not appointed. 10. From perusal of the documents it is apparent that Mr. K.S. Chandravanshi, then the Assistant Engineer was examined by the Presenting officer and cross-examined by the petitioner. 11. L. N. Kanwar, then the Assistant Engineer was also examined by the Presenting officer and cross-examined by the petitioner. This witness stated that the report regarding meter shifting submitted by the petitioner was fabricated. 12. Mr. Aditya Kumar Thakur was examined by the Presenting officer on 09.02.2019 and was cross-examined by the petitioner. He also supported the case of the department. 13. Likewise, witnesses namely N. K. Poyam, then the Executive Engineer; Mukesh Kumar Lahre, Junior Enginer, Ms. Gayatri Gavde, then the Junior Engineer; Chandra Kumar Baghel, then the Junior Engineer (Trainy), Ashwani Gopawar, then the Executive Engineer, Kanker, supported the case of the department. 5 14. The inquiry report was prepared by the Inquiry officer and submitted before the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority concurred with the findings of the Inquiry officer. The Appellate Authority also concurred with the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority and affirmed the penalty of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect. The order passed by the Disciplinary Authority has thus been affirmed by the Appellate Authority. 15. In the matter of Roop Singh Negi (supra), the Supreme Court set aside the orders on the ground that the orders passed by the disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority were not supported by reasons. The relevant paragraph 17 was reproduced as under:- “17. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the Criminal Court on the basis of self-same evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the Enquiry officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof.“ 16. In the present case, the authorities concerned have assigned sufficient reasons while inflicting the penalty of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect. Therefore, the petitioner does not derive any benefit from the said judgment. 6 17. In the matter of H.C. Goyal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot examine the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular finding. In the said case, the third charge framed against the employee was proved based on no evidence. The relevant paragraph 23 is reproduced as under:- “23.That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charge framed against the respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney-General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by he appellant is a reasonably possible view, this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondent's case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that charge No. 3 was proved against him? In exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which dealt with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent's grievance is well-founded because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit in the appellant's order dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence.” 7 18. In the present case, no such plea has been taken, and it is not a case of no evidence. Rather, sufficient documentary and oral evidence have been led to prove the misconduct of the petitioner. 19. In the matter of Narinder Mohan Arya (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where the inquiry report is based on no evidence and the order is passed without application of mind, interference is warranted. However, in the present case, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority failed to apply their minds or that their findings are unsupported by evidence. 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Others Versus P. Gunasekaran4 while dealing with the scope of interference in service matters held as under :- “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings. the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings: (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case: (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations 4 . (2015) 2 SCC 610 8 (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 21. In one of the earliest decisions in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao. many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus: (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7) "7.... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution as a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the 9 departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution." 22. Likewise, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Others Versus Datta Linga Toshatwad5 held that penalty inflicted in a departmental inquiry can be interfered by the High Court while exercising power under Article 226 of Constitution of India if the order has been passed by an incompetent authority or if procedure to inflict the penalty has not been followed or if the penalty if disproportionate looking to the misconduct. 23. The scope and power of judicial review of the Courts while dealing with the validity of the quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority was the subject matter of discussion before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India and others vs. S.Vasanthi [(2014) 9 SCC 315], wherein it was reiterated that the High Court in the exercise of its powers of judicial review cannot assume the role of sitting as a departmental appellate authority as the same is not permissible under law. It shall be apt to reproduce paras 10 and 11 of the judgment which read thus:- "10.The scope and power of judicial review of the courts while dealing with the validity of quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is now well settled. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. J. Hussain (2013) 10 SCC 106, the law on this subject, is recapitulated in the following manner: (SCC pp.110-12, paras 7-10) "7. When the charge is proved, as happened in the instance case, it is the disciplinary authority with whom lies the discretion to decide as to what kind of punishment is to be imposed. of course, this discretion has to be examined objectively keeping in mind the nature and 5(2005) 13 SCC 709 10 gravity of charge. The Disciplinary Authority is to decide a particular penalty specified in the relevant Rules. Host of factors go into the decision making while exercising such a discretion which include, apart from the nature and gravity of misconduct, past conduct, nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of duties assigned to the delinquent, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in department or establishment where he works, as well as extenuating circumstances, if any exist…. 11. We are of the opinion that the High Court transgressed its limits of judicial review by itself assuming the role of sitting as departmental appellate authority, which is not permissible in law. The principles discussed above have been summed up and summarized as follows in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank . v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 ( SCC p.382, , para 19):- "19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry, the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of of disciplinary/ departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent rt authority. 19.3 Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4 Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 11 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co- delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co- delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co- delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable." 24. From the above proposition of law, it is well settled that the High Court in exercise of its powers of judicial review cannot assume the role of sitting as a departmental appellate authority. The limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 25. In the present case, the petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity of hearing. The disciplinary authority, on the basis of the legally admissible evidence and taking into consideration the evidence available on record, inflicted the penalty. Further, the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority have been affirmed by the appellate authority; thus, there are concurrent findings of fact, which cannot be disturbed while exercising powers under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India. 26. Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, no good ground is involved in the present case to interfere with the impugned order, accordingly, the petition is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Rakesh Mohan Pandey Nadim JUDGE