1 CGHC010259552024 2026:CGHC:34332-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 529 of 2024 B.K. Sharma S/o Late Keshrilal Sharma Aged About 57 Years Occupation - Laboratory Technician In The Government Veer Surendra Say Pg College, Gariyaband, District - Gariyaband, R/o Near Purana Forest Naka, Balak High School Road, Gariyaband, Chhattisgarh --- Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - The Secretary, Department Of Higher Education Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, New Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Commissioner Department Of Higher Education Block - C, 3rd Floor, Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar, New Raipur (C.G.) --- Respondents (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Sharad Mishra, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri R avi ndra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.08.19 17:37:26 +0530 2 Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 05/08/2026 1. The writ appellant has filed the instant writ appeal against the order dated 13.06.2024 passed by the learned single judge in WPS No. 1560 of 2019, whereby the learned single judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner, and affirmed the order dated 18.01.2019 (Annexure P-13) passed by the respondent authorities. 2. The case of the petitioner, in substance, is that he was placed under suspension on 22.06.1998 on account of his detention for more than 48 hours and his conviction for offences under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. Subsequently, he was dismissed from service on 31.12.2007 by invoking Rule 19(1) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, solely on the basis of his conviction. However, the said conviction was set aside by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 95/1998 vide judgment dated 24.01.2014, pursuant to which the petitioner was reinstated in service on 09.12.2014. The grievance of the petitioner is that, while reinstating him, the respondents failed to pass any specific order regarding the treatment of the period of suspension and dismissal and the pay and allowances payable for the said period, as mandated under Fundamental Rule 54. According to the petitioner, the competent authority was under a statutory obligation to determine whether the period during which he remained out of service was to be treated as duty and whether he was entitled to full pay and allowances, 3 particularly in view of the fact that his conviction, which formed the sole basis of his dismissal, had subsequently been set aside. 3. The further case of the petitioner is that despite repeated representations seeking consequential benefits, no decision was taken, compelling him to approach this Court in WPS No. 5665/2018. By order dated 30.08.2018, this Court directed the respondents to consider the petitioner's entitlement to all consequential benefits which he would otherwise have received had he not been suspended or dismissed. However, by the impugned order dated 18.01.2019, the respondents rejected his claim by relying upon the principle of “no work, no pay” and by holding that Fundamental Rule 54-A was not applicable. The petitioner contends that the impugned decision is contrary to the statutory scheme of Fundamental Rule 54, the earlier direction issued by this Court and the circumstances in which his dismissal had ceased to exist upon the setting aside of his criminal conviction. It is, therefore, contended that the respondents were required to pass a specific and reasoned order regarding the pay and allowances for the period of suspension/dismissal and the treatment of such period for service purposes, instead of mechanically denying the consequential benefits on the ground of “no work, no pay.” 4. The respondents/State, it its return, have submitted that the petitioner, who was working as Laboratory Technician in Government Veer Surendra Sai P.G. College, Gariyaband, was placed under suspension on 22.06.1998 on account of his detention for more than 48 hours and, prior thereto, had been convicted by the learned 1st Additional 4 Sessions Judge, Jagdalpur, in Sessions Trial No. 335/1993 vide judgment dated 15.04.1998 for the offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the IPC and sentenced to seven years and two years' rigorous imprisonment respectively. Based on the said conviction, his services were terminated vide order dated 31.12.2007 under Rule 19(1) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. It is pleaded that the petitioner had earlier challenged the dismissal in WPS No. 365/2008, which was dismissed for want of prosecution on 10.02.2017. Though the conviction was subsequently set aside by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 95/1998 vide judgment dated 24.01.2014, the petitioner was reinstated vide order dated 09.12.2014, wherein his claim for consequential benefits was not accepted in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109, and the reinstatement order was made subject to the outcome of WPS No. 365/2008. According to the respondents, since the said writ petition was subsequently dismissed on 10.02.2017, the order of reinstatement dated 09.12.2014 no longer survives. It is further submitted that the petitioner, after considerable delay, filed WPS No. 5665/2018 seeking consideration of the period of suspension and dismissal and consequential benefits, which was disposed of on 30.08.2018 directing the respondents to determine the manner in which such period was to be treated in the light of Fundamental Rule 54-A and also to consider his entitlement to consequential benefits. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner submitted his representation dated 12.09.2018, which was duly considered and rejected by the impugned 5 order dated 18.01.2019, inter alia, on the principle of “no work, no pay.” The respondents averred that the petitioner never challenged the order dated 09.12.2014, whereby his claim for consequential benefits was declined, and therefore the present petition suffers from inordinate and unexplained delay and laches; hence, the petition, being belated and devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 5. Having considered the rival submissions and the material available on record, the learned Single Judge held that acquittal in a criminal case does not, by itself, confer an automatic right to full back wages and consequential monetary benefits for the period during which the employee had not worked. In the facts of the present case, since the petitioner had remained in custody in connection with the matrimonial dispute and his suspension and dismissal had resulted from his arrest and conviction, and admittedly he had not rendered any service during the relevant period, payment of full salary and allowances merely on account of his subsequent acquittal would amount to granting a premium for the acts leading to his suspension. Consequently, finding no sufficient ground to interfere with the impugned order dated 18.01.2019, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition as devoid of merit. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the statutory mandate contained in Fundamental Rule 54, which requires the competent authority, upon reinstatement of a dismissed employee, to pass a specific order regarding the pay and allowances for the period of absence, including 6 the period of suspension preceding dismissal, and also to determine whether such period is to be treated as duty. It is argued that the petitioner was dismissed solely on account of his conviction in a criminal case, which was subsequently set aside by this Court, and upon such setting aside he was reinstated in service. Therefore, the respondents could not have mechanically rejected his claim by applying the principle of “no work, no pay” without undertaking the determination contemplated by FR 54. The said principle has no application where the employee was willing and entitled to serve but was kept out of service by an order of dismissal which subsequently ceased to have its foundation upon the conviction being set aside. It is further submitted that the competent authority was required to exercise the statutory power in the manner prescribed by the FR and ought to have considered whether the suspension and dismissal were wholly unjustified and what consequential benefits were admissible to the appellant. 7. It is further argued that the subsequent acquittal of the appellant furnished a ground for reinstatement without examining the consequential effect of setting aside the very conviction which constituted the sole basis of his dismissal. Learned counsel would argued that the earlier order passed by this Court in WPS No. 5665/2018 had specifically directed the respondents to determine the manner in which the period of suspension and dismissal was to be treated and also to consider the consequential benefits which the appellant would otherwise have received had he not been suspended or dismissed; however, instead of undertaking the exercise mandated 7 by the FR, the respondents rejected the claim solely on the basis of “no work, no pay” and on an erroneous premise regarding applicability of FR 54-A. It is also argued that the learned Single Judge ought to have examined whether the statutory exercise required under FR 54 had actually been undertaken and whether the order of the competent authority was consistent with the earlier judicial direction. Mere absence from actual work cannot by itself defeat the appellant's claim where such absence was occasioned by an order of dismissal founded upon a conviction which was subsequently set aside. The impugned order, therefore, is legally unsustainable, and warrants interference in the present writ appeal. In support of his submission, he would rely upon the judgment of Raj Narain v. Union of India, (2019) 5 SCC 809. 8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State would oppose the arguments of the writ appellant and submit that the learned Single Judge has rightly declined interference with the impugned order dated 18.01.2019, which was passed after due consideration of the appellant's representation in compliance with the order dated 30.08.2018 passed in WPS No. 5665/2018. It is argued that the appellant was suspended and thereafter dismissed on account of his conviction for offences under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and, admittedly, he did not render any service during the period in question; therefore, subsequent setting aside of the conviction did not confer upon him an automatic or indefeasible right to full salary and consequential monetary benefits. The State counsel would further submit that the appellant had already been reinstated vide order dated 8 09.12.2014, wherein his claim for consequential benefits had been considered, and he did not challenge the said order at the relevant time; hence, the claim raised after several years suffers from delay and laches. Relying upon K.V. Jankiraman (supra) and the principles reiterated in Santosh Kumar Bhaskar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2021 SCC OnLine Chh 477, it would be argued that reinstatement following acquittal does not, by itself, entitle an employee to full back wages as a matter of right and the competent authority has discretion to determine the pay and allowances for the intervening period depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. It is, therefore, submitted that the learned Single Judge, having considered the applicable Fundamental Rules and the fact that the appellant had remained out of service and had not worked during the relevant period, rightly applied the principle of “no work, no pay” and dismissed the writ petition, and no ground for interference in the intra-court appeal is made out. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through their respective pleadings and material placed in the writ appeal as well as the writ petition. 10. The undisputed factual position in the case is that the appellant was placed under suspension consequent upon his detention in connection with the criminal case, was thereafter convicted for offences under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the IPC and, on the strength of such conviction, was dismissed from service under Rule 19(1) of the applicable Rules. His conviction was subsequently set aside by this 9 Court in Criminal Appeal No.95/1998 and, consequently, he was reinstated in service. The controversy in the present appeal, however, is not as to the appellant's reinstatement but is confined to his claim for salary and other consequential monetary benefits for the period during which he remained under suspension and thereafter out of service pursuant to his dismissal. In our considered view, mere setting aside of the conviction does not, in the facts of the present case, automatically entitle the appellant to full back wages. The appellant was not kept out of service pursuant to an independent departmental proceeding which was subsequently found illegal or unsustainable; rather, his dismissal was founded upon his conviction by the competent criminal Court, and the respondents were statutorily justified in taking action on the basis of such conviction. The subsequent acquittal may obliterate the conviction for the purpose of his continued service, but it does not retrospectively render the action of the employer in keeping him out of service unlawful or unjustified. 11. Fundamental Rule 54 indeed requires the competent authority, upon reinstatement, to consider and make a specific order regarding the pay and allowances for the period of absence and also as to whether such period shall be treated as duty. However, the said provision does not create an absolute right in favour of the employee to receive full pay and allowances merely because he has been reinstated after acquittal. The competent authority is required to determine the consequences in accordance with the applicable Rules and the facts of the case. In the present matter, the respondents considered the appellant's representation pursuant to the order dated 30.08.2018 passed in WPS 10 No. 5665/2018 and rejected the claim by applying the principle of “no work, no pay”. The learned Single Judge, after noticing the applicable legal position, has also found that the appellant had remained in custody in connection with the criminal case and that his suspension and dismissal were consequent upon his arrest and conviction. In such circumstances, the appellant cannot claim full salary as a matter of right merely because his conviction was subsequently set aside. 12. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant upon Raj Narain (supra), in our opinion, does not advance his case. In Raj Narain (supra), the employee had initially been placed under suspension in contemplation of departmental proceedings; the departmental proceedings were subsequently dropped, yet the suspension was continued for a considerably long period and was revoked only thereafter. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, therefore, found that the employee was entitled to full wages for the period during which the suspension continued despite there being no subsisting departmental proceeding justifying his continued exclusion from service. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also distinguished the position of an employee facing criminal proceedings and held that subsequent acquittal would not, by itself, entitle such employee to back wages, except where the prosecution was shown to be malicious or vexatious. The factual foundation on which Raj Narain (supra) was decided is thus materially different from the present case. Here, there was an actual conviction by the criminal Court, followed by dismissal under Rule 19(1), and there is no finding or even allegation that the criminal prosecution was instituted by the respondents maliciously, 11 vexatiously or with an ulterior motive. The appellant's suspension and dismissal were consequences of his detention and conviction and not of any unlawful or mala fide action of the respondents. Consequently, the principle applied in Raj Narain (supra) cannot be extended to the appellant's case so as to confer an automatic right to back wages. 13. On the contrary, the facts of the present case are substantially governed by the principle reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Corp. Mithilesh Kumar alias Mithilesh Singh v. Union of India, (2020) 12 SCC 423. In that case also, the employee was convicted by the criminal Court, removed from service on account of such conviction and subsequently reinstated after the conviction was set aside in appeal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, following Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, 1996 (11) SCC 603, and Union of India v. Jaipal Singh 2004 (1) SCC 121, reiterated that where an employee is convicted in a criminal case and is consequently kept out of service, his subsequent acquittal does not, by itself, entitle him to back wages, since the employer cannot be faulted for having acted upon the conviction and could not avail the services of the employee during the relevant period. The present case stands on the same footing. The appellant was admittedly not in a position to render service during the relevant period, and his exclusion from service was occasioned by the criminal proceedings, his conviction and the consequential order of dismissal. There is no material on record to establish that the respondents were responsible for the criminal prosecution or that the prosecution was actuated by mala fide or vexatious considerations. Thus, the 12 subsequent setting aside of the conviction cannot retrospectively convert the appellant's absence from service into a period for which full salary must necessarily be paid. 14. We, therefore, find no perversity or jurisdictional error in the view taken by the learned Single Judge warranting interference in the intra-court appeal. Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice